Preventing ‘Unsound Minds’ From Populating the British World: Australasian Immigration Control & Mental Illness 1830s—1920s by Kain, Jennifer S.
  
    
 
 
Preventing ‘Unsound Minds’ From 
Populating the British World 
Australasian Immigration Control & 
Mental Illness 1830s —1920s 
 
Jennifer S. Kain 
 
 
 
PhD 
 
 May 2015 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
Preventing ‘Unsound Minds’ From 
Populating the British World 
Australasian Immigration Control & Mental 
Illness 1830s —1920s 
 
Jennifer S. Kain 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment  
of the requirements of the 
 University of Northumbria at Newcastle  
for the degree of 
 Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Research undertaken in the 
Faculty of Arts, Design and Social Sciences 
  
May 2015 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the bureaucratic controls designed to restrict the entry of migrants 
perceived to be ‘mentally ill’ into New Zealand and Australia in the period between the 
1830s and 1920s. It is the first study to analyse the evolution of these practices in this 
region and timeframe. It addresses a gap in the current literature because it explores the 
tensions that emerged when officials tried to implement government policy. This study 
sheds new light on the actions, motivations and ideologies of the British and 
Australasian officials who were responsible for managing and policing immigration. 
While there were attempts to coordinate the work of border officials, this proved very 
difficult to achieve in practice: some immigration controllers were, for instance, 
receptive to the theories that were coming out of international debates about border 
control, others retained a parochial perspective. The thesis argues that every attempt to 
systematise border management failed. The regulation of the broad spectrum of ‘mental 
illness’ was a messy affair: officials struggled with ill-defined terminology and a lack of 
practical instructions so tensions and misunderstandings existed across local, national 
and metropolitan levels.  Based on extensive research in British, New Zealand and 
Australian archives, this study reveals the barriers that were created to prevent those 
deemed ‘mentally ill’ from migrating to regions imagined as ‘Greater Britain’. It shows 
how judgements about an individual’s state of mind were made in a number of locales: 
in Britain; on the voyage itself; and at the Australasian borders. This thesis, by 
exploring the disordered nature of immigration control, will add a new perspective to 
the existing scholarship on transnational immigration legislation and Australasian 
asylum studies. The in-depth examination of border control systems also contributes to 
our understanding of the links between migration and illness in the British world during 
this period. 
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Introduction: Migration, Mental Illness and the British 
World 1830s—1920s 
 
This thesis examines the mechanisms used in the British world which were designed to 
prevent the migration of those perceived to be mentally diseased or disabled. During the 
period surveyed - the 1830s through to the 1920s - Australasian administrators 
persistently complained that they were burdened with so-called imported lunatics from 
Britain. Medical historians have, in part, agreed with this claim. Some migrants 
admitted to asylums in the Australian colonies had indeed been institutionalised in 
Britain.
1
 Scholars however have not yet considered how these people were able to 
migrate. This thesis addresses this discrepancy by examining the Australasian border 
controls in terms of its legislation, practices and outcomes. This study displays how, 
despite the evolution in terminology and procedures, administrators would ultimately 
fail in preventing the ‘mentally ill’, particularly the borderline cases, from entering New 
Zealand and Australia. By using case studies, and official returns, this thesis exposes 
how, despite the strongly worded legislation, the number prevented from leaving 
Britain, or identified at Australasian borders, was minimal. This complicates the view 
expressed by some politicians and asylum officials that their regions were being 
inundated with ‘imported incurable lunatics’.2 Furthermore, some were allowed in 
through bonding and exemption provisions. This thesis examines these contradictions. 
 Through scrutinising the role and motivations of the policy makers, migrant 
recruiters and border controllers, this study will examine the policy and practice 
involved. While in theory the ‘lunatic’, ‘idiotic’ or ‘insane’ were excluded from the 
                                                 
1
 Angela McCarthy, ‘Migration and Madness in New Zealand’s Asylums, 1863-1910’ in Angela 
McCarthy & Catharine Coleborne eds. Migration, Ethnicity, and Mental Health: International 
Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 58-60. 
2
 A phrase used by, for example, Dunedin hospital and asylum superintendent Edward Hulme in 1861. 
NZNA: AAAC D500 707 Box 135a/524  E Hulme to Superintendent, reporting admission of two 
incurable patients from the ‘Storm Cloud’. 
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Australasian outposts of the British world, in practice these conditions were too 
complex to police effectively. Throughout each period considered, migration 
administrators faced the same challenge. At the root of the problem was the transience 
of some forms of mental disease which led one key New Zealand official to argue that 
most ‘appeared perfectly sane before they left England’.3  
 This study is the first one of its kind to examine the mechanics of Australasian 
migration control to this level of operational detail. It both provides the overarching 
picture and finer detail required to understand British world border control. Thus far 
historians have concentrated on specific parts of this story in isolation such as 
immigration restriction ideologies, border controls and asylum practices. This thesis 
brings these approaches together. In doing so, it contributes to our understanding of how 
officials in the broader British world interacted within the framework of national and 
local border controls. Restricting the movement of those perceived to be mentally ill 
relied on British administrators or colonial representatives based in the metropole. As 
such, regulating migration involved a network of officials, operating out of distinct 
locales, and from different motivations. A rural British doctor’s assertion that an 
emigrant was ‘sane’ enough to travel, by providing their medical reference, could be 
challenged by any number of colonial officials, whether a port health official, asylum 
superintendent, or an administrator from the Ministry of Immigration.  
 This thesis highlights the extent of these tensions. It exposes how beneath an 
international framework of immigration legislation, the actual operations were ill-
defined, subjective and very messy. This new analysis adds to the scholarship of British 
world networks by considering the practices and locations of immigration control. It 
responds to a recent critique of how scholars have not properly considered how local 
                                                 
3
 Dr Isaac Featherston, New Zealand Agent General between 1871 and 1876. AJHR, 1875, Session I, 
Section D-02, ‘Immigration to New Zealand, Letters from the Agent General’, Enclosure No.123, p. 83. 
 3 
 
conditions, or in this case, local operations, complicated British world networks.
4
 By 
using this broad approach this thesis examines the real and imagined limitations of those 
deemed too mentally ill to enter New Zealand and Australia. It engages with the current 
trend of considering the onset of mental illness in relation to the act of migration itself, 
to show how this link was recognised contemporarily, not just by asylum officials but 
by border controllers.
5
 This thesis crucially challenges existing understanding in other 
historical themes. It shows that official repatriation of the ‘mentally ill’ occurred 
alongside the informal provisions for return migration. Furthermore, it exposes how the 
understanding of the so-called early twentieth- century eugenic phase of immigration 
control needs to be countered with the extent of exemptions involved. As such, this 
thesis segues between geographical areas, theories and operations. In order to define the 
scale of this study, this introduction is divided into four sections: ‘Scope and 
Terminology,’ ‘Key Historiography,’ ‘Sources and Methodology’ and ‘Aims and 
Structure’.   
Scope and Terminology 
 
Timeframe 
 
It is necessary here to explain the focus, in terms of the timeframe - 1830s to 1920s - 
and geographical regions - New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia - of this 
study. While immigration restrictions based on health clauses began in the colony of 
Victoria in the 1850s, levels of migration control across the whole region came into 
operation twenty years earlier. Systematic emigration - the recruiting and sending of 
migrants from Britain to Australia - began in the 1830s. This decade represented the 
start of British reforms which resulted from colonial complaints that emigration was 
                                                 
4
 Tamson Pietsch, ‘Rethinking the British World’, Journal of British Studies, 52:2 (April 2013) pp. 441- 
463. 
5
 Most notably in Catherine Cox & Hilary Marland eds. Migration, Health and Ethnicity in the Modern 
World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 4 
 
used as a way of relieving British pauperism.
6
 Thus began the attempts to scrutinise the 
health and character of intending emigrants.
7
 It was within these selection criteria that 
the requirement of being of ‘sound mind’ emerged.8 Over the remainder of the 
nineteenth century the Australasian colonies took greater control over migrant 
recruitment and restriction. By the turn of the twentieth century, in addition to race-
based exclusions, all of the Australasian colonies sought to protect their borders from 
those perceived to be undesirable including the ‘idiots’ and ‘insane’. However, 
considering these nineteenth century operations in isolation would exclude some 
important research findings. It was not until the 1910s that attempts were made to 
streamline terminology and processes, the full implementation of which was delayed 
into the 1920s, made possible by the empire settlement ideologies. As such, in order to 
provide an effective assessment of the evolution of border control from the start of 
systematic emigration to the so-called eugenic phase of the early twentieth century, the 
timeframe 1830s to 1920s is necessary. 
Regions 
 
To provide an effective appraisal of this period, specific Australasian regions have been 
selected.  This study focusses on New Zealand between 1860 and the 1920s, and the 
Commonwealth of Australia between 1901 and the 1920s. Because these operations 
continued from the earlier colonial practices, some mention is given to these areas 
outside this time frame. The Australian colonies prior to federation in 1901 do receive 
some attention because of the alignment between the operations of immigration control 
in these areas. Within the wider attempts at populating the geopolitical region of 
Australasia, ideals about mental and physical suitability were uniform. As such, when 
                                                 
6
 Marjory Harper, ‘British Migration and the Peopling of Empire’ in Porter ed. The Nineteenth Century, p. 
78. 
7
 Robin Haines, ‘Indigent Misfits or Shrewd Operators? Government-assisted Emigrants from the United 
Kingdom to Australia, 1831-1860’, Population Studies, 48:2 (1994), p. 246. 
8
 Alison Bashford, ‘Insanity and Immigration Restriction’, in Cox & Marland eds. Migration, Health and 
Ethnicity in the Modern World, p. 16. 
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British-based or managed operations are discussed, especially in Chapters One and 
Two, they should be seen as relevant to all of the Australasian regions which developed 
as settlement colonies. In order to avoid too broad a generalisation, the colonial 
practices of New Zealand receive specific attention. This case study enables us to track 
the evolution of immigration control against New Zealand’s development as a nation 
state. This approach shows how, from the nineteenth century into the twentieth, the 
translation of migration policy into practice was badly managed. This inconsistency was 
also true of Australia’s 1901 so-called ‘White Australia Policy.’ Unlike New Zealand’s 
evolving and reactive legislation, Australia sought to incorporate immigration control 
into their formation as a nation. Yet, although federation was meant to unify state 
immigration control, again we find disjuncture between political ideals and operational 
realities. Comparing the early twentieth-century operations of the then-dominions of 
New Zealand and Australia provides an interesting dichotomy. Australian 
administrators incorporated medical methods and theories into border operations. As 
such, they moved ahead of their New Zealand counterparts. This transformation 
involved refocusing on their British-based operations, and advocating them as ‘best-
practice’ for their fellow dominions.  
‘British World’ 
 
Despite some differences in their practices, the extent of alignment between these 
regions justifies the use of the term British world in the thesis’ title. This label is given 
to the so-called ‘Third British Empire’ of Canada, Australia and New Zealand; the white 
settlement colonies created through mass voluntary migration.
9
 Historians have been 
considering the geographical limits of the British world since the 1970s, although the 
inclusion of the Australasian regions within it has not been disputed.
10
 And yet, not all 
                                                 
9
 Carl Bridge & Kent Fedorowich, ‘Mapping the British World’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 31:2 (2003), pp. 3-5. 
10
 Most famously triggered by J.G.A. Pococks’1974 plea for a ‘new British history’ to include the 
consideration of the dominion settler colonies. See Phillip Buckner & R. Douglas Francis, ‘Introduction’ 
 6 
 
of the British world’s boundaries have been so neatly deliniated. This thesis has been 
informed by Adele Perry’s assertion that the British world was ‘imagined in spatial and 
temporal terms’ and Hilary Carey’s definition of it as ‘a set of ideas, as much as a set of 
territories’.11 This malleability of borders may have worked for the politicians, 
intellectuals and professionals who, like Joe Hardwick’s Anglican clerics, moved 
around the British world seeking to replicate and modify British laws and customs.
12
 
Yet, while Australasian policy makers were informed by wider British world practices, 
British migrants were not guaranteed entry to these regions. They first had to prove 
themselves physically, mentally and morally healthy.  
We also find that, despite the best attempts by administrators to create common 
practices, the prevailing local border operations stymied British world uniformity. 
While moneyed professionals and intellectuals were able to move between the English-
speaking regions with ease, others - the labouring classes - had to show that they would 
be self-supporting. As such, there are two levels of networks to consider here; the 
intellectual theories, and the practical operations.  
The influence of immigration legislation and operations from other parts of the 
British-dominated intellectual world is also apparent. The inclusion of the United States 
in the concept of the British world has been made by nineteenth century contempories 
and modern-day historians.  James Belich terms this region the ‘Anglo-sphere,’ 
reflecting Sir Charles Dilke’s 1868 definition of it as a ‘Greater Britain’.13 While this 
thesis focusses on the networks between Britain and Australasia, it is impossible to 
                                                                                                                                               
in Buckner, Phillip & R. Douglas Francis eds. Rediscovering the British World (Calgary: Calgary 
University Press, 2005), p. 12.   
11
 Adele Perry, ‘Whose World was British? Rethinking the ‘British World’ from an Edge of Empire’, in 
Darian-Smith, Kate Patricia Grimshaw & Stuart Macintyre eds., Britishness Abroad: Transnational 
Movements and Imperial Cultures (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007), pp. 133-152; Hilary 
M. Carey, God’s Empire: Religion and Colonialism in the British World (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2011), p. 3. 
12
 Joseph Hardwick, An Anglican British World: The Church of England and the Expansion of the Settler 
Empire, c.1790-1860 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), p. 3. 
13
 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783 – 
1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 50.  
 7 
 
ignore the United States’ influence across policy and practice. This is because at each 
stage of immigration restriction legislation discussed the North American practices, that 
of the United States and Canada, were held up as the ideal. By the early twentieth 
century this influence was made explicit in the Australian practices of medical selection. 
They were designed by a medical administrator who had researched the North American 
operations, many of which he replicated in his instructions. 
 
‘Mental Illness’ 
  
The use of the terms unsound mind and mental illness in the title of this thesis also need 
clarification. This study includes contemporary terminology relating to mental illness 
and disability which is offensive compared to modern day sensibilities. It is necessary 
here to explain that the use of this umbrella term is intentional. As will be made 
apparent, the language employed by migration administrators did not match that of the 
legislation. As such, it is necessary to group the wide array of labels under one phrase, a 
simplification which is acknowledged as problematic.  
A number of points need to be made when considering archaic ideas of mental 
illness and disability. From the vast scholarship on the evolution of its terminology and 
treatment of mental illness and disease, David Wright offers the best summary.
14
 The 
Victorians, he explains, made the following distinctions; ‘lunatics’ had a mind and lost 
it, ‘idiots’ never had a mind at all. Such ideas were legitimised through the 1845 Lunacy 
Act which applied to England and Wales and proscribed ‘idiots, lunatics and persons of 
unsound mind’ as non-compos mentis. This latter phrase, the literal translation of which 
is not of sound, or sane mind, was a medical and legal term covering those who were 
                                                 
14
 From Roy Porter’s considerable work see A Social History of Madness: Stories of the Insane (London: 
Phoenix, 1996), particularly Chapter 1, and Madness: A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002); Chapters 1 and 2 of Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the 
Age of Prozac (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997) provide a good historical framework, as does 
Andrew Scull’s ‘The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era’ in Andrew Scull ed. Madhouses, 
Mad-Doctors, and Madness: The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), pp. 5-32.  
 8 
 
not capable of conducting their own affairs.
15
 In the legal sense this Act defined each 
type as follows. ‘Idiots’ had an infirmity from birth and so were unable to direct 
themselves; ‘lunatics’ veered between having a sound memory and being non compos 
mentis; and those of unsound mind, being neither ‘idiot or lunatic or merely of weak 
mind,’ were incapable of managing their own affairs because of their ‘morbid condition 
of intellect’.16  
These British descriptions were transferred to the Australasian colonies. There 
the term lunacy was employed in legal provisions, although like in Britain, was 
interchangeable with insanity in both professional and non-professional settings.
17
 Over 
the course of the nineteenth century mental illness and disabilities were increasingly 
categorised into levels of severity and transmissibility. The so-called developmentally 
delayed, including ‘imbeciles,’ were distinguished from those who lost their mental 
reasoning temporarily - the ‘lunatics’ or ‘insane’.18 The condition epilepsy - now known 
to be a neurological disorder - was also perceived to be a degenerate mental disorder.
19
 
As such, this thesis includes epilepsy under the broad umbrella term mental illness. This 
corresponds to how it was considered within the immigration policies examined. By the 
early twentieth century epilepsy was listed alongside ‘feebleminded’ and ‘imbecility’ 
within what will be referred to as the ‘mental health clause’. 
This thesis argues that within this increasingly broad sphere, it was immigrants 
deemed to ‘inhabit the borderline of imbecility’ who were perceived to be the greatest 
threat.
20
 The evolution of this broad category was, Mark Jackson asserts, complex, but 
overlapped with the idea of ‘feebleminded.’ Appearing ‘normal’ but neither ‘sane’ nor 
                                                 
15
 David Wright, Mental Disability in Victorian England: The Earlswood Asylum 1847-1901 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 9-10.  
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Angela Hawk, ‘Going ‘Mad’ in Gold Country: Migrant Populations and the Problem of Containment in 
Pacific Mining Boom Regions’, Pacific Historical Review, 80:1 (2011), pp. 64-96. 
18
 Ian Dowbiggin, The Quest for Mental Health: A Tale of Science, Medicine, Scandal, Sorrow and Mass 
Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 105. 
19
 Shorter, A History of Psychiatry, pp. 86-87. 
20
 Mark Jackson, The Borderland of Imbecility: Medicine, Society and the Fabrication of the Feeble Mind 
in Late Victorian and Edwardian England (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 28-29. 
 9 
 
‘insane,’ this term was used to denote a form of ‘mental deficiency’ covering an array of 
‘congenital ineptitudes’.21 Most of the outmoded classifications just described; idiocy, 
lunacy, insanity, imbecility and feeblemindedness, were incorporated into immigration 
restrictions. This study examines the purpose behind the inclusion of these terms in the 
legislation. It also shows that these labels were used inconsistently by border 
administrators. Accordingly the use of the phrase unsound mind in this study 
encapsulates a wide scope of mental illness and mental disability; those displaying 
‘unhinged’ or ‘dysfunctional’ behaviour, ‘defective’ minds, and those who fell in 
between. 
In order to treat this type of labelling sensitively, migrants’ full names are used 
sparingly where possible. These details have already been cleared for public usage by 
the archive repositories themselves. There are a number of other terms which need 
clarifying. First the distinction between migrant, emigrant and immigrant may appear 
inconsistent. Unless directly quoted from the primary source, emigrant is used when 
discussing British procedure, and immigrant in the colonial or dominion setting.  If not 
so clearly framed, migrant is used. Second, the descriptor dominion replaces colony in 
the latter part of this thesis, unless when quoted from a primary source.
22
 The term 
British is most commonly used to denote nationality following the example of the 
border controllers. While asylum historians have considered regional distinctions at 
length, the main actors discussed in this thesis, the port officials and politicians, rarely 
differentiated between British migrants’ local origins.23 
                                                 
21
 Ibid, pp.1-2.  
22
 The Commonwealth of Australia was granted dominion status in 1901 to coincide with federation, New 
Zealand in 1907. 
23
 There is a vast and assured historiography dealing with diaspora, identity and asylum. In McCarthy & 
Coleborne eds. Migration, Ethnicity and Mental Health see: Elizabeth Malcolm, ‘Mental Health and 
Migration: The Case of the Irish, 1850s-1990s’, pp. 15-38; McCarthy ‘Migration and Madness in New 
Zealand’s Asylums’, especially pp. 56-58; and Catharine Coleborne, ‘Locating Ethnicity in the Hospitals 
for the Insane: Revisiting Case Books as Sites of Knowledge Production about Colonial Identities in 
Victoria, Australia 1873-1910’, pp. 73-90. 
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The use of the term deportation requires particular explanation. This study 
employs it to describe ‘an act of a state and underpinned by its resources, to send 
someone from its territory’.24 This action was legalised by both New Zealand and the 
Commonwealth of Australia at the turn of the twentieth century, although other forms 
of more informal repatriation occurred prior to this. For the majority of this thesis, 
deportation is considered as taking place either from Australasian borders, or from the 
institutions in which immigrants were placed on arrival. However, some attention is 
given to the results, but not the operations of the 1920 Australian Act which legalised 
the deportation of those institutionalised within three years of arrival.
25
 Those dealt with 
in this study were deported within a smaller time frame under a separate prohibited 
immigrant clause. As such, apart from two ‘epileptic cases’ who were returned after a 
period of living and working in New Zealand, this study considers the actions taken 
against those who were deemed undesirable upon their arrival.  
Key Historiography 
 
 
The prohibited immigrant health clauses which sought to exclude the biologically, 
mentally or morally unhygienic Britons have not been ignored by historians. Alison 
Bashford has consistently framed these restrictions as ‘medico-legal’ controls used by 
governments to manage the character and health of colonial populations.
26
 She has 
associated these legal mechanisms with the first half of the twentieth century in 
particular. After the 1901 ‘White Australia Policy’ formalised national exclusions on 
health and racial grounds, the ‘exclusion, deportation, or restriction of entry based on a 
                                                 
24
 Glenn Nichols, Deported: A History of Forced Departures from Australia (Sydney: University of New 
South Wales Press, 2007), p. 11. 
25 This provision has been examined by Philippa Martyr in ‘Having a Clean Up? Deporting Lunatic 
Migrants from Western Australia, 1924-1939’, History Compass, 9:3 (2011), pp. 177-199.  
26
 See Alison Bashford, ‘At the Border: Contagion, Immigration, Nation’, Australian Historical Studies, 
33:120 (2002), p. 346; Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Globalization and Security, 
1850 to the Present (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, [2003] 2014), p. 139; and 
‘Internationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Eugenics’ in Alison Bashford & Philippa Levine eds. The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 158-159. 
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eugenic rationale’ became widespread. These eugenic clauses were not only employed 
by white settlement colonies, post-colonial nation states also attempted similar 
exclusionary restrictions.
27
   
This thesis engages with Bashford’s research on a number of levels. Most 
importantly it addresses her recent assertion that the mental health and disability clauses 
in immigration statutes have been under-recognised.
28
 Furthermore, by analysing the 
workings of these mechanisms it is possible to challenge some of her previous findings. 
First, while accepting that the intention of the early twentieth century legislation was to 
create ‘medico-legal’ barriers, the reality of their application suggests otherwise. This 
thesis highlights how these controls were open to loopholes, challenges and confusion. 
It demonstrates that decisions made by officials were more nuanced than simply based 
on fears about degeneration and public funds.
29
 As such, Bashford’s assertion that the 
insanity clauses linked eugenics and immigration needs to be treated with caution.
30
 As 
will be shown, many administrators sought to minimise the eugenic aspect of the 
legislation. 
Although Bashford has acknowledged that research on the operations of health-
related immigration control is lacking, this thesis takes an even broader approach.
31
 By 
considering migrant recruitment schemes as well as immigration restrictions, it provides 
a fuller picture of migration control, over a larger time frame. The limited evaluation of 
operations to date has concentrated on those of Australia in the twentieth century. 
Bashford and Sarah Howard have found that operational procedures were not articulated 
                                                 
27
 Bashford: Imperial Hygiene, p. 138; ‘At the Border’, pp. 346 and 356; ‘Internationalism, 
Cosmopolitanism, and Eugenics, p. 159. Bashford has also traced this ubiquitous use to a post-colonial 
setting such as in Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Ceylon, Nauru, Fiji, Brunei and Papua New Guinea.  See 
‘Immigration Restriction: Rethinking period and place from settler colonies to postcolonial nations’, 
Journal of Global History, 9:1 (March 2014), pp. 26-48. This thesis has also uncovered the existence of 
similar legislation in other regions, which have been listed in Appendix A. 
28
 Bashford, ‘Insanity and Immigration Restriction’, p. 15. Unlike the attention already given to infectious 
disease control, see Alison Bashford ed., Medicine at the Border: Disease, Globalization and Security, 
1850 to the Present (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 
29
 Bashford, ‘Insanity and Immigration Restriction’, p. 19. 
30
 Ibid, p. 23.  
31
 Ibid, p. 21; Imperial Hygiene, p.152; and ‘At the Border’, p. 347. 
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in the legislation prior to 1912, and Barry York has collated immigration exclusion 
statistics for the first half of the twentieth century. Both works were framed as providing 
findings to assist future researchers.
32
 More recently, Philippa Martyr’s examination of 
Western Australia’s deportation function between the 1920s and 1930s, considered the 
level of operational detail, in terms of practicalities, that this study employs.
33
 Like 
Martyr, Ellen Boucher’s study of mental testing on British child migrants focusses on 
operations which occurred after the duration of this thesis.
34
 This study considers a 
wider range in terms of regions and timeframes. 
Compared to the limited, yet useful attention given to the Australian operations, 
New Zealand’s have been ignored. To date, the methods and outcomes of excluding 
mentally ill migrants at its borders have not been scrutinised. The ‘Migration, Ethnicity 
and Insanity in New Zealand and Australia’ project at the University of Otago, New 
Zealand has however consolidated the strong scholarship in asylum studies for that 
region. Historians have noted how medical officials engaged with transnational ideas 
about degeneration and immigration control.
35
 One key scholar is Angela McCarthy, 
who after recognising that ‘unfit’ people still entered New Zealand, suggested that the 
legislation should be investigated as part of the country’s migrant and ethnic history.36 
This study is the first to answer this call. McCarthy has more recently recognised that 
                                                 
32
 Alison Bashford & Sarah Howard, ‘Immigration and Health: Law and Regulation in Australia, 1901– 
1958’, Health and History, 6:1 (2004), p.106;  Barry York, Immigration Restriction, 1901-1950 (annual 
returns as required under the Australian Immigration Act between 1901 and 1957 on persons refused 
admission, persons who passed the dictation test and departures of coloured persons from Australia). 
(Studies in Australian Ethnic History, Centre for Immigration and Multicultural Studies at the Australian 
National University, Canberra. 1992), p. 1. 
33 Martyr, ‘Having a Clean Up?’. 
34
 Ellen Boucher, Empire’s Children: Child Emigration, Welfare and the Decline of the British World, 
1869-1967 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 128-140. 
35
 Maree Dawson, ‘Halting the ‘Sad Degenerationist Parade’: Medical Concerns about Heredity and 
Racial Degeneracy in New Zealand Psychiatry, 1853-1899’, Health and History 14:1 (2012), pp. 38-55.  
36
 Angela McCarthy: ‘Ethnicity, Migration and the Lunatic Asylum in Early Twentieth Century 
Auckland’, Social History of Medicine, 21:2 (2008), p.50; and ‘Future Directions for the Study of 
Migration and Ethnicity in New Zealand: Comparative, Transnational and Multidisciplinary Approaches 
to Records of Insanity’, Journal of New Zealand Studies (2010), p. 92.  
 13 
 
the migration process did not always result in asylum admission.
37
 This thesis highlights 
those who were not institutionalised and offers explanations as to why. Research on 
New Zealand immigration legislation is lacking compared to the focus given to the 
White Australia Policy. While the political debate leading to New Zealand’s racial 
exclusions has been examined, the health clauses have not.
38
 Likewise, there is more to 
learn about the transfer of immigration practices within the British world. Although the 
circular relationship between restrictive legislation has been traced by Jeremy Martens, 
Alison Bashford and Catie Gilchrist, New Zealand’s has not yet been fully understood, 
nor contrasted with Australia’s.39 This new research addresses this lack of comparison 
in order to highlight the differences between nation-state building in this region. 
The attention given by medical historians to asylum sources has led to the 
current consideration of mental illness as a consequence of the act of migration itself, 
which has been described as a ‘malady of migration’. This is a term given to a theatre 
production based on the research undertaken by Hilary Marland and Catherine Cox as to 
how mental disorders in Irish migrants resulted from the act of emigration.
40
 Marland 
and Cox’s 2013 collection Migration, Health and Ethnicity in the Modern World 
includes a number of international case studies on this theme.
41
 Across a number of 
locales it has been found that doctors attributed the breakdown in migrants’ mental 
states to two main factors; their inherent susceptibility and the effects of the dislocation 
                                                 
37
 Angela McCarthy & Catharine Coleborne, ‘Introduction: Mental Health, Migration and Ethnicity’ in 
McCarthy & Coleborne eds. Migration, Ethnicity and Mental Health, p. 3. 
38
 See Philip Ferguson’s unpublished PhD Thesis, The Making of the White New Zealand Policy: 
Nationalism, Citizenship and the Exclusion of the Chinese, 1880-1920 (The University of Canterbury, 
2003). 
39
 See Jeremy Martens, ‘A Transnational History of Immigration Restriction: Natal and New South 
Wales, 1896-1897’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 34:3 (2006), pp. 323-344 and 
Alison Bashford & Catie Gilchrist, ‘The Colonial History of the 1905 Aliens Act’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 40:3, (2012), pp. 409-437. 
40
 Through a Wellcome Trust funded project ‘Madness, Migration and the Irish in Lancashire, c.1850-
1921’. See http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/history/chm/outreach/migration/  [accessed 23 July 2015].  
This project has led most recently to an article by Catherine Cox & Hilary Marland: ‘“A Burden on the 
County”: Madness, Institutions of Confinement and the Irish Patient in Victorian Lancashire’, Social 
History of Medicine, 28:2 (2015), pp. 263-287. 
41
 Cox & Marland eds. Migration, Health and Ethnicity in the Modern World . 
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itself.
42
 This association has also been made within the strong scholarship of 
Australasian asylum studies.
 
McCarthy in particular has raised the need to consider the 
effect of the voyage in migration studies. From asylum records she has identified how 
patients and their families blamed the voyage for increasing their mental suffering.
43
 
She has also acknowledged how asylum officials considered many of their patients to 
have been of unsound mind before they left England.
44
  
This thesis shows just how far this concern transcended into immigration 
control. From the 1860s some migrant recruiters sought to prevent those with pre-
existing conditions or susceptibility to ‘insanity’ from emigrating. Paradoxically, while 
many politicians accepted the onset of mental disease in immigrants as inevitable, some 
border administrators sought to prevent those they deemed susceptible to such a decline 
from emigrating. These attempts are found throughout each period examined in this 
study. All reformers would, however, ultimately admit failure in trying to exclude those 
who displayed such ‘peculiarities when exposed to the voyage and the new start’. 45As 
such, this thesis raises the consideration of the malady of migration beyond asylums to 
international medical border control. Furthermore, this level of research makes it 
possible to challenge McCarthy’s belief that the return of migrants to Britain was only 
made possible through consultation with familial networks. Although these informal 
systems were important, this new research shows that there were in fact ‘official acts of 
repatriation’.46  
                                                 
42
 Ibid, Chapters Two and Three: Catherine Cox, Hilary Marland & Sarah York ‘Itineraries and 
Experiences of Insanity: Irish Migration and the Management of Mental Illness in Nineteenth-Century 
Lancashire’, pp. 36-60 and Letizia Gramaglia ‘Migration and Mental Illness in the British West Indies 
1838-1900: The Cases of Trinidad and British Guiana’, pp. 61-82. See also Jacqueline Leckie, ‘Lost 
Souls: Madness, Suicide and Migration in Colonial Fiji until 1920’, in McCarthy & Coleborne eds. 
Migration, Ethnicity, and Mental Health, pp.107-140. 
43
 McCarthy, ‘Migration and Madness in New Zealand’s Asylums’, pp. 62-65 and 68-69. 
44
 Ibid, pp. 58-59. 
45
 Sir Neville Howse, Migrants: Medical Examination in England (Victoria: H.J. Green, Government 
Printer for the State of Victoria, 1924), pp. 15-16.   
46
 McCarthy, ‘Migration and Madness in New Zealand’s Asylums’, p. 65. 
 15 
 
 This thesis seeks to match the level of policy versus practice already undertaken 
for North American immigration control. This is important on two levels. First, it adds 
to the current scholarship on worldwide health immigration controls. Second, it enables 
a transnational comparison between these regions. It is possible to make links between 
international operations and historiographies. It is now a decade since historians called 
for the analysis of United States immigration restrictions in context to the fear of 
‘defective or broken down’ newcomers.47 This rhetoric was also found in Australia and 
New Zealand, whose policy makers, on the whole, replicated the North American health 
clauses. And yet, there was one clear difference between these regions. Despite the 
widespread admiration for the United States operations, Australian administrators did 
not create an equivalent to New York’s inspection station at Ellis Island. That site 
became a focal point for reformers and scientists, whose outputs have provided 
extensive research material.
48
 In terms of Canada, some work on the control of mentally 
ill migrants has been undertaken. The British Columbian deportation process has been 
charted by Robert Menzies, and Marjory Harper is currently focussing on the 
experience of dysfunctional migrants.
49
 While the concentration on the North American 
eastern seaboard practices has been countered with studies of other port locations, this 
                                                 
47
 See the special edition of the Journal of American Ethnic History, 24:3 (Spring 2005) especially 
Douglas C. Baynton, ‘Defectives in the Land: Disability and American Immigration Policy, 1882-1924’, 
pp. 31-44; and Amy Fairchild, ‘Comment: Historicizing the Notion of Disability’, pp. 45-48. Prior to this, 
Ian Dowbiggin importantly traced the links between eugenics and immigration control in the North 
America in Keeping America Sane: Psychiatry and Eugenics in the United States and Canada 1880-1940 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, [1997] 2003).   
48
 See Jennifer Sarah Kain, ‘From Idiocy to Constutional Pychopathic Inferiority: How the United States 
Reacted to the Immigrant ‘Befuddled Masses’’(unpublished master’s dissertation, University of 
Newcastle, 2010). For the best published work on these operations see: Alan M. Kraut, Silent Travellers: 
Germs, Genes and the Immigrant Menace, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995); 
Roxana Galusca,‘ From Fictive Ability to National Identity: Disability, Medical Inspection, and Public 
Health Regulations on Ellis Island’, Cultural Critique, 72 (Spring 2009), pp. 137-163; and Jay Dolmage, 
‘Disabled upon Arrival: The Rhetorical Construction of Disability and Race at Ellis Island’, Cultural 
Critique, 77 (Winter 2011), pp. 24-69. 
49
 Robert Menzies, ‘Governing Mentalities: The Deportation of the Insane and Feebleminded Immigrants 
out of British Columbia from Confederation to World War II’, Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 13 
(1998), pp. 135-173. For Marjory Harper’s pertinent research see 
http://wellcomehistory.wordpress.com/2014/11/30/dysfunctional-diasporas/  [accessed 10 December 
2014]. She also has a number of forthcoming titles: ‘Minds on the edge: immigration and insanity among 
Scots and Irish in Canada, 1867-1914’,  Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies, and an edited collection The 
Past and Present of Migration and Mental Health, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Mental Health in 
Historical Context series, 2016). 
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region’s influence on the Australasian operations cannot be understated.50 Throughout 
each phase of migration control considered, there is a sense of Australasian 
administrators looking towards North America. 
Sources and Methodology 
 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing scholarship by comparing migration policy 
with its practice in New Zealand and Australia. This has been achieved by considering 
each phase of the operations from the experiences of those involved - the policy makers, 
the administrators, and those affected. This last group covers a wide range of 
individuals: those directly concerned - migrants, their families and institutions 
responsible for their care; and interested parties, such as local politicians, journalists and 
travel writers. In order to cover these different perceptions, information has been 
sourced from a number of online and physical archive repositories across Britain, New 
Zealand and Australia.
51
  
The primary sources were selected to enable a top-down analysis of the 
practicalities of colonial border control. This evidence covers a wide range of 
                                                 
50
 This east-coast centric approach was critiqued by Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenic Nation: Faults of 
Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 5. Scholars 
have considered a wider geographical approach. See, for example, H. Markel & A.M. Stern, ‘Which 
Face? Whose Nation? Immigration, Public Health and the Construction of Disease at America’s Ports and 
Borders, 1891-1928’, American Behavioral Scientist, 42:9 (1999), pp. 1314-1331; Julia Rodriguez  
‘Inoculating against Barbarism? State Medicine and Immigration Policy in Turn of the Century 
Argentina’, Science in Context, 19:3 (2006), pp. 357-380; and Alan Mayne, ‘Guardians at the Gate: 
Quarantine and Racialism in Two Pacific Rim Port Cities, 1870-1914’, Urban History, 35:2 (2008), pp. 
255-274.   
51 The National Archives for each country have been visited, of which New Zealand’s have been the most 
thoroughly interrogated. Digitised parliamentary debates have been analysed: The Appendices to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives (AtoJs), New Zealand; and the Hansard systems of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, (ParlInfo) and Britain (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers). Archived 
Australasian newspapers have been accessed through the National Library of Australia’s Trove system, 
and the National Library of New Zealand’s Papers Past system. A wide range of printed primary 
materials have been used, located either online or in libraries. In Britain - the British Library, Wellcome 
Library, National Library of Scotland, National Maritime Museum, Merseyside Maritime Museum, 
Newcastle’s Lit and Phil, and at Oxford University, the Bodleian and Rhodes House. In New Zealand the 
Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington holds much of the sources pertaining to the New Zealand 
political debates. Two Australian libraries, the Immigration Museum Library, Melbourne and the Western 
Australian Maritime Museum, Fremantle provided secondary sources which helped initiate ideas for this 
thesis. 
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officialdom, from political debate to procedural guidelines. The individual responses of 
the border controllers are included too in order to reflect on the operations, and impact, 
of immigration restrictions. This approach seeks to uncover the viewpoints of the 
officials charged with operating the controls, and those who sought to challenge them. 
These sources were selected with the intention of building up a picture of the intended 
methods, and actual outcomes of, immigration control. To decipher the intent of the 
legislation, parliamentary records for New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia 
have been examined. This approach has made it possible to analyse the purpose behind 
the legislation. It highlights how far political reticence existed as to how the laws were 
designed to operate. Likewise, the views of external commentators expressed in 
newspapers or medical journals have been used to gauge the wider reaction to such 
legislation.  
To ascertain how these measures worked in practice, actual immigration 
experiences have been examined in order to unpick how border controllers assessed the 
health of the incomers. These stories have been drawn from case notes which exist as 
individual records or part of collated immigration accounts, in regional archival 
repositories in New Zealand and Australia. The ways in which these cases were 
documented was not uniform. Some examples provide rich documentary sources which 
offer insight into the experiences of both migrant and border official; others provide 
only basic details- name, date, ship and medical condition - on the landing certification. 
Accordingly, in order to better decipher how newcomers were dealt with on arrival, this 
study has sought to examine the working practices of border control through other 
avenues. At these same physical archives and, via their digital equivalents, procedural 
information has been uncovered in order to consider the approaches and attitudes of the 
officials towards the immigrants they were tasked with rejecting. 
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While this approach seeks to move the research into the experience of ‘insane’ 
immigrants away from the prevailing asylum setting, it is acknowledged that the use of 
immigration department paperwork is problematic. Border control practices were 
inconsistent, hence, the way in which statistical information was recorded has also been 
found to be unreliable. The quantitative data in this these should therefore be considered 
as indicative rather than conclusive. This is because, aside from the likelihood of data 
being missing, the method of recording immigration returns was erratic. This was the 
case even for Australia, where providing yearly immigration returns was made a 
statutory requirement. Despite the availability of such formal data, some gaps or 
anomalies have been identified. These challenges should not however detract from the 
main purpose of this thesis, nor should the lack of the migrants’ voices in what was an 
incredibly stressful experience. This study is primarily an examination of the 
bureaucratic controls and the actors struggling to operate them. It therefore uses the 
perspective of the administrators to tell the stories of the migrants. 
Despite these challenges, the amount of primary information collated has made 
it possible to apply a consistent approach to researching each phase of migration 
control; the comparison between purpose, policy and practice. This method highlights 
how the legislation and practices, ill-defined from the start, became increasingly 
muddled. Colonial doctors, journalists and intellectuals also became caught up in the 
debate about the systems’ inadequacies. These failures were due in part to the long list 
of actors involved in regulating the movement of the insane, across and between, 
national and maritime borders. Within the long list of officials we find immigration 
agents, provincial doctors, British port controllers, ship’s doctors, and at the receiving 
end, quarantine, port health and immigration officers. Although roles and procedures 
may have been defined at a local level, a proper ‘end-to-end’ process did not exist. This 
study seeks to understand not only the regulations administrators were operating under, 
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but the language and ideals they employed. Because of this focus on procedure, 
individual practices have been represented, where possible, in the form of a process 
diagram. This pictorial format is helpful in tracking the evolution of these operations. It 
also helps demonstrate the main research finding running through this thesis; it did not 
matter where, how or who was made culpable for identifying the ‘mentally ill’ migrant, 
the task was simply too subjective. 
As well as this level of detail indicating a micro-history approach, this study 
involves a number of transnational comparisons. It assesses the parallels between 
Australian and New Zealand policies and practices. It also considers the influence of 
theories and operations in Britain and the United States. The consideration of all these 
themes makes it possible to pinpoint the tensions between ideologies and 
administrations. While officials may have been working towards the same aim, tensions 
existed at many levels, whether local, national or international. It is these pressure 
points which highlight how British world networks did not always runs smoothly.  
Accordingly this focus on policy and administration necessitates a top-down 
approach. This is because it was the official mind - politicians, intellectuals and 
professionals - that instigated the methods of border control. Their terminology is likely 
to differ widely from that used by migrants and their families. Historians have sought to 
examine how personal writings reflected lay descriptions of illness of health.  Catharine 
Coleborne and Ondine Godtschalk in particular have found that people were more likely 
to refer to a declining state of mind in terms of loneliness and despair.
52
 This thesis 
instead considers the language employed in migration control by considering a number 
of mechanisms: New Zealand’s Imbeciles Passengers Act and Immigration Restriction 
Act (1873—1920), and for the Commonwealth of Australia: the Immigration 
                                                 
52
 Catharine Coleborne & Ondine Godtschalk, ‘Colonial Families and Cultures of Health: Glimpses of 
Illness and Domestic Medicine in Private Records in New Zealand and Australia, 1850-1910.’ Journal of 
Family History, 38:4 (2013), pp. 403-421. 
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Restriction Act and its successor Immigration Act (1901—1924). These have been 
chosen because they represent the attempts of both nations to implement national border 
controls over a period in which ‘mentally-ill’ immigrants were increasingly derided. For 
each of these phases of control the methodology follows the same format; analysis of 
political debate, implementation and outcomes. 
Aims and Structure 
 
 
This thesis is organised chronologically to cover the distinct operational phases of 
migration control. This is a subject that has been recognised as providing a challenge to 
researchers. One historian has astutely admitted that these regulations have created 
analytical complexities for those trying to disentangle them.
53 
As such, it is useful to 
delineate stages in the evolution of Australasian border control. Between the 1830s and 
1920s migrant recruitment fluctuated according to colonial or dominion demand. It is 
important to note that systematic emigration existed alongside and separate from 
colonial immigration restrictions. From the mid nineteenth century, colonies introduced 
what can be considered as a bonding system. This legal provision made the shipping 
companies responsible for providing financial guarantees for passengers deemed to be 
lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind or infirm on arrival. From the late 1890s, these 
‘undesirables’, now labelled as idiots and insane, were made deportable under a new 
legal framework. The Commonwealth of Australia then extended the scope of this 
function to incorporate what some contemporaries called a eugenic phase. This thesis 
uses the term eugenics to mean the ideologies and policies of improving the mental and 
physical qualities of future generations.
54
 As such, the 1912 inclusion of the so-called 
feebleminded, and those carrying transmissible defects in the list of prohibited 
immigrants fits this description, in theory, if not in practice. 
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 Haines, ‘Indigent Misfits or Shrewd Operators?’, p. 227. 
54
 Jackson, The Borderland of Imbecility, p. 37. 
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 By analysing how this legislation was made operational, this thesis uncovers the 
extent of disconnect between policy and practice, particularly regarding terminology.  
This is because colonial concerns about newcomers confused ideas about unwanted 
‘mental’ and ‘moral’ traits. Nowhere was this more obvious than in New Zealand’s first 
immigration restrictions, promoted by its instigator as designed to prevent the entry of 
‘half scamps and half lunatics’.55 While a forthcoming article by this author frames the 
so-called ‘ne’er-do-well’ as a dysfunctional immigrant, this thesis considers how 
borderline types were confused with the ‘idiots’ and ‘insane’.56 It examines the roles 
and the motivations of those border officials tasked with making these decisions. Most 
were local doctors who struggled to operate under an-ill-defined system. Only in the 
case of Australia’s Dr William Perrin Norris is it possible to create a proper biography 
which details his career progression, influences and motivations. As will be shown, 
Norris moved between the British world, and beyond, with ease, unlike many port 
health officials who worked in isolation. 
This thesis also seeks to demonstrate how the idea of excluding the British 
‘mentally ill’ was met with a broad consensus by colonial administrators. These were 
the same officials who would struggle to reconcile the rejection of those unable to work 
due to physical or educational shortcomings. This study therefore highlights a number 
of paradoxes within the concept of the British world. In theory, the British ‘mentally ill’ 
were prevented from moving freely between its regions or enjoy the protection provided 
by colonial structures.
57
 And yet, although historians have considered how 
discrimination against the ethnic ‘other’ challenged the idea of an inclusive British 
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world, the experience of the white ‘mentally ill’ is not so clear-cut.58  Despite their 
theoretical exclusion, evidence points to many gaining entry. Whether through the use 
of financial bonds, exemptions or influential relatives, this study highlights how the 
system was beset with loopholes and subjectivity. Likewise these Australasian regions, 
New Zealand in particular, were promoted by politicans and travelogue writers as 
‘invalids’ paradises’.59 This ideal complicated the concept of border control, as did the 
incidences of people colluding with officials to prevent their relatives from landing. 
Furthermore, shipping companies persistently challenged the tenuous legal 
framework.
60
    
The new research uses archival information to demonstrate how British world 
border operations were messy, malleable and discretionary. It shows how each attempt 
to systematise border management between the 1830s and 1920s was flawed. To 
investigate these themes a number of key research questions underpin this study: who, 
how, where decided whether a migrant was mentally suitable to enter Australasia?; what 
were the influences which drove the evolution of these practices?; how far was the act 
of migration itself seen as triggering ‘mental illness’?; and ultimately, what does the 
system tell us about British world operations?  
 
Thesis Structure 
 
 
Because this research relates to the restriction of people moving within the British 
world, the chapters are structured as follows. Chapter One explores this British world 
concept in more detail, in particular the political and administrative systems relevant to 
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this study. It considers the real and imagined frameworks within which ideas about 
migration control would emerge. This level of contextual information is organised into 
three broad themes. First, the political administration of the emerging colonies is 
examined to show that the granting of responsible government meant the colonies took 
greater control over their borders. Second, it considers how British world institutions 
and customs were transferred from metropole to periphery. Of special significance were 
the realms of welfare provisions, medicine and law. Finally, a broader examination is 
given to the emerging categorisations of character, mental illness and intellectual 
ability. This wider context is necessary because these degeneration theories emanating 
from Europe would inform colonial attempts to categorise their newcomers. 
Chapter Two moves on from this contextualisation of systems and theories to 
consider the practicalities of migration control between 1830 and 1860. This was an era 
of systematic emigration, when land sales were used to fund the emigration of labourers 
to rural Australasian regions. Analysis of these schemes shows how operational 
structures existed in which migrants were selected, controlled and increasingly 
scrutinised. It was within these operations that a number of mechanisms for migration 
control were introduced. Third party referees had to guarantee that intending emigrants 
were of ‘sound mind’ while ship’s surgeons monitored migrants’ health and conduct en-
route. Using the case study of Otago, New Zealand, the chapter demonstrates how 
arbitrary these early controls operated in practice. And yet, the primary sources 
involving New Zealand and Scottish officials illuminate how closely some British world 
administrators worked together to try to improve selection methods. Some British 
controls were tightened after colonists complained about immigrants displaying insane 
tendencies on arrival. As such, British world operational networks in this era were 
tightly fused. 
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Chapter Three traces this evolution through to the national migration controls of 
the 1870s. Regional initiatives took second place to the New Zealand government’s 
desire to expand the population with the morally, mentally and physically fit. This 
national scheme involved a new level of officialdom based in Britain which was 
increasingly derided as too autonomous by politicians and doctors in New Zealand. The 
London-based Agent General relied on British selecting officers, referees and port 
officials. New Zealand politicians therefore had to make a number of concessions in 
their desire to expand the domestic population. Not only were they reliant on controls 
enforced thousands of miles away, they had to admit to the inevitability of some 
newcomers being unsuitable. Instead it was the regional politicians and institutional 
officials within New Zealand who would petition for tighter controls. It is within this 
era that New Zealand introduced its first health based immigration restrictions – the title 
of which clearly defined its purpose – the Imbecile Passengers Act. This chapter 
introduces the bureaucratic complexities that would continually disrupt the attempts to 
both attract and exclude people based on ideas about mental disease. This was an era 
when medical theories started to focus more on the dangers of imported illnesses and 
the drain on public funds. 
These financial concerns are drawn out further in Chapter Four. This chapter 
concentrates on the workings of the Imbecile Passengers Act between 1876 and 1899. 
This mechanism became more prominent after assisted migration was phased out. Its 
purpose did not translate properly to its practices. As such, its legality became 
increasingly challenged by shipping companies, medical superintendents and 
immigrants themselves. This was a period in which economic and trans-colonial links 
became more prominent. Australians and New Zealanders became more aware of their 
national identities and engaged with inter-colonial concerns about security and trade. 
These modernising tendencies were not however reflected in migration control.  The 
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primary sources employed show that the parochialism of the border administrators 
endured, as did the use of incoherent rhetoric and procedures. It was in this era that 
attempts to exclude paupers and the illiterate were derided as offensive to British world 
ideals. Those on the so-called borderline of imbecility were not, however, given the 
same levels of leniency by politicians. 
 Globalisation and wider influences become more apparent in the final part of 
this thesis. The last three chapters use a transnational approach to compare the policy 
and practices between New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia. Chapter Five 
takes a broader view of British world migration control. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, the immigration restriction legislation of Britain’s white settlement colonies 
was brought into line with that of the United States. Imperial sanctioning of the 
prohibited immigrant clause created a new kind of common bureaucratic structure in 
which undesirables could be rejected. Those attempting illegal entry faced fines, 
imprisonment and, ultimately, deportation. Shipping companies, who had long been 
seen as accomplices of undesirable immigration, were now made liable for the removal 
of unwanted migrants. This chapter demonstrates how this new provision was derived 
from previous Anglo-sphere legislation. It also compares the political debates in 
Australia and New Zealand to highlight how border controllers were not given guidance 
as to how to operate the new systems. As such, the maritime administrators persisted 
with their existing parochial methods, left over from the nineteenth century. 
 Chapter Six examines how Australia finally took the lead in attempting to define 
better processes and standardise their operations. It was in the 1910s that the medical 
administrators finally attempted to define medico-legal border controls. Unlike New 
Zealand, Australia employed heredity clauses to target those with the vagaries of 
transmissible disability, diseases or defect.  In practice, however, New Zealand officials 
employed similar rhetoric when labelling undesirable immigrants. It was the Australians 
 26 
 
who engaged with eugenic theory on a more political level.  Their first Commonwealth 
Medical Officer, Dr W. Perrin Norris, sought to tighten the Australian British-based 
controls. He also advocated using the Australasian systems to manage migration to New 
Zealand and Canada. Despite his ambition, Norris’ efforts would be curtailed by 
tensions between state and commonwealth, and would be ultimately derailed by the 
First World War.  
Chapter Seven shows that Norris’ ideas re-emerged in the post-war period as 
part of the empire settlement schemes. Migrants were assessed for their suitability 
through standardised medical inspections in Britain. Still administrators could not align 
their processes at the dispatching and receiving ports. It took another Australian medical 
reformer, Sir Neville Howse, to suggest that some people were simply not mentally 
strong enough to cope with the act of migration itself. This was official recognition of 
what border administrators had been struggling with for nearly one hundred years.  
Despite a series of transformations designed to bring standardisation and closer 
regulation, the same problem persisted. Regardless of the transformation of methods 
and terminology, ‘mental illness’ in migrants was simply too difficult to police. 
 This thesis sheds light on the overall system of British world migration control 
by piecing together the different themes hitherto considered in isolation. By exploring 
the disordered nature of immigration control, it adds a new perspective to the existing 
scholarship on transnational immigration legislation and Australasian asylum studies. 
The in-depth examination of border control systems also contributes to our 
understanding of the links between migration and illness in the British world during this 
period.
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Chapter One: Administering the British World  
 
This chapter provides the contextual background for this thesis. It introduces the 
political and administrative structures underpinning migration between Britain and 
Australasia. It highlights the professional networks within, and between these regions, 
particularly in the crucial realms of medicine and law. This broad framework is 
necessary to position migration control as one of the British world systems which 
operated unevenly.
1
 This irregularity was due in part to the British political indifference 
to the development of the Australasian colonies. It took the colonists themselves to 
replicate British administrative systems in order to create what were, in effect, ‘neo-
European peripheries’.2 These neo-Britons sought a level of independence from their 
homeland. Essential to this transfer was the establishment of representative government, 
which made it possible for the colonial administrations to implement their own 
migration control.  
 As such, the transfer of British administrative and professional networks needs 
to be understood as part of colonial expansion. This is because the replication of 
familiar structures induced many migrants to move to the developing Australasian 
settlements.
3
 Aside from the practicalities of creating infrastructures, the settlers brought 
an informal ‘Britannic civic culture’ with them. This meant that British world 
intellectual networks resulted from the creation of societies and organisations.
4
 The 
replication of professional practices in the fields of medicine, politics and law is 
particularly important. It was in these fields that the ideas about the control of ‘mentally 
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ill’ migrants would emerge. Intellectuals and professionals who moved between 
metropole and periphery communicated such ideas, some of which reached the political 
spheres. By considering the role and motivations of these campaigners, it is obvious that 
the most amount of ‘noise’ came from those based in the colonies, or mobile enough to 
traverse the British world with ease.  
 In order to demonstrate how official imperial interest in migration control 
remained limited, this chapter focusses on the real and imagined British world 
structures. It provides the context to the subsequent examination of the theories, 
methods and results of migration control. This background information is arranged into 
three broad sections: ‘Political Administration’, ‘British World Structures’, and 
‘Categorising Worthiness’. The first section provides an overview of the evolution of 
the Australasian political systems. It displays how British governmental policy towards 
the colonies fluctuated until the end of the nineteenth century, when their economic 
importance was realised. Instead, it took the actions of colonial and metropolitan 
reformers to faciliate mass emigration from Britain. 
 The second section considers how these Australasian regions functioned in 
terms of formal and informal adminstration. This involved the replication of British 
norms and structures, which in turn induced British people to migrate. And yet, not all 
colonial systems were the exact copy of home. Focussing on the medical sphere, it is 
shown that, unlike the usual replication of British models, there was no official welfare 
provision in the colonies. This formed the basis of the enduring fear that incapable 
immigrants would become public charges. Over the course of the nineteenth century 
these financial concerns would merge with wider theories of race degeneration. The 
final section introduces the broader degeneration discourses emanating from Europe. 
These were employed by the professional networks in the colonies and inform the 
political and administrative attempts to categorise the newcomers. Through considering 
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how these professional responses evolved, it will be ultimately shown that, despite some 
levels of medical reform, managing the entry of those considered mentally ill remained 
imprecise. 
 
Political Administration 1820s to 1920s 
 
 
When we consider the early development of the Australasian regions as settlement 
colonies, it is clear that British political interest towards them fluctuated, or as Harper 
and Constantine aptly put it, ‘imperial policy blew hot and cold’.5 The British 
government driven by laissez-faire attitudes to free trade and movement of labour were 
reluctant to intervene in emigration.
6
 Any ad-hoc migration initiatives were driven by 
commercial or ideological organisations. The demand for immigration depended on the 
political and economic conditions in the colonies. Because these circumstances would 
determine the amount of focus given to the standards of immigrants, the following 
topics are considered. First, attention is given to the imperial reluctance to formally 
populate the Australasian colonies, an ideology which endured until the inter-war 
period. Instead it took private individuals and idealistic organisations to take the lead in 
stimulating migration. Second, the importance of the granting of responsible 
government to the colonies is highlighted as changing the administration of migration 
control. Finally, the evolving imperial-colonial dynamic is examined. While 
imperialistic intellectuals sought to strengthen the economic and cultural bonds in their 
concept of a Greater Britain, it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that the 
British government realised this importance. 
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British Governmental Non-Intervention 
 
 
 
In essence, the Australasian outposts of the British world developed without any real 
political master plan for them. The founding of settler Australia began with the First 
Fleet’s arrival at Botany Bay in 1788.7 This transportation system, which from 1803 
triggered a new penal colony, Van Diemen’s Land, has been well documented.8 The 
corresponding colonial expansion involving free settlers has been considered by 
contemporary and modern scholars as somewhat ‘accidental’.9 In New Zealand informal 
British settlement occurred from 1820, triggered by the trans-Tasman trade routes.
10
 By 
the 1840s the maritime enclaves across Australasia which began as extensions of the 
‘mother colony’ New South Wales were formerly established as British territories.11 
These colonies were overseen by governors acting on instructions from the British 
government, whose Board of Trade provided limited advice on how to manage the 
burgeoning trade routes.
12  
Under this system of colonial autocracy, the free population 
increased slowly in response to mining or trading opportunities.
13
 
 The concept of systematic emigration - the recruitment of labouring families for 
assisted passages - emerged in the 1820s when British reformers started to question the 
viability of the transportation system. In 1826, Secretary of State for the War and the 
Colonies, Robert William Horton, established an emigration committee to consider the 
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advantages of ‘disposing the excess of the labouring population’ to the colonies.14 
While Horton favoured using Canada, political reformer Robert Torrens suggested the 
Australasian colonies as an alternative.
15
 It was there, he told the committee, that ‘the 
sources of wealth are abundant, but poverty and misery prevail’.16 Torren’s ideas 
combined altruism with what he saw as the financial benefits for the British 
government. Their initial outlay for subsidised passages, he explained, would be 
recouped by selling the ‘redundant’ crown land to capitalists, and profiting from the 
opening of east-Indian commercial routes.
17
 The British government reacted, in part, by 
using land sales to provide the first assisted passages, in 1832, to New South Wales and 
Van Diemen’s Land.18  
 The demographic transformation of the Australasian colonies, particularly those 
not established through convict labour, was largely instigated by commercial 
associations. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, like Torrens, was instrumental in creating joint 
stock companies to facilitate land-sale systems. Initially, both men favoured South 
Australia, but after an ideological disagreement, Wakefield created the New Zealand 
Association - later renamed the New Zealand Company - in 1837.
19
 Not all expansion 
was driven by business entrepreneurism. Church-affiliated land companies employed 
similar land sale methods to develop regions and provide subsidised passages.
20
 British 
governmental involvement in contrast, was reactive, a point not lost on Wakefield. 
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‘Individuals initiated colonial settlements’, he informed parliament in 1840, and 
‘politicians acted afterwards’.21 Indeed, the same year, and a decade after Horton’s call 
for systemised emigration, T. F. Elliot was appointed as British Agent-General for 
Emigration. The Colonial Land and Emigration Commission (CLEC) was also created 
to accelerate the despatch of emigrants. Again this resulted from British concern over 
colonists seeking greater control over their development. Some colonial administrators 
had initiated bounty schemes, through which people were nominated for assistance to 
emigrate.
22
 
Whether driven by British idealists or the established colonists, systematic 
emigration was designed to recruit a better standard of immigrants. While British 
politicians remained on the whole disinterested to the idea of the colonies moving away 
from their ‘convict stain’, it was the emerging colonial capitalist classes who demanded 
metropolitan assistance in terms of money and manpower.
23
 Tensions between 
metropole and colony emerged first in New South Wales, where commercially minded 
colonists objected to the convict transportation system.
24 
Any debates about the 
economic and demographic development of these regions were hampered by the fact 
that imperial instructions could take months to arrive. A number of examples point to 
colonial governors acting independently of their imperial superiors. Lieutenant-
Governor, Sir George Arthur, ran Van Diemen’s Land between 1823 and 1837 like a 
‘police state’.25 Some governors used this level of autonomy to instigate further 
expansion. In charge of New South Wales between 1831 and 1837, Sir Richard Bourke 
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launched his own migration recruitment to bolster the early tentative British schemes.
26
 
Imperial control clashed with expansionist ideas in New Zealand when in 1840 
Lieutenant-Governor William Hobson refused to recognise the land procured by 
Wakefield’s New Zealand Company.27 It was these kinds of diverging interests, coupled 
with communication difficulties, which created the environment in which colonial self-
government became necessary. This in turn led to the attempts by the colonists to 
populate their own regions. 
 
Colonial Self-Government 
 
 
 
The granting of colonial self-government was a complex and lengthy process. The most 
important outcome, in terms of this study, was that it formalised the connection between 
colonial state-making and immigration policy.
28
 This is because it enabled colonial 
governments to begin, albeit erratic, systems of migration control. And yet, while most 
British politicians conceded that colonists should be given control over certain areas of 
their administration, not all wanted to relinquish population control. Reformer Charles 
Buller, for example, thought migration should remain ‘entirely subject to the will of the 
mother country’.29 Henry George Grey, Colonial Secretary, responsible for the 
enactment of the Australian Colonies Government Act in 1850, thought otherwise. To 
Grey, constitutional government included the power to manage some aspects of 
immigration.
30
 In the end, the British government did not completely rescind their 
control and acted as trustees for the colonial funds provided to encourage emigration.
31
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 This imperial paternalism also determined the timescales for the establishment 
of responsible government, and the ending of transportation. Self-government was 
granted only when a colony was deemed to have achieved self-sufficiency. New South 
Wales and Victoria became self-governing in 1855, New Zealand and Van Diemen’s 
Land, renamed Tasmania, in 1856 and South Australia in 1857. The remoter and less 
developed Western Australia, which continued to use convict transportation until 1868, 
only achieved political autonomy in 1890. When self-government was achieved the 
colonists began to develop their own systems of political administration.
32
 As with the 
professional and cultural networks, these practices were replications of British systems. 
The establishment of responsible government reproduced the ‘Anglophone institutions’ 
of representative assemblies, common law, and male franchise.
33
 The creation of a 
system of parliamentary democracy occurred in stages. The executive power of the 
governors was replaced first with appointed, then elected legislative councils.
34 
It was 
through these bicameral parliamentary systems that the self-governing colonies 
implemented their first immigration restrictions. The colony of Victoria acted first with 
provisions designed to stem immigration from a source closer to home. Their 1852 
Convicts Prevention Act decreed that ex-convicts from Van Diemen’s Land had to 
prove their freedom.
 35
 The same year Victorians enforced bond payments for 
immigrants if ‘lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind or infirm’.36 By the end of the 
nineteenth century all of the Australasian colonies had enacted similar statutes, 
including in 1873, New Zealand.
37
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 Despite these controls, the newly independent colonies remained reliant on 
British emigration. The colonial governments were, however, able to assert greater 
control over migrant selection. These attempts varied. Some colonies sent dedicated 
recruitment agents to London, or relied on collaborations with shipping companies.
38
 In 
the case of New Zealand, a central London agency was created in 1858. Yet, because 
promotional activity fluctuated according to economic and commercial conditions, any 
colonial schemes were not ‘one cohesive, well-shaped movement’.39 However, this 
official ceding of imperial control is crucial to the context of this thesis. It was a 
vacuum into which the colonies would step, thus beginning their attempts at populating 
their own territories. The case study of New Zealand’ migration control, which begins 
in Chapter 2, shows how much of this relied on British systems and practices. 
 
Imperial versus Colonial Identities 
 
 
 
The political re-structuring did not sever colonial-imperial diplomatic administrative 
networks, or the allegiance to the British monarchy. While the British monarch, or in 
reality the Colonial Office, kept the right to veto the colonies’ legislation, the only real 
effect on immigration restriction was to delay its enactment. Colonial crown agents in 
London continued to represent Australasian business interests, in a role which would 
merge into a form of chief emigration officer, the agent-general. From the 1860s the 
colonial agent-generals acted as official representatives in London, the forerunners to 
the dominion high commissioners.
40
 While British politicians remained detached from 
colonial expansionist ideals, those more commercially minded did not. In 1870 New 
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Zealand Treasurer, Julius Vogel borrowed vast sums from the London markets to 
finance his expansion initiatives.
41
 
 By the 1870s the limited British political interest in populating the Australasian 
colonies was reduced further. The CLEC was absorbed into the Board of Trade, before 
closing in 1878. Importantly many of the CLEC’s practices were replicated by the 
colonial agent-generals who took responsibility for the selection and dispatch of 
emigrants.
42
 Again, therefore, we see a replication of British designed practices. 
However in terms of actually promoting emigration, British officials remained 
detached. The Emigrants’ Information Office (EIO) established in 1886, offered 
practical information only.
43
 Between 1889 and 1891 a Commons Select Committee on 
Colonisation rejected the idea of further organised land settlement.
44
 And yet, in some 
respects, British officials were becoming more receptive to using colonial resources to 
their mutual benefit. The last two decades of the nineteenth century signified, what 
Belich has termed, a British ‘re-colonisation’ of the Australasian regions.45 This interest 
was commercial rather than demographic. The import of colonial goods and raw 
materials was reorganised through the improving transport and communication 
systems.
46
 
 The so called economic re-integration of the colonies does have some bearing on 
this thesis, in the sense that it fed in to the idea of Greater Britain.
47
 This idea of a 
shared identity would both inform and complicate the immigration legislation employed 
throughout the British world at the turn of the twentieth century. Many of the colonial 
immigration debates rested on whether legislation would restrict the good types of 
                                                 
41
 Ibid, p. 23. 
42
 Robin Haines, Life and Death in the Age of Sail: The Passage to Australia (London: National Maritime 
Museum, 2006), pp. 31, 47. 
43
 Constantine, ‘Introduction: Empire Migration and Imperial Harmony’, pp. 3-4. 
44
 Keith Williams, ‘A Way out of our Troubles: the Politics of Empire Settlement, 1900-1922 in 
Constantine ed. Emigrants and Empire, pp. 22-23. 
45
 Belich, Replenishing the Earth, pp. 179-180. 
46
 Ibid, pp. 206-208.  
47
 Ibid, pp. 179-180. 
 37 
 
British immigrants. No longer were colonial governments obligated to simply replicate 
British legislation. Instead, in many ways, a more equal intellectual relationship 
between Britain and the colonies emerged.  In 1866 Charles Dilke had included 
Australia and New Zealand in his survey of Greater Britain, a concept he defined as ‘the 
development of England in half the habitable globe’.48 By the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, the Australasian colonies, now seen as ‘social laboratories’, had 
forged ahead with liberal ideas and legislation.
49
  
  Imperial intellectuals took note of how the Australasian colonies were emerging 
as independent entities. The British legal profession formed the Society of Comparative 
Legislation in 1894 to consider how countries were adapting established laws for their 
own requirements. Their resulting journal was written to reflect on how while ‘our 
colonies borrow the form of many Statutes from England’, Britain was now ‘borrowing 
from them’.50 British elitist organisations such as the Royal Colonial Society and the 
Imperial Federation League promoted closer colonial unions. And yet, despite these 
emerging metropole-periphery links, most of this imperialistic activity occurred outside 
parliament.
51 
Political interest remained more commercially driven, such as when the 
introduction of colonial protective tariff barriers threatened British concerns.
52
 
Australasian politicians and intellectuals sought to form closer trans-Tasman ties 
in their own regions. The idea of an Australasian federation had been mooted in the 
1880s. The first Inter-colonial Convention to discuss the safety and welfare of the 
British Dominions in Australasia, including mutual defence and quarantine, was held in 
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1883.
53
 The first constitution for federation was drafted by the Federal Australasian 
Council in 1891.
54
 Colonial politicians also remained aware of their position in the 
wider British world. They engaged with their imperial counterparts through the Colonial 
Conferences which began in 1887. It was not until Joseph Chamberlain’s tenure as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies between 1895 and 1903 that maintaining proper links 
with the colonies received proper imperial attention.
55
 
Australia and New Zealand only achieved a more equal status with the ‘mother 
country’ in the early twentieth century. Australia became a British dominion in 1901, 
and New Zealand, which declined to join the Commonwealth of Australia, followed suit 
in 1907. Although this change was mainly symbolic, the forming of a Dominions Royal 
Commission (DRC) in 1911 signified a key ideological shift in joint migration control. 
The DRC represented proper British political attention towards establishing a ‘system of 
migration of equal benefit to the Old Country and to the New’.56 Any hope of jointly 
managing emigration to the dominions was, however, curtailed by the First World War. 
It took the 1922 Empire Settlement Act to fully engage the British government with 
emigration. The mutual governance of the British world became tied to more equal 
economic and power relationships.
57 
In 1926 the Balfour Declaration awarded Australia 
and New Zealand full parity with Britain. Thus, approximately one hundred years since 
crown colony status, full autonomy was achieved.  While still allied to the British 
crown, and members of the British Commonwealth, Australia and New Zealand no 
longer required royal or de facto assent for their legislation.  
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The  granting of equal status to Australia and New Zealand followed a century 
of constant flux in British involvement with their colonies. If we consider the control of 
migration in the period up to the First World War, a number of themes are clear. The 
British government’s detached approach to their colonies resulted in them taking a back 
seat in the populating of the regions. The organisation of official emigration schemes 
was left to British capitalists or altrusitic associations. The granting of responsible 
government then enabled colonial politicians to start asserting control over migration 
control. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the recognition of mutual economic 
benefits led to an intellectual, and then political desire to create a more unified imperial 
relationship.  
Within the period 1820 to 1920 attempts by both periphery and metropole to 
regulate migration fluctuated. There was no one clear process, or central body acting for 
either party. Any ideological desire to populate the Australasian regions were countered 
by the practicalities of communication,  economic requirements, recourse to convict 
labour and the ability to transport people across this vast distance. And yet, despite 
these conflicting factors, this part of the British world expanded exponentially. In 1810 
the European population of the region as a whole was 12,000. By 1860 the figure had 
risen to 1.25 million.
58
 The migrating British, whether forced or voluntary, individually 
or in organised groups; went on to recreate their home environment and administrative 
structures. This is the context in which attempts to exclude certain types of their own 
countrymen and women would develop. 
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British World Structures 
 
This section considers the factors which facilitated British migration to the Australasian 
colonies. It is important to frame this in terms of the overall study because, despite 
British political disinterest in populating the Australasian colonies, many factors 
induced British people to emigrate. It would be those who did so successfully who 
vocalised ideas about which types were worthy of following in their footsteps. The 
colonial agency which drove the need for self-governance therefore informed ideas 
about progressing immigration. This section considers the formal and informal systems 
of administration which developed in response to the increasing population. British 
professionals brought with them ideas about ‘codes of civilising conduct and the proper 
ordering of society’.59 These standards would underpin the structures through which 
migration control would be made operational. As such, they need to be understood as 
part of the framework for this study.  
 To do this, the pertinent existing historiography in relation to the development of 
British world structures is highlighted. This thesis has been informed by Gary Magee’s 
and Andrew Thompson’s explanation of the replication of Britannic civic culture and 
James Belich’s discussion of the importance of formal settlerism.60 More crucially it 
engages with the work of historians who have identified the extent of the medical 
networks within the British world. As will become apparent, it was the educated 
professional colonists who formulated ideas about acceptable standards of migrants in 
advance of political restrictions. Much of this stemmed from the lack of official welfare 
support in the colonies. Accordingly this sphere is highlighted as one which deviated 
from the usual replication of British provisions for medicine, law and quarantine. 
Without an exact equivalent of the British Poor Law, immigrants were expected to be 
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capable, industrious and self-supporting. It was the prevalence of those who did not 
meet these requirements so became public charges which drove the need for 
immigration control. 
 
 
Development of a Britannic Civic Culture 
 
 
 
Australasian colonists employed the term British world to describe their real and 
imagined common origins, culture and identity.
61
 Their isolation was reduced in part by 
shipping improvements from the 1820s which created what Belich has called virtual 
bridges between metropole and periphery.
62  
This meant that through the more efficient 
carriage of people, letters and goods, links with the homeland were strengthened.
63
 
Boom triggers, that is, stimuli for more people to migrate were bolstered by the creation 
of institutions like banks, newspapers, and mail services.
64
 These British conventions 
made the act of emigrating more attractive and, in turn lessened the elitist disdain about 
it. By the mid-nineteenth century the Australasian colonies were integrated into the 
British world networks through the systems of global communications transmitting 
news, ideas and values.
65
 From the 1860s a new cable system reduced the time lag in 
news from home.
66
 Improved systems of communication and transport gave the 
colonies the agency and ability to facilitate trade, investment and migration.
67
  
 On a local level, colonists replicated British working practices. Professional 
networks of middle-class settlers fostered a Britannic civic culture in fields such as 
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academia, law, medicine, science and journalism.
68 From the 1850s the CLEC’s 
Colonisation Circulars, which advised prospective emigrants on colonial conditions, 
began catering for this professional migration. It provided information for barristers, 
attorneys, physicians, surgeons and apothecaries as to how to set up their practices in 
the colonies.
69
 British world networks were not only the domain of the middle-classes. 
For those lacking professional standing, the commonalities of language and culture 
provided, to a certain extent, a ‘comfort zone of familiarity’.70 Associational culture, in 
terms of clubs and societies, kept British regional identities alive.
71
 Those literate 
enough to communicate with and fund relatives back home faciliated chain migration.
72
  
 These British world shared identities already examined by historians are also 
evident, to some level, in the political debate examined in this thesis. When colonial 
politicians began to consider the immigrant types they wanted to exclude, many were 
reticent to restrict the entry of those who had previously helped build their nations, such 
as the illiterate. Nominated immigrants, those recommended by friends or relatives 
resident in the colonies were preferred over the single people who arrived without 
existing familial networks. And while colonial politicians agreed that the ‘insane’ 
should not be part of the expansionist visions, an exemption system developed, which in 
some cases, enabled the ‘mentally ill’ to enter if their support was guaranteed.  
 There is another aspect to this thesis which draws on the ideas about Britannic 
civic culture, that of booster literature. While this print revolution has been 
acknowledged as essential to inducing migration, the resulting so-called idealisation 
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literature needs to be understood as part of migration control.
 73 
The scale and effect of 
this output has been noted by historians.
74
 Written primarily by wealthy travellers, 
health tourists, doctors and clerics, it was within these tracts that the ideas of those with 
pre-existing health conditions, or those not prepared to work, emerged as undesirable 
immigrants. It was these incapable types who did not fit the utopian visions of the 
expanding Australasian colonies. 
 
Medical Administration in a ‘World without Welfare’ 
 
 
 
While some idealisation literature peddled by travel writers promoted the Australasian 
regions as beneficial to body and mind, in reality immigrants became ill or destitute. 
British legal and medical models were established early in the colonisation process, 
which, in practical terms, meant the creation of, albeit rudimentary, hospitals, gaols and 
courthouses.
75
Amongst the replication of British systems were medical and scientific 
practices, some adapted according to local conditions.
76
 This metropolitan medical 
influence would endure. Most Australian and New Zealand doctors practising before the 
First World War were either trained, or undertook post-graduate studies, in Britain. The 
mobility of some doctors has led Catharine Coleborne to describe them as medical 
migrants, who facilitated the flow of medical ideas.
77
 Medical historians recognise that 
Australasian practitioners engaged with European ideas through conferences, societies 
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and journals.
78
 This was true also of the psychiatrists and asylum officials who treated 
the ‘mentally ill’.79 
 Doctors adapted metropolitan theories and practices to their particular 
environments. Warwick Anderson has examined these adjustments across the 
Australian temperate and tropical regions.
80
 In terms of treating ‘mental illness’, asylum 
historians have found both continuation, and some adaptation, of British practices. Ideas 
about so-called congenital idiocy were transferred to Auckland, for example, through 
the physical migration of British-trained doctors to New Zealand.
81
 Studies of Dunedin 
institutions have found that these influences were more nuanced than being simply a 
direct translation of British medicine to a colonial setting.
82
 Importantly, the medical 
profession has been found to have developed influences on both domestic and 
international policy.
83
 The case studies employed in this thesis confirm that asylum 
officials operated within the immigration legislation more shrewdly than the other 
parties involved.  
 At a legislative level, British medical statutes were replicated in the Australasian 
colonies. The creation of British institutions included enacting Lunacy Laws, deemed 
necessary to manage the single male ‘mad’ or ‘vagrant’.84 The terms lunatic and idiot 
were defined through colonial legal discourse about insanity which was built around the 
idea of ‘dangerous lunatics’.85As in England, the 1843 New South Wales Dangerous 
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Lunatics Act provided for the removal of such types, as did New Zealand’s Lunatics 
Ordinance, enacted three years later.
86
 These provisions enabled the police or public to 
refer those they suspected to be lunatics to the legal system. Once two independent 
medical practitioners had diagnosed the condition, a magistrate could order the person 
be confined.
87
 Similar legal provisions were enacted, and updated, across all Australian 
colonies throughout the nineteenth century.
88
 This enduring British legislative influence 
also led to attempts to segregate the ‘feebleminded’. After the British Royal 
Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded completed their report in 
1908, New Zealand passed their Mental Defectives Act in 1911, which predated 
Britain’s 1913 Act and those of the Australian states.89   
 And yet, in contrast to the usual replication of British systems, there was no 
official Poor Law. The Australasian colonies have been described as a world without 
welfare.
90
 This lack of an official welfare state did not mean there was no support for 
those in need. Instead, a ‘mixed economy of welfare’ developed, like that in Britain 
prior to the 1834 amendments to the Poor Law, consisting of aid provided by local and 
central governments, families, churches, charities and philanthropists.
91
 From the 
establishment of colonial settlements, governors had to consider how best to provide for 
the inevitability of immigrant destitution. Case studies have shown how the local 
institutions providing poor relief would become increasingly derided as pauperising 
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agents.
92
 It was due to this lack of official ‘safety net’ that unproductive immigrants 
would especially be demonised.  
Any new arrivals that became incapable or destitute fell on the stretched local 
provisions.
93
 Ideally then, immigrants were expected to be healthy, industrious and self-
supporting. For all inhabitants, new or old, family members were expected to provide 
for any sick or destitute kin. In 1846, the same year as New Zealand’s first Lunacy Law, 
the Destitute Persons Ordinance legislated that the near relatives of the needy were 
practically and financially responsible for them.
94
 Those found to be lunatics and 
segregated were initially housed in jails, but by the mid-1850s both Auckland and 
Wellington had public asylums.
95
 Across the Australasian colonies, the institutional 
authorities sought maintenance payments from families of the insane.
96
  
 Many single immigrants lacked familial support systems so were more likely to 
become public charges. In the maturing colonies many un-bonded labourers or ex-
convicts ended up in asylums.
97
 ‘Old age’ was the key factor underpinning diagnoses of 
dementia and illness.
98
 Sea-locked Tasmania suffered from the perception of its 
institutions full of the ‘broken, the unhinged, the helpless, the mad and the 
abandoned’.99 In New Zealand, a colony which had been formed without recourse to 
convict labour, itinerant and bondless men were equally prolific. It was there, according 
to David Thomson, that welfare provision was based on minimal collective state activity 
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more than any other Australasian colony.
100
 Instead, benevolent societies managed the 
provincial charitable aid which existed alongside the minimal local government 
provisions.
101
 
 By the 1870s all the main centres in New Zealand had a network of welfare 
institutions such as a hospital, lunatic asylum, and relieving officers dispensing outdoor 
relief.
102
 Public asylums were administered by the provincial authorities and, after the 
provinces were abolished in 1876, the central government.
103
 This centralisation 
focussed national attention on those who had arrived as part of the recruitment drives of 
the 1870s but had ended up as public charges. In 1885 the Hospitals and Charitable 
Institutions Act made it necessary for the inspector general to collate statistics of those 
provided with medical treatment or given outdoor assistance.
104
 By the 1910s the 
numbers of unhealthy immigrants, whether treated, allowed to arrive under bonds, or 
deported, were included in this reportage. This meant that idea of undesirable 
immigrants was firmly bound up with how they drained the already limited economy of 
welfare. 
 Non-infectious and self-supporting health tourists were, in contrast, welcomed. 
The rising concern about the numbers of ‘indigents’ requiring public or charitable 
assistance co-existed with the promotion of New Zealand, in particular, as an ‘invalid’s 
paradise’. Many wealthy types, who made the voyage for their health, would remain in 
the colonies and become involved in politics and migration control.
105
 Ideas of 
restricting immigration on health grounds would rankle some, although not when it 
came to mental disease. Some altruists imagined the climatic benefits of New Zealand 
as open to all classes. Clergyman Thomas Henry Braim wrote that the working poor, 
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‘constitutionally quite unfitted for living in England,’ would live longer in New 
Zealand.
106
 When, in 1874, four times New Zealand Premier, William Fox mooted the 
idea of developing hydropathic resorts he envisioned dual benefits.
107
 Using them 
alongside hospitals and asylums, he suggested, could ‘alleviate much human misery’, 
and make New Zealand the sanatorium of the world.
108
  
In reality, these benefits were only open to visitors who would not become 
public charges. One such health tourist, Dr John Murray Moore was so impressed with 
how the Rotorua hot springs region improved his ‘much broken down health’, that he 
wrote a guide to the region.
109
Although much of it detailed the physical benefits of spa 
treatment, he also advocated how ‘mental faculties’ would improve. Those ‘slow, 
unintelligent, and depressed in England’ he wrote, would be transformed to feeling 
‘quick, lively, hopeful and energetic’.110 Moore’s target readership was clearly expected 
to have money. He advised them to plan their trip around the seasons and make time to 
enjoy ‘town society and varied amusements’.111 Those of a nervous disposition, he 
countered, should plan to avoid the humidity in Auckland, because it could trigger 
restlessness and insomnia.
112
 Presumably, if wealthy enough, these nervous types could 
seek treatments in one of the rare private asylums, where the clientele were admitted 
based on whether they could pay.
113
 Regardless of social standing, inhabitants were 
expected to be self-sufficient, either through paying for their own treatments, or relying 
on mutual support. In these so-called white men’s paradises, newcomers were expected 
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to be responsible for their own health, in terms of preventing it, or paying for its 
treatment.
114
 
 Whether they were passenger or steerage class, all emigrants were subject to 
quarantine controls. This is another essential medical sphere which needs to be 
understood as part of British world administration. Quarantine practices were 
introduced, like other legislative systems, as part of the development of administrative 
government. Although concerned with infectious disease, this is relevant to this study 
because, as Bashford states, the regulation of vessels evolved into the control of 
individuals.
115
 Furthermore, these practices necessitated the creation of port health 
officers, who, crucially, would be one of the main actors involved in identifying the 
arriving ‘mentally ill’. Much of the existing historical research has considered the 
mechanics of infectious disease control at Australian ports.
116
 There is a gap here as 
regards to New Zealand operations. As Linda Bryder has pointed out, public health and 
national identity have not been explored in the New Zealand context.
117
 We can see 
however that the quarantine framework that was rolled out in the Australian colonies 
was also employed in New Zealand. 
 The first Australasian replication of British quarantine legislation occurred in 
New South Wales in 1832. Although the British government’s priority was the free 
movement of trade, the fear of cholera necessitated quarantine controls at Port 
Jackson.
118
 This early system relied on the ship’s master informing the customs officer 
who then had to locate a doctor to confirm the existence of disease. The first in-situ port 
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health officer was appointed in 1838 to reduce this delay. This official boarded the 
vessel with the customs officer in order to decide whether to quarantine the ship or grant 
pratique, the permission to proceed to wharf and unload. Increasingly the quarantine 
process-which meant fumigating the ship its contents and passengers-was performed at 
separate quarantine stations, often on isolated locations such as islands, or headlands.
119
 
Over the nineteenth century eleven quarantine stations were created around the coast of 
Australia.
120
   
 Although they were designed in response to infectious disease, these procedures 
set the precedence for the identification of ‘mental illnesses’ in individuals. The 
quarantine controls relied on using medical questionnaires and the honesty of the ships 
masters and surgeons to report any ill-health in their passengers. Crucially, this placed 
the port health officer at the forefront of border control. While attempts to control the 
entry of prohibited immigrants would evolve into a more complex process, it remained 
reliant on the port health officer. Surviving health reports from the mid-nineteenth 
century indicate that the officer was tasked with only monitoring ‘epidemical, 
contagious or infectious disease’.121 However, by the early twentieth century, this 
Australian paperwork also referred to considering ‘mental disease’, and the same border 
officials administered both the Quarantine and Immigration Acts.
122
  
 By the end of the nineteenth century Australian and British maritime disease 
control differed. From the 1870s British provisions instructed that only the infected 
individuals were removed to hospitals.
123
 Although New Zealand quarantine controls 
have not received the same historiographical attention it is likely they followed 
Australian conventions. In 1842 the New Zealand Ordinance to provide for the 
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Regulation of Harbours enabled the Governor to appoint regulations, officers and 
quarantine stations.
124
 While the role of customs officer was to collect import duties, the 
responsibility to order quarantine lay instead with the harbourmaster.
125
 In 1862 a Chief 
Marine Board was established to oversee port operations and became responsible for 
issuing quarantine regulations.
126
  
 By the 1870s the role of port health officer in New Zealand had been aligned to 
that of their Australian counterparts. Like in the Australian colonies, the New Zealand 
port health officers were made responsible for eliciting a written account of health from 
the ships’ masters. After performing a medical inspection if necessary, the port health 
officer would either award the ship a clean ‘bill of health’ or detain it for quarantine. 
Again this decision rested on whether the presence of infectious or contagious disease 
was a danger to public health.
127
 As in Australia, each of the main port cities in New 
Zealand had island quarantine stations.
128
 By 1901 the district health officers could also 
act as port health officers.
129
 Public health and quarantine provisions in New Zealand 
were, as in Australia, geared towards infectious disease. 
 The role of these Australasian port health officials should not be underestimated. 
They became part of the systems of the immigration control pertaining to the mentally 
and morally undesirable. Jean Foley’s examination of the individuals based at Port 
Jackson highlights a number of key points. Many individuals had extensive naval or 
military medical experience. Some also held key administrative positions on medical 
advisory boards pertaining to public health or immigration, so would lobby for 
operational improvements.
130
 Through a combination of ‘professional capabilities, 
                                                 
124
 New Zealand Harbours Act 1842, 5 VIC 1842, No. 15. 
125
 New Zealand Customs Act 1841, 4 VIC 1841, No. 3; NZ Harbours Act 1842, 5 VIC 1842, No. 15. 
126
 New Zealand Marine Boards Act 1862, 26 VIC 1862, No. 20, Section 29. 
127
 New Zealand Public Health Act 1876, 40 VIC 1876, No. 60, Sections 62-66. 
128
 ENZ online version: Helen Keyes & Carl Walrond. 'Biosecurity - Definitions and history', [accessed 2 
March 2015].   
129
 New Zealand Public Health Act Amendment Act (No.2) 1901, 1 EDW VII No, 61, Section 9. 
130
 See Foley, ‘Maritime Quarantine Versus Commerce’, p.155. 
 52 
 
public appointments and social standing’ they achieved a level of colonial authority.131 
Auckland port health officer Dr Thomas Philson likewise held a number of key medical 
roles, including provincial surgeon and hospital superintendent.
132
 Because Australasian 
cities were built in maritime locations, the influence of these port officials is not 
surprising.  In terms of British world administration these health officers were crucial to 
border control although, as this study will show, they were far from infallible.   
This section has highlighted the key professional roles and structures through 
which migration control would emerge. It has shown that despite the usual replication 
of British legislation, some areas evolved in response to colonial conditions. The 
expansion of Greater Britain meant keeping these ‘peripheries free of the irrational, 
effeminate, infantile, criminal or idiotic’.133 While the authors of the booster literature 
espoused these ideals, colonial administrative systems upheld them. The colonial 
medical and welfare structures were not designed to provide for the ill and needy, 
although the reality was that they had to. Categorising the undesirable in order to 
manage them would increasingly trouble administrators in the colonies. This labelling 
would become progressively complex and focus on the newcomers who did not 
conform to the colonial ideal. The doctors and intellectuals involved with British world 
professional networks would engage further with wider scientific theories.  
Categorising Worthiness 
 
 
Ideas about who would best populate the burgeoning Australasian settlements emerged 
properly when reformers started to advocate assisted emigration. In the first decades of 
the nineteenth century metropolitans viewed those who emigrated, forced or otherwise, 
with contempt. While convicts were described as ‘an excrementitious mass,’ early free 
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migrants fared little better.
134
 In 1816 The Times divided emigrants into two types: 
pauper fools and ‘malignant outcasts with base natures’.135 When Wakefield began to 
formulate his ideas for systematic emigration he also noticed that this ‘passion for 
distinctions’ existed in colonial society.136 This observation is important. Throughout 
this thesis we find evolving attempts by colonists to categorise the worthiness of the 
immigrants. Concerns over pauperism merged with ideas about hereditary traits, 
including so called ‘mental defects’. Thus began an on-going attempt to delineate 
immigrants according to their physical and mental capacities. As such, this section 
considers two overarching themes. First, it examines how the need for labour in the 
colonies was increasingly tempered with ideas about character suitability. Second, 
attention is given to the wider concepts of human taxonomy and degeneration doctrines 
emanating from Europe. This approach is necessary because both sets of influences 
would create the environment in which the ‘morally’ or ‘mentally’ unfit were 
unwelcome.  
Dividing the Newcomers: Colonists and Migrants 
 
 
Wakefield’s observation displays how colonial societies were built on social hierarchies 
prior to the rise of degeneration theories. He noted how free emigrants claimed they 
were superior to convicts who, once freed, distanced themselves from those still serving 
time.
137
 This penchant for ‘distancing’ was also evident amongst colonists who would 
later call for the exclusion of immigrants, regardless of their own roots. Many who had 
achieved success had arrived in straitened circumstances, an irony which would be 
raised time and again in parliamentary debates about immigration restriction. 
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 While some early free migrants sought to define themselves as colonists as 
opposed to emigrants, the social convention was to define anyone travelling in steerage 
as emigrants, and those in the cabins as passengers.
138
 Some tried to hide their social 
status. Church of England Minister, John Davies Mereweather, scorned how a recent 
arrival attempted to distinguish herself from her fellow immigrants by describing herself 
as feeling ‘quite colonial’. Mereweather found this pretentious because generally most 
newcomers had ‘been driven from their homeland by hunger or crime’.139 Thomas 
Cholmondeley likewise saw the act of migration as a levelling experience. Writing 
about how his moneyed friends had considered themselves better than the emigrants 
below deck, Cholmondeley countered that all newcomers had to go through the same 
transition, and were only to be considered colonists once they decided to stay.
140
  
The earliest concerns about the standards of immigrants related to the fear of 
Britain shovelling out her paupers from the workhouse system. Some organisations 
however actively condoned this type of immigration. The Australian Patriotic 
Association, for example, promoted the immigration of convicts and paupers as 
mutually beneficial.
141
 Presbyterian minister John Dunmore Lang agreed that the 
‘enormous and alarming evil’ of paupers accumulating in workhouses should be 
assisted to migrate, but only if able-bodied.
142
 He also expressed concerns about how 
land-squatters in part of Australia had so-far recruited labourers ‘destitute of every 
moral and religious principle’.143  
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Lang’s concern about physical and moral attributes reflects how, from the mid-
nineteenth century, ideas about desirable migrants became more complex. This change 
coincided with the increasing focus on areas being opened up for free settlement. Not 
only were migrants meant to be physically fit, but mentally and morally too. When 
systematic emigration began properly in the 1840s these requirements were described 
invariably as being honest, industrious, of sound body, and, in the first attempts to 
define good mental health, of ‘sound mind’. Amongst the idealisation literature, which 
by the 1870s had become popular, many reflected on how those who had succeeded as 
colonists had done so based on their industrious habits, regardless of whether they 
arrived without financial means.
144
  
The idea of having moral backbone should not be overlooked when considering 
how views about ‘mental illnesses’ in immigrants developed. Although pro-migration 
intellectuals did not directly reference the contemporary labels of insanity or idiocy, 
those who did not conform to the cornerstones of Victorian society - strong will, 
character and industry - were regarded as morally dysfunctional.
145
 The ‘ne’er-do-well’, 
the wayward younger sons, ejected from wealthy British families, were the first class of 
immigrants derided for their ‘mental deficiencies’.146 The rise of theories about hidden 
defects would emerge in debates about migrant suitability, especially because some who 
had been selected for having sound minds would arrive in the colonies in states of 
insanity or develop mental illnesses on arrival.  
By the 1880s the idea of pauperism in immigrants clearly drew on concerns 
about hereditary traits and economic suitability. This link is evident in how the 
Emigrants Information Office described the colonial immigration restrictions then in 
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place. In 1889 they began to report on this legislation as ‘Statutes Passed by the 
Colonies to Restrict Pauper Immigration’.147 This legislation was aimed at preventing 
the entry of those thought likely to become public charges for a variety of physical and 
psychological reasons, the so-called lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind or infirm. 
Likewise Charles Dilke revisited his idea of Greater Britain and bemoaned how, in 
contrast with the older streams of men with ‘pluck and energy’ the less desirable types 
were trying to emigrate.
148
 While colonial success had been originally promoted as open 
to those with the required verve, ability and attitude, this ideal was no longer viable. 
This belief had declined in line with the ideas of degeneration emanating from Europe 
which had informed those who sought to protect the ideal white, healthy Australasian 
populations. 
‘Efficiency and Empire’: From Degeneration to Eugenics 
 
 
The increasing attempts of the Australasian colonies to improve their population 
coincided with European concern about the so- called cult of infirmity. In 1901 
polemical British journalist Arnold White equated this deficiency with the urban lower 
classes of ‘undersized, street-bred people’.149 He warned how the ubiquity of this group 
could lead to the loss of the British Empire, because areas ‘won by a hardy people’ 
could ‘scarcely be held by invalids’.150 To counter this degeneration, White wanted to 
revive the ‘production of sound minds in healthy, athletic and beautiful bodies’.151 
While his book has been described as the British eugenic movement’s central text, it 
was available in Australasia in various formats.
152
 White contributed an article of the 
same title, alongside Charles Dilke’s ‘The Century in Our Colonies’ in The Imperial 
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and Colonial Magazine and Review.
153
 Indeed, although White’s perception was based 
on the British lumpenproletariat, similar sentiments existed in relation to the 
Australasian urban areas. The expansive rural regions were, in contrast, favoured as the 
locations in which to ‘reshape a new breed of rugged imperial subjects’.154 
 Scholars have identified the extent and locations of the eugenic practices in 
Australasia.
155
 As Stephen Garton has highlighted, Australians and New Zealanders 
actively sought to protect their population from internal and external threats.
156
 In the 
white settler colonies, degeneration became a broad cultural movement because it fed 
into the concern about public funds supporting the unworthy and incapable.
157 
These 
themes should therefore be considered as another virtual bridge of information reaching 
the Australasian peripheries. One transnational link in particular has not been properly 
considered, the use of the term stigmata of degeneration. Coined by Italian 
criminologist Cesare Lombroso, it was used in United States immigration control and 
subsequently in Australian attempts to align their practices with those in North 
America.
158
 As such, in order to understand this type of language, it is necessary to 
frame the development of degeneration doctrines in relation to the mentally and 
behaviourally undesirable. 
 Wakefield’s acknowledgement of how people sought to distinguish between 
types of people had a more sinister, pseudo-scientific connotation in other spheres. The 
attempts to categorise racial standards began at the end of the eighteenth century. The 
anthropological, ‘race-science’ distinctions have been well documented. By 1774 
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Swedish botanist Carolus Linnaeus developed his taxonomy - a classification scheme - 
of animal and plant species.
159
 Subsequent attempts to categorise humans led to theories 
that linked physical appearance with behavioural characteristics. To this end Peter 
Camper developed ‘facial angle’ theories, and more famously Johann Blumenbach 
measured skulls, to conclude that the Caucasian race represented the highest level of 
development.
160
 This superiority was in turn, distinguished according to heredity. The 
rise of anthropological charting led to studies of white peoples’ heritage.161 The study of 
‘differences’ became a major preoccupation of physical and social scientists in the 
nineteenth century, of whom Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer are perhaps the most 
well-known.
162
 
Within this intellectual fixation with categorisation, a research area emerged 
which linked intellectual capability with heredity.  European psychiatrists began to 
consider ‘mental illnesses’ as having genetic components, thus passed between 
generations and causing degeneration within family trees.
163
 Benedict Morel, having 
studied ‘outward incurable monstrous anomalies’ in ‘cretins’ developed his 
dégénérescence concept. This idea of degeneration became increasingly equated with 
physiognomy, the attempts to identify inbuilt inefficiencies according to facial 
characteristics.
164
 Robert Knox’s 1850 Races of Men and Daniel Mackintosh’s 1861 
Comparative Anthropology of England and Wales used such ‘techniques’ to chart the 
mental and moral characteristics of mankind.
165
 The British Anthropological Society 
was founded in 1863 and some members debated the ways in which ‘idiocy’ could be 
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identified. 
166
 French psychiatrists concentrated on facial features in their on-going 
attempts to identify degeneration.
167
 In 1876, more famously, Italian Cesare Lombroso 
documented faces of criminality in his L'uomo delinquente. It was in this work that 
Lombroso defined stigmata of degeneration as features which distinguished the 
‘criminal’ from the ‘insane’.168  Francis Galton derived the term eugenics in 1883 from 
a combination of the Greek eu (good or well) with genesis (to be born), to represent 
selective breeding.
169
 
Australia and New Zealand absorbed these ideologies into their attempts to 
develop healthy and efficient populations.
170
 These influences are relevant to this thesis 
for two main reasons. First, degeneration became associated with those seen as 
reflecting the ‘disorder of society’ particularly the undesirable immigrants.171 As such, 
individual cases of immigrants found to be ‘insane’ merged with panic over the 
collective undesirability of newcomers; be it due to their ill-health, or bad behaviour.  
Second, eugenics determined that some human types were more valuable to the nation-
state and future generations.
172
 This meant that as massive labour movements prompted 
ever tighter restrictions, migration control included eugenic aims and methods.
173
 These 
influences will be unpicked in the latter chapters of this thesis. Furthermore, by the end 
of the nineteenth century the Australasian ‘social laboratories’ were imagined as regions 
untainted by European degeneration.
174
 Degeneration was associated in particular with 
immigrants who had appeared ‘normal’ enough on departure but whose health had 
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deteriorated by the time they landed. As such, the mainly British-trained psychiatrists in 
the colonies followed the anxieties of the British and the North Americans about the rise 
of the so-called ‘feebleminded’ that were difficult to identify.175  
We need to be careful of over-generalising this influence in relation to migration 
control.  Although Australasian psychiatrists forged close links with international 
eugenicists, this was more obvious in Australian immigration legislation than in New 
Zealand’s. Both countries did, however, engage with eugenic theories in terms of their 
existing populations. Francis Galton advised eugenics enthusiasts at the first joint 
Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) conference held in 
1888.
176
 At this gathering a special committee was created to establish psychological 
measurement programmes in order to ‘preserve the standards of the parent race’.177 This 
type of intelligence testing persisted, mirroring United States methods.  New Zealanders 
were active in employing eugenic theories and methods on a domestic level, as were 
their Tasman neighbours.
178
 By the 1920s Australian eugenicists such as R. J. A. Berry 
used these methods at children’s hospitals to identify levels of ‘mental deficiency’.179 
Other Australians sought to make the link between intelligence testing and migration 
control more explicit. In 1925 A. H. Martin presented his ideas on how to use 
psychological techniques in examining immigrants to the Australian Association of 
Psychology and Philosophy.
180
 In terms of migration control however, New Zealand did 
not reach the same level of overtly eugenic policy. 
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Australian immigration officials attempted to employ United States methods and 
terminology.  In 1914 efforts were made to include ‘stigmata of degeneration’ as an 
indicator of immigrants’ poor mentality. American usage of this phrase had developed 
alongside European degeneration theories. In 1875 American phrenologist Samuel R. 
Wells wrote how mental deterioration, including ‘idiocy’, ‘insanity’ and a ‘nervous 
temperament’, were indicated by the ‘degradation of physical structure’.181  By the end 
of the century Eugene S. Talbot, in reviewing the existing work on the topic, surmised 
that stigmata of degeneration were most obvious in the face, jaws and teeth, ear, eye, 
cranium, body and bodily functions.
182
 By 1905 the phrase had transferred to United 
States immigration control. Thomas Salmon of the Public Health Service advised his 
Ellis Island staff to check for the ‘well-marked stigmata of degeneration’ including 
‘unduly animated, vacant or abstracted expressions’.183 In 1914 Howard Knox also 
highlighted facial peculiarities, such as states of sullenness and facial tics as indicating 
‘mental deficiencies’.184 It is not surprising then that in 1914, Australia’s Chief Medical 
Officer, after returning from his worldwide survey of immigration restriction 
operations, including the United States’, made reference to the ‘marked stigmata of 
degeneracy’.185 The use of such a phrase speaks volumes about how transitional theories 
and operations were in existence across the British world. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has identified the structures and ideologies which frame this thesis. It has 
introduced the influence of British, European, and to a certain extent United States, 
policies and practices. It is clear that the fluctuating relationship between Britain and her 
Australasian colonies was a complex one. The transformation of the initial informal 
settlements to self-governing democracies was driven by the increasing numbers of 
colonists wanting greater control. And yet, whilst many wanted a less British autocratic 
style of rule, they did not reject their home culture; if anything they recreated a 
concentrated version of it. As it has been shown, it was those living within the 
Australasian regions who replicated British administrative systems. Their independence 
was also built using British institutions of responsible government, education and law. 
Crucially, self-government provided the ability to begin migration control as part of 
colonial state-building. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, this growing nationalism had put the 
colonies on a more equal footing with Britain. As such the perception of colonial 
settlements had changed from being outlying peripheries to essential collaborators in the 
vision of a Greater Britain.
186
 However this region was hardly an exact facsimile of the 
mother country. It was a ‘world without welfare’ where people were categorised 
according to their background and ability to support themselves. From the initial 
differentiation between convict and free migrants, ideas developed around which types 
of new arrivals would succeed. For all classes the ability to work became the main 
criterion. Ideas about industriousness became central to key to ideas about populating 
these areas, whether the process was managed by colony or metropole. European and 
American notions of degeneration and eugenics in turn informed Australian attempts to 
create modernising countries. All of these themes about suitability, including character, 
                                                 
186
 Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain, p. 3. 
 63 
 
morality and mental health, would consistently influence the operations of migration 
control. The next chapter considers the first phase of assisted emigration in which 
administrators sought to prevent those of ‘unsound mind’ from emigrating. In contrast 
colonists would start to complain about the incidences of ‘imported lunatics.’ Thus 
began a set of tensions between metropole and periphery which would remain 
unresolved. 
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Chapter Two: Populating the British World 1830s—
1860s  
 
This chapter examines the evolving systems of migration control which developed in 
response to the opening up of new regions in Australasia for European settlement. It 
expands on the discussion of the replication of British systems to consider the working 
practices which underpinned the management of migration from Britain to Australasia. 
We begin to understand these operations as a network involving actors in the metropole, 
periphery and on the voyage itself. As will become apparent, the practicalities of the 
system relied on British professionals to recruit and transport emigrants. These 
operations were built on the British maritime regulations which evolved as opportunities 
for emigration increased.  
When reformers started to consider some Australasian regions as destinations to 
systematically colonise, the perceptions of which types should populate them changed 
dramatically. Included in this was the idea that migrants should be of ‘sound mind’. 
Assisted emigrants - those who were awarded free or subsidised passages - were 
deemed eligible in accordance with their health, age, character and skills. Although a 
personal selection of migrants was seen as the optimal method of recruitment, this was 
not practicable. Instead migrant selectors were forced to rely on paper certification of 
applicants’ suitability.  It was this reliance on third party subjectivity which would 
consistently trouble colonial administrators. Although this period saw improvements in 
pre-departure inspections and on-board medical care, some migrants would arrive in the 
colonies unfit for work due to their mental condition. Consequently the first complaints 
about ‘imported incurable lunatics’ requiring costly medical and welfare aid emerged.1 
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 While Robin Haines has acknowledged that assisted emigrants in this era were 
subjected to an ‘intricate and methodical scrutiny’ the existing research has not 
considered how this extended to the requirement of having a sound mind.
2
 In order to 
unpick the operational structures through which migrants were selected, controlled and 
increasingly scrutinised in terms of their mental state, this chapter is organised into 
three sections. First we consider how the proponents of systematic emigration attempted 
to recruit people with proven ‘industry, sobriety and good moral conduct’. 3 It was the 
idea of good character alongside physical ability which, in the first part of the 
nineteenth century, formed part of a wider concept of self-sufficiency. These ideals 
would evolve into, and exist alongside, the requirement of being of ‘sound mind’. This 
was the precursor to the subsequent attempts to exclude those perceived to be mentally 
ill. Second, these principles are contrasted with the practicalities of transporting 
emigrants to the Australasian colonies. While the replication of British legislation meant 
that colonial port health officials assessed the state of immigrants on their arrival, a 
further medical role was created. The ship’s surgeon was made responsible for both the 
medical and moral state of their passengers. While historians have traced the evolution 
of this role, in one aspect their responsibilities need to be revisited.
4
 The ship’s surgeon 
played a key part in the messy system of British world migration control.
 
This is 
because their ‘end of voyage’ reports were designed to inform the colonial authorities as 
to the state of the immigrants. However, despite clear direction from British emigration 
authorities on how to do this, this en-route medical assessment was inconsistent. 
Individuals who had displayed so-called insane behaviour on the journey were 
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frequently overlooked in relation to infectious disease or groups engaging in immoral 
behaviour. 
 The third section uses actual immigration cases involving immigrants reported 
to be ‘insane’, ‘hysterical’ or ‘lunatic’ on arrival in New Zealand. These are used to 
show how far the colonists were bound by British practices. The discussions between 
officials in Britain and New Zealand show that, in this era, a tightly managed network 
of operations existed. British administrators reacted to colonial criticism by tightening 
their selection techniques. By unpicking the dialogue between metropolitan and colonial 
bureaucrats it is possible to start building up a picture of British world migration 
control. It was within this British world network that the debate about how to manage 
migrants perceived to be insane on arrival began. 
 
Recruiting Good Characters 
 
 
 
The regulations within the early systematic emigration schemes of the mid nineteenth 
century did not explicitly exclude the ‘idiots’ or ‘insane’. Instead, the all-important 
suitability of migrants was gauged by their ability and desire to work. In these colonial 
worlds without welfare newcomers were expected to be industrious and play their part 
in expanding better-Britains. When Wakefield wrote how best to populate the ‘new’ 
Australasian regions, he envisaged efficient and self-supporting rural societies. Essential 
to this vision was the recruitment of young and healthy married couples.
5
 These ideals 
formed the basis of the burgeoning systematic emigration schemes which became 
operational by the late 1830s. 
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 The creation of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission (CLEC) in 1837 
signified a level of British governmental interest in emigration. Although a limited 
number of assisted passages had been provided since 1832, the creation of this body 
marked the start of migrant recruitment.  Maritime operations also evolved in response 
to concerns about conditions on the voyage itself. From 1815 the British government 
responded to colonial criticism of the state of arriving convicts, by stipulating that every 
convict ship had to have a naval surgeon. This set the precedence for medical care on 
emigrant ships. Furthermore, these surgeons became involved in migrant recruitment.
6
 
In 1837, T. F. Elliot, the British agent-general appointed to oversee the operations of the 
CLEC, appointed naval surgeons to the charted emigrant ships.
7
 His initial plan to have 
these surgeons select the migrants, and then accompany them on the voyage, was found 
to be impractical. Instead separate ship’s doctors, the surgeon-superintendents, voyaged 
to the Australian colonies.
8
 
 Elliot defined the suitability of migrants in terms of being free from disease and 
from immoral tendencies. Intending emigrants were meant to have sufficient character 
for ‘industry, sobriety and good moral conduct’.9 British port officials, like their 
Australian counterparts, focussed on infectious disease. The surgeon-superintendent and 
selecting surgeon were made responsible for the pre-departure mustering of emigrants, 
designed to ensure that ‘no person with an infectious disorder be allowed to proceed’.10 
Those who proved themselves non-infectious benefitted from the other improvements 
implemented by Elliot. He improved on-board provisions for diet and medical care.
11
 
Although practical and altruistic in nature, some of the CLEC’s regulations signified a 
greater consideration of the character, if not the mental health, of the emigrants. Elliot 
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was concerned about how they would influence what he called the moral condition of 
the colonies.
12
 To balance out the gender imbalance in the colonial settlements, he 
advocated the selection of ‘honest families who would raise their children to the same 
correct standard’.13 These traits were also crucial to the success of the voyage. Elliot 
designed instructions for the surgeon-superintendents to ensure the ‘good order of the 
emigrants’ en-route.14  
 The selecting officers found these criteria difficult to fulfil. In 1840 one 
complained that most of those who applied to him for assisted passages did not fit the 
ideal. Many were ‘broken-down-artisans’ or unemployed labourers, ‘distressed by 
misconduct or incapacity’, he protested, and were ‘unwilling to engage with continuous 
labour’.15  Despite problems in matching applicants to these requirements, such ideals 
endured through subsequent emigration provisions. Migration schemes directed by 
either British or colonial authorities continued to define suitability by age, health, 
occupation and character. While different techniques evolved, similar criteria existed 
across all types of migration schemes. The colonial bounty schemes, for example, 
penalised their selecting agents and shipping companies if, on arrival, emigrants were 
found unfit by character, age, health or occupation.
16
  
 The focus on so-called sound minds became more pronounced in the 1840s. As 
new Australasian destinations opened up, the use of third party certification became 
necessary. It is on the pro-forma documents that we get a sense of the evolving 
descriptions about good mental health. Around the mid-nineteenth century this 
requirement was couched in phrases such as ‘mental energy’ or ‘sound mind’.  Unlike 
the travelling selecting surgeon who was able to form a personal opinion of the 
applicants, migrant recruiters started to rely on information from third party referees, 
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such as the applicants’ own local doctors. Thus began the enduring concern about these 
local medical practitioners not properly considering a person’s mental state or whether 
they would prove to be a successful emigrant. 
 The CLEC, seeking to facilitate increased emigration to areas like Port Phillip 
(later Victoria) and parts of New Zealand, defined their health requirements in 1842. 
Their phraseology set the benchmark for the colonially-run schemes. The CLEC relied 
on written verifications regarding character and health, both physical and mental. The 
applicants’ doctors had to confirm them not ‘mutilated or deformed’, nor ‘afflicted with 
disease that would shorten life or impair physical or mental energy’.17 The character 
reference became equally important, as did the suitability of the person providing it. Not 
only was the intending emigrant meant to be ‘honest, sober, industrious, and of general 
good character’, their referee had to declare them as ‘not likely to become a burden on 
the colony’. The need to confirm a lack of pauper tendencies made the integrity of the 
character referees more paramount. The regulations proscribed that these referees could 
not be someone who dealt in alcohol. Furthermore all references had to be verified by a 
magistrate, clergyman or priest.
18
  
 The commercial colonisation schemes similarly sought to recruit labourers of 
so-called sound mind and body for their rural utopian visions. In 1840 the chairman of 
the South Australian Company for example, grandly proclaimed his intention to recruit 
a farming tenantry to replicate ‘the flower of the yeoman of the father-land’.19 The 
British recruitment agents working on behalf of these colonisation companies used strict 
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selection criteria to try to fulfil these ideals.
20
 The regulations for the Plymouth 
Company of New Zealand and the New Zealand Company were based on successful 
land cultivation.
21
 While the land-purchasers only had to provide basic details about 
their ‘age, profession or trade’ their labourers were expected to be physically and 
mentally fit.
22
 Although all applicants were required to be of good character, the 
labouring classes had to be ‘of sound mind and body’.23 
 The method of assessing someone to be of sound mind was not specified in 
these regulations, just that recruiting agents should enquire personally into the health 
and character of the applicants if at all possible.
24
 Yet, despite this preference for 
personal verification, the New Zealand Company’s Superintendent of Emigration, like 
the CLEC, relied on third party references. Each referee was asked whether the 
applicant was ‘sober, honest, industrious, healthy, and, would ‘prove a valuable settler’. 
Religious ministers were also asked to comment on the applicants’ moral character, 
which led to some ambiguous responses. Reverend Haigh spoke of Jacob Batey, ‘I 
know nothing in any way detrimental to his moral character’. Another minister was 
adamant that Thomas Baker’s character was irreproachable, yet added he had been of 
‘low spirits’ but was now recovered.25 Of those noted as rejected for a passage in the 
register of applications,  the phrase unsound mind or body was not used as a reason. 
Instead, amongst these rare instances as in the case of 35 year-old William Ewart, 
rejection was noted as being due to his ‘bad character’.26 This scarcity suggests that 
either the character criterion was flexible, or that referees like Reverend Haigh felt 
compelled to provide vague responses. 
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 A validated good character did not always make a good colonist. Although some 
companies promised to provide work for their emigrants at all times, some labourers 
became incapable of work through illness or circumstance.
27
 The CLEC noticed the lack 
of an organised poor law in the colonies. In 1843 they took steps to caution against 
those likely to become public charges from emigrating. Their Colonization Circulars, 
which included practical advice about land availability and wage rates, also warned that 
local welfare assistance was only given in extreme emergencies.
28
 By 1845 the 
emigration commissioners had tightened their regulations for assisting the labouring 
classes accordingly. In addition to the usual criteria, applicants could not have been 
‘resident in a workhouse or in the habitual receipt of parish relief’.29 Other factors 
enhanced the ideas of suitability, such as literacy levels. Applicants were to specify their 
ability to read and write as ‘very well’, ‘well’, ‘a little’ or ‘not at all’. The CLECs health 
conditions continued to specify that the applicant could not be ‘deformed’, ‘infectious’ 
or ‘afflicted with disease impairing physical or mental energy’. Furthermore, in signing 
the form, the applicant was promising to adhere to ‘general good conduct and 
industrious habits’ in the colonies.30 
 These tightening criteria reflect the increasing desire to control the standards of 
migrants. After New South Wales’ Governor George Gipps called for migrant 
recruitment to be left to their own bounty agents, the British emigration commissioners 
began to reduce their role in the operations of the more developed colonies.
31
 While 
remaining active in publicising emigration opportunities, in 1843 the CLEC further 
clarified their position.  The ‘fitness of migrants’, they announced, was to be determined 
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by the port officials who despatched and received them.
32
 However, by 1847, they were 
still actively facilitating assisted passages to South Australia, through an increasingly 
patriarchal set of regulations. These included what one historian has called ‘checks of 
pauperism’.33 As well as their personal state, the emigrants’ clothing and belongings 
were checked for suitability.
34
  The language relating to sound mind or mental energy 
was couched more negatively. If emigrants were found to have ‘mental or bodily 
defects’ at the time of embarkation they would forfeit their passage.35  Although these 
regulations in part were created to protect the welfare of all on board, they exhibited a 
general mistrust of the emigrants. Those allowed to travel were warned that if they 
‘perversely thwarted’ the on-board rules, they would suffer in the colonies.36   
Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, the benchmarks of migrant suitability had 
been set. The combination of sobriety, industriousness and good character were 
prerequisites across all schemes, whether managed by the British government, 
emigration companies or individual colonies. For all involved it was crucial that 
migrants were fit for work, physically, mentally and morally. The introduction of the 
term ‘mental defects’ into migration control, reflects how the mental condition of 
emigrants had increased as a concern. The term reflects a move away from the emphasis 
on character towards ideas of inherent mental disease which could be triggered by the 
act of migrating. By end of the 1840s, a decade after the start of systematic emigration, 
we find a clear shift towards officials considering the mental suitability of migrants. 
This is not to say that some ships’ doctors had not already noted the effects of 
the voyage on the mental health of individual convicts, sailors and emigrants. Analysis 
of surgeons’ journals has shown how some equated sunstroke with insanity and noted 
instances of ‘emotional breakdowns’, ‘depression’, and passengers becoming 
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‘deranged’.37  In terms of migration control, mental suitability began by being couched 
in terms of ‘being of sound mind’. This likely reflected the legal definition of non-
compos mentis, used to describe those whose mind was not ‘sound’ enough for them to 
be deemed capable of conducting their own affairs.
38
  Regarding migration control this 
phrase was not, as yet, distinguished by levels of unsound mind , whether ‘lunacy’, 
‘idiocy ’or ‘weak mind’. While British maritime controls remained focussed on 
infectious disease, they also started to reflect increasing concerns about mental and 
moral inadequacies in emigrants. This task of monitoring and reporting such traits was 
mandated to the ships’ surgeons. 
 
Enforcing Good Conduct 
 
 
 
The 1849 New Passengers Act enhanced the role of the ships’ surgeons and reinforced 
the pre-departure medical inspection of emigrants.
39
 In response, the CLEC created the 
Instructions to Surgeons of Emigrant Ships which defined their role as ‘enforcing the 
regulations for securing cleanliness, regularity, and good conduct’.40 These instructions 
help us understand the maritime framework within which port officials assessed the 
suitability and health of the departing migrants. There are two key actors on the British 
side to be considered here, the government emigration officer and the ship’s surgeon. 
The British government emigration officers, under the jurisdiction of the CLEC, 
managed the commercial agreements with the shipping companies and ensured that 
ships were seaworthy, properly equipped and sailed punctually.
41
 The ship’s surgeon 
checked the emigrants for ‘disease dangerous to others, or from one likely be 
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aggravated by the voyage’, before allowing them to board.42 After the emigrants had 
spent two nights on board, the emigration officer and surgeon performed the final 
mustering and completed the paperwork which sanctioned the ship’s clearance. The 
surgeon’s administrative role in this procedure was to confirm the number of passengers 
delivered to his charge and that no ‘sickness of consequence’ existed amongst them.43   
 After embarkation, the ship’s surgeon was charged with overseeing the health 
and conduct of the passengers and crew. He was, as one historian has pointed out, the 
‘moral, sanitary, disciplinary, and medical policeman on board’, a role based on the 
assumption that disorder on the voyage was inevitable.
44
 It is worthwhile reflecting on 
the connection between this policing role and that of moral conduct. This is because 
there appeared to be a fine line between immoral conduct and so called insane 
behaviour. In addition to the main concern about preventing or containing infectious 
disease, the surgeon was given instructions on how to acquire a moral influence over the 
emigrants.
45
 To exercise his functions ‘in a firm, yet kind way’, the surgeon was 
expected to define the boundaries between crew and passengers.
46
 This required 
segregating berths according to gender and marital status, and creating a hierarchy of 
responsible people to oversee their fellows. The surgeon appointed berth supervisors in 
the form of constables and, if not already provided by the CLEC, a matron for the single 
women and teachers to promote educational activities.
47
 Activities such as gambling 
were banned; weapons were stored with the captain and any ‘fighting, riotous, or 
quarrelsome behaviour, swearing, and violent language’ was to be stopped at once.48 
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  Although these regulations were no doubt created to ensure on-board comfort 
and safety, the requirement for good conduct had other far-reaching consequences. The 
role of surgeon needs to be more properly understood as part of the network of British 
world border operations. While well behaved emigrants were rewarded with books and 
bedding, more significantly, their good conduct could be noted by prospective 
employers in the colonies.
49
 Likewise, the surgeon and crew received payment only 
after the colonial government was satisfied with their role in maintaining the health and 
conduct of those in their care.
50
 Although the first concern for colonial port officials was 
the presence of infectious disease on board, immigration agents also investigated the 
standards of surgeon, crew and emigrants. These agents scrutinised the surgeon’s 
reports and interviewed the immigrants and ship’s officers.  The opinion of the 
immigration agent, as well as their statistical reports, reached the colonial secretary and, 
eventually, the British emigration commissioners.
51
 In this way the interactions between 
surgeon, emigrants and the colonial authorities bound together British operations with 
those of the colonies.
52
  
While the importance of the surgeons’ reports to the colonists has already been 
noted in terms of their statistical benefits, their content requires greater consideration in 
relation to migration control.
53
 This is because the surgeons’ reports informed the 
colonists’ opinions of the state of the new arrivals on a number of levels. Newspaper 
reporters, if able to board the ship, were sometimes the first to read the surgeon’s 
journals. As such, stories of the success, or not, of the voyage often appeared in 
newspapers the next day.
54
 The arrival of a seemingly healthy ship meant that those who 
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had travelled on it were deemed suitable to contribute to colonial society.
55
 It is telling 
how colonial advertisements for labourers used the same language as the emigration 
scheme regulations, such as applicants having to be ‘of good health and character’.56 
This type of language linked British and colonial maritime administration. This is 
because the surgeon’s report used by the immigration officers to reflect on the 
suitability of the immigrants was, in a sense, a type of character reference. Upon arrival, 
the surgeon’s medical journal and daily log, used to note ‘any remarkable instances of 
the good or bad conduct’, were handed to the colonial authorities.57 A separate arrival 
report, primarily detailing births, deaths and health conditions, enabled the surgeon to 
provide commentary about emigrants’ employment prospects. He also had to raise any 
instances of ‘serious misconduct’ for punishment.58  
Not only were the badly behaved unlikely to find employment they also faced 
possible prosecution. Colonial magistrates were entitled to fine and imprison 
immigrants based on the extent of their misdemeanours.
59
 As such, the CLEC’s warning 
to migrants that if they ignored regulations, their ‘health, comforts and future prospects’ 
would be harmed was no veiled threat. The surgeon’s report on their health and conduct 
would affect their success in finding employment in the colony.
60
 The CLEC were clear 
to state the importance of adhering to the rule. Those who ‘perversely thwarted’ them, 
they warned would suffer because, once in the colony, ‘their conduct during the voyage 
is sure to become known’. Furthermore, while persons shown to have arrived in a 
‘happy and orderly’ ship ‘may expect the best offers of employment’ those who have 
been ‘quarrelsome and refractory will naturally be avoided’.61   
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Despite these warnings, the regulations, and those charged with implementing 
them were not failsafe. The surgeons’ effectiveness was sometimes challenged by their 
peers, superiors and by the emigrants themselves. Historians concerned with infectious 
disease have noted attempts made by the surgeons to conceal or underplay outbreaks.
62
 
The management of ‘mental illnesses’ within this framework adds a further level of 
complexity. It is likely that some emigrants also sought to conceal or play down such 
incidences, thus avoiding the surgeon’s attention. Occasionally emigrants would make 
reference to incidences of ‘mental illness’ in their fellows, using descriptions such as 
hysterics.
63
 However, because such states were often temporary it is likely that, even if 
this was noted by the surgeon, migrants would land without difficulty if their behaviour 
had returned to normal.   
Some of those literate enough to write voyage accounts reflected on the 
ineffectiveness of the maritime controls.  George Hepburn’s account of his family’s 
emigration to Otago, New Zealand in 1850 provided some such insights.
64
 He detailed 
extensively what he considered disrespectful behaviour within both passengers and 
crew, and how the surgeon’s instructions were ignored. And yet, despite the continuous 
fracas, by the time they neared their destination, ‘all hands’, he wrote, were employed in 
scrubbing the decks.
65
 Such a description was indicative of how first good impressions, 
regardless of what had happened on the journey, were part of getting past the port 
officials.
66
 
 Such contradictions remind us that maritime controls relied on the motivations 
of the individuals involved. In terms of the overall maritime framework a number of 
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conclusions can be made regarding the development of migration control. By 1850 most 
assisted emigrants were subjected to a sequence of checks before being considered 
suitable for travel, and were scrutinised throughout the voyage. From a British 
administrative perspective there were a number of actors involved: selecting agents, 
referees, port officials and the surgeon superintendent. All had some responsibility in 
ensuring that only people with healthy physiques, minds and morals could emigrate.  
The ideas of suitability at this stage relied more on good character and lack of 
infectious disease than any other criteria. While regulations made reference to ‘sound 
mind’ or ‘mental defect’ it would be the colonial administrators who would raise the 
concern about imported colonial lunatics. Such instances called into question the 
reliability of British medical checks and the role of the surgeon-superintendents. At the 
heart of colonial concern was how to pay for the medical care of those who ought to 
have arrived fit and ready for work, yet whose physical or mental state rendered them 
incapable. 
 
Seeking Recompense for Public Charges 
 
 
 
So far this thesis has described the different actors involved in British world migration 
control in the nineteenth century. In terms of the medical assessment of migrants there 
were a number of professionals involved. For those who applied for assisted passages, 
local referees provided some sort of character or health certification. The first actual 
inspection of their physical or mental state occurred at port of departure by the surgeon-
superintendent. This same doctor performed some level of health monitoring en route 
and provided health information to the colonial port authorities. At the receiving ports a 
level of quarantine procedures, which focussed on infectious disease existed. 
Immigration officers collated the responses of both the ship’s surgeon and port officials 
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as to the state of the ship and passengers. This system, in its generic version, has been 
represented as Process Chart 1. This diagram shows that in theory, the assessment of 
intending emigrants occurred at a number of locations. Their selection, as per Steps 1, 2 
and 3 took place in British rural or urban settings. The recruitment agents operated 
across Britain and Ireland and used their own judgement, and third party references to 
decide on the suitability of migrants. The subsequent judgements were made by 
bureaucrats operating out of port or maritime locations. Steps 4 and 5 relied on the 
ship’s surgeon to monitor the health of the migrants before and during the voyage. Once 
the ships arrived in colonial ports, it fell to the port officials there to monitor the state of 
the arriving immigrants, as per Steps 6 and 7. Although these assessments occurred 
thousands of miles apart, their outcomes were part of a wider network. As per Step 8, 
the colonial provincial superintendents fed back any concerns to those responsible for 
recruiting the migrants in Britain.  
             This framework relied on, or was a replication of, British operations. However, 
as colonial regions achieved self-government, they became more active in migrant 
control, whether in terms of recruitment, restriction, or a combination of both.  In New 
Zealand the provincial councils, established in 1853, used agents based in Britain to 
recruit migrants.
67
 During the 1850s a combination of schemes existed throughout the 
Australasian region as a whole. The CLEC’s Colonisation Circulars reported on the 
different schemes in use at any one time, including the colonial bounty and nomination 
systems.
68
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 From 1856 the Colonisation Circulars reported on the prevalence of regions 
using ‘bonding’ systems. This mechanism changed the landscape of border control by 
instigating fines on shipping companies for any of their passengers who were deemed 
likely to become public charges. The system of extracting financial deposits from ships 
captains began in New York State at the end of the eighteenth century.
69
 By the mid-
nineteenth century the white settlement colonies started to follow suit. In 1851 the 
Canadian province of New Brunswick made provisions for the arriving lunatic, idiotic, 
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maimed, blind, deaf, dumb or infirm.
70
 The Colonisation Circulars reported on these 
legalities under a section entitled Bonds for Immigrants Likely to be Chargeable to the 
Colony, which they described as being intended for passengers with ‘bodily or mental 
infirmities’.71 The first Australasian colony to enact similar legislation was Victoria in 
1852; the influence of North American legislation on that of Australasia has been 
acknowledged by historians.
72
   
At the same time as the CLEC closely followed such enactments, they reduced 
their role in assisted migration. In 1859 they removed themselves entirely from migrant 
recruitment for New Zealand. Due to the existence of provincial agents based in Britain, 
the commissioners reported that they would no longer interfere in emigration to New 
Zealand, except to ensure that the provisions of the Passenger Act were carried out.
73
  
Crucially the CLEC’s techniques set the benchmark for colonial operations. As the 
colonies took responsibility for their own immigration, they adopted the same 
standards.
74
 Unassisted emigrants travelling in steerage on private ships were likewise 
governed by similar regulations concerning standards of hygiene and behaviour.
75
  
New Zealand’s operations matched those of the CLEC. After the 1863 New 
Zealand Settlements Act enabled the confiscation of more Maori land, the New Zealand 
government sought increased numbers of immigrants to aid expansion. Colonial 
Treasurer Reader Wood, fundraising in London in 1864, was told by Premier Frederick 
Whitaker to focus on the immigrants’ ‘fitness of character’.76 Wood met with the CLEC 
and reported how he was impressed with their system of local agents and ‘responsible 
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medical officers’ on the voyage. After the British Secretary of State for the Colonies 
vetoed the CLEC taking up operations on behalf of New Zealand, Wood re-organised 
the existing British agents into the New Zealand Emigration Board. These agents were 
warned not to select the ‘mere refuse’ of Britain. In order to recruit and supervise 
British migrants, the Board replicated the CLEC’s regulations to the extent that they 
employed the same ships’ surgeons.77  
Despite these British controls, evidence for the New Zealand province of 
Otago’s recruitment shows how colonial administrators began to react to immigrants 
perceived to be undesirable. The Otago Association, an affiliation of the Zealand 
Company, recruited migrants from Scotland, the first of whom arrived in 1848.
78
 By the 
mid-1850s the provincial government had appointed Edinburgh-based agents James 
Crawford and John Auld to recruit and dispatch migrants.
79
 Examining the relationship 
between officials in Scotland and Otago provides a number of key findings. Within the 
concerns about immigrants adding pressure to the already stretched public funds, we 
find instances of so called imported lunatics. The British agents sought to rectify this, 
thus indicating how closely the network of medical administrators and migration 
controllers worked together. This level of negotiation within the British world networks 
would not be seen again until the twentieth century. 
 In Otago, provincial surgeon and superintendent of the Dunedin hospital and 
asylum Edward Hulme, was vocal in his critique of the newcomers.
80
 In 1861 he 
complained to the provincial superintendent John L.R. Richardson regarding the 
incidences of immigrant ships bringing ‘lunatics and others affected with incurable 
diseases’. He noted how the current cases of ‘incurable lunatics – imported’ had 
recently been added to by diseased arrivals on the Storm Cloud. They included a 
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married woman with gastro-enteritis, dysentery and ‘incurable disease of the bones of 
the nose and face,’ which caused Hulme to comment that her effluvia must have been 
‘an intolerable nuisance to her fellow passengers’.81 A tuberculosis sufferer had also 
arrived ‘greatly reduced in flesh and strength’. As such, Hulme stressed to Richardson 
that the selecting agents should be ‘more particular in future’ and suggested that the 
ships’ captains be penalised for bringing in such types.82 This recommendation is likely 
one of the first calls in New Zealand to enact a bonding system like the already-
established Victorian Act.  
 It was not until 1873 that the New Zealand government would enact their first 
immigration restriction. Prior to that, recruitment agents in Edinburgh could only act on 
a case by case basis to the criticisms from Otago. While the annotation ‘forward a copy 
to the agent’ is visible on Hulme’s letter of complaint, later complaints were more 
explicitly dealt with.
83
A number of instances show how Crawford and Auld responded 
to criticism about unsuitable immigrants raised by the superintendents of Otago.
84
 These 
included complaints about diseased immigrants, married women masquerading as single 
women and, what would become a familiar refrain, people who appeared sane before 
they left Britain, but whose mental condition had deteriorated.
85
 In February 1863 the 
agents responded to one such case by seeking advice from the medical referee. This 
doctor, a surgeon based at the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, reported to them that he had 
never observed ‘even the slightest tendency of insanity’ in the woman in question.86  
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 Crawford and Auld’s response to this case of suspected insanity resulted in an 
overhaul of their medical certification process. They went as far to apologise to the 
Otago officials and promised to do all they could to prevent further incidents.
87
 Their 
updated guidelines made the medical referees responsible for considering whether near 
relations of the applicant had ever been ‘affected with insanity’.88 As such, these 
recruitment agents employed the medical theories about hereditary conditions then 
becoming prominent in Europe. It should be speculated that they had links with the 
Edinburgh Royal College of Surgeons, because in terms of migration control, these 
ideas appear progressive for the time. In addition to the prevailing requirement for 
applicants to be sober, industrious, of good moral character, and free from any bodily or 
mental defect, an extra clause was added to the medical certification.
89
 The doctor had 
to confirm that they had ‘no reason to suspect that any relations of the applicant have 
ever been afflicted with insanity’ nor suspected a ‘tendency to insanity from hereditary 
causes’.90 
 Crawford and Auld’s amendments are arguably the first steps taken by 
nineteenth-century migrant recruiters in relation to people pre-disposed to insanity. 
Similarly progressive attempts would not occur until the early twentieth century. And 
yet, despite these steps, the migration of the so-called insane continued. In 1869, 
Superintendent of Otago, James MacAndrew complained more fervently about what he 
called the ‘evil effects of lunatics’ sent there from Britain. Like Edward Hulme, over a 
decade before, MacAndrew informed Auld that he was seeking a ‘legislative measure 
on this subject’. Auld’s response suggests a measure of frankness in their professional 
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relationship. While he thought that legislation was a good idea, Auld informed 
MacAndrew that it would be difficult to put into practice. Despite the changes 
implemented by Crawford and himself six years earlier, he explained that they had 
found that, in every case the colonists had complained about, the certification had 
shown that no ‘insane tendencies’ existed.  The recruiting agents had, he stressed, been 
careful not to select such types.
91
   
 It appears that, within this closely managed network, some financial recompense 
existed to cover these eventualities. Auld reported how Michael Franklin’s ‘mind 
became unsound’ because of adverse weather conditions and rough sea soon after the 
ship had sailed. This had occurred, he explained, despite his medical certificate not 
indicating any ‘tendency to insanity’. Subsequently disembarked at the island of Arran, 
from where he was returned to Glasgow, Auld’s take on the instance suggests that a 
system of financial accountability did exist. As a nominated emigrant, Franklin’s sister 
had provided part of the passage money upfront. Furthermore, the costs of his asylum 
stay were later recovered from the shipping company. Auld wrote to MacAndrew 
expressing relief that Franklin’s insanity was soon detected.92 The context of this is 
debatable. It could refer to Franklin being swiftly removed for treatment, or more likely 
that the shipping company was responsible for providing the costs of his maintenance. 
The question of whether a system of financial recompense existed is further 
complicated by Auld’s response to the case of Miss Cullinan.  She, like Franklin, had 
passed the medical checks and had been guaranteed by her brother in Otago. Unlike 
Franklin however, Cullinan reached Otago requiring medical care. Because Auld could 
not elicit a response from the British doctor who had provided her reference, he 
expressed some concern about its validity. He proposed to MacAndrew that Cullinan’s 
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brother be made ‘responsible to the government for the expense and loss occasioned to 
them’.93 Whether this referred to a provision within the migration regulations or to the 
usual attempts to extract maintenance from relatives is unclear. It is obvious that Auld 
was becoming less confident about the medical regulations pertaining to ‘mental 
illnesses’. He expressed a sense of not being able to completely stop these occurrences 
but suggested that better questioning of those in the colony who had nominated their 
friends and relatives should help. Auld also suggested that despite all available attempts 
to identify these types, an ‘unhinging of minds’ in some immigrants may be inevitable. 
This may result from the ‘feeling of dread on leaving the country for an unknown 
land’.94  
 Auld suggested this inevitability after a series of such problematic cases. In 
addition to the ones just detailed, by far the most complex case involved Elizabeth 
Wilson. Arriving at Dunedin in May 1869 Wilson’s ‘mental health’ was deemed to be 
so poor that she was admitted to an asylum, and as it transpired, never released. The 
circumstances of her case piqued the interest of journalists who used it to highlight the 
lack of legal border controls. The lengthy correspondence between MacAndrew and 
Auld highlights their confusion about how to manage the financial implications of 
immigrants requiring asylum care. Wilson’s case also displays the different terminology 
employed by border and medical administrators in relation to ‘mental illness’, many of 
whom expressed a level of sympathy towards her plight. It also shows how migration 
administrators were becoming fully aware as to insanity being triggered by the stresses 
of the voyage itself. 
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 Wilson’s state on arrival was initially overlooked in the first reports of the 
arrival of the clipper Peter Denny from Glasgow into Port Chalmers in May 1869. The 
Otago Daily Times reported the success of this voyage as ‘more of a pleasure trip than 
anything else’. The ship made a speedy and ‘splendid passage’, and all 46 passengers 
were in ‘good health’. Furthermore, the surgeon-superintendent had performed well, 
and both he and the captain were given testimonials to reflect their ‘kindness and 
courtesy’ shown to the passengers.95 And yet, a second account contradicted this 
glowing report somewhat. A so-called ‘unfortunate lunatic’ was found amongst the 
female passengers. She had apparently been ‘surreptitiously placed on board by a 
medical gentleman’ who thought fit to take advantage of the ‘absence of any penal 
enactment in this colony’. Accordingly the newspaper, although expressing some 
sympathy towards her plight used the case as another example of this ‘type of fraud’, 
against which legislature was required.
96
 
Whether this opinion had originated from James MacAndrew is unknown, but 
the superintendent acted quickly to berate James Auld in Edinburgh. Thus began a 
debate between them which rested on the question of who was culpable of assessing 
Wilson as sane enough to travel, and who should pay the maintenance for her treatment. 
Throughout this correspondence the language employed to describe her mental state 
varied, a further indication of how colonial response to the so called ‘imported lunatics’ 
was inconsistent. While the response of journalists had been to describe Wilson as a 
lunatic, the legal paperwork provides the medical responses to her condition. The two 
medical opinions as to her mental state were provided on 14 May 1869. The legal ‘facts 
indicating insanity’ rested on how long she thought she had taken to travel to New 
Zealand.  Wilson told one doctor, Robert Burns, it had taken eight years, and the one 
who provided the second opinion, Edward Hulme, twelve. Subsequently they reported 
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that because she did not know which month it was, her memory was therefore, 
defective’. 97 
Wilson’s condition had not escaped the notice of the ship’s surgeon who 
testified to her ‘obscene language’ and ‘dirty and disgusting personal habits’. The same 
day the Justice of the Peace signed the order for admission to the asylum. This 
paperwork stated that Wilson was ‘suffering from dementia’ and that her bodily health 
was poor.
98
 Her symptoms were listed in the asylum entry log as loss of memory, a 
tottering gait, and ‘dirty habits’. The asylum sources detailed how her condition 
worsened at night when she would howl, shake and make what were described as 
‘hideous’ noises. These records also stated that she had been in the same state upon 
departure from Scotland and she had been sent to Otago to ‘avoid being a trouble to her 
friends’.99 In addition while her bodily state had improved by 26 July, her mental state 
had not.
100
 Accordingly, unlike the other cases of those who appeared insane on arrival 
but recovered, Wilson’s state rendered her as requiring intuitional care. 
Auld’s initial response was to deny any knowledge about Wilson’s state and 
blame the British port officials for sanctioning her emigration. His concern was how she 
had passed the pre-embarkation checks and, prior to that, had gained medical 
certification. Auld found that the shipping company were, like himself, attempting to 
trace the doctor who had signed the medical certification, a Dr Weir.
101
 The fact that the 
ship’s medical officer had allowed Wilson to embark suggests a number of possibilities. 
She either appeared well at that time, or because already certified as fit, she would have 
gone undetected in the hasty on-board medical inspections. When Auld reviewed Weir’s 
certification he expressed concern about the doctor’s reference because, despite him 
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‘occupying a respectable position in Glasgow’, he had not explained how he came to 
know Wilson nor had described her previous history.
102
     
 Determining culpability was made more complex because it transpired that Weir 
had asked a fellow doctor, Dr Paterson, to provide another set of certification. This 
unusual step promoted Auld to speculate that Weir must have suspected Wilson to have 
an ‘unsound state of mind’.  Indeed, Weir had described Wilson as ‘eccentric’ and 
because was ‘liable to be taken advantage of’ was better off living with friends in 
Otago.
103
 Auld thought this idea absurd, commenting that if Weir had any interest in her 
welfare, he would not have sent her unaccompanied to a distant land, with insufficient 
means.
104
 As it was later made clear, Paterson had not sanctioned Weir’s idea, instead 
suggesting Wilson have a change of scene, not abroad, but to a family in the countryside 
where she would benefit from a ‘good and cheerful society’.105 Paterson went as far as 
making a personal offer to take Wilson in himself, and when informed that she was 
actually abroad, expressed great surprise.
 106
  
 What would turn out to be a three month investigation hinged on who should 
cover Wilson’s asylum fees? Although Auld disparaged Weir’s intention to send her to 
Otago, he informed MacAndrew that there was no evidence of ‘any criminal act’. 
Neither could he find any legal grounds for holding the shipping company responsible 
for returning Wilson to Glasgow. Auld did concur with MacAndrew that the provincial 
authorities should not be responsible for her maintenance so she should be sent back to 
the Scottish parochial authorities. Regardless of her background, Wilson clearly was too 
ill to take up her proper place in colonial society. Weir continued to deny knowledge of 
any predisposition, although did confess to having known her for ‘some years’. During 
this time he had helped her financially when she succumbed to ‘indigent 
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circumstances’. It was because of her periodic destitution, Weir tried to explain, that 
when Wilson and her friends started to plan to emigrate to Otago he had condoned the 
idea. Responding to Auld’s questioning about her mental state he stressed that he 
believed her to be in a ‘fair state of health, mental and bodily’. He had not known her to 
be intemperate and, to his knowledge she never had ‘delirium tremors’.  If Wilson had 
ever been ‘insane’ Weir conceded, she must been ‘quite recovered for a long period of 
time’.107 Although disappointed at the outcome of Wilson’s migration, Weir maintained 
that he ‘could not pretend to account for it’.108 Despite admitting that he had not 
involved Paterson with the plans for Wilson’s emigration, Weir thought that his fellow 
doctor would have approved, because he likewise believed her ‘perfectly sane’.109 
 Without any provincial regulations to deal legally with this case, it fell to Auld 
to decide the outcome. After taking private steps to ‘ascertain Weir’s character’ he 
informed MacAndrew that it was difficult to prove that he had acted from improper 
motives. Although concluding that Weir had not been candid with Paterson, Auld found 
that his only action was to reprimand the first doctor. In terms of Wilson’s situation the 
only option available was to send her back to Glasgow where she would be assessed by 
the Inspector of the Poor.
110
 He did not, however, provide any instructions as to how to 
facilitate such a return.
111
 Nor did it happen. Elizabeth Wilson died in Dunedin Lunatic 
Asylum on 20 November 1871 due to ‘general paralysis from softening of the brains’. 
She had been there since May 14 1869.
112
 How her treatment was paid for is not known, 
nor is the detail of her sad demise, although her symptoms are commonly held to have 
been consistent with syphilis.  
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From the details of Wilson’s case a number of observations can be made about 
the system of migration administration in New Zealand. Without any national 
immigration restrictions, provincial authorities dealt with the ‘imported lunatics’ on a 
case by case basis. Those who arrived needing medical attention were provided for. 
While some would recover and take their places as capable workers, others, like Wilson, 
would not. The provincial superintendents, like James MacAndrew, had close links with 
their recruitment agents in Britain. James Auld went to great lengths to determine who 
had found Wilson fit enough to travel. This indicates just how tightly bound these 
British world migration operations actually were. While Wilson’s background appears 
particularly complex, attempts to determine culpability did not change her fate. She 
arrived in a state of ‘dementia’ and required costly asylum treatment, seemingly for a 
period of nearly two and a half years. The extent of people involved in her case, and the 
different terms used to describe her state, show how managing the entry and costs of 
those deemed to be mentally ill was a messy affair. And yet, despite MacAndrew using 
these cases to complain about the ‘evil effects of lunatics’; he had no legal protection to 
prevent them entering the country.  
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has shown how, in the space of forty years, controls around systematic 
emigration had tightened. The early utopian ideals of the ideal emigrants displaying 
good character, morals and physique had evolved into more practical concerns. 
Depending on the stage of development of their region, Australasian colonies began to 
focus on newcomers becoming public charges. As such, these concerns were framed 
financially in regions where the indigent fell on the ‘mixed economies of welfare’ for 
support. There is a sense too of evolving terminology regarding ‘pauperism’ and 
‘mental illness’. Whereas the migration schemes referenced ‘unsound minds’ and 
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‘mental defect’, the established legal framework in the colonies meant administrators 
employed legal terms such as ‘lunacy’ and ‘insanity’ to describe what were, in effect, 
the same conditions. 
 Within this period we find the first instance of those who, despite the pre-
departure check, succumbed to the malady of migration. This led, as shown in the case 
of Otago, recruitment agents attempting to consider whether applicants were 
predisposed to ‘insanity’ or ‘lunacy’. However, despite the introduction of new methods 
of medical certification, some were succumbing to what may have been latent 
conditions. The assistance they required in the colonies further stretched the already 
limited local resources. 
 What is apparent is that, despite the hands-off approach to emigration by the 
British government, British officials and administrators played a huge part in 
Australasian migration control.  In effect, by 1850 the ability of British people to 
migrate to the Australasian colonies was subject to multi-layered selection procedures 
and the monitoring of their suitability on the voyage itself. The surgeon-superintendent 
became what should be viewed as a conduit between metropole and periphery. 
Recruitment agents were also key actors in this British world network through which 
ideas about desirability were transferred. And while these discussions may have 
occurred between particular individuals, their concerns were starting to be raised more 
publicly, through newspapers for example. Although the colony of Victoria was first to 
enact legal border controls in the 1850s, by the next decade some colonial 
administrators, like Otago’s James MacAndrew were starting to petition for greater 
protection.  
It was in the 1870s that these concerns would become magnified into a national 
problem. That decade signified a centralising of New Zealand migration control. Not 
only would systematic emigration be organised on a national level, in 1873 New 
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Zealand launched their first immigration restrictions which sought financial recompense 
for any ‘lunatic’ or ‘idiot’ seeking entry. The next chapter will show how, despite these 
two specific provisions representing national attempts to improve the standards of 
immigrants, British and colonial practices came into conflict. As such the level of 
cooperation between the Otago administrators and their British recruiters would not be 
replicated. 
 
 
 94 
 
Chapter Three: Funding ‘Unsound Minds’, New 
Zealand 1870—1876  
 
 
 
Throughout the 1870s, the challenges faced by provincial administrators in New 
Zealand began to be played out on a political level. The incidences of immigrants 
arriving in the country perceived to be insane achieved greater prominence in political 
and medical spheres. As such, the concerns previously raised by provincial politicians 
like Otago’s James MacAndrew became magnified on many levels.  Anxieties about 
immigrants becoming public charges increased exponentially as a result of the national 
assisted immigration schemes which, between 1871 and 1876, brought in 71,000 British 
and European migrants.
1
 The previously private discussions regarding imported 
incurable lunatics emerged into the public domain. The migrant recruiters operating in 
Britain on behalf of the New Zealand government were openly criticised by local and 
national administrators. This period also saw New Zealand’s first immigration 
restriction legislation. The 1873 Imbeciles Passengers Act, as in other parts of the 
British world, sought to appropriate financial bonds for any non-assisted immigrants if 
deemed lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind or infirm.  
 This chapter focuses on how the provincial migration controls were incorporated 
into the national initiatives of the 1870s, the so-called Vogel Era named after Colonial 
Treasurer Julius Vogel.
2
 It was in this decade, only thirty years since the official 
‘creation’ of New Zealand, that politicians started to centralise their administrative 
structures, including border control. This chapter answers the call to investigate the 
immigration legislation in relation to the ‘mentally ill’.3 It also revisits Raewyn 
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Dalziel’s analysis of the evolution of the Agent-General role to highlight how the 
assisted emigrants who arrived in ‘insane’ states became a national problem. The 
provincial port controls and officials employed to assess them on arrival, as presented in 
Process Chart 1, generally remained the same. Furthermore, this new research counters 
McCarthy’s suggestion that no official acts of repatriation occurred.4 It shows how the 
petitioning for the deportation of immigrants did succeed, albeit on an ad-hoc basis.  
Whereas the Otago migration schemes had been tightly managed between 
provincial leaders and their British recruitment agents, the national initiatives were more 
unwieldy. The attempts to induce migration on a far larger scale continued to rely on 
third party certification. This practice became even more derided by New Zealand 
administrators. The New Zealand Agent-General became the focus for the increasing 
tensions between periphery and metropole. It was in this decade that anxieties about the 
newcomers took on a more ominous meaning for the medical profession. As already 
acknowledged, European ideas of degenerative ‘mental states’ were employed in the 
Australasian colonies. In 1875 New Zealand Inspector of Asylums, Duncan MacGregor, 
warned that the nature of ‘mental illness’ had changed from ‘curable insanity’ to what 
he termed the more ‘backward idiots and imbeciles’.5 
 To help us untangle these increasingly messy themes and relationships, this 
chapter is organised into three sections. First, it considers the tenure of Isaac 
Featherston as New Zealand’s Agent-General between 1871 and 1876. Featherston, as 
the London-based chief emigration officer, would be held responsible by his peers and 
superiors for the selection of those perceived as insane on arrival. However, although 
Featherston would be forced to defend his system on a case by case basis, when the 
government reviewed the overall process, one key minister conceded that such instances 
were inevitable. This did not sit well with the local regions that had to provide the 
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assistance for anyone requiring medical care. As such, the question of funding the 
treatment of the incapable took political centre stage, which was particularly apparent in 
the introduction of the Imbeciles Passengers Act (IPA) in 1873. The implementation of 
this is examined in the second part of this chapter. And yet, this legislation was 
designed to control the entry of self-paying passengers from surrounding colonies. It 
was, therefore, mainly redundant in a period when the majority of newcomers were 
British assisted immigrants. 
 The third section exposes the flaws in both sets of migration control - the 
assisted scheme and the IPA - which operated separately from each other. Despite being 
national provisions, their practicalities were ill-defined and evolved only when their 
inadequacies were exposed. The analysis of immigration cases displays how the border 
controls were inconsistent. The officials who we have already met-the customs officers, 
immigration officers and ships’ surgeons-continued to work according to the 
frameworks created decades earlier. They were not given clear advice as to how to 
manage the arrival of those perceived to be insane. The British selection processes were 
found increasingly lacking and colonial administrators, including James MacAndrew, 
continued to lobby for a system of repatriation. As in the 1860s, agreement could not be 
reached on how to fund this, although some migrants, as will be shown, successfully 
petitioned for their own repatriation on the basis that they were they were not fit to 
work. As such, this era was characterised by the lack of clear process for dealing with 
those deemed insane, whether assisted or self-funding. 
 
The Agent-General as Migrant Selector 
 
 
Before revisiting the role of New Zealand’s Agent-General it is important to 
acknowledge that its function as chief emigration officer for individual colonies has 
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been recognised.
6
  Historians have highlighted how Dr Issac Featherston was held 
culpable for the selection of those found unsuitable upon arrival.
7
 This new study is 
unique in how it spotlights the instances of the ‘insane’ in this critique who, Featherston 
argued, appeared perfectly sane before they left. As such, this research should be used 
to bolster the current focus on insanity in migrants being triggered by the act of 
migrating itself. Featherston ironically should also be seen as a medical migrant on a 
number of counts. Medically trained at Edinburgh University, he emigrated to 
Wellington in 1841 seeking to cure his tuberculosis. After practising medicine, through 
journalism Featherstone entered local politics. In 1853 he became the first 
superintendent of the Wellington Province, a post he held intermittently alongside being 
a member of parliament until 1870. That year he was appointed a New Zealand 
Commissioner and sent to London to negotiate with the British government over 
military provisions.
8
 
 This key appointment coincided with political plans to nationalise immigration 
and public works operations, and to diminish the role of provincial leaders.
9
 Driven by 
Colonial Treasurer Julius Vogel, the 1870 Public Works and Immigration Act changed 
the landscape of migration control. Like Featherston, Vogel had moved from journalism 
into provincial politics.
10
 Otherwise, these two men had different political outlooks, and 
for the next six years would frequently clash over the practicalities of migration 
recruitment. Historians have noted how while Vogel was a moderniser, and sought to 
abolish the provinces, Featherston represented the ‘old guard’ parochial politicians.11 
Despite holding opposing ideologies, Vogel appointed Featherston New Zealand Agent-
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General in 1871. Financed by central funds, Featherston was authorised to establish a 
central office and appoint a system of British agents to put Vogel’s plans into practice.12 
These practicalities worked similarly to the provincial schemes by relying on British 
maritime regulations and references provided by the intending migrants’ local doctors.  
Featherston oversaw these operations as the scheme’s national figurehead. As such, he 
was the intermediary between national policy and the local British administrative 
practices. Like with the Otago system, some migrants prone to insane behaviour went 
undetected so were granted assisted passages. Compared to the Otago agents, 
Featherston faced increased levels of hostility towards his working practices, about 
which he remained resolute. He clashed with Julius Vogel who increasingly urged his 
Agent-General to assert control over the third-parties in Britain. 
 The clash between these individuals has been noted, as has the amount of 
criticism aimed at Featherston by New Zealand officials. Now forty years since 
Dalziel’s important investigation of this New Zealand-British diplomatic relationship, it 
is possible to evaluate these tensions in relation to those immigrants perceived to be 
mentally ill. The following section analyses these problematic immigration cases 
sourced from the New Zealand’s Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives and the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives 
(AJHRs). This online repository includes communications and reports documenting the 
work of governmental departments. From these documents it is possible to get a sense 
of the evolving tensions between the officials operating in the periphery and in the 
metropole. Nationally the scheme was designed to recruit those of good moral character, 
of sound mind, free from bodily deformity. But here again we find that the language 
used to describe anyone ‘unsound of mind’ was inconsistent and blurred with rhetoric 
around immoral behaviour. Some New Zealand politicians increasingly bemoaned what 
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they saw as Featherston’s autonomy in Britain. Featherston and his sub-agents would, 
however, consistently justify their practices and, in the case of the ‘mentally ill’, argue 
that migrants had been certified as sane before they left Britain. 
 Like the provincial schemes, Vogel’s national immigration initiative was 
designed to recruit the best of British to assist with the economic development of the 
country.  In 1870 Premier William Fox sanctioned the scheme but stressed that he 
wanted an ‘exceedingly careful selection of suitable persons’, not one which would rid 
‘Great Britain or any other country of its unemployed population’.13 Provincial 
superintendents yielded to Featherston’s overall control, with the caveat that he rejected 
those who did not reach the required standard of sound mind, good health and good 
character.
 14
 With this national initiative came greater attention to the state of the 
arrivals. Migrants continued to be evaluated and supervised - in theory - at embarkation, 
during the voyage and at disembarkation. In a key departure from the provincial 
schemes, a panel of immigration commissioners reported on the outcome of each 
incoming immigrant ship. Their opinion as to the state of each ship and those on it, 
reached the Minister of Immigration, and, ultimately, the Agent-General in London.   
 This increased national focus also drew more attention from the local parties 
who had previously criticised the provincial initiatives. Those in the ports and 
expanding cities continued to experience the arrival of the ‘insane’ first hand. The 
concerns expressed by maritime, asylum and local government officials were magnified 
by journalists, who published synopses of the yearly immigration and asylum reviews. 
Even before the assisted immigrants started to arrive, the concerns of asylum officials 
were reflected on a national level. In 1871 Dr M. S. Grace reported to the Joint 
Committee of Lunatic Asylums about the causes of lunacy in the colony. He described 
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the commonness of insanity as due to the ‘oppressive loneliness’ experienced by 
immigrants ‘depressed’ by the actualities of what had been ‘extravagant anticipations of 
their new home’. These types he found were not ‘organically mad’ so were curable.15 
Whether curable or not, those immigrants who arrived in this state of mind, became 
included in those deemed undesirable. The broad spectrum of ‘mental’ or ‘moral’ 
conditions found in the political reportage indicates the number of different officials 
who reacted to the arrival of the ‘mentally ill’ using inconsistent terminology. At the 
heart of these concerns was colonial anxiety about having to finance any newcomers 
who were incapable of work. 
 Those immigrants who quickly recovered from their ‘insane symptoms’, or were 
met by friends or relatives were more easily assimilated. In 1872 a number of women 
were labelled as displaying various forms of ‘hysteria’ upon arrival. The reaction from 
the port officials suggest that as long as this condition subsided, or the women were 
taken care of, they did not prove a threat. Equally it is clear how the language employed 
by colleagues differed, as did their initial perception of immigrants. When the 
immigration officials first boarded the Charlotte Gladstone which arrived at 
Christchurch in 1872, they reported that the migrants had been well-selected. However 
after reading the surgeon’s report, immigration officer J. Edwin March discovered that 
three women had been hospitalised en route. Two had suffered from ‘frequent hysteric 
fits,’ which in one woman had manifested in convulsions, partial consciousness and 
paralysis. Despite this condition and her being ‘prone to sentimental dreaming,’ March 
concluded that her character was excellent.
16
 Similarly, in Dunedin, the initial report 
about the William Davie suggested that everyone had arrived in excellent health. Again 
once the official reports had been reviewed a different picture emerged. One female 
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cabin passenger had arrived ‘insane’. Despite this specific labelling, an immigration 
officer later reported her as ‘quite well’ after being met by her friends. Her insanity, he 
explained, consisted of a ‘nervous excitement’.17  
   These cases suggest that ‘insane’ or ‘hysterical’ symptoms could be downplayed 
by officials, as long as they displayed the requirement of good character. It is also 
apparent that if the migrants had support networks in place, such as friends or family to 
meet them, they were more likely to be landed. The immigration commissioners also 
displayed a level of subjectivity. Although they reported that a single female suffering 
from ‘hysteric dementia’ had arrived on the Lady Jocelyn, the commissioners’ main 
focus was the incorrect social divisions on board. Due to the lack of available 
accommodation she had been treated in the married women’s hospital, which they 
described as a concern.
18
 Conversely, the commissioners decided to overlook a 
complaint from the Friedeberg’s ship’s surgeon about the immigrants’ behaviour on the 
journey. Although single men had been found in the single women’s compartment at 
night, the commissioners concluded it to be ‘more of a case of frolicsome mischief’ than 
anything else.
19
 
The commissioners were not so accepting of immigrants they deemed unable to 
work. Their perception of physical incapacities brought them into direct conflict with 
Featherston. The Agent-General challenged their complaint about the passage he 
granted to a man who had lost all fingers on one hand.
20
 Featherston argued that 
according to his references the man was able to maintain himself. The medical 
certification stated he could still use that arm, and furthermore, the man’s employer 
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described him as a good agricultural labourer and an honest, sober man.
21
 These were 
not simply disagreements between immigration officials. These types of correspondence 
were passed between government ministers, in some cases the New Zealand Premier. In 
this role between 1872 and 1873, George Marsden Waterhouse complained to 
Featherston directly about those he considered invalids requiring government hand-outs, 
and the physique of married couples not being of the required standard.
22
After further 
complaints about so-called ‘cripples’ and pregnant single women, the immigration 
commissioners mooted ideas about better pre-embarkation medical inspections.
23
 The 
commissioners polite request for ‘closer medical inspections’ to occur was subsequently 
made more explicit.
 24
 By April 1873 Minister of Immigration, George Maurice 
O’Rorke, berated Featherston for the ‘faulty’ system of shipping emigrants. 25  
Featherston persistently argued that he had neither the authority nor the 
resources to change the British operations. Instead, he designed an approval process 
which, like the provincial schemes, relied on third party certification. By March 1873 he 
had appointed 120 local agents across Britain and Ireland to recruit migrants, under the 
proviso that assistance was granted only to those ‘sober, industrious, of good moral 
character, of sound mind, free from bodily deformity, in good health’, and, only going 
to New Zealand with the ‘intention to work for wages’. As with the CLEC’s system, 
migrants found to be infectious or to have any bodily or mental defect were meant to be 
disallowed from embarking.
26
 Featherson’s deputy, Walcott, described this medical 
inspection to his political superiors after viewing it first-hand.  Emigrants were 
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assembled on the deck, he explained, before walking past the port health officer, ship’s 
surgeon, emigration officer and ship’s broker.27 Despite appearing to be a ‘merely 
illusory’ check, Walcott stressed that any suspicious cases were fully investigated and 
ailing  passengers were not allowed to proceed. He went on to assure his superiors that 
the medical inspections were also a ‘matter of anxious consideration’ to his team in 
Britain. Yet without establishing their own depots in which to observe migrants prior to 
departure, Walcott admitted that they could not suggest a better way than the one 
created under the Passengers Act.
28
  
Without the time or finances to have a medical officer inspect each emigrant, 
Featherston had no choice but to rely on the certification and the discretion of his sub-
agents.
29
 Some admitted to their level of subjectivity. C. Carter, the agent who 
processed the Brogden Navvies railway constructors, was asked to explain his selection 
after complaints were made about their conduct on the journey. Admitting that this 
group was ‘rough in their manners and at time unruly’, Carter explained that he believed 
them to be hard-working and honest. Furthermore, he sought to disparage the reputation 
of the ship’s surgeon who had described the navvies as a very bad class. Not only had 
this doctor been present at the mustering, Carter explained, the ships matron had in turn 
described him as the ‘greatest scoundrel’ she had ever met, and had found him 
responsible for causing the bad behaviour. The matron had reported the doctor falling 
on the deck drunk, and openly kissing the women whilst ‘filling their husbands with 
drink’.30 
While such accounts point to the inability of administrators to control the 
standards of migrants, and those they employed to oversee them, provincial politicians 
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had more pressing concerns. Although individuals arriving as so called ‘cripples’ or 
‘hysterics’, were absorbed into local welfare provisions, undesirables arriving en masse 
were more visible. In 1873 the Superintendent of Auckland, Thomas Gillies, reacted to 
the amount of new arrivals requiring local poor relief.  Foreseeing how these numbers 
would likely increase, he asked the national government for instructions as to how to 
provide for the reception and treatment of the sick.
31
 In this set of correspondence we 
get a sense of how colonial moral concerns were increasing as to the state of the 
newcomers. For instance a baby had become a charge upon the province, after being 
abandoned, first by its mother, who had eloped with one of the ship’s crew, then by its 
father.
32
 
 What followed was a clear conflict between national and local perspectives as to 
how to deal with the newcomers. Gillies explained to Premier Waterhouse that, 
although the province did not begrudge doing all they could to relieve the sick and 
destitute, they required financial recompense for this from the national government.
33
 
This request received a terse response from Waterhouse, who argued that the 
government could not be ‘accountable for the maintenance of immigrants who become 
destitute or disabled after their arrival’.34 Gillies re-asserted that he was objecting to 
those who landed in unfit conditions, so the government should not ‘saddle the 
province’ with their upkeep.35 After scolding Gillies for his intemperate language, 
Waterhouse conceded that he could not guarantee that after the long voyage there would 
not be some invalids on board. The Auckland Province should not, the Premier ordered, 
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stop the charitable aid which the other regions were providing.
36
 Undeterred, Gillies 
persisted and raised the same question which had been discussed in Otago in the 
previous decade. Who, he asked, was to be held responsible for the selection of the 
immigrants unable to maintain themselves on arrival? 
37
 It took Julius Vogel, in his role 
as Premier, to deal directly with this question. In 1874 he authorised central funds to 
cover the immigrant welfare costs for one month after their arrival, after which they 
were to be dealt with in the ‘usual manner as colonists’.38 In effect this gave one 
month’s health care to immigrants after which they were expected to be self-supporting, 
or rely as they did before, on local welfare provisions. Because of these extra demands 
on Vogel’s pot of funds, he would increasingly deride Featherston’s British operations.   
 
‘Half Scamps, Half-Lunatics’: Imbecile Passengers Act 1873 
 
 
Alongside the increasing discontent expressed by the provinces about the standards and 
cost of the assisted immigrants, the New Zealand government introduced their first 
immigration restriction legislation. Reflecting the debate about which administrative 
body should financially cover the treatment for incapable immigrants, the new law 
introduced the bonding system. The 1873 Imbeciles Passengers Act (IPA) was copied 
from the colony of Victoria’s 1852 legislation which sought to extract bonds from 
ship’s masters for any non-assisted passengers they carried. Unlike the more subtly 
named Victorian Passengers Act, New Zealand legislators clearly defined the purpose of 
their Act in its title. Analysis of the political debate which led to its implementation 
shows how it was designed to prevent ‘lunatics’ landing from surrounding colonies. As 
such, it should be considered separately from the assisted migration debates. The 
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implementation of the IPA went largely unreported in this early phase. And yet its 
importance should not be underestimated. Not only did politicians concede that it was 
aimed at those who appeared on the borderline between ‘mental’ and ‘moral’ illness, it 
was not really designed to restrict the British. From the political debate a number of 
enduring themes emerged. These rested on how these Act’s provisions would work in 
practice, and whether it would adversely impact relationships with the shipping 
companies who carried the self-paying passengers. 
 When the Imbecile Passengers Bill was first introduced, it was aimed at both 
assisted and non-assisted immigrants.
39
 It took Featherston’s successor as Wellington 
Superintendent, William Fitzherbert, to propose that government migrants should be 
exempt.
40
 Fitzherbert recognised the contrariness of assisting migrants ‘either wholly or 
partly at the expense of the Colony’, only to seek recompense for any subsequent 
maintenance of them. Any migrants who became a charge upon any public or charitable 
institution, he suggested, should have their costs ‘defrayed out of the consolidated 
fund’.41 Colonial Secretary, Daniel Pollen, explained the purpose of the legislation was 
to deal with the ‘half-scamps, half-lunatics’, transported to the colony by their friends. 
These, whom he called mauvais sujets or ‘bad fellows’, ended up requiring medical 
treatment so were distorting the levels of reported ‘lunatics’. This rhetoric, as argued in 
article by this author, matches the wider concern about British ne’er-do-wells being sent 
to the colonies to reform their ways.
42
 Pollen explained the inspiration for the 
legislation. It was copied, he explained, from the Victorian law which had prevented the 
‘introduction of immigrants of that character’.43 
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 Pollen’s description of ‘that character’ incorporated mental, moral and physical 
shortcomings. He blurred ideas about the ‘lunatics’ or ‘insane’ he sought to exclude. He 
explained that the bonding system was aimed at ‘imbecile’ persons because of their 
‘physical defects’. However the case which had prompted the Bill clearly involved 
‘mental illness’. A Fijian ‘lunatic’ had, Pollen explained, been sent by their consul to 
Auckland for treatment. On arrival the man had been ‘taken up in the usual way by the 
police’ and sent to the lunatic asylum. Although Fiji was not made a British colony until 
1874, and the man’s nationality was not described, his maintenance was provided for.   
The Fijian Finance Minister, who had travelled on the same ship as the ‘lunatic’, agreed 
to cover the cost of his maintenance. Pollen recognised this as a lucky coincidence so 
wanted to protect New Zealand from any further occurrences where ‘lunatics’ were 
shipped to the nearest port.
44
   
Pollen’s reasoning was therefore very much framed in relation to excluding the 
‘mentally ill’. Pollen’s colleagues agreed with his premise, but not with what some saw 
as the ‘over-stringency’ of the measure. Some acknowledged the problems dealing with 
the transience of ‘mental’ conditions.  Former New Zealand Premier, Henry Sewell, 
complained that it was not fair to make the captain responsible for a person who had not 
appeared to have been in an ‘imbecile condition or insane’ when taken on board. 
Wellington’s Charles Pharazyn agreed that this ‘innocent party’ should not be punished 
for those who became insane or imbecile during the voyage. He also commented that 
Otago had attempted to enact similar provisions two years earlier but had failed.
45
 This 
suggests that James MacAndrew’s lobbying for repatriation of the so called imported 
colonial lunatics had been considered at a provincial political level.   
Despite these practical concerns as to how the Act would work, Pollen remained 
steadfast. He argued that the provisions would be successful if properly administered. 
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He explained that before the provincial superintendents enforced bonds, they would 
need to hold the right evidence. Furthermore, Pollen asserted, the only party the 
authorities could make responsible for carrying the undesirable were the masters of the 
vessels.
46
 Pollen’s colleagues were quickly convinced. The Bill went through the 
required stages in a little over three days.
47
 On 2 October 1873, An Act to prevent the 
introduction of Imbecile Persons into the Colony of New Zealand, otherwise known in 
its shortened title, The Imbecile Passengers Act 1873 (37 Vic 1873, No. 70) was passed. 
It decreed that within seven days of landing, provincial superintendents were 
responsible for enforcing bonds for passengers deemed lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, 
blind or infirm, and likely to become public charges.  
 The politicians did not discuss the finer details of how the superintendents were 
to be informed about, or prove these instances. Neither did the Act provide further 
definitions about the types it sought to restrict. It did however define those who would 
not be assessed under it; assisted immigrants, shipwrecked sailors, ship’s crew and Her 
Majesty’s forces. Although Pollen had advocated its use against those arriving from 
‘other colonies’ the wording of the Act widened its intent further. Section 2 detailed 
how it could be used for any ‘British or foreign navigable vessel of any kind’ unless 
carrying passengers between internal ports. This meant that self-paying passengers 
arriving from British or Australian ports could be bonded.  
This bonding system signified a greater responsibility being placed on the 
shipping companies. The ship’s master and two local sureties had to provide a £100 
bond, and guarantee that they would pay ‘all moneys or expenses for the maintenance or 
support of each passenger’ to the Colonial Treasurer. If the captain did not comply, he 
faced a £100 fine and the threat of not being able to clear the port. Furthermore the 
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sureties had to prove they were resident in New Zealand and worth treble the amount of 
the bond value. Whether the bond had to be provided as a cash deposit, or was simply a 
written guarantee to cover any costs is unclear from the wording of the legislation.  
Section 3 of the Act described the bond as conditioned to pay the Colonial Treasurer for 
any maintenance up to five years after the passenger had arrived.  Section 4 clarified 
that this maintenance should be provided for out of the money collected. By using 
archival sources relating to the first use of these provisions the following year, it is 
possible to make some sense of their practicalities.  
Although the IPA was New Zealand’s first immigration restriction legislation it 
did not receive nationwide newspaper attention. The Timaru Herald and Otago Daily 
Times reported the debate in the Legislative Council dispassionately, focussing on how 
it made the shipping companies responsible for bringing imbecile persons to the 
colony.
48
 Editorial from The Wellington Independent, who transcribed the IPA in full, 
alongside the other statutes of 1873, followed Pollen’s line. The Act, it gushed, was of 
great importance in ‘preventing other colonies throwing their useless population’ upon 
them.
49
 It should be speculated that both politicians and press did not fully appreciate 
how the legislation would also affect British passengers. 
 In fact, the first attempt to enact a bond occurred in February 1874 involved a 
British passenger arriving on the Wave Queen from London. From the individual 
immigration cases it is possible to build up the picture of which officials were party to 
this process. They show how, under the existing British world legal systems pertaining 
to lunacy and quarantine controls, the role of doctors, and in some cases police, 
continued to manage any instances of immigrants perceived as being insane. In this case 
Provincial Surgeon Dr Philson was ‘signalled for’ by the ship’s captain in relation to 
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one of his passengers.  Miss Chapman, had, the doctor was informed, attempted ‘self-
destruction’ after a period of ‘deep melancholy’. However, when Philson examined 
Chapman he found her ‘calm and rational’, so was unable to certify her as insane.50 
Travelling by herself, Chapman had expected to be met on arrival.
51
 Because this did 
not occur Philson recommended she be kept on board and monitored, pending a further 
medical examination.
52
 In turn the Auckland police inspector advised the provincial 
superintendent’s office that Chapman had not been allowed to land.53   
If this was the first attempt to enact the provisions of the IPA the resulting 
events showed how local administrators struggled to operate it. As per the legislation 
the provincial superintendent was responsible for deciding whether the passenger was 
likely to become a public charge. While Chapman remained on board, the provincial 
solicitor tried to contact the superintendent, then at the furthest eastern reaches of the 
province.
 54
 Provincial secretary John Sheehan had to explain by telegram that the 
superintendent was out of reach. Could they not, he suggested to his colleagues, ‘go on 
as if done’ and ‘initiate proceedings?’55 Whether the provincial administrators took 
these steps is unknown. We can only speculate that because the seven day time limit 
was reached Chapman was not bonded so was landed without any guarantee for her 
future maintenance. Her ‘calm and rational’ state may of course have continued 
considering the voyage had ended. Aside from Chapman’s case, the only other instance 
of an apparently ‘lunatic passenger’ in 1874 occurred when a man on the Jubilee 
appeared in police court charged with being of ‘unsound mind’ and was remanded. 56 
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Whether this was in connection to a misdemeanour, or part of having him certified 
insane, is unclear, because no bond or correspondence about one, exists. 
Despite Pollen’s anxiety over other colonies sending their ‘half-scamp, half-
lunatics’ to New Zealand, the relevance of the IPA was at this stage, minimal. The years 
between 1873 and 1875 represent the peak era of assisted immigration into New 
Zealand. Amongst these British migrants were those whom Featherston argued were 
‘perfectly sane’ before they left. The provisions of the IPA did not extend to these types. 
Many assisted immigrants, however, arrived in less-than- healthy states which rendered 
them likely to be public charges. The increasing concerns about unhealthy arrivals set 
the stage for a showdown between Featherston and the man who had employed him, 
Julius Vogel. The Agent-General’s assertion that the infectious or undesirable were not 
awarded passages did not ring true to New Zealand administrators. Daniel Pollen now 
complained about the ‘defective system of management and inspection’ in Britain.57 
Ships’ surgeons also reported how the health of the emigrants was lacking, an aspect not 
always obvious to them at time of embarkation. One complained about how families of 
‘highly weak constitution’ were emigrating and that age restrictions were being flouted. 
In one case a doctor complained about how he had to provide care for a ‘tottering and 
feeble’ woman who was allegedly 48. After having a seizure en-route, she was ‘with 
difficulty landed alive’, hence the doctor thought her more likely to be aged nearer 65.58 
 Julius Vogel sought to take greater operational control over his scheme in 1873 
by combining the Minister of Immigration portfolio into that of his role as Premier 
After prioritising the nomination system Vogel turned his attention to Featherston’s 
British practices.
59
 In October 1873 Vogel wrote to his Agent-General expressing the 
hope that their relationship would be cordial. Although not wanting to find ‘fault with 
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the emigrants already sent’, Vogel asked Featherston whether the character certificates 
were personally verified by him.
60
 His Agent-General responded equally carefully. That 
level of examination, considering the numbers involved, Featherston explained, was not 
practicable. Instead his agents took great care to ‘ascertain the genuineness of 
certifications’ about which they were guided by his instructions, regulations and 
forms.
61
 Vogel was not convinced by this explanation.  He was now under increased 
pressure from the provincial authorities to cover the funding of indigent cases, above 
that of the one month he had already sanctioned. Vogel agreed to this but only ‘if the 
disease was of a character that should have been rejected by the medical inspector at 
home’.62 By home, Vogel meant Britain, hence Featherstone, the man in charge of these 
operations, became increasingly under fire. 
 Discussions around this culpability mirrored the dialogue between the Otago 
superintendent and his agents in Edinburgh. The stakes, and therefore tensions, were 
higher between Vogel and Featherston because they both operated at a national political 
level. By March 1874, Vogel’s language became more direct, imploring Featherston to 
‘use every exertion to guard against the sacrifice of life’.63 Aside from allegedly 
awarding passages to diseased emigrants, Featherston’s reputation was being tarnished 
in other ways. In a high profile case for which he was widely lampooned, Featherston 
awarded passages to a group of French migrants who presented themselves as 
mechanics. Their subsequent emergence as a group of professional ballet dancers in 
Auckland coincided with the increase of other groups perceived as dubious by 
colonists.
64
 Vogel complained about the amount of ‘drunken, dissipated and immoral’ 
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immigrants on the Woodlark and, in a rare reference to the regional origin of 
immigrants, the Irish girls on the Asia, some of whom he described as ‘notoriously 
loose’.65 He therefore continued to question the validity of using paper certifications as 
proof of character suggesting that, even if the signatories were of ‘high moral rectitude’, 
they might provide references based on a ‘belief that people deserved a chance’.66 
Despite this concern Vogel did concede that ‘evil principles may lie latent for a 
considerable period’ so the character of immigrants may not be immediately apparent.67 
Featherston argued that no amount of his intervention could prevent over-favourable 
references being given. Despite them taking every precaution the Agent-General 
admitted that ‘persons of an undesirable class will sometimes be passed’.68 
 Despite this impasse, these men continued to clash. Vogel attempted to change 
the New Zealand’s British-based emigration operations. Acting upon advice from the 
New Zealand immigration commissioners, Vogel sought to change the wording of the 
medical criteria. The medical questionnaire, he proclaimed, should be as thorough as in 
life insurance applications. Their own medical officers should then examine the habits 
and health of the intending migrant in order to reject ‘untidy’ persons.69 Featherston 
continued to reject such attempts. After a series of further complaints about the 
recruitment of ‘bad characters’ he held steadfast.70 He reiterated how it was not possible 
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to prevent sending a ‘certain proportion of unfit or unworthy subjects’, and that no 
measure would ‘obviate this ancient yet ever new complaint’.71  
 Bolstered by a further series of pejorative reports from both immigration 
officials and ships’ surgeons Vogel persisted. Despite not wanting to revive ‘old 
controversies’ with his Agent-General in April 1875 he sent him a list of lengthy 
improvements. These included changing the certification system and implementing 
better medical inspections. If the personal selection of emigrants was not possible, 
Vogel advised, he wanted hand-written references, to which the referee would have to 
give greater consideration. Although conceding that individual medical examinations 
were not practical, Vogel instructed Featherston to prepare a code of instructions for the 
medical referees. His optimal plan was for the New Zealand government to run the 
British depot, thus managing their own practices on British soil. Vogel envisioned their 
surgeon-superintendent examining each migrant personally and where necessary 
challenging the medical certification. The Agent-General could then overturn their 
original approval. Anyone rejected at this stage would be compensated, a cost which 
Vogel regarded as preferable to sending out those who were ‘evidently undesirable 
emigrants’.72  This level of colonial control over British practices would not however be 
implemented until fifty years later. 
 The first half of the 1870s signified the beginnings of national border control in 
New Zealand, despite its inconsistencies. In policy terms the national government 
enacted two key pieces of legislation. The 1870 Immigration and Public Works Act 
centralised migrant recruitment in Britain and the 1873 Imbeciles Passengers Act sought 
to elicit financial bonds for self-paying immigrants. Both were designed to deter the 
incapable from seeking to enter New Zealand. In relation to mental disease and 
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disability, the concerns evident in the provincial schemes were magnified to a national 
level. Key to these debates were trying to decide who was responsible for sanctioned the 
emigration of the ‘insane’ and whether this condition was pre-existing. Proving this 
culpability would divide Vogel and Featherston further, and lead to Vogel taking over 
the British based role of Agent-General. Furthermore, the idea of repatriating assisted 
immigrants who did not meet colonial requirements re-emerged, and in some cases was 
arranged. 
Repatriating the ‘Knowingly Insane’ 
 
 
While the IPA legislated that unhealthy self-paying immigrants required financial bonds 
to gain entry to New Zealand, assisted immigrants did not have such guarantees. 
Government immigrants, if not cared for by their friends and relatives had to be 
absorbed into the limited welfare system. Although Vogel sanctioned the cost of 
treatment for one month or longer to appease the provinces, this meant that the 
maintenance of incapable immigrants still came from the overall public purse. The very 
fact that these migrants were selected according to their capability for work was galling 
to colonists. The provincial discussions about repatriation emerged onto a national 
stage. This idea of what was, effectively, deportation was thought by some politicians as 
a cheaper alternative to long term asylum maintenance. The debate rested on whether 
the migrants’ propensity for ‘insanity’ had been known by the officials in Britain, 
whether the recruiting agents, medical referees, or those who had observed them 
embark, the port officials and ship’s surgeon.  
 Featherston persistently argued that these types appeared ‘perfectly sane’ before 
they left Britain. He continued to justify his systems of third party recruitment and 
certification, and stressed how he was unable to prevent certain behaviours. Coinciding 
with the on-going friction between Featherston and his national peers was the dilemma 
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faced by colonial politicians and medical officials. Was it practical or ethical to reject 
those who were, in effect, their own countrymen and women? In some cases this 
quandary was answered for the New Zealanders. Immigration files show that a number 
of migrants, with the assistance of concerned colonists, successfully petitioned for their 
own return, facilitated through official channels. This complicates the existing 
understanding that return migration was normally undertaken within familial 
networks.
73
 These instances serve to show that the experience of the ‘mentally ill’ did 
not simply involve themselves and health providers. Colonists concerned with the 
immigrant’s welfare acted on their behalf. It is also likely that some of the migrants, 
who appeared ‘insane’ on arrival, may have, like Chapman, displayed fluctuating 
symptoms. We should assume that some migrants were met and cared for by concerned 
friends or relatives. As such they merged into colonial society and their stories are lost. 
 Those who did not assimilate remained visible and, like Elizabeth Wilson, 
became public charges. Superintendent of Otago, James MacAndrew continued to raise 
examples like hers, to petition that repatriation be legalised as a formal method of 
return. Whereas his previous complaints had been directed at Crawford and Auld, 
MacAndrew’s ire was now directed at the administrators of the national scheme. In 
1874, after two ‘lunatics’ had arrived in his province, he complained directly to the 
national government. One of these cases involved ‘M.A.T’, a single woman who arrived 
in October 1874 on the Christian McAusland. MacAndrew reported that she had shown 
symptoms before departure and, after becoming violent on the voyage, was sent to the 
lunatic asylum immediately upon arrival.  Accordingly he described her as a ‘continual 
burden on the province’, and another instance of a case that ‘should be sent back to 
England’.74 On behalf of the New Zealand Immigration Office, Harry Atkinson 
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informed MacAndrew that they were considering this idea, but put the onus on the 
provinces to manage its practicalities. He asked MacAndrew whether the provincial 
authorities could do this, and how much it was cost. Furthermore, seemingly wary of 
how this action would appear, Atkinson asked, ‘have the lunatics any friends in the 
colony who would object to proposed action?’75 Alongside placating the provincial 
leaders Atkinson scolded Featherston. If any of these had been ‘knowingly insane in 
Britain’, he wrote, ‘this gross carelessness on part of the inspecting and shipping 
officers would be extremely painful to the government’.76 
 For this case and others, Featherston was able to argue that the British checks 
were reliable. Because he argued that migrants had not been ‘knowingly insane’ New 
Zealand officials were forced to conclude that they ‘could not be shipped back with any 
show of reason’. In the case of ‘M.A.T’ Featherston provided her original certification. 
Her references, he argued, showed that no proper precaution had been omitted therefore 
had acquitted his selecting officers from any charges of misconduct. Indeed, all of her 
referees denied any prior knowledge of her condition. The local agent who managed 
‘M.A.T.’s’ application expressed surprise at her fate because he had ‘never saw with her 
anything touching insanity’. Her previous employer likewise recalled her as being 
‘perfectly sound in her mind’. The medical referee was more reticent, admitting that he 
could not recall her, but added that if she had shown any symptoms of insanity he would 
have not signed her certificate. Furthermore, the magistrate who had verified the 
authenticity of these referees also confirmed that he did not suspect anything was amiss 
with her. In addition to these local affirmations, the staff at the Plymouth emigration 
depot also vouched for her sanity. After questioning his staff and finding that no one 
there remembered her, the manager reported to Featherston that it was ‘hardly possible 
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that symptoms of insanity, imbecility or even peculiarity of manner could escape the 
notice of all the staff, or your own ship’s surgeon’.77 
 These responses placated the New Zealand officials to a certain extent. By the 
time this information had been acquired and circulated to the interested parties, the 
woman’s circumstances had improved. Immigration officer Colin Allan admitted that 
her eccentricities had only assumed the ‘form of insanity’ after a few weeks at sea, and 
actually it had been her sister who had suggested that she had shown similar symptoms 
in England. After five months in the asylum ‘M.A.T’ had now ‘quite recovered her 
reason’ and was working as a domestic servant. While she and another woman had an 
‘insane’ state, Allan was forced to concede there was nothing to be done now. Because 
there was no real proof that they were insane before they left Britain, he admitted, they 
‘could not be shipped back with any show of reason’.78 
In a case where a married woman’s stay in an English asylum had been known 
to his selecting officer, Featherston argued that she had recovered. His local agent 
confirmed that ‘Mrs S.’ had been discharged from Colney Hatch Asylum seven months 
earlier. Because the asylum authorities had deemed her recovered he had accepted the 
application. Furthermore, the doctor who signed the medical certification found her free 
from ‘mental or bodily defect’, and fit enough to make the journey.79 Featherston relied 
on this type of medical validation more than any other certification, and made sure to 
quote the medical qualifications of those who signed them. These credentials and his 
belief that the signatures were genuine led him to assert that there was little doubt that 
these migrants were ‘perfectly sane’ when they left England.80 Such references led 
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Featherston to claim that the ‘emigration of any person known to be insane would not 
under any conceivable circumstances be sanctioned’ by his department.81  
New Zealand officials were persuaded in part, although discussions continued 
on how to deal with such cases. A year after MacAndrew’s call for repatriation, the 
immigration commissioners addressed the idea of pre-existing insanity in immigrants, 
and likened it to fraud. This view emerged from a case in Auckland involving the same 
health officer who had assessed Miss Chapman, Dr Philson.
82
 A single woman, 
travelling with her brother on the British Empire was reported as displaying ‘symptoms 
of unsound mind’ on the voyage. On landing, ‘B. O’K.’, was examined by Philson and 
subsequently admitted to the asylum. The ship’s surgeon stated that her ‘mental 
derangement’ had not been apparent until after nearly three weeks at sea. Her brother, 
travelling with her, had however apparently admitted to her ‘partial insanity’, a claim he 
later denied. Accordingly the commissioners concluded that he was probably not 
completely ignorant of her condition, so it was likely that ‘B. O’K.’, was liable to 
‘occasional mental derangement prior to embarkation’. This they saw as a worrying 
trend because it was unlikely that her brother could provide much assistance towards 
maintenance. As such, they regretted that there were no ‘available means provided by 
law,’ to punish those requiring ‘maintenance for life’, or covering the cost of ‘returning 
them to the mother country’.83  
At this stage then, political anxieties were fixated more on the financial cost of 
the incoming ‘insane’ rather than any wider concerns of race degeneration. Assisted 
immigrants who displayed symptoms upon arrival could not be automatically excluded 
from landing. It is worthwhile speculating that if this woman’s brother had had the 
financial means to cover her care costs the term ‘fraud’ may not have been used. In 
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another case which ended in suicide, the commissioners made no reference to pre-
disposition or culpability. A man arriving in Napier had shown ‘exemplary conduct’ 
throughout the voyage but, in a ‘state of temporary insanity’, jumped overboard. The 
commissioners exonerated the captain and ships surgeon, concluding that the man ‘for a 
time had become insane’.84 For those whose ‘temporary insanity’ did not have a tragic 
end, the challenge for the colonists was how, and for how long, to provide treatment 
until they recovered.   
 Coinciding with the unresolved debate about deporting the ‘insane’, two women 
suffering from epilepsy successfully petitioned for their own repatriation. Using the 
support of community networks to explain that they were incapable of work, the 
Immigration Department covered the cost of their passage back to England. Such cases 
highlight that empathy towards British invalids did exist in the community at large. 
Furthermore, they show how officials were involved in sanctioning return migration.  
Emma Naylor, described as ‘an epileptic subject’, had been initially capable of work. 
However, after succumbing to between one and three fits per week which disrupted her 
employability, she was admitted to Auckland hospital at the end of 1874. The hospital 
medical attendant informed the Auckland immigration officer that Naylor was now 
‘unfit for service’.85As with concerns about the pre-existence of ‘insanity’ the 
immigration officers took steps to investigate her background. This time Featherston 
was found at fault. Naylor had apparently made a ‘personal application’ to him and, 
despite her medical past, was awarded an assisted passage. Immigration depot master 
Edward Brophy noted how she had spent seven months in the London Hospital for 
Incurables, and two years as a patient at the University College Hospital. He also 
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explained that she herself now wanted to go home and live with her parents in 
London.
86
  
Naylor’s own desire to return perhaps assuaged Harry Atkinson’s previous 
concerns about any objections from colonists to such a return. Unlike MacAndrew’s 
previous pleas, Atkinson agreed that Naylor be returned at the government’s expense.87 
On 20 January 1875 Naylor sailed back to England on the City of Auckland, a passage 
which cost the national government £20.
88
 This repatriation appears to have been 
sanctioned on both humanitarian and fiscal grounds. Covering a £20 passage on a ship 
already sailing for England was no doubt an astute choice compared to the possibility of 
providing long term financial assistance. When Featherston reviewed the case he may a 
rare concession. ‘If she had been examined properly by her medical referee’ he admitted 
that her ‘impaired state of health’ would have been discovered.89   
This managed repatriation was not unique. A year later another female 
‘epileptic’ appealed directly to the Auckland superintendent for assistance. Her 
handwritten letter in the archive folder gives a rare glimpse of a migrant’s view of their 
own situation. In it, Martha Joel explained how her worsening fits were making her 
‘very unhappy and unsettled’. Now feeling ‘not very long for this world’ she pleaded, 
‘hoping Sir, you will please assist me in whatever way you can in thus getting me 
back’.90 Joel had support for her repatriation from the wider community. Her employer 
wrote that he could no longer keep her, and as she was not capable of earning her own 
living, ‘in charity it seems to me she should be sent home to her friends’.91 Joel was 
already known to the local Ladies Benevolent Society whose secretary agreed that 
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sending her home was the ‘best thing that could be done with her now’.92 Both the 
provincial and national government concurred with this idea.
93
 The Minister of 
Immigration approved her return passage and directed that ‘strict enquiry be made as to 
whether this person was subject to epileptic fits before embarkation’.94 Like Emma 
Naylor, Martha Joel left on the City of Auckland for London. Both had proven that, 
despite their best intentions to work and be self-sufficient, they were not employable in 
the long term. 
 Compared to the unresolved discussions as to whether the ‘insane’ should be 
returned, Naylor and Joel’s cases suggest a level of collusion between national and local 
authorities. Negotiations occurred at a bureaucratic level, using tempered, sympathetic 
language. Naylor’s repatriation was reported dispassionately in the press as ‘a young 
woman, subject to epileptic fits, was sent back to England’.95 In contrast, the individual 
‘insane’ or groups of badly behaved garnered greater interest. This rested on whether 
they were more visible in the wider community. This was the case in the on-going press 
coverage about a woman who arrived in Auckland at the end of 1874, described as ‘the 
insane immigrant’.96 Her mental state was overlooked in the initial arrival reports, in 
which the condition of all 400 government immigrants on the Waitangi was described 
as ‘well’.97 The ship’s surgeon’s report indicated otherwise. He wrote that a nominated 
single woman, ‘M.C.’, was reportedly of ‘unsound mind’ after developing symptoms of 
insanity twenty four days after leaving England.
98
 Because her condition upon arrival 
was not certifiable, ‘M.C.’ was not admitted to an asylum but was housed in the 
immigration depot. Unlike the other single women who found employment, the Herald 
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reported her as causing trouble for the depot matron and highlighted her case. ‘There is 
no doubt that the girl is insane’, it reported, but it was hoped she would be collected by 
her friends who nominated her. Despite this possibility, the paper queried why ‘anyone 
of unsound mind’ would have been put on the ship in London?99   
 The woman’s friends did not appear and because her condition worsened she 
was admitted to the asylum. This led the Herald to continue their critique of her passage 
being approved.  After running away from the depot, they reported, she was found 
‘apparently imbecile’, so was returned. After absconding again, the police became 
involved, which led to her asylum admission. The Herald turned on Featherston. Why 
did the Agent-General approve her passage if she was insane, it asked, ‘when we do not 
want to supplement the numbers of existing lunatics by importation?’ The paper also 
queried why, if the ‘poor girl’s mind was unhinged during the voyage’, it was not 
reported?
 100
 This criticism led the ship’s surgeon to write to the paper to explain his 
actions. He had reported her condition to the health officer Dr Philson, and while he had 
suspected her to be of ‘unsound mind’ at embarkation, she had not at that point shown 
any ‘symptoms of insanity’.101 
 This case highlights how a number of external factors influenced how ‘mental 
illness’ in immigrants was managed. Although the ship’s surgeon described ‘M.C.’ as 
unsound of mind it is likely that the Auckland health officer gave her some leeway. Not 
only were her symptoms on arrival not severe enough to justify immediate asylum 
admission, it was hoped that those who nominated her would collect, and therefore, care 
for her. Responses to whether immigrants should and would be public charges were 
inconsistent. Only a month later Philson arranged treatment for a male immigrant on the 
Assaye had also shown ‘symptoms of insanity’. In this instance Dr Philson sent the man 
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to hospital. Perhaps wary of further public criticism, he justified this action as based on 
the man’s condition. Because his symptoms were not violent, Philson considered him 
likely to recover.
102
 When Featherston was subsequently asked to explain why this man 
was approved in the first place, he was dismissive. Based on the medical certification 
the Agent-General asserted that ‘there can be little doubt that this man was perfectly 
sane when he left England’.103  
 Although Featherston was ultimately responsible for all migrants who left 
Britain, they arrived in different ports in New Zealand. Port health officers were clearly 
left to use their medical discretion as to how to assess the arriving ‘insane’. When a man 
arrived into Dunedin after having shown violent symptoms, the health officer sent him 
to the depot. This man was later described as ‘rapidly recovering’.104 Whether these 
inconsistent responses were driven by the need to save money or, a belief that these 
symptoms would subside, is debateable. 
 What is clear is that, at the heart of migration control in this period, was the need 
for immigrants to be self-supporting. While the IPA bonding system legislated for non-
assisted immigrants, one piece of evidence does point to ‘insane’ assisted immigrants 
being ‘returned’, like the ‘epileptics’ had been. Unsurprisingly, considering James 
MacAndrew’s persistent petitioning for this, it occurred in Otago. The Aldergrove 
arrived in Dunedin in the spring of 1875 carrying ‘two imbeciles’. Because one was a 
self-paying passenger the captain was served with a writ to enter into the bond, and the 
other, a government immigrant was ‘to be sent back to England soon’.105  
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 This implied case of an ‘imbecile’ and the ‘epileptics’ known to have been 
returned to England shows how, on a provincial level, official repatriation did occur. 
While such cases must have required approval by the Minister of Immigration, this does 
not appear to have been a rigid provision. It was more likely, as shown in the case of 
Naylor and Joel, an ad-hoc response. The only other national change to migration 
control occurred in 1875 when the IPA was amended. Two years after its original 
enactment, the period in which to enforce the bond was increased from seven to 
fourteen days.
106
 The purpose of this change was not noted in the parliamentary 
records.
107
 It should be speculated that the delays in Chapman’s case prompted this 
extension. And yet, because the IPA was mainly redundant in this era of assisted 
immigration, it is difficult to understand the full extent of its provisions. A case from 
1876 at least details the interactions between the administrative roles, if not how ‘idiots’ 
and ‘lunatics’ were distinguished. After being informed that a ‘lunatic’ arrived in 
Auckland, the provincial superintendent informed the ship’s captain that he, and two 
other sureties were  responsible for executing a bond to Her Majesty the Queen, in the 
sum of £100. This money, the superintendent explained, was conditioned to pay to the 
Colonial Treasurer ‘all moneys or expenses’ for maintenance or support, incurred within 
five years. While a copy of this requisition was forwarded to the principal customs 
officer it remains unclear whether the captain provided such assurances and whether it 
was in the form of cash, or a promissory note.
108
 
 From this case, and that of Miss Chapman, it is possible to try to piece together a 
picture of how the IPA was meant to operate. This is reflected in Process Chart 2. As 
indicated by Step 1, this system relied on the authorities on board the ship - the captain 
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and doctor - to inform the colonial authorities that their passenger(s) were ill. While it 
fell to the health officer and customs official based at the port to confirm whether a 
bond was necessary for the passenger to land (Step 2), enacting this provision was the 
responsibility of the provincial administrators (Steps 3 and 4). Only if the ship’s captain 
refused to comply with the regulations, did the customs officer take action (Step 7). 
Otherwise the customs department were informed of a bond being taken (Step 6), which 
was subsequently managed by the Colonial Treasurer (Step 8). Accordingly, what was 
an ill-defined process to start with relied on the action of officials based in separate 
locations; the port, the provincial government offices, and the national government in 
Wellington. 
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Because of this dysfunctional administration, in the first half of the 1870s we get a 
sense that the provincial authorities acted as well as they could under the national 
frameworks. Neither the IPA or the Public Works and Immigration Act appear to have 
resulted in any specific operational instructions for those managing New Zealand border 
operations.  As such, official views varied not only in relation to the ‘mentally’ or 
‘morally’ ill but also in relation to physical disabilities. For example, after the chairman 
of the Auckland Harbour Board complained about the ‘enormous influx of deformed 
people’ arriving there, the immigration officer disparaged this as a misconception. Only 
two so-called ‘cripples’ had arrived, he explained and while one was ‘provided for on 
arrival’, the other found employment.109  This was an era in which assimilation mattered 
more than the state of the person. New arrivals should either be employable or, if not, 
‘provided for’. Both outcomes meant they did not become public charges. 
 This ideal was reflected by the New Zealand government. Although Featherston 
and his team in Britain came under frequent criticism, the official party line was that the 
assisted migration scheme had been a success. In October 1875 Harry Atkinson, now 
Colonial Treasurer, reported that despite the initial unproductive two years, the total 
arrived up to that time was ‘very considerable’.110  He presented the new arrivals to 
parliament, as per Table 1. 
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Table 1: Immigrants landed under the Immigration and Public 
Works Scheme 1872-1875 
 Souls Adults 
Landed to June 30 1872 693 613 
Landed to June 30 1873 6810 5827 
Landed to June 30 1874 17513 14310 
Landed to June 30 1875 30043 24758 ½ 
Landed to Sept 30 1875 6253 5238 ½ 
TOTALS 61322 50747 
Source: NZPD, Fifth Session, 19
th
 Volume, 1875, p. 464 
  
Although Atkinson had previously advocated the repatriation of the ‘insane’, and 
sanctioned the return of two ‘epileptics’ he sought to play down the need for such 
action. He criticised what he called the ‘wonderful stories’ about the introduction of 
‘very bad characters’, unfit to do anything ‘except live on the charity of others’. Instead, 
he had ‘taken some pains in ascertaining’ that they should be ‘thoroughly satisfied with 
the immigrants both physically and morally’. Atkinson came to this conclusion through 
‘personal observation’ and statistical evidence. From the nearly 51,000 adults landed 
(Table 1) he had found that 489 had been jailed. This number included some for 
drunkenness which he described as an offence which they should ‘reasonably expect 
immigrants to fall into, upon their first landing from a voyage’. Such numbers, Atkinson 
argued, suggested a ‘very satisfactory moral state of the immigrants brought to the 
colony’.111 This level of toleration is indicative of how, despite the strict on-board 
regulations and threat of the wider consequences, certain conditions or behaviour went 
overlooked. These types, once sobered up, presumably could work for a living. 
 Those who arrived ‘insane’ enough to be certified as needing asylum care were 
more problematic. Despite Atkinson’s correspondence with James MacAndrew on the 
matter of deportation, he also played down these instances. He criticised the amount of 
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newspaper articles which had blamed the government, and the Agent-General for 
introducing a ‘large number of lunatics’. Atkinson singled out a recent article which he 
found particularly misleading. It had apparently reported that fifty per cent of patients in 
one asylum were government immigrants. While this was statistically correct, Atkinson 
admitted, it was however based on only two inmates. As such, although the writer was 
‘correct in his statement’ the impression to the public had, Atkinson argued, been 
misconstrued.   
 To counteract this misconception Atkinson quoted what he saw as the real 
picture. From the total of assisted immigrants forty-seven immigrants had been admitted 
to lunatic asylums, of which, twenty-seven had been subsequently discharged. He 
described this near negligible proportion as justifying the existing regulations. Sounding 
remarkably like Featherston, Atkinson suggested that it should be assumed inevitable 
that some immigrants would ‘become lunatics during the voyage or from circumstances 
arising in the colony’.112 This means that those at the highest political level, as well as 
their border controllers, viewed ‘lunacy’ as a by-product of the act of migration. 
 These official numbers were derived from asylum admissions. As such, they do 
not reflect those who recovered on arrival, or worse case, committed suicide. There 
were those too who were met by relatives so assimilated more easily. Indeed Atkinson 
noted the preference for nominated immigrants because they ‘had friends who can 
advise and look after them’.113 His figures therefore underrepresented the amount of 
immigrants arriving in states described invariably as ‘insanity’, ‘lunacy’, or ‘hysteria’. 
In contrast with the picture presented by the New Zealand government, the regional 
politicians had better links with their local asylum and border officials. A number of 
members of parliament countered against Atkinson’s overly positive view of the results. 
Lauchlan McGillivray, on behalf of Southland, spoke out against the free passages 
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because he thought it likely that ‘an inferior class of persons would avail themselves of 
that arrangement’.114 Wellington’s George Hunter disagreed. His residents, able to 
observe the arriving immigrants before they were distributed to other provinces, had 
found them a credit both to the selection process and to the old country.
115
 Dunedin’s 
Nathaniel Wales urged caution against too much optimism. He had found some new 
arrivals to have ‘become burdens on benevolent institutions’. Furthermore, he thought 
that because of the cost of the inspection of immigrants, the numbers of prison 
committals, albeit small, ‘should not exist at all’.116 Wales’ fellow South Islander, 
Superintendent of Canterbury, William Rolleston, took a more nationalistic view and 
proclaimed ‘do not let us curtail the supply so as to really retard the progress of the 
country’.117 
 Asylum officials presented a more uniform view about the adverse effects of the 
newcomers. In 1875, Inspector of Asylums, Duncan MacGregor, vocalised these 
increasing concerns. His colleagues, he explained, were seeing a ‘disproportionate 
increase in the numbers of lunatics, due to the inferior character of our recent 
immigrants’. The public works policy had, he feared, altered the previous streams of 
immigration, which ‘left the weak and lunatic behind’. They should now expect rates of 
lunacy and criminality to multiply, and ‘mental disease’ to alter. The numbers of ‘idiots 
and imbeciles’ would increase as a result of ‘low degrees of development’ in contrast to 
the usual ‘acquired and therefore largely-curable insanity’.118 While Vogel’s vision of 
expansion had worked in terms of increasing the population, its results were starting to 
be realised in other areas. By 1875 the demand for immigrants started to wane.
119
 
Furthermore, imported lunatics were no longer simply feared for being financial 
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burdens. Concerns about hereditary traits became incorporated in the continuing debate 
about how to manage the incoming ‘insane’, whether low in numbers or not. 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has shown how New Zealand’s dual attempts at migration control in the 
first half of the 1870s were beset with operational problems. In theory, the Immigration 
and Public Works Act and Imbeciles Passengers Act represented the first national 
attempts at curtailing the entry of those deemed to be ‘mentally ill’ amongst other health 
provisions. This involved actively seeking to recruit those of ‘sound mind and free from 
mental defect’ and seeking bonds for the self-paying ‘idiots and insane’. Not only did 
this terminology cover a varying amount of mental states, the national policy did not 
extend to providing instructions to New Zealand border operators.  Even if it had, port 
health officials reacted inconsistently to anyone arriving with ‘symptoms of insanity’ or 
had shown them on the journey.   
 This was a period in which New Zealand attempted to recruit a new mentally, 
and physically fit, national work-force.  The so-called ‘half-scamps, half-lunatics’ were 
not part of the vision for an expanding nation, nor were those of ‘unsound mind’. Yet, 
as shown in the attempts of Featherston and his agents, like with the provincial 
schemes, recruiting migrants was especially problematic in relation to ‘mental 
illnesses’. Arguably recruiters in Britain never sanctioned the passage for anyone 
‘knowingly insane’, yet aside from determining culpability; it fell to the colonial 
administrators to deal with such cases. The response to those perceived ‘insane on 
arrival’ depended on the extent to which they recovered and assimilated into colonial 
society. From the cases identified it is clear that some recovered in time, or were met by 
relatives, therefore avoided the need for long term financial assistance. 
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 For provincial authorities in New Zealand, the idea of repatriating individuals 
was increasingly mooted as a way of reducing the stress on local welfare systems. 
Deportation, framed in both financial and altruistic terms, became an option for both 
migrants and authorities. This does not appear to have been a national or legal 
mechanism, although because of the high level politicians involved, should be 
considered as official acts of repatriation. The responses to ‘insane’ immigrants varied 
between national and regional locations.  The next chapter considers how, despite a 
centralising of administration, these border inconsistencies endured throughout the 
remainder of the nineteenth century. In this period Julius Vogel took on the role of 
Agent-General, and assisted emigration became increasingly curtailed. The IPA became 
the main method of restricting the entry of the ‘mentally ill’. Accordingly, attributing 
the blame for importing the ‘insane’, switched to the commercial shipping operations. 
And yet, port administrators remained unguided as to how to manage the ‘mentally ill’. 
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Chapter Four: Parochial Border Controls in a 
Globalising World: New Zealand 1876—1899 
 
In 1898 New Zealand Premier Richard Seddon bemoaned that, with ‘regard to lunacy’, 
the colony was suffering from the effects of a ‘vigorous public works policy’.1 This 
opinion contradicted Harry Atkinson’s positive view of the 1870s migrant recruitment 
schemes. By the end of the nineteenth century Vogel’s vision had helped the population 
of New Zealand increase to nearly 800,000.
2
 This chapter examines how and why 
political viewpoints had polarised. It covers a quarter-century of social, political and 
economic change in New Zealand. The provincial system of local government ended in 
1876 and the national government attempted to better monitor, and control, migration 
operations. However, while immigration legislation, in some aspects was streamlined, 
the disconnect between policy and practice continued. Port health officials remained 
bound to specific locations and reliant on their own experience and knowledge. Instead, 
it took asylum officials and psychiatrists to engage on a more international scale with 
their Australian colleagues. Crucially, some politicians like Seddon engaged with the 
increasing fear of race degeneration. 
 This chapter covers a period in which assisted migration was phased out and the 
Imbeciles Passengers Act (IPA) became the prominent mechanism for controlling 
immigrants. This evolution occurred against a backdrop of political change. By the 
1880s the era of progressive colonisation was curtailed by economic downturns.
3
  In 
this decade, John Hall’s so called ‘prudent’ ministry attempted to curtail the spending-
spree of the 1870s.
4
 This political reform continued into the 1890s when the first Liberal 
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government attempted to rescue the failing economy and create a ‘democratic social 
laboratory’.5 Despite such forward thinking it was in this period that attempts to 
redesign national immigration restrictions for those deemed undesirable by health or 
conduct were rejected by politicians and the public alike. 
 In order to ascertain how these broader themes affected the attitudes and policies 
towards ‘mentally ill’ immigrants, this chapter is organised into three main sections. 
First, Julius Vogel’s tenure as Agent-General is examined to show how the role’s 
function as chief immigration agent peaked in the mid-1870s and thereafter declined.
6
 
This research shows how, despite his critique of Featherston, Vogel would also admit 
near-defeat in attempting to identify ‘mental defects’ in migrants. Second, the 
increasing prominence of the Imbeciles Passengers Act (IPA) is shown to have resulted 
from the phasing out of assisted immigration. As per its legal provisions, the shipping 
companies were forced to provide bonds for any ‘insane’ self-paying passengers they 
carried. This system relied on the immigrants’ health being assessed at New Zealand 
ports. As such, although the recruitment schemes declined, many aspects of border 
control endured. The port health officers remained responsible for identifying the 
arriving ‘insane’. 
It was not until 1882 that attempts were made to streamline operations. This 
resulted in the creation of a key archival source, the bond certificate. This type of 
administrative document and the surrounding commentary is used to show how, despite 
attempts at improvement, immigration practices remained inconsistent. The legalities of 
the border controls were increasingly challenged by shipping companies, asylum 
superintendents and immigrants themselves. The border administrators continued to 
operate without clear national guidance as to how to diagnose and manage the ‘mentally 
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ill’ who arrived at New Zealand ports. It was no longer applicable to blame their 
colleagues in Britain, because migrants were travelling without needing any prior 
approval, apart from the shipping companies’ cursory pre-embarkation health checks. 
The third section contrasts this sense of status quo and parochialism with how, 
in other realms such as medicine, officials and intellectuals engaged with modern ideas. 
Key to this was the increasing concern about race degeneration. Although medical 
historians have considered the extent of how asylum officials engaged with their 
international colleagues, the relationships between doctors and politicians needs to be 
made more explicit.
7
 This section does just that. It shows how New Zealand politicians 
started to acknowledge this medical influence when reflecting on the standard of their 
population in a globalising world. Such anxieties manifested in the political debate 
surrounding William Pember Reeves’ Undesirable Immigrants Bill which aimed to 
tighten border controls and exclude a wider range of the ‘mentally and morally 
undesirable’. This particular debate has not yet been examined by historians. The 
themes and tensions evident within it would endure beyond the focus of this chapter 
which covers the period in which New Zealand politicians started to close their national 
borders. 
Assisted Immigration 1876–1883 
 
At the beginning of the period covered in this chapter, the borders were still, in effect, 
‘open’. The assisted immigration schemes, albeit on a lesser scale, continued into the 
early 1880s. Between 1876 and 1880 Julius Vogel took on the Agent-General position, 
a period in which the role’s responsibilities for migrant recruitment was phased out. 
Because the demand for immigrants decreased it has been suggested that the  British-
based agents were able to be more selective. As such Vogel’s tenure was seen as more 
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successful than Featherston’s.8 In order to test this hypothesis the next section examines 
how Vogel dealt with cases of ‘insane’ immigrants. In 1875 Vogel travelled to London 
to re-organise the Agent-General’s office. A year later a disgruntled Featherston 
resigned due to ill-health and died in June 1876.
9
  
Despite the antagonism between Featherston and Vogel a number of similarities 
existed throughout their terms in office. Although Vogel had persistently attempted to 
force Featherston to transform the British operations, Vogel would likewise concede 
that ‘mental defects’ were difficult to discover.10 He also argued that cases of 
immigrants arriving ‘insane’ were not in that state when they left England. The reaction 
of the New Zealand officials as to the ‘undesirable’ remained inconsistent. Like Harry 
Atkinson had done in 1875, some provincial immigration officers downplayed the 
instances of ‘immoral’ behaviour, depending on its severity. One officer reported that 
no new immigrant had been committed for any serious offence, and another confirmed 
any instances brought to court for ‘nothing more but the occasional drunkenness’.11 
Invercargill’s Walter Pearson went as far as reporting a ‘marked improvement in 
physique and moral culture’.12 These positive reports were not consistent country-wide. 
Pearson’s near-neighbour complained that many had arrived ‘almost destitute of 
everything’.13 
 Vogel did have, to a certain extent, a better record dealing with ‘insane’ 
immigrants. The immigration commissioners found him blameless in two cases which 
occurred in 1877. A man who arrived in Auckland on the Oxford in March was, 
according to the ship’s surgeon, ‘quite idiotic’. However, after the port health officer 
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disputed this opinion, the commissioners reported that they found no ‘evidence of 
insanity’ or anything that would warrant them recommending his return.14A month later 
a man, for whom Vogel had refused assistance, arrived in Wellington under a confused 
set of circumstances, which were reported nationally. The man’s brothers complained to 
journalists how he had been restrained on the voyage. According to them, he had 
travelled with a friend as a private passenger and, although he had ‘developed 
symptoms of insanity en-route’ was ‘quite sane’ on arrival.15 Despite the suggestion that 
the man was a self-paying passenger, the commissioners complained if that had been 
the case, the provisions of the Imbeciles Passengers Act would have applied to the 
owners of the vessel.
16
  
  These conflicting accounts about the man’s circumstances display how the 
realities of migration control remained confused. Regardless of the legal provisions, 
migrants, whether self-paying or assisted, were able to enter New Zealand. Diagnoses of 
‘mental illnesses’, itself a fluctuating state, varied widely and were either played down, 
or inflated, depending on personal motivations. Despite the best attempts at border 
control in Britain and New Zealand, some episodes of ‘insane’ or ‘immoral’ behaviour 
on the voyage clearly went either unidentified or unreported.  Sarah Stephens’ account 
of her family’s voyage to Christchurch on the Cardigan Castle in 1876 provides a 
number of such insights. It suggests how the passengers and crew were on occasion 
party to manipulating the official reports of the success of a voyage. Stephen’s writings 
also show how the layman’s description of ‘insane’ behaviour differed from the medical 
perception of it.  
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 Stephens’ voyage account importantly reminds us to treat official immigration 
reports with caution. By monitoring the interactions between passengers and crew she 
exposed how the success of the all-important on board hierarchy depended on the 
subjectivities of those charged with creating it. Stephens held a unique vantage point. 
Although travelling with her middle-class family, as an unmarried woman she was 
berthed with the other single females.
17
 As a literate, self-paying passenger she provided 
evidence of how the assisted immigrants responded to their supervisors. One of whom, 
a single girl, Stephens described as being separated for displaying ‘insane’ behaviour. 
Like the equally respectable George Hepburn had noted, Stephens considered some of 
her fellows as ‘very rough’, and noted how they challenged the voyage regulations. Her 
account therefore exposes the fragility of the journey. It provides a first-hand account of 
how migration policy did not always translate well into practice.  
 Much of this disconnect between policy and practice resulted from inappropriate 
interactions. The single girls, in particular, persistently challenged the matron’s 
authority by trying to liaise with the ship’s crew, and disrupt the Sunday hymns. 
Although migrants had been warned that these incidents, if reported, would likely affect 
their reputations, the ship’s surgeon did not, according to Stephens, become involved. 
Neither did he intervene with the fighting which occurred between the married couples. 
Only the captain seemed to take such breaches seriously and ‘stormed’ at a girl for 
talking to a crew member. Stephens only referred to the surgeon’s role as ‘moral 
policeman’ once, in an instance when he disciplined the married men for not 
maintaining their mess properly. Furthermore, both the surgeon and captain provided 
the matron with enough alcohol to the extent that she acted inappropriately. The matron 
apparently dressed the girls’ as ‘negroes’, and made them dance for her amusement in 
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order to avenge their previous behaviour. Stephens likewise reported the fighting 
between officers and crew members as ‘mutiny’. 
 This perception may have been due to Stephens’ sensibilities. Her writing style 
and language indicates her gentility. Thus, her description of the voyage as being 
‘perfect bedlam, for there is always some quarrelling going on’ may not have been, for 
the more worldly-wise, perceived as so dramatic. She also wrote of being ‘scared’ by a 
single girl, known by the passengers to have previously been in an asylum, whose 
behaviour was affected by the heat in the tropics. And yet, while Stephens noted that 
this had led to the girl’s on-board hospitalisation, this did not appear in the official end 
of voyage accounts. Neither did Stephens’ description of another girl going ‘off into 
hysterics’ and ‘yelling like a mad creature from a bad temper alone’.18   
 The fact that the official accounts did not focus on these instances is further 
proof that some conditions were overlooked. For this voyage, it is uniquely possible to 
contrast Stephens’ diary entries with the official perception of the journey, which 
concentrated on the quarantine of the ship.
19
 Not only was the presence of infectious 
disease perceived as more dangerous, those reported as ‘mentally ill’ died. These cases 
were, however, not the single girls described by Stephens. Amongst the dead was a 
male who had suffered from ‘softening of the brain’ and an alleged suicide of a man 
thought to have ‘fallen overboard’ when the ship had arrived in Christchurch.20 
Furthermore, despite Stephens’ recollection of the amount of discord on board, the 
immigration officer described them to be a ‘first-class number of people, and 
thoroughly well conducted’.21 Neither were the inadequacies of the ship’s hierarchy 
publicised in the official end-of-voyage accounts. The all-important surgeon’s report 
concluded diplomatically that ‘there were no disturbances or occurrences requiring 
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special comment’.22 Newspapers reported that the doctor found that the matron had 
given the ‘greatest satisfaction’.23 However, when the single girls were released from 
the quarantine station, they chose not to acknowledge her. Instead, they wanted to offer 
their grateful thanks to the captain ‘for the kind attention and care he gave to their 
comfort and happiness during their passage’.24 In turn the captain described the voyage 
as on the whole a ‘very pleasant passage’ and that the passengers had been well-
behaved and contented.
25
 
 This viewpoint of the ship’s personnel, and one which was repeated by colonial 
journalists was that the emigrants were mentally and morally suitable. Accordingly, 
once the commissioners collated these opinions to form their official report, accounts of 
such orderliness prevailed. They described the immigrants as ‘well adapted for the 
requirements of the colony’ and decreed that full gratuities were to be paid to their 
supervisors.
26
 The girl hospitalised for being ‘hysterical’ was never mentioned. Such 
inconsistencies display how the categorisation of the ‘mad’ and the ‘bad’ were based on 
personal interpretations.  In the case of the Cardigan Castle, we can also speculate that 
collusion existed between the emigrants’ supervisors and the emigrants themselves 
whom, it was reported, ‘made no complaints’ against them.27 As such, in this case, 
Vogel was not required to justify his selection of either staff or emigrants. However the 
official response to the events of the voyage did not match Sarah Stephens’ version.  
 It is not possible to compare how perceptions differed for each emigrant voyage. 
Vogel’s methods were only called into account in an instance where the circumstances 
surrounding a ship’s arrival made it impossible for any collusion to occur. In fact, the 
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first two years of Vogel’s position as New Zealand’s Agent-General appeared to run 
smoothly. This was due in part to his responsibilities being less onerous in the reduced 
schemes.
28
 By 1878, however, Vogel came up against James MacAndrew, now Minister 
of Immigration. MacAndrew had, as already detailed, first started to complain about 
imported incurable lunatics in 1861 as a provincial politician. By the time he came to 
national political prominence his stance had not softened. Interestingly, the resulting 
argument between MacAndrew and Vogel was reminiscent of how Vogel had 
previously admonished Featherston. Although the demand for immigrants had slowed 
after the influx of the mid 1870s, MacAndrew still encouraged Vogel to send those of 
‘good character, able-bodied and willing to work’.29 Regional immigration officers 
continued to express on the whole, positive responses, but in October 1878 a high-
profile case finally tarnished Vogel’s reputation.30  
 The ship in question, the City of Auckland, was wrecked off the Kapiti coast 
northwest of Wellington.
31
 If this had not occurred, the state of passengers and crew, 
like the 1876 arrival of the Cardigan Castle, may have been overlooked. Rather than the 
usual system of relying on voyage reports to ascertain the standards of immigrants and 
crew, the circumstances warranted a personal visit from Ministry staff. Under-Secretary 
of Immigration Elliot visited the scene of the wreck to ensure that the passengers were 
transferred safely to shore. As a result he was able to provide a first-hand official 
account. Although ‘giving allowances to these unfortunate circumstances’, Elliot was 
alarmed by the unsuitability of the immigrants. He reported that the married couples 
were ‘old and physically weak’ and amongst the single men were a ‘large number of 
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undesirable characters’ with a ‘strong desire for intoxicating liquor’. Furthermore, he 
found that a man, M—, after displaying symptoms of ‘insanity’, had become a ‘raging 
lunatic’ so was straight-jacketed.  
Elliot also found the on-board hierarchy vastly inadequate.  He concluded that 
the surgeon had not only had abandoned his journals on the wreck, but had gained 
popularity by selling the ‘medical comforts’ (medicinal alcohol). Accordingly neither 
the doctor nor the matron, whom Elliot thought had been ‘probably selected for her 
appearance’ were awarded their gratuity.32 As a result of this high-profile criticism 
MacAndrew sternly reminded Vogel that ‘due regard should be given’ to the characters 
of immigrants, as well as to their physical qualifications’.33  
 This ministerial scolding of the Agent-General was reminiscent of the previous 
relationship between Vogel and Featherston. Vogel’s explanation of how his migrant 
recruitment process worked showed how he had not made a great deal of changes to it.  
Like his predecessor he relied on medical and character referees to provide the proof of 
what continued to be described as ‘sound mind’ and ‘freedom from bodily defect or 
deformity’.34 Conversely MacAndrew’s language reflected how modern medical 
terminology was being used alongside the more established descriptions of lunacy, 
idiocy and imbecility. In the same correspondence in which he complained about the 
‘raging lunatic’ on the City of Auckland, MacAndrew raised a case of another immigrant 
he described as ‘deficient in ordinary mental capacity’.35  
 Vogel’s responses do suggest that he had forged closer links with British port 
officials than Featherston, so had more confidence in the pre-embarkation checks. This 
is apparent in a case in which MacAndrew complained how a female emigrant had been 
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prevented from embarking solely due to ‘medical intervention’.36 Vogel argued that this 
intervention proved that, although cases of ‘mental defects’ were difficult to identify, 
the existing safeguards were effective. His investigation of the case also displays the 
differences within the language used to describe mental illnesses by immigration staff. 
The depot matron had apparently suspected a ‘level of imbecility’ in the woman, so 
referred her to the ship’s surgeon. He accordingly found her ‘mentally incapable’ so 
disallowed her from embarking. Vogel therefore concluded that her ‘latent insanity’ 
developed because of the ‘novelty of her position and the excitement’.37 
 This recognition that some people would succumb to insanity was not the only 
similarity between Featherston’s and Vogel’s responses to the ‘mentally ill’. Vogel 
increasingly conceded that some types would get through his system undetected. He 
was unable, he informed MacAndrew, to send out several thousand emigrants without 
some being ‘unsuitable either in character or health’.38 By 1880 Vogel admitted that 
because influences existed on-board which brought about an ‘undesirable state of 
things’, some factors were uncontrollable.39 As the colonial demand for immigrants 
diminished, it was more common for ships to carry a mixture of self-paying and assisted 
migrants. This mixing of different types of emigrants complicated the already fragile 
attempts at maritime regulations. The surgeon on the Stad Haarlem for example, 
complained how the young male saloon passengers ‘looked upon the domestic servant 
women as fair game’ and sought to gain their attention through giving ‘obscene 
pantomimic demonstrations’.40 Because the women reciprocated Vogel was forced to 
concede that even if people were certified to be ‘steady and of good character’ they 
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were liable to behave to the contrary.
41
 This was proven by the passengers and crew of 
the Boyne. The surgeon, who had an opium habit, failed to assert control and the captain 
provided the single girls with alcohol. The immigration commissioners reported with 
dismay that although the women found employment on arrival, they soon gave up their 
jobs and were instead out in the town with the sailors.
42
   
By analysing the responses to these complaints it is clear that both Featherston 
and Vogel struggled to police migrants’ mental health. This is because migrants’ mental 
states were inconsistent and transient, and, relied on different administrators to judge 
their severity. Even the presence of mental illness in some cases was overlooked by the 
officials responsible for reporting it. Accordingly, both the first and second Agent-
General argued that they could not be totally confident in the validity of references or 
control all of the adverse influences on the journey. Although admittedly Featherston 
experienced the most ire from his New Zealand superiors, Vogel was also reprimanded 
in similar terms. And yet, crucially, in order to justify their selection processes, they 
both argued that in most cases, the approved migrants appeared sane before they left 
Britain. 
 Moving into the 1880s, this response was needed less because migrant 
recruitment was phased out. Vogel’s successor as Agent-General, Francis Dillon Bell, 
had a more diplomatic remit.
43
 Although Bell’s role in migrant recruitment was minimal 
compared with his predecessors’, on occasion he too faced accusations of poor 
selection. He was in the post when William Delisle Hay’s Brighter Britain was 
published in 1882. In it, Hay recalled how on his voyage there was amongst the assisted 
single women, one who looked sixty, and was ‘purblind’ and ‘decrepit’. How he asked, 
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was this ‘ancient cripple’ passed by the Agent-General and dispatching officer? Despite 
her condition Hay reported that on arrival she was employed to work in a farmer’s 
kitchen, and noted how ‘old granny toddles away amid the friendly laughter of the 
crowd’.44 Bell was criticised directly in 1883 over a typhoid outbreak on the Oxford.45 
His response was similar to his predecessors. No ship, he reported, could ever be 
entirely free from the danger of some form of disease ‘lurking among her people’.46 No 
archival sources have been found to suggest that he had to justify his selection of those 
deemed ‘insane’ upon arriving in New Zealand. This is because those arriving in that 
state were increasingly doing so as self-paying passengers. As such, for the remainder 
of the nineteenth century, the Imbeciles Passengers Act finally came to prominence. 
Imbeciles Passengers Act 1879-1899: Operations and Results 
 
 
 Once self-paying passengers outnumbered assisted immigrants the focus of migration 
control changed. The shipping companies were culpable for any ‘idiotic’ or ‘lunatic’ 
they carried under the provisions of the IPA. In 1879 the Act was amended to render 
bonds a requirement for ships’ crew in addition to passengers.47 In theory this extended 
scope should have increased the prevalence of the use of this function. And yet, this 
amendment attracted little press attention, and was mentioned only as part of the overall 
business of the Legislative Council.
48
 Its importance was not, however, overlooked by 
those directly involved in migration control, as will be made clear in this section. 
 Vogel’s final year as Agent-General coincided with this shift towards self -
funded immigration. In April 1880, Minister of Lands Immigration and Education, 
William Rolleston, highlighted the importance of the IPA to Vogel. Rolleston was part 
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of Premier John Hall’s so-called ‘prudent ministry’, a government dedicated to 
administrative reform and curbing the spending policy of the 1870s.
49
 Vogel was told he 
had to start reducing his department and to advise any intending migrants to make their 
own arrangements with shipping firms.
50
Although Rolleston was initially impressed 
with the class of people who had come out of their own accord, his department was 
clearly well versed in the purpose of the IPA.
51
 At the end of 1879 Christchurch’s 
immigration officer J. E. March informed the Under-Secretary for Immigration that he 
had enacted its provisions for two immigrants. One girl aged 13, ‘idiotic from infancy’ 
had arrived with her parents, and a man ‘at present, lunatic’ was now in an asylum.52 
Under-Secretary Elliot’s response to both these cases was specific. He informed March 
to ‘see that the law is strictly enforced with regard to the two lunatics [and] report when 
bond entered into’.53  
 Among the about-to-be-suspended system of assisted emigration, some were 
still arriving ‘insane’, or according to Rolleston, ‘lunatic’. After being informed by the 
Inspector of Asylums about the recent arrival of two such types, Rolleston asked Vogel 
to enquire into the reputation of their medical referees. This type of culpability was not 
going to be important for much longer. Rolleston noted regretfully that more cases 
amongst private passengers were requiring action under the IPA. Rolleston asked Vogel 
to make it clear to the British shipping companies that they were responsible for any 
‘insane’ they carried. This meant providing the companies with copies of the existing 
IPA regulations.
54
 As such, the role of Agent-General in migration control was reduced 
to that of publicising the legal border controls rather than recruiting migrants. In April 
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1880 the New Zealand government informed Vogel to discourage further nominations.
55
 
By the end of the year Vogel had retired from the role, proclaiming how he was proud 
of the legislation he had implemented.
56
  
 In New Zealand the political and administrative reforms continued. In 1882 the 
outdated provisions of the IPA were overhauled to reflect the ending of the provincial 
political system. This administrative revamp was again reported dispassionately in the 
press.
57
 Customs collectors at the ports were made responsible for enacting bonds, 
instead of the by-then extinct provincial superintendents.
58
 The Commissioner of Trade 
and Customs was made responsible for handling the resulting £100 bond.
59
 Attempts 
were also made to define the other operational roles involved. A new section 
emphasised that the medical institutions should seek recompense for those who ended 
up under their charge.
60
  Process Chart 3 shows how despite these changes, the port 
health officer remained responsible for assessing the health of the new arrivals (Step 2) 
upon the referral - on theory- from the ship’s officials (Step 1). Their task therefore 
relied on the increasing reluctance of the shipping companies to highlight any cases 
which may require bonds. Compared to the previous process, detailed in Process Chart 
2, enacting a bond was now done in situ. Based on the opinion of the port health officer, 
the customs collector became responsible for demanding and collecting the bond 
payment (Steps 3 and 5). This new system also recognised the role of institutional 
officials in taking the initiative to claim financial recompense for any immigrants who 
ended up under their care (Step 7). 
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In theory these changes refocused the administration of the Act on those most closely 
involved in the control of mentally ill immigrants, that is, the border and asylum 
officials. And yet, it would be the latter that developed a better working knowledge of 
its mechanisms. The immigration and customs officials would struggle with the lack of 
guidelines as to how to define or identify those who remained defined legally as 
‘lunatic’ or ‘idiotic’. 
Although these amendments clarified the roles of the local officials responsible 
for enacting the bonds, they also reflected attempts at better national administration. The 
new pro-forma bond certificates were used nationwide and required the customs 
collectors to write the ‘condition’ of the passenger or crew member which deemed them 
likely to become a public charge, on the section which read as: 
 
 149 
 
And whereas the Collector of Customs of the said port has certified that the said 
{name of passenger or crew} hath arrived in the said colony on board the ship 
being {condition} and likely to become a charge upon the public, or upon a 
charitable institution. 
 
Because these bond certificates, and in some cases corresponding paperwork, for all the 
New Zealand ports are held in one archival repository, it is possible to highlight some 
overall themes.
61
 The conditions written on the bonds examined have been collated 
statistically in Table 2 below. While this collection may not provide the overall picture 
of this type of administration, some certificates may be missing, it is possible to draw 
some speculative conclusions about the frequency of the use of the IPA. They show the 
inconsistencies in how the ‘mentally ill’ were labelled by border officials. Because this 
version of the IPA remained in use until 1899 it is possible to highlight some key trends 
over a sixteen year period across all ‘conditions’ entered on the bonds.  
  
Table 2: Conditions named on New Zealand’s Imbecile Passengers Act bond certificates 1883-1899 
 
Condition  1883 1884 1885 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1896 1897 1898 1899 TOTAL 
Consumption   1            1 
Epileptic    1           1 
Imbecile       1   3 2 1  1   8 
Infirm  2    1 2 1       6 
Insane          1     1 
‘Ships Name’        1        
Lunatic   1   1  2   1 1 1 2 9 
Weak Mind   1            1 
Phthisis              1 1 
Sick    1           1 
  2 3 2 1 2 2 7 2 2 1 2 1 3 30 
 Source: NZ NA: C 304 991 C24 4 7, and C 304 991 C24 4 8.  
 
As Table 2 indicates, thirty bonds were enacted in thirteen years of the overall sixteen 
year period. This represents an average of approximately two per year. Across the range 
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of results the conditions entered by the customs officials deviated from those defined in 
the act as ‘lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind or infirm’.  In addition to this terminology, 
the following terms were used, ‘consumption’, ‘epilepsy’, ‘imbecile’, ‘insane’, ‘weak 
mind’, ‘phthisis’ and ‘sick’. In one case the condition was incorrectly written as the 
name of the ship, ‘Knight of St Michael’. Such inconsistences suggest how these forms 
were open to administrative error. Furthermore they show that the fear of newcomers 
becoming public charges mattered more than their specific diagnosis. The indeterminate 
‘infirm’ or ‘sick’ could equally suggest malaise of either mind or body.  
 Despite these administrative inconsistencies, one key theme emerges. The 
proportion of ‘mental’ conditions outweighed that of physical or infectious disease. 
Twenty from the overall total were for the varying forms of ‘mental illness’, of which 
only nine corresponded to one of the Act’s provisions for ‘lunatics’. The term 
‘imbecility’ as per the Act’s title was used nearly as often. In order to focus on this 
finding, these cases have been detailed separately in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: ‘Mental illness’ conditions named on New Zealand’s IPA bond certificates 1883-1899 
 
Condition  1884 1885 1887 1888 1890 1891 1892 1896 1897 1898 1899 TOTAL 
Epileptic   1          1 
Imbecile      1  3 2 1  1   8 
Insane        1     1 
Lunatic  1   1 2   1 1 1 2 9 
Weak Mind  1           1 
  3 2 1 2 7 2 2 1 2 1 3 20 
Source: NZ NA: C 304 991 C24 4 7, and C 304 991 C24 4 8. 
 
Although the proportion of bonds for mental illness and disability is clearly higher, still 
these figures provide a one-dimensional viewpoint only. In order to explain the greater 
prevalence of bonds for ‘mental’ as opposed to ‘physical’ disease, it is necessary to 
consider the ‘bigger picture’. It is possible to provide the context to some of these cases 
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due to the existence of extra correspondence relating to them. Official paperwork and 
newspaper reports also highlight the attitudes towards the migrants and the shipping 
companies who brought them. The following section examines the use of the IPA in the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century. This analytical approach displays how, 
despite administrative improvements, the local operations remained arbitrary. This 
inconsistency was particularly evident in the terminology used in relation to ‘mental’ 
illness. 
 Prior to the amendment to the IPA in 1882, instances of the arriving ‘insane’ did 
occur and remained newsworthy. In January 1880 The Wanganui Herald complained 
that a man deemed ‘sane’ on arrival was later pronounced to be a ‘dangerous lunatic’ 
after assaulting someone, but too late for the ship’s captain to be charged with 
liability.
62
 Other accounts revealed sympathy for the shipping companies. At the start of 
1881 the captain of the Northumberland provided the bond for Henry Rottinger Wells 
committed to the lunatic asylum in Wellington.
63
 This case was reported with the 
following by-line, ‘this is quite alarming. If ships captains are to be held responsible for 
all the imbeciles they bring out, it will be rather tough on them’.64   
 The first cases under the new administrative system occurred in 1884. The 
‘lunatic’ bonded this year (see Table 3) was Edward Gleeson who arrived into Dunedin 
in January.
65
 Although the archival sources provide no further details about this case, 
his subsequent death received national coverage. This ‘unknown and friendless’ man, 
newspapers reported, died after being admitted to the asylum.
66
 Gleeson’s bond had 
been signed by James Mills, listed as the Managing Director of the Union Steam Ship 
Company. Because Gleeson had been admitted to the asylum within five years of his 
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arrival, Mills would have been obligated to pay his maintenance to the Commissioner of 
Trade and Customs.
67
 In Gleeson’s case the administrative process was adhered to thus 
he was not a public charge. His speedy death also reduced the cost to his guarantors. 
 Other cases were not so straightforward. While medical administrators were 
quick to enforce the mechanics of the Act when immigrants entered their institutions, 
they were dependent on the actions of the port officials. The customs officers did not 
always request bonds at the time of the immigrant’s arrival. One reason for this was the 
instances of those, who despite exhibiting symptoms en-route appeared to port officials, 
sane on arrival. This rendered the port health officer unable to class them as insane. In 
addition, the fourteen day time limit to enact a bond still proved too short a window. 
This was the case with Charles Robertson who landed unrestricted from San Francisco 
in 1884 and was, after police intervention, admitted to an asylum. Accordingly 
Inspector of Asylums Dr Grabham, asked the Auckland customs collector to enact a 
bond. Unable to elicit any information from the health officer about the ‘supposed 
lunatic’, no bond document exists for Robertson.68 This suggests that, either the time 
limit to do so had ended, or the port health officer had not found him insane.   
Even if bonds were enacted on time, their legality, on occasion, was dubious.  In 
1885 the Wellington port health officer found William George Wilkes to be of ‘weak 
mind’. Accordingly customs collector James Hart instructed the ship’s captain to 
provide the bond.  Because Hart had been advised by the shipping agents that Wilkes’ 
relatives in Auckland were willing to act as sureties, he sent the half-completed 
certificate to his counterpart there, advising that that ‘if such persons present themselves 
to you they may execute the same’. This action suggests that the Auckland customs 
officer was made responsible for completing the rest of the information. Hart asked for 
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confirmation of when this had been done, advising his colleague that, if delayed, he 
would require the ship’s captain to give the ‘required security’.69 The certificate does 
not exist in the archives suggesting that it was not properly enacted.  If not ‘weak-
minded’ enough to be able to reach his relatives, Wilkes likely assimilated more easily 
than the cases ‘lunatics’ who were admitted to asylums. It seemed that he did remain in 
the community. Nearly twenty years later, a man of the same name, and then aged 53 
was cautioned by Auckland police for using obscene language. He was according to the 
chief detective, ‘eccentric’.70   
 The description ‘weak mind’ had, however, been used on a bond enacted the 
previous year, also in Wellington, for Edward Pickard.
71
 This suggests that localised 
port health officials used terminology according to their experience or training.  By 
separating the conditions named on the bonds by port, it is possible to examine these 
inconsistencies. As evident in Table 4, only the officials in Dunedin adhered to the 
terms quoted in the IPA, in these cases, lunatic. Their Wellington equivalents used the 
greatest number of deviations across the terms relating to ‘mental illness’. No official 
used the term ‘idiot’, instead preferring the interchangeable ‘imbecile’. Because the port 
health officers provided these labels to the customs officials it must be concluded that 
the port doctors operated without any guidance as how to ensure uniformity.   
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Table 4: ‘Mental illness’conditions named on New Zealand’s IPA bonds per port of entry 1883-1899  
  Epileptic Imbecile Insane Lunatic Weak Mind TOTAL 
‘At Sea’  1     1 
Auckland   1  1  2 
Christchurch   3  2  5 
Dunedin     3  3 
Wellington   4 1 3 1 9 
  1 8 1 9 1 20 
Source: NZ NA: C 304 991 C24 4 7, and C 304 991 C24 4 8.   
 
Unlike the customs collectors, whose correspondence shows how they engaged 
with colleagues at other ports, the port health officers did not appear to do likewise. No 
evidence exists to suggest that they interacted with each other on how best carry out 
their responsibilities. Their opinion on the state of immigrants held more sway than that 
of any other official. In 1886 the Dunedin customs collector warned his Auckland 
colleague to look out for a ‘lunatic or imbecile passenger’ called Adamson, arriving 
from Sydney on the Te Anau. However, because the Auckland health officer found 
Adamson ‘at present perfectly sane’, no action was taken.72 
 The inconsistencies in the actions of border controllers were exploited by 
shipping companies. This was particularly evident in their attempts to avoid paying 
maintenance for their crew. Although not always pertaining to ‘mental’ illness, a 
number of such cases are worthy of note. In October 1885 the manager of the Union 
Steam Ship Company refused to provide a bond for seaman Alexander Moss. They did 
that based on two grounds. First on a technicality - they had not received notice within 
fourteen days - and second, they argued that because Moss had just been paid he was 
not destitute, or likely to become a public charge.
73
 In 1889 the same company declined 
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to ‘acknowledge any liability’ for German seaman Herman Kruger who had approached 
the Auckland Relief Office for aid.
74
 This time they argued that the German consul 
should assist him.
75
 The same year, seaman Carl Kjoge was admitted to the lunatic 
asylum in Auckland after acting strangely in the city’s Sailors Home. Because Kjoge 
was reported as ‘alright’ when discharged from the ship, the customs collector was 
unable to enact a bond.
76
 This proved extremely costly. When Kjoge’s death was 
reported twenty seven years later, aged sixty, he was reported as having been a quiet 
patient at the Avondale Mental Hospital since 1889.
77
 
 It is likely that the single bondless sailors were treated differently from the few 
cases of ‘insane’ immigrants. Although the bond certificate did not distinguish between 
migrant and seaman, initial analysis suggests that the latter were more likely bonded 
under the vagaries of appearing strange, eccentric, or more frequently, syphilitic. This 
hypothesis opens up a separate avenue of research, as does the treatment of stowaways. 
One such case occurred with Holger Hansen, who in 1889 was described as a 
‘stowaway’ of ‘unsound mind’. Despite their previous attempts to avoid paying 
maintenance, the Union Shipping Company entered into the bond after Hansen was 
found to be a lunatic at medical examination.
78
 The case received a satirical response 
from the New Zealand Observer who described Hansen’s eccentricities while locked up, 
and how he had arrived ‘on the nod’.79 
Although these ill and destitute sailors were generally unwanted, the response to 
immigrants was not so clear cut. Migrants of British origin, with family members 
already in New Zealand, were more likely to be treated with journalistic sympathy. 
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Such publicity fed into the increasing criticism of the practicalities of the border 
operations. Shipping companies also began to challenge the provisions of the IPA in 
relation to passengers, as well as their crew. The port health officers, on the other hand, 
continued to operate without any clear guidance. In the 1890s it took the action of all 
parties involved- migrants, shipping companies, asylum officials and journalists- to 
challenge both the administration and the provisions of the IPA. 
 
1890s: Critiques and Challenges Escalate 
 
 
In May 1889 Wellington’s Evening Post described the purpose of the IPA as preventing 
‘persons of weak or impaired intellect being introduced to the colony from abroad’. 
Although it supported the premise of the legislation, the paper complained that ‘the 
manner in which it is administered is the reverse of satisfactory’. This critique stemmed 
from a case in which a British man was seen as likely to become a public charge despite 
having relatives in Wellington. Whether the paper was fed the story by the family or by 
politicians in the capital is unclear, but the way in which the proceedings were detailed 
was done in a way to highlight administrative discrepancies. It involved the youngest 
son of an English family, Harry, who was reportedly ‘subject to fits which impaired his 
intellect’ so was ‘incapable of work’.80  
 It was Harry’s need for financial support which alarmed his brothers and the 
authorities in Australasia. He had been dispatched to his brother in Adelaide by his step-
father in Britain. His Adelaide-based sibling, fearing he could not look after him, sent 
him to another brother in Wellington. This New Zealand based brother, holding the 
same concerns, forewarned the customs department about Harry’s impending arrival. 
However, when the ship Waihora docked firstly at Bluff, where the bond should have 
been triggered, it was not. Thus when the brother met Harry off the ship in Wellington, 
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officials could not instruct the captain to enter into a bond. Instead they advised the 
brother to ask the Benevolent Society for financial assistance while investigations were 
made. The resulting delay caused the fourteen day period to lapse, about which the 
newspaper was highly critical. Why, it asked, should a bond be taken at the first port, 
and why was Harry allowed to land without evidence of the bond being provided? As 
such, they concluded, that if his brother could not support him, the public of Wellington 
would have to, which if due to ‘official blundering’ would be a ‘great shame’.81  
The following year, 1890, saw the highest number of bonds enacted between 
1883 and 1899 (see Table 3). It is likely that due to the furore over Harry’s case, the 
practices were tightened. And yet, still there were problems. This total of seven included 
three ‘imbeciles’, two ‘lunatics’, one ‘infirm’, and the one completed incorrectly with 
the ship’s name. Furthermore despite this ‘peak’ the subsequent numbers dropped back 
to the usual rate of one or two per year. Still, no official guidelines existed to prevent 
further ‘official blundering’ or sought to make terminology uniform. 
Like for Harry and his brother, colonists remained somewhat sympathetic to 
these cases. The bonding of a respected one-time ship’s master John Sutherland, for 
being an ‘imbecile’ was described as a ‘sad occurrence,’ causing much sorrow to his 
shipmates.
82
 After developing symptoms of ‘insanity’, this elderly man from London 
was admitted to the lunatic asylum.
83
 Another of the ‘imbeciles’ from Table 3 was 
George Marshall Webster, a second class passenger.
84
 Regardless of profession or 
ability to pay for a better cabin, people were only allowed to land if their maintenance 
was guaranteed.  In June 1891 the New Zealand government attempted to broaden this 
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financial responsibility.  An amendment to make shipping agents as well as the shipping 
companies ‘responsible for the ‘importation of an imbecile person’, was discussed, but 
was struck out.
85
 
The status quo was only challenged again in 1894 in an instance which was 
described as a ‘test case’. The details of this case were reported nationally and again 
highlighted how the provisions of the Act, now twenty years old, were still not properly 
established. The case involved a British immigrant Timothy Sullivan who, since 
arriving in March 1891, had been in the Whau Lunatics Asylum, in Auckland.  By 
January 1894 Sullivan was still an inmate there, and Crown Solicitor Joseph Tole was 
forced to seek further maintenance payments from the bond sureties. Finding that the 
bond had not been properly completed, because the surety details were missing, Tole 
feared that the entire bond was not legally binding.
86
 Customs Collector Alex Rose 
concurred that the bond was faulty, explaining how bonds were normally entered in the 
record book for legal approval.
87
 Not only had this not occurred but, when Tole 
calculated the asylum costs at the maximum legal weekly rate, they currently amounted 
to the value of the original bond of £100.
88
 Both officials feared that a legal challenge 
for any extra maintenance would highlight the illegality of the bond. 
Such cautions were disregarded by their superiors because, in 1895, the case 
went to trial and received national press coverage. The ‘missing’ bond sureties were 
named in court in a case which rested, not on the completion of the bond certificate, but 
on whether the shipping company was liable for further maintenance. Although the 
plaintiff for the New Zealand government argued that the £100 bond value was only a 
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security, so costs could not be recovered from it, the judge disagreed.
89
 He found that 
the shipping company had covered their liability with this amount, and that it ‘would be 
unfair to put them in a worse position through having made the payments than if they 
had made none’.90 This decision was symptomatic of how any challenges thus far had 
been were financially driven, and rested on the adverse effect on the public purse, 
shipping companies and family members. No party had yet confronted the terminology 
used by port officials, or queried how shipping companies appeared to be able to defy 
the legal provisions.  
In 1896 one British man quite literally took the law into his own hands to 
highlight how the shipping companies were using the IPA to their own advantage. 
Robert Livingston was bonded on arrival in New Zealand and admitted to the Sunnyside 
Asylum in Christchurch.
91
 Upon his release he purposely committed theft so he could 
publicise his case. In court he admitted that he had first been ‘confined as a lunatic’ in 
England and then had travelled to Australia. After his most recent discharge from 
Melbourne Lunatic Asylum, Livingston explained that he was sent to Sydney on a 
Huddart-Parker boat. However, because he started to show ‘signs of insanity’ on this 
journey, the shipping company, rather than paying the New South Wales’ £500 bond 
rate, persuaded him to continue to New Zealand where the requirement was £100. 
The Huddart-Parker’s General Manager admitted to this but explained that they 
had also attempted to get Livingston back to Melbourne. As such, they were now ‘quite 
unable to get rid of him’ and would be liable for his maintenance at either Hobart or 
Sydney. He suggested that governments should have the power to send any lunatic back 
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to the place they came from.
92
 This idea would, by the end of the century, be in place 
across the British world. The magistrate responsible for the case at hand, convicted and 
then discharged Livingston. He scolded Livingston for taking the wrong course’, 
although conceded that no doubt due to the publicity, his maintenance would be paid 
for.
93
 Livingston’s audacity had the desired effect and his case was reported extensively 
across the Australian colonies.
94
  
 Despite the cases of Sullivan and Livingston achieving much publicity, the IPA 
was not subsequently amended. Some evidence however, does point to a more careful 
consideration of due process amongst the officials operating within its framework. 
When Mr A. Compton was bonded for being an ‘imbecile’ in 1897, the customs 
collector in Wellington made sure to telegram his counterpart in Auckland confirming 
that he had processed the bond for the ‘brain affected’ man.95 Indicative of wider 
transformations was the ship Compton had arrived on. He travelled on the Delphic, 
which was celebrated in the press as being the ‘largest cargo-carrying vessel that has yet 
visited New Zealand’.96  
 The final four cases of the century were all bonded for being ‘lunatic’. While 
this suggests a level of uniformity still no official guidelines relating to ‘mental illness’ 
existed.  By 1897 the Inspector of Customs did begin to provide his customs collectors 
with limited information on how to deal with some health conditions. This did not 
extend to the ‘lunatic or idiotic’, but to blind people. Those not in ‘indigent 
circumstances’, Inspector Glasgow explained, were now able to apply for pre-entry 
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certificates to prove that they were bona fide travellers and not impecunious.
97
 Shipping 
companies continued to attempt to evade their financial responsibilities. In July 1898 
Glasgow communicated with the customs collector in Auckland about whether a ship’s 
master had fully comprehended his obligation under the IPA. Officer Alex Rose 
confirmed that he had indeed read the captain and the shipping company’s agent the 
Act. Accordingly Rose explained to Glasgow that the agent had subsequently visited 
him and (now) ‘says I suggested payment of deposit assessed by hospital authorities in 
lieu of bond’.98  
 By the end of the nineteenth century the bonding mechanism, although 
implemented twenty five years, earlier remained confused. Shipping companies, savvy 
to its inconsistencies, sought to bend the terms to best suit their requirements. The 
leeway given to one of types feared likely to become a public charge, the blind, did not 
extend to the ‘idiotic’ or ‘lunatic’, or their variations. Over the course of the period 
1883–1899, and despite attempts to better administer the IPA, the provisions remained 
inconsistent and undefined. This was particularly true of the terminology employed by 
port health officials. And whilst these semantic discrepancies were seemingly 
overlooked, the legal challenges exposed how there were greater problems with the IPA. 
Officials were not fully cognisant with how the provisions to cover maintenance were 
meant to work in practice. If a modern day audit had taken place, it would likely have 
shown how many bonds had not been legally enforced in terms of language, timeliness 
and proper completion. While the port health officials held the responsibility for 
triggering the bonding process, it took asylum officials to petition for a more consistent 
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terminology, and medical practitioners engaging on a trans-colonial level to call for a 
better control of the medical state of immigrants. 
Degeneration and Border Control 
 
 
Medical historians have raised the need to consider degeneration theories in relation to 
the increasing colonial concern over inadequate border control. The scholars involved in 
the University of Otago’s Migration, Ethnicity and Insanity project have examined the 
extent to which some colonial institutional doctors engaged with transnational ideas 
about degeneration.
99
 Maree Dawson, in particular, has examined the construction of 
ideas about heredity in an asylum environment to highlight the link between heredity, 
mental illness and immigration.
100
 Both Dawson and McCarthy have identified that the 
restriction of ‘mentally ill’ immigrants requires greater academic attention.101 This 
section builds on their valuable analysis of asylum records and officials to help answer 
this call. It does this by examining the level of medical petitioning outside of the asylum 
environment, through trans-colonial networks, and how far it extended into the political 
sphere. This enables us to contrast the motivations of the asylum officials with that of 
and port officials. This analysis shows that, unlike the parochialism displayed by the 
port health officers, it took the asylum officials to petition for the use of uniform 
terminology and better procedures to deal with the arriving ‘insane’.  
The drive to improve political administration in the 1880s resulted in a greater 
visibility of asylum admissions. Unlike the informal numbers for IPA bonds discussed 
previously, the actual asylum statistics were reported in the Journals of the House of 
Representatives (AJHRs) from the 1880s. These political journals began to include the 
views of asylum officials, in addition to that of the immigration officers, as to the 
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standards of immigrants. As such, the connection between degeneration concerns and 
attempts at better border control can be made. No longer were these simply localised 
concerns. Whereas in the 1860s migrant recruiters had attempted to assess whether near 
relatives had ever been affected with insanity, this had been in response to provincial 
complaints.  By 1897 asylum officials were advising the New Zealand government on 
how to avoid these so-called acquired traits on a national basis. 
 Unlike the port officials, who used terminology relating to ‘mental illness’ 
arbitrarily, asylum officials sought better labelling of their patients. An often-expressed 
view was that many of their inmates were not actually insane enough to be 
institutionalised.  From the 1880s the commonly held belief was that some had been 
admitted to asylums only because there was no proper system of poor relief as in 
Britain. As such, they bemoaned how some inmates were labelled as ‘insane’, whereas 
their minds had been merely ‘weakened’ through old age. Legal terminology continued 
to reference ‘insanity’ and ‘lunacy’ interchangeably however. In 1882 the Lunacy Act 
was overhauled to, amongst other improvements, ensure the better recording of patients’ 
state on arrival, and of their on-going ‘mental state and bodily condition’.102 The 
definition of ‘lunacy’ remained all-encompassing; ‘insane, idiot, lunatic or person of 
unsound mind’.103  
 In 1881 the Inspector General of Lunatic Asylums, Dr Frederick Skae, criticised 
this outmoded approach. Skae had been recruited to this post in 1875 by Julius Vogel 
after a parliamentary select committee recommended that an experienced British 
medical practitioner be appointed to oversee asylum provisions.
104
 It was Skae and one 
of his successors, Duncan MacGregor, who are seen as crucial in exerting British 
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psychiatric thought on New Zealand practices.
105
 After five years in this key role, Skae 
bemoaned that the term ‘insanity’ was being used with the ‘utmost latitude’, and in 
some cases to describe those who only had ‘weak or impaired minds’. These types in 
Britain, he argued, would have been cared for in the community through the local parish 
system. In New Zealand however, he thought it was financial considerations, rather than 
a ‘state of a man’s mind’ which led to their admission. As a result, Skae saw families 
content to leave their ‘feeble-minded dependents’ in a public institutions in order to 
save money.
106
  
 The 1880s also saw increasing criticism of how the recruitment drives of the 
1870s had resulted in the deterioration of mental and physical health in the general 
population. In 1881 Dunedin Medical Superintendent, Dr A. H. Neill, suggested that his 
admissions had increased due to ‘recent importations from beyond the sea’. He also 
agreed with Skae that some of them should not be in asylums but cared for in hospitals 
or benevolent institutions.
107
 The focus on propensity for ‘mental illness’ in immigrants 
was reflected in the statistical tables published in the AJHRs which denoted heredity as 
a cause for asylum admission.
108
 Neill made this connection more explicit by providing 
his yearly admission statistics under categories such as ‘emigration and congenital 
weakness’, and ‘senile decay and emigration’.109  
 Other asylum officials, like Edward Hulme had done twenty years earlier, 
demanded new immigration controls. Dr W.E. Hacon, medical superintendent for the 
Sunnyside Asylum, Christchurch, advocated better techniques. Much of his rhetoric was 
reminiscent of earlier complaints made by immigration and asylum officials. He 
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stressed that enquiry should be made into ‘heredity insanity’ in order to prevent those 
discharged from home asylums from migrating. Furthermore he wanted any ‘imbeciles’ 
or ‘lunatics’ who managed to enter the country to be returned.110 On behalf of the 
Inspector-General’s department, L.W. Loveday pointed out that many such provisions 
already existed. Asylum superintendents were, he explained, taking the correct action 
for the ‘admission of lunatics from shipboard’ under the IPA. He admitted that, with 
regard to the idea of deportation, any ship’s captain landing an ‘imbecile’ or ‘lunatic’ 
passenger could not be compelled to take them back.
111
  
Skae’s successor, George Grabham, was suspicious of the shipping companies’ 
willingness to adhere to this legislation, and suggested that the ‘English insane’ were 
being shipped to New Zealand to escape maintenance costs at home.
112
 In 1883 
Grabham expressed his fear that shipping companies were becoming savvy towards the 
regulations of the IPA. One of the leading companies, he reported, had returned such a 
case in order to avoid being financially penalised.
113
 This opinion, when considered 
with the cases previously highlighted, shows how some shipping companies were 
actively avoiding their legal responsibilities. 
 Over the 1880s and 1890s some shipping companies reacted to the legislation on 
a more official level. A number of guides and manuals for their voyages began to make 
reference to colonial immigration restrictions. These warnings were combined with the 
promotion of journeying to benefit ill health, including for ‘mental conditions’. In 1884 
for example, the Orient Line of Steamers encouraged those with a ‘tendency to 
melancholy’ and those suffering from anxiety through over-work, to travel.114 This 
sentiment was repeated by the P & O Company who cited research from the British 
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Medical Journal that a voyage could negate ‘nervous exhaustion brought about by over 
brain work’.115 By the start of the 1890s the P & O Company more specially warned 
passengers that if the ship’s surgeon found them unfit ‘by reason of disease, bodily or 
mental’ they would be ‘re-landed’.116 In 1890 the Orient Line’s advice reflected how 
medical ideas about ‘mental disease’ were becoming more nuanced. Although their 
medical officer promoted a voyage as restful to the over-taxed professional, those he 
described as on the ‘borderline between sanity and insanity’ should be wary of the 
melancholia caused by the lack of on-board activities. As such, he warned that the 
suicidal were constantly reminded of how easily they could ‘throw themselves on the 
sea’.117  
 The advice provided by shipping companies was couched as being relevant to all 
colonial destinations. The latter decades of the nineteenth century signalled an era of 
globalisation facilitated through better shipping and communication.
118
 Some mobile 
types, such as doctors, were able to transfer their ideas between the Australasian 
colonies. Concerns about heredity and over-crowded asylums were not only expressed 
in New Zealand. British-trained doctors in Australia held similar views, and formed 
what Coleborne has termed a ‘professional collective’.119 These trans-colonial 
similarities led to the creation of the first Inter-colonial Medical Congress of 
Australasia, held in Adelaide in 1887. Designed to discuss ‘facts peculiar’ to Australian 
medical practice, the event led to the creation of a medical journal from which ‘facts, 
theories and proposals might all be made common property’.120  
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 These types of gatherings attracted likeminded doctors who were concerned with 
better migration control. Christchurch’s Dr Hacon, for example, acted as Vice-President 
for the Psychological Medicine division at the 1889 congress in Melbourne.
121
 Two 
years later, he spoke about the importance of better public health operations at the 
Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science.
122
 Duncan MacGregor’s 
lengthy tenure in the role of New Zealand Inspector General (1886-1905) coincided 
with the strengthening of these trans-national links. He frequently made comparisons 
between the colonies of New Zealand and Victoria. He thought that the asylums in both 
regions had to receive the ‘flotsam and jetsam of society’, unlike in more prosperous 
times, when people were less anxious to ‘get rid of their imbecile and helpless 
relatives’. He also noted how the ‘professional conception of mental disease’ was 
changing, in particular towards ‘nervous disease’ and ‘hereditary neuroses’.123 The use 
of these more modern terms was not however evident amongst all the medical fraternity. 
In 1890 for example, Dr John Murray Moore, when promoting New Zealand’s hot 
springs continued to use the same archaic language as the port officials. Moore agreed 
that ‘lunatics’ were being shipped there, only to become more ‘insane’ due to the 
stimulating air.
124
  
 By the 1890s it is clear that medical factions were reacting differently towards 
those newcomers they perceived to be insane. The port health officials continued to act 
in isolation and employed terms such as ‘lunatic’, ‘insane’ and ‘imbecile’. The asylum 
officials were more active in embracing modern terminology. They were better 
positioned to comment on the causes, and types of degeneration in those they 
monitored. Although some politicians engaged with these themes, the same method of 
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immigration control endured until the turn of the century. In 1894 attempts to restrict 
the entry of the congenitally ‘undesirable’ by overhauling immigration controls were 
rejected by the New Zealand government and the wider population. 
 
Undesirable Immigrants Bill 
 
 
In 1894 Minister of Labour, William Pember Reeves’, Undesirable Immigrants Bill was 
widely condemned. This topic has, thus far, received little historiographical attention, 
with only Reeves’ biographer noting how the resulting ridicule of the Minister of 
Labour led to his sobriquet ‘Undesirable Bill Reeves’.125 This Bill, drafted by, 
admittedly, a great reformer and later author of State Experiments in Australia and New 
Zealand, deserves re-examination for a number of reasons. First, Reeves’ use of the 
prohibited immigrant clause was based on the United States legislation. In 1897 this 
provision would be employed in the so-called Natal Act, and was sanctioned by British 
Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. Second, Reeves’ Bill targeted the ‘mad, bad 
and poor’ which had become so derided in New Zealand in relation to fears about 
widespread degeneration. Third, it attempted to tighten the administration of 
immigration control, for which the IPA was seen as inadequate. This section examines 
the content of the Bill, and the surrounding debate to show how New Zealanders were 
faced with the dilemma of keeping the ‘undesirable’ out, while continuing to promote 
their ‘Britain of the South’ as a tourist destination.  
 Unlike the amendments to the IPA which attracted infrequent reportage, Reeves’ 
Bill elicited by far the most extensive reaction to all of the New Zealand legislation 
examined in this thesis. The New Zealand Herald hailed it as a ‘drastic measure’ 
containing some ‘startling provisions’.126 Their main objection was to the extent of the 
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‘prohibited persons’ section, about which Premier Richard Seddon later attributed to 
Reeves copying the ‘objectionable clauses’ from an American Act.127 Indeed by placing 
these provisions side by side with the United States legislation, this comparison is clear. 
 As evident from the labels highlighted in Table 5 below, Reeves copied some of 
the terminology from the United States 1891 legislation, namely ‘pauper’ and the 
clauses for contract workers and those convicted for criminality. The inclusion of 
‘imbecile’ to cover ‘mental illnesses’ suggests it was transferred from the title of the 
IPA. Furthermore, Reeves attempted to introduce new prohibited clauses which had not 
appeared elsewhere.  The inclusion of ‘habitual drunkards’ clearly shows how he was 
influenced by the degeneration theories. Taken together, the combination of ‘imbecile, 
cripple, pauper, and habitual drunkard’, suggests an increased idea of ‘undesirability’, 
as does the addition as the catch-all phrase ‘every person likely from any cause to 
become a charge on the public funds’.  
Table 5: Comparison of immigration restriction terminology New Zealand and United States, 1873-1894 
 New Zealand  United States  
1873 
 
Imbeciles Passengers Act: lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, or 
infirm and likely to become a public charge. 
 
1882  An Act to Regulate Immigration, prohibited classes: convict, 
lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of him or 
herself without becoming a public charge.
128
 
 
1891  An Act in Amendment to the Various Acts Relative to 
Immigration: prohibited classes = idiots, insane persons, 
paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, 
persons suffering from a loathsome or dangerous contagious 
disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or 
other infamous crime or misdemeanour involving moral 
turpitude, polygamists, and also any person whose ticket or 
passage is paid for with the money of another or is assisted 
by others to come, or to the class of contract labourers.
129
 
1894 Undesirable Immigrants Bill: contract worker, imbecile, 
cripple, pauper, habitual drunkard, every person likely from 
any cause to become a charge on the public funds, or suffering 
from tuberculosis or leprosy, or who has been adjudged guilty 
in any country of any offence involving (if such offence were 
committed in New Zealand) imprisonment < 12 months.
130
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Although some commentators challenged the vagaries of defining ‘pauper’ and 
‘cripple’ this was outweighed by the widespread condemnation of how tourists were to 
be distinguished from immigrants. Reeves planned for the ships’ masters to be 
responsible for certifying any passengers visiting for temporary purposes. These 
‘tourists’ would then be allowed to stay for six months, after which they would default 
to being prohibited, unless granted an extension by an immigration officer. Dispensation 
was given to returning residents, but only if returning after three years or less. The 
ship’s master was made more responsible for identifying the ‘undesirable’. As well as 
ascertaining some ‘twenty particulars’, including who paid their passage and whether 
they had been in prison, or alms-house, the ship’s master also had to describe the 
immigrant’s mental and physical  health. Such an evaluation included commenting on 
whether they were ‘deformed or crippled, and if so, from what form. The ship’s surgeon 
re-merged as part of border control. He was to validate the ship’s master’s opinion as to 
the health of the passengers.
131
 
New Zealand port officials remained ultimately responsible for providing 
immigrants and tourists with landing certificates. And yet, this task rested on the 
information provided by the shipping company. Ship’s masters were to be fined £50 for 
incorrect reports and, if they did not comply, would not be given clearance to leave the 
port. Furthermore, if any immigrants subsequently applied for public funds within 
twelve months, because of a condition present at the time of landing, the master was 
culpable.  As with the IPA the shipping company had to cover their passenger’s 
maintenance costs and, in addition, bear the costs of returning them to their place of 
origin. While the IPA already legislated for such financial liability through the bonding 
system, Reeves’ plan for returning migrants was a clear departure from previous 
practices. This was the deportation so often petitioned for by local politicians and 
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asylum officials. These new provisions did not extend to providing a definition of the 
term ‘imbecile’. They did for ‘pauper’ which was judged literally in terms of how much 
cash visitors arrived with. In addition to ‘goods and chattels’, a man had to have at least 
£20, a married couple £30, plus an extra £10 for each accompanying child. A separate 
section of the Bill recommended similar responsibilities in monitoring ‘Asiatic’ 
immigrants, with greater fines planned for non-compliance.
132
 
The anti-Asian sentiments went unchallenged by politicians and press, as did the 
clauses for ‘imbeciles’ or ‘drunks’. Most of the criticism focussed on how the Bill 
would impact wealthy tourists, people willing and able to work hard, or those whose 
disabilities did not make them incapable of work. The New Zealand Graphic parodied 
how the Bill would work in a series of cartoons, one of which depicted a wealthy 
gentlemen type being asked by the ship’s master whether he was a ‘imbecile, cripple, 
pauper or habitual drunkard?’ The (Wellington) Evening Post likewise ridiculed how 
the wealthy ‘crippled’ would be excluded purely on their incapacity for work, of which 
they were in no need. The Post also parodied the Bill, imagining how the current Agent-
General, Westby Brook Perceval, would not be allowed back to New Zealand without a 
permit, because he had been in London for three years.
133
 There is a further irony here. 
Perceval’s tenure in the role of Agent-General saw him trying to build relationships 
with the shipping companies.
134
 In this era of globalisation Perceval persuaded the New 
Zealand Shipping Company to grant reduced passages to moneyed farmers which he 
foresaw as helping the country compete with other colonies for the best type of 
settlers.
135
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 These cutting newspaper criticisms prompted members of the public to express 
their objections to the Bill. A self-monikered ‘working-man’ responded to the Evening 
Post’s skit. This anonymous reader suggested that Perceval be replaced as Agent-
General by Reeves for more than three years, after which ‘his own Bill will bar him 
from further mischief’. He also complained about how the planned legislation would 
affect Australian labourers and asked ‘does Mr Reeves also think that the Australian 
colonies would not retaliate upon such un-statesmanlike measures?’136 The wider 
international ramifications were also raised by another reader the following day who 
thought that those abroad should be informed about this  ‘harassing measure’ forced on 
the country by a so-called Liberal government’.137 People in England, the New Zealand 
Herald likewise asserted, will avoid the country and believe ‘we are governed by a knot 
of Socialistic cranks of the very worst description’.138 
 The adverse effect on the tourist trade was a recurrent theme across the country. 
Although Canterbury’s The Press described the exclusion of imbeciles and paupers as 
justifiable, it cautioned that if the provisions were not watched carefully they could kill 
off tourist traffic. In addition to its other objections the Evening Post concurred that the 
Bill could ‘cut of the stream of visitors’.139 Christchurch’s Star was even more scathing, 
objecting to how ‘wealthy gentlemen from England’ would have to prove themselves as 
tourists, whilst invalids seeking treatment would need special permission to enter the 
country. And yet, while agreeing that, like the United States, it was proper to guard 
against the ‘influx of pauper and criminal classes’ and the ‘wholesale ingress of 
Asiatics’, the Star contradicted itself somewhat. The Bill, it summarised, was ‘one of 
the most foolish and pernicious measures ever submitted to colonial legislature’.140 
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 Parties concerned with the domestic labour market were more receptive to the 
Bill. The Wellington Trades and Labour Council passed a resolution to express its 
appreciation to Reeves for introducing the Bill which they thought proposed ‘reasonable 
checks on the arrival of undesirable immigrants’.141 The Editor of the Auckland Star 
hoped that the Auckland Trades and Labour Council would ‘show more common 
sense’. How would the industrial classes of this colony have fared in recent years, he 
asked, if such a law had been in force in the neighbouring colonies?’142    
 As with the debate over the IPA, the inclusion of a clause designed to prevent 
the entry of the ‘mentally ill’, or in this case, ‘imbeciles’, was accepted in theory. Like 
with the existing Act, the culpability of the shipping companies in identifying such 
types caused concern. The Christchurch Star mused that the captains would ‘have a 
lively time before them’ in examining the immigrants. The extent of this, they described 
as like a ‘Holy Inquisition’ and will probably end with the question ‘does your mother 
know you are out?’ As such, they thought the Bill was degrading to the country.143 The 
Auckland Star subsequently described the Bill as well named because is undesirable in 
every sense of that term’.144  
 Alongside the widespread negative response from journalists and public alike, 
newspapers also closely followed the political fallout from the debates. According to the 
Waikato Times, many government supporters were about to lobby Ministers to disclaim 
it because ‘they could not possibly defend such a ridiculous and mischievous bill’.145 
Other politicians wanted it debated properly in order for them to express their 
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indignation officially.
146
 The amount of antagonism towards Reeves’ Bill led Seddon to 
backtrack on his initial support. On 11 October he told the House that the Bill was not 
likely to be heard that session, an admission which was apparently met with laughter, in 
which he participated.
147
 The Observer described the Premier’s about-face as ‘truly 
deplorable’, because he had not thought about how this would discredit his Ministry.148 
The Herald asked how Seddon, now clearly opposed to the Bill, had allowed this 
‘parcel of rubbish’ to be submitted? ‘It is impolite on the part of Reeves to seek to 
exclude idiots from the colony’ it mused, because when these measures are passed ‘no 
one but idiots will want to come to New Zealand’.149  
 It must have come as no surprise to these ubiquitous critics, when, on 18 
October Seddon dismissed the Undesirable Immigrants Bill.
150
 The antagonism towards 
Reeves continued. The same week a ‘mock parliament’ was held in which a pretend 
debate over the Bill ended in Reeves, who was present, being declared as an undesirable 
immigrant himself.
151
 This political tomfoolery was perhaps unwise considering that it 
was not only New Zealanders who had objected to the Bill. Its surrounding furore had 
been keenly reported by the Australian media who, unlike New Zealand challenged the 
definition of the ‘imbecile’ provision. 
 Many Australian papers recycled the stories from their New Zealand 
equivalents. The Herald’s description of the Bill’s ‘drastic measures’ was repeated 
across the Australian colonies.
152
 The Sydney Morning Herald went on to describe the 
legislation as ‘eccentric’, and would restrict anyone without £20 from migrating 
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there.
153
 The Melbourne Argus was more disparaging of how it rendered anyone who is 
‘knock-kneed, or has a wooden leg or a defective lung’ forbidden to ‘step on the sacred 
soil of New Zealand’. Unlike any of the New Zealand papers, the Argus shrewdly 
pointed out that no attempt was made to define the exact degree of ‘imbecility’. Overall 
it saw the Bill as ‘a proclamation of non-intercourse with the rest of the human race’, 
and ‘will be seen as an exquisite joke by everybody outside New Zealand’.154 This 
critique in turn was repeated in New Zealand papers which, despite their own 
widespread condemnation of it, reported their Australian counterparts as being very 
severe on Mr Reeves’ Bill.155 
 It was not long until the premise behind, if not the application of Reeves’ ideas 
re-emerged more favourably. Prior to the removal of the Bill from New Zealand’s 
statute book, the Herald had suggested that it would ‘no doubt be reintroduced at some 
point’.156 By the end of October 1894 some newspaper editors were becoming more 
forgiving. The Christchurch Star reminisced about how New Zealand had been built on 
the ‘sturdiness of character’ and ‘robustness of physique’. They equated this with some 
of Reeves’ ideas about excluding ‘Chinamen, Assyrians and criminals’. Accordingly 
they urged politicians to be ‘true to the best interests of the colony’ and after some 
modifications, pass the measure into law.
157
   
The much-maligned William Pember Reeves continued to promote his ideals. At 
the start of 1895, he informed the Wellington Federated Trades and Labour Council that 
he still wanted to convert New Zealanders to his way of thinking.
158
 Later that year he 
modified his plans to form the Asiatic and Other Restriction Bill. Reeves’ focus on the 
white ‘undesirables’ continued. During the ensuing debates he asserted that ‘criminal’, 
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‘pauper’ and ‘imbecile immigrants’ would breed their kind.159 This recycled Bill passed 
the early political stages with a narrow majority, but attempts to recommit it failed, as 
did his attempts to introduce a Bill designed solely to further restrict Chinese 
immigration.
160
 The following year, after being removed from his position as Minister 
of Labour by Seddon, Reeves went to London to take over as Agent-General from 
Westby Brook Perceval.
161
 While this role was no longer focussed on immigration, 
Reeves’ flair for public speaking ensured he kept a high profile and he was later 
appointed Director of the London School of Economics.
162
  
 Although Reeves was, in effect, sacked from Seddon’s Liberal Ministry, his 
ideas endured. It fell to the medical fraternity to petition for better immigration control 
in relation to their fears about degeneration. In March 1897 the New Zealand branch of 
the British Medical Association (BMA) resolved to appoint a special committee to 
advise Seddon on the proposed amendment to the Public Health Act, otherwise known 
as the Undesirable Immigrants Bill.
163
 The subsequent discussions involved a number of 
men who had track records in engaging with trans-colonial concerns.  President of the 
BMA, Dr William Collins, for example, had been active in the Inter-colonial Medical 
Congresses since 1889.
164
 At the BMA’s medical congress in March 1898 Collins 
presented a paper on ‘lunacy reform’ in which he argued that in the ‘age of scientific 
precision’, patients were suffering from ‘mental diseases’, rather than ‘lunacy’.165 
Collins’ ideas impressed relative newcomer Dr Edward Levinge, who, after arriving as a 
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ship’s surgeon in 1884 was by, 1897, superintendent of the Christchurch asylum.166 In 
his annual report written a month after the congress Levinge praised Collins’ ideas 
about updating the classification of lunacy.
167
 Levinge held specific views about 
immigration control. Like Dunedin’s Dr Neill, he blamed the public-works policy for 
the amount of his ‘epileptics, imbeciles and senile dements’ patients. The extent of 
immigration had, he argued led to the ‘physical and mental deterioration’ of a 
population by bringing in ‘waifs and strays, the vicious, intemperate, and others of low 
and feeble mental organisation’. Furthermore, he added the crucial warning that, unless 
port health officers were aware of family history, such types were likely to be regarded, 
incorrectly, as sane.
168
 A year later he suggested that the term ‘lunatic’ was a relic from 
the dark ages’ so should no longer be used.169  
 There is evidence that Seddon was listening to such views. After the 1898 
Medical Congress he met the BMA’s deputation to discuss the suggested ‘lunacy 
reforms’. At this meeting he agreed with the doctors that with regards to lunacy the 
colony was suffering from what he called the ‘effects of a vigorous public works 
policy’.170 A year later he was able to reintroduce some of Reeves suggestions for 
reform, this time with greater confidence. This is because similar controls became 
politically acceptable under a wider British world legal framework.  
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has covered a period of change in the development of New Zealand. In a 
wider context the political administration of the country changed from the ‘spending 
sprees’ of the Vogel era, to the more ‘prudent ministries’ necessary in the economic 
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downturns which followed. Under both political approaches border controllers struggled 
to manage the entry of the so-called ‘insane’ about whom the labelling was becoming 
more complex. From Vogel’s admission that ‘mental defects’ were difficult to discover, 
to Reeves’ failed attempts to make shipping companies responsible for reporting cases 
of ‘imbecile’ passengers, no political administration had implemented a clear strategy 
towards them.  Although the Imbeciles Passengers Act was updated in 1882, its 
practicalities remained ill-defined, particularly for the port health officials and for 
provincial administrators. It took the reactions of asylum officials and shipping 
companies to highlight how the legalities of the IPA were not watertight. 
 And yet, William Pember Reeves’ attempts to create tighter controls and 
exclude more of the widely derided undesirable types failed. New Zealanders, the public 
and politicians alike, objected to the Undesirable Immigrants Bill in terms of how it 
would hamper the tourist trade and labourers. This shows how immigration control was 
beset with conflicting concerns. This period was one of parochial and international 
contrasts.  Asylum officials engaged with transnational concerns and petitioned for the 
use of more nuanced terminology. This was the era in which they talked in terms of 
‘mental weaknesses’ and ‘mental deterioration’, as opposed to the archaic ‘lunatic’ and 
‘idiot’.  
 The descriptions used by port health officials remained inconsistent, which 
points to a lack of clear instructions. However, even if they had been able to work 
within the same framework, the disconnect between voyage accounts and the official 
reports show how professional opinions as to someone’s ‘mental state’ varied widely. 
The case studies show that even if the ship’s surgeon flagged someone as ‘lunatic, 
idiotic or infirm’ to customs officials, such a diagnosis had to be confirmed at the port. 
Behaviour suggesting ‘mental illness’ fluctuated, while so called ‘immoral conduct’ was 
frequently ignored. As such, not only were the border controls lax, but the amount of 
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differing opinions as to an immigrant’s worthiness, added further confusion. Still the 
issue of deportation remained unresolved. It is worthwhile speculating that without the 
desire of Britain to pull its colonies together, and the continuing influence of United 
States legislation, New Zealand might have persisted in their parochialism towards 
immigration control. As the next chapter explains, this was not an option under the 
wider British world framework, which New Zealand leaders embraced. 
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Chapter Five: Prohibiting ‘Idiots’ & ‘Insane’, 
Immigration Acts 1899—1912  
 
 
{prohibit [verb] formally forbid by law, rule, or other authority.
1
}  
 
  
In 1900 the Auckland Star contradicted its critique from six years earlier in which it had 
described Reeves’ Undesirable Immigrants Bill as well named because it was 
undesirable in every sense.
2
 The Star now thought that ‘hard things’ had been said about 
Reeves’ ideas and, other countries, ‘after abusing’ New Zealand were ‘beginning to 
follow the lead she gave them’.3 This shift in opinion was due to the new British world 
legislative framework which was adopted at the turn of the twentieth century. Britain 
and her white settlement colonies aligned their immigration restriction legislation to that 
of the United States. Key to this was the inclusion of the ‘prohibited immigrant’ clause 
which, forty years after the start of petitioning in New Zealand, finally legalised the 
rejection, or deportation of, undesirable immigrants, including the so-called ‘idiots’ and 
‘insane’. 
 In reflecting on this new legal mechanism, a British journalist noted that colonial 
immigration was entering a new phase, and could not continue to operate as a ‘relieving 
measure’.4 The Star accordingly gloried in how New Zealand’s policies had influenced 
Australia which was about to implement a uniform set of immigration restrictions under 
a federal constitution. The paper mused that this new commonwealth would be able to 
‘inscribe on her portals “No foreigners wanted”, without fear of interference from the 
Mother Country’.5 This transnational recognition permits this focus of this thesis to shift 
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from an isolated analysis of one nation state, New Zealand, to its Australasian 
counterparts which, in 1901, federalised into the Commonwealth of Australia.  These 
parts of the British world were no longer simply backwaters. People moved between 
these areas with greater ease than sixty years previously when colonists had started to 
seek the best of British to populate their regions. Shipping companies now warned 
intending passengers of the colonial laws against ‘undesirable passengers’. In 1901 the 
Orient-Pacific Line’s Guide for example, referenced their right to reject any person 
found to be ‘lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, maimed, or having symptoms of disease 
or infirmity’ because they could be found liable for their maintenance.6 
          This chapter looks more closely at these transnational exchanges and influences.  
It provides a direct comparison between these regions in terms of political debate, 
operations and results. What we shall see is how, at the turn of the century, the 
settlement colonies sought to create a new kind of common bureaucratic structure to 
make the movement of peoples between nations much more difficult. This move 
towards a kind of trans-national and imperial regulatory system was one of the key 
changes seen in this period. These themes are relevant for both countries and yet, the 
amount of political source material for Australia vastly outweighs that for New Zealand. 
There are reasons for this. The new federal Australian government covered an area 
geographically and demographically distinct from New Zealand. Unlike New Zealand, 
where politicians had been debating national immigration control since the 1870s, 
Australian politicians continued to assert their regionalism. As such, in simplistic terms, 
the Australian debate took longer, and was famously designed to create a White 
Australia by using the principle of non-European exclusion.
7
 New Zealanders did 
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likewise, but, familiar with debating which types of British immigrants should be 
allowed to enter unrestricted, elected not to subject them to the so-called ‘literary-test’. 
  Despite these major changes to the legal framework of immigration control, in 
both countries we get a sense of status quo. First, implementing the prohibited clause 
against the ‘mentally ill’, went on the whole, unchallenged by politicians on both sides 
of the Tasman.  Second, neither government provided proper guidance for their border 
officials, on how to operate under the new legal framework. This led to a continuation 
of the nineteenth century operations. Australian state officials relied on their existing 
localised practices, as did New Zealand, where curiously the IPA remained used in 
tandem with the new legislation. 
 This chapter continues the policy versus practice approach. It focuses on the 
‘mental illness’ clauses within the new Immigration Restriction Acts. Both the New 
Zealand Act (1899) and the Commonwealth of Australia Act (1901) were designed 
around the ‘prohibited immigrants’ clause. This provision criminalised undesirable 
immigrants, including the now-termed idiots and insane. Those attempting illegal entry 
faced fines, imprisonment and, ultimately, deportation. And yet, despite these 
transformations designed to ensure standardisation and closer regulation, old problems 
remained. The lack of clarity over how ‘mental illness’ was defined continued, as did 
the dilemma of how to manage those who ‘appeared sane before they left’. These early 
twentieth century mechanisms were, therefore, a continuation of the disconnect between 
policy and practice.  
In order to untangle and compare these complexities between these two 
countries, this chapter is structured into three main parts. First, building on Jeremy 
Marten’s trans-national analysis of Natal’s 1897 Immigration Restriction Act, the 
prohibited clause is shown to be a composite of previous Anglo-sphere legislation.  
Second, the parliamentary debates in New Zealand and Australia are compared to show 
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that colonial reticence about the exclusions was to some extent, shielded by wider 
imperial acceptance. Finally, the practicalities and results of this new framework are 
examined to demonstrate that, behind the strongly worded legislation, the realities of the 
system were constantly being redefined. This level of analysis enhances the current 
understanding of this topic. It shows that a legal framework that was supposed to bring 
order and clarity, actually carried with it loopholes, financial flexibility and disordered 
operations.                                                   
The Transnational Dimension: The Insane Become Prohibited 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century British politicians had finally started to consider 
the benefits of closer union with the white settlement colonies. From 1887 this drive for 
imperial ‘closeness’ was promoted through Colonial Conferences, where leaders of 
Britain and her self-governing colonies discussed the strengthening of British world 
ties. It was at the 1897 event where the standardisation of immigration restrictions was 
mooted as one of the ‘subjects of the greatest interest to the Empire’.8 The conference 
convenor, British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, promoted the widespread 
adoption of the Colony of Natal’s legislation ratified two months previously. At the core 
of the so called ‘Natal Act’ was the ‘prohibited immigrant’ clause designed to restrict 
‘coloured’ immigration through a writing test in a ‘European language’. This provision 
was sanctioned by Chamberlain despite him warning against discrimination based on a 
distinction of race or colour. Such exclusion, he had claimed, conflicted with the 
principle of equality of the British Empire.
9
 Indeed when Arthur Reginald Butterworth 
reviewed the debate for the Society of Comparative Legislation, he described the 
outcome as ‘rendering still more stringent the regulations against the importation of 
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coloured labour’.10 Although not wanting to offend any of Her Majesty’s subjects, 
Chamberlain advocated the use of the prohibited clause to protect colonies ‘against any 
invasion of the class to which they would justly object’.11 Within this group he included 
those ‘undesirable not on the basis of colour, but for being dirty, immoral or a pauper’.12 
This gave carte blanche to the exclusion of those deemed ‘degenerate’ by colonial 
governments. As such it was used to continue the attempts to control the migrations of 
the ‘mentally ill’. 
The provenance of the clauses can be traced not just to the United States, but to 
the Australasian colonies. Marten’s research of this influence is particularly 
enlightening.  He found that the architect of the Natal Act, Prime Minister Harry 
Escombe, had examined anti-‘coloured’ immigration measures introduced in New 
South Wales, New Zealand and South Australia.
13
 Furthermore, Escombe ‘borrowed 
liberally’ the categories of ‘undesirable aliens’ from the United States’ Immigration Act 
of 1891.
14
 William Pember Reeves had attempted this replication in 1894, although not 
to the same extent as Escombe’s ‘word for word’ incorporation.15 This explains why 
both Australia and New Zealand used the phrase ‘idiot and insane’ in their resulting 
legislation, thus dropping the term lunatic. This terminology was derived from the 
United States, via Natal. As such, although asylum officials had criticised the outdated 
term ‘lunacy’ in legislation, its removal from some immigration restrictions was based 
on linguistic replication.
16
  
This imperial approval provided the colonial representatives with the confidence 
to petition their governments to enact similar legislation. In attendance, alongside all six 
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Australian State Premiers, was Richard Seddon.  In 1899 New Zealand implemented 
their Immigration Restriction Act, as did the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. 
Appendix B details each prohibited clause of the Immigration Restriction Acts of Natal 
(1897), New Zealand (1899) and Australia (1901). This 1901 federal Australian Act 
replaced those implemented by the individual Australian states, of which Western 
Australia had done so first in 1897. Although the language and extent of the clauses 
pertaining to literacy, disease, criminality, prostitution and pauperism under this 
imperial framework varied, one remained consistent; ‘idiots and insane’. According to 
the Society of Comparative Legislation’s Everard Digby, it was justifiable to exclude 
these types, even if British, on ‘ethnological, social, moral, and economic’ grounds.17 
While Natal’s Harry Escombe had thought it unlikely that the provisions would ever be 
applied to white settlers in Natal, this would be the case in Australia and New 
Zealand.
18
 
Like Escombe, most Australasian politicians considered that the new legislation 
was designed to deal mainly with Asian immigrants. The comparison of how politicians 
in Australia and New Zealand debated the replication of the Natal Act displays how, as 
nation-states, the border administration for these countries developed under different 
time frames. The creation of the Commonwealth of Australia was envisioned along the 
lines of administering a White Australia.
19
 New Zealand, on the other hand, had twenty-
five years’ experience of national immigration control. What follows now is an analysis 
of each set of parliamentary debates. This shows that within the prohibited clauses 
eventually ratified, as detailed in Table Six, the exclusion of ‘any idiot or insane person’ 
went unopposed. 
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Table 6: Prohibited immigrant clauses (abridged) in the Immigration Restriction Acts of New Zealand 
and Australia 1899 & 1901 
 
 
 New Zealand  (1899) Australia (1901) 
‘Literacy/ 
Education 
Test’ 
 
Any person other than of British (including Irish) birth and 
parentage who, when asked so to do by an officer appointed 
under this Act by the Governor, fails to himself write out 
and sign, in the presence of such officer, in any European 
language, an application in the form numbered two in the 
Schedule hereto, or in such other form as the Colonial 
Secretary from time to time directs.  
 
Any person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to 
write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a 
passage of fifty words in length in an European language 
directed by the officer. 
 
‘Public 
Charge’ 
 Any person likely in the opinion of the Minister or of an 
officer to become a charge upon the public or upon any 
public or charitable institution 
 
‘Mentally Ill’ Any idiot or insane person Any idiot or insane person 
‘Diseased’ Any person suffering from a contagious disease which is 
loathsome or dangerous 
Any person suffering from an infectious or contagious 
disease of a loathsome or dangerous character 
   
‘Criminality’ Any person who, not having received a free pardon, has 
within two years next preceding the date on which he lands 
has been convicted in any country of any offence involving 
moral turpitude. 
Any person who has within three years been convicted of an 
offence, not being a mere political offence, and has been 
sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer therefor, 
and has not received a pardon 
 
‘Prostitution’   Any prostitute or person living on the prostitution of others 
 
‘Contract 
Labourer’ 
 Any persons under a contract or agreement to perform 
manual labour within the Commonwealth, (unless) 
exempted by the Minister for special skill required in 
Australia 
   
 
 
Debating Which Types to Prohibit 
 
New Zealand 
 
 
New Zealand’s Immigration Restriction Bill was debated by the same Liberal 
government who, only five years previously, had rejected the Undesirables Immigrants 
Bill. Its architect, William Pember Reeves, was now well established in London as 
Agent-General. Many of the themes previously debated re-emerged. The new Bill was 
introduced in September 1898 by Minister of Immigration William Campbell Walker.
20
 
The following year Richard Seddon, by then nearly half-way though his time as 
Premier, drew on Chamberlain’s call for the colonies to use the Natal Act. Seddon 
marketed the Bill as a way of removing the difficulties of the Asiatic Restriction Act 
                                                 
20
 ‘Parliament’, Wairapa Daily Times, 3 September 1898, p. 3. 
 187 
 
which, at that time, was still awaiting royal assent.
21
 The Premier described the 
Immigration Restriction Bill as ‘along the lines’ of those agreed at the Colonial 
Conference, and ‘already working satisfactorily’ in Natal. As such, he was eager to have 
it read a second time without having to ‘worry the House with many remarks’ about it.22   
Seddon’s haste and reliance on its provenance was not well received by the 
Independent member for Patea, George Hutchison, who wanted to debate what he saw 
as the ‘condemnable education test’.23 Attempts to have this provision struck from the 
Bill had previously failed.
24
  Hutchison voiced his objection in relation to how it would 
affect many of ‘those who have been the pioneers of our colonies all over the world’. 
He mused that ‘Chamberlain must have had the colonial premiers in an amiable mood’ 
when he advised them to follow Natal’s example. This was a test, he complained, that 
could be passed by ‘any clever, wily Asiatic who had set his wits to work on the 
voyage’.25  
Much of the criticism of the new Bill reflected the same concerns raised in 
relation to the Undesirable Immigrants Bill. The MP for Clutha, James William 
Thomson, argued that British illiterates already in the colony were ‘very worthy’. 
Opposition Leader, Sir William Russell, likewise asserted that ‘the man who knows 
how to handle the pick and shovel is of more use to us than the man who can only 
write’.26 Liberal MP for Buller, Patrick O’Regan, criticised his party leader, scorning 
‘we are afraid of a few poor illiterates, and we propose to place them on a par with 
                                                 
21
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idiots and criminals’.27 Those with infectious disease should, he agreed, be prevented 
from entering, but should not be placed in the same category as ‘decent people who 
cannot read or write’.28 Dunedin’s Independent MP, Alexander Sligo, likewise 
conceded that the ‘insane, diseased and criminal’ should be excluded, but found the 
education test ‘monstrous’. 29 Across party lines, politicians clearly saw the education 
test as a threat to those they wanted to attract, the healthy and productive British. 
Although the practicalities of the IPA had been openly criticised, the clauses of 
the new Bill which sought to improve the border operations were not well received 
either. Sections 2 and 19 gave the Governor in Council the power to award exemptions 
and to change the provisions of the Act.
30
 William Herries thought that this placed too 
much autonomy outside of the government, and queried how this would affect someone 
who arrived after the list of infectious diseases had been changed half way through the 
journey?
31
 Independent Thomas Taylor likewise wanted to remind the government how 
the nation prided themselves on being a curative destination. He feared that the ability 
to change the list of diseases easily would put people off from seeking therapeutic 
treatment at the thermal hot spring’s district.32 Again we see more empathy for the 
infectious, as long as wealthy enough not to become public charges, than those 
perceived to be ‘mentally ill’. 
The only reference to the ‘idiots and insane’ clause occurred in relation to the 
overall mechanics of the Bill.  Scobie Mackenzie took offence to the inclusion of clause 
5, which allowed the entry of ‘prohibited’ dependents of a male head of family, as long 
as he himself was not ‘prohibited’.33 It was not this loophole which troubled Mackenzie, 
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but the mere suggestion that a man needed to prove his family members were not ‘idiot, 
or insane, afflicted by disease or guilty of no misconduct’.34 Both this objection and the 
clause itself suggest that the medical fears about degeneration had not yet properly 
translated into political thought. In the minds of the politicians, as long as the able and 
solvent head of household was able to provide for his dependents, families should still 
be allowed to enter, even if some fell under the prohibited clauses. 
The strongest objections focussed on the extent of the planned education test. 
Richard Meredith, MP for Ashley, feared it would exclude Europeans and ‘our own kith 
and kin’. As such, he wanted the clause amended to specify that ‘no Englishman, 
Irishman, or Scotchman should be excluded whether he could write or not’.35 Michael 
Gilfedder concurred, arguing that as it stood, the clause would ‘contravene our 
Constitution and the Imperial authorities would not allow us to pass it’.36 These types of 
objections clearly frustrated Seddon who reminded the House that, not only had Her 
Majesty assented to these measures, but exemptions were provided for.
37
 By the time 
the session ended, he appeared worn down by the objections made to the education test. 
Seddon conceded that the provision should be tightened, so not to ‘exclude our illiterate 
countrymen’.38  
Prime Minister Seddon was by now, a veteran of major immigration debates. He 
responded to the oft-quoted concern about how hard-working British immigrants would 
be prevented from entering New Zealand. He subsequently spared those of ‘British and 
Irish birth’ from the education test, while other nationalities were given the right to 
appeal if they failed it. No legal recourse was built into the subsections for the ‘insane’, 
‘diseased’, or ‘criminal’, although anyone unlucky enough to be shipwrecked was 
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automatically not subjected to any of the prohibited clauses.
39
 By the end of October 
1899 the Bill had been passed by the New Zealand parliament to await the Queen’s 
assent, which materialised in May 1900.
40
  On 8 August 1900 a supplement to the 
Government Gazette proclaimed that ‘An Act to Place Certain Restrictions on 
Immigration into New Zealand’ was in operation.41 These ‘certain restrictions’ were far 
more explicit than the political debate suggested. A major change resulted from the 
passing of the Act. Like Natal’s provision for returning immigrants, section 13 of New 
Zealand’s Act legislated for the deportation of those found to be prohibited. This was a 
function for which New Zealand administrators had persistently petitioned. This new 
provision in border control was not so obvious in the White Australia policy. The 
Australians first had to reconcile their regional differences before organising a national 
migration control framework.  
 
The Commonwealth of Australia 
 
 
It is important to recognise how prior to federation in 1901, the individual 
Australian states had expanded within different timeframes.  Each had been granted 
responsible government beginning from the 1850s. This autonomy included enacting 
legislation as and when deemed necessary. The Commonwealth was, as Michael Roe 
has described, a complex federation, and signified both national unity and regional 
conflict.
42
 These differences translated to state immigration control. At the end of the 
nineteenth century not all Australian states acted as quickly as Western Australia did in 
following Natal’s lead. In some cases this was due to the personal experiences of state 
leaders. Premier of South Australia, Charles Kingston, experienced migration control 
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first hand when he visited the United States in 1898. The Adelaide Register reported 
how he had been ‘alarmed’ by the ‘various devices’ of inspection at Ellis Island where 
due to the ‘danger of invasion by undesirables’ the measures were more necessary than 
in Australia. The paper also reflected on New Zealand’s attempts to erect ‘ring fences’ 
in contrast with their usual promotion of the ‘marvellous grandeur of their scenery’. The 
undesirable immigrant term, the Register explained, could be ‘stretched to suit special 
circumstances’ but generally used to describe people who were ‘paupers or persons who 
are insane’. Accordingly, it wanted Australia’s plan to put up a ‘no room’ sign to be 
carefully considered. Any restrictions, the paper warned, needed to be countered against 
the need for a population increase required for Australia to become a great nation.
43
 
However, despite his misgivings, Kingston later reported to the Commonwealth 
government that South Australia had tried to introduce measures along the lines of the 
Natal Act.
44
 
The Commonwealth of Australia actually went further than Natal in their 
attempts to control immigration, as recognised by The Society of Comparative 
Legislation’s Arthur Reginald Butterworth.45 William Pember Reeves likewise noted 
how New Zealand’s legislation was milder than Australia’s because it did not include 
the ‘pauper’ clause.46 Reflecting on the previous furore over his Undesirable Immigrants 
Bill, he admitted that the exclusion of ‘paupers’ was a ‘hard matter’. This was because, 
Reeves explained, it was not long since white labourers, who, as long as were ‘not 
notoriously criminal or incurably vicious’, were welcomed in the Australasian 
colonies.
47
 Despite his unsuccessful attempts to redefine New Zealand’s border control, 
Reeves now sought solace in how the country was protected by its ‘remoteness and the 
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cost of the voyage to its shores’.48 This geographical consideration is interesting. 
Australia was of course, nearer to Asia and often the first port of call for ships en-route 
to New Zealand. Yet, despite these physical differences, the parliamentary debates in 
New Zealand and Australia shared many commonalities. Australian Prime Minister, 
Edmund Barton, like Richard Seddon, relied on the provenance of the Natal Act. Both 
leaders faced considerable opposition to the education test, and furthermore, the 
exclusion of the ‘idiots and insane’ went generally unchallenged.  
 The Australian debate took far longer than New Zealand’s. This is not surprising 
considering that Australia’s first national government consisted of members from a 
wider geographical area attempting to formulate federal policies. The Hansard records 
of the debates cover 272 speeches and 571 pages.
49
 Although the State parliaments had 
already ratified their individual immigration acts, Prime Minister Edmund Barton 
recognised how the ‘education test’ was the clause which would cause a battle ‘amongst 
us’.50 As an architect of the Australian Constitution, Barton led his Protectionist Party to 
form the first Commonwealth government with the Australian Labor Party.
51
 Barton, 
like Seddon, tried to steer the debate about the Immigration Restriction Bill to the 
education test, although he did not ‘wish to sacrifice’ the other provisions.52   
 Australia’s ‘education test’ was introduced as having to be performed in the 
English language.
53
 Barton’s reasoning for this revealed his protectionist ideals. Using 
‘our language’ of English, he explained, was necessary because it was the language that 
                                                 
48
 Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, p.357. Reeves admitted that several colonial 
Parliaments had already denied entry to ‘grossly unfit persons’ but were now having to follow America’s 
example, p. 356. 
49
 Alanna Kamp, ‘Formative Geographies of Belonging in White Australia: Constructing the National 
Self and Other in Parliamentary Debate, 1901’, Geographical Research, 48:4 (2010), p. 413.  
50
 CAPD, ‘Immigration Restriction Bill’, 7 August 1901.  
51
 ADB online version, Martha Rutledge, 'Barton, Sir Edmund (Toby) (1849–1920)', [accessed 18 March 
2015]. 
52
 CAPD, ‘Immigration Restriction Bill’ 7 August 1901.The Bill had been introduced on 5 June 1901.  
53
 ‘Any person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out and sign in the presence of the 
officer, a passage of 50 words in length in the English language.’ 
 193 
 
would enable a man to do business here.
54
 He countered accusations of this being anti-
European by clarifying that ideally immigrants should be bilingual, including being 
literate in English.
55
 Relying heavily on the provenance of the Australian state 
legislation and that of Natal, Barton argued that the government should be trusted to 
enact legislation to discriminate between ‘desirable civilised immigrants’ and those 
whose presence is ‘baneful’. Like Seddon he explained that officials would have 
discretion in administering the regulations. The measures, Barton explained, were not 
meant to be ‘distinctions between rich and poor’ but employed ‘in the spirit of broad 
international humanity’.56  
Much of the debating focussed on the ‘education test’, with some politicians 
arguing that it was prejudiced against the poor. Like their New Zealand counterparts, 
some argued that white illiterates had been amongst the best of the settlers.
57
 One 
exclaimed that it was the first time he had heard that a man had to be a good scholar ‘in 
order to be a good workman, a good gardener, or a good agriculturalist’.58 Others saw 
the clause as not stringent enough, such as Melbourne’s James Ronald, who feared that 
it allowed British ‘coloured aliens’ to be admitted. 59  
Although New Zealand had decided not to subject the British or Irish to the 
‘education test’, the Australian politicians who objected to the clause did not raise their 
neighbour’s dispensation.  Only John Quick drew on trans-Tasman comparisons. He 
was forced to do so after being criticised for promoting the Australian Bill as ‘more 
advanced’ and more ‘stringent’ than the United States’ Act. After it was pointed out that 
the statistics he quoted related to an ‘utterly different’ region, Quick turned instead to 
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the New Zealand operations. Seddon, he argued, as ‘one of the greatest democrats 
Australia has ever produced,’ had ‘exercised the educational, pauper and health test with 
wonderful success’. Quick’s evidence for this was dubious. He thought that if the New 
Zealand Act had been found lacking, Seddon ‘would have been the first to cry out in 
favour of stronger and more drastic legislation’. Quick did not explain the New Zealand 
practices. Instead he described the necessity of an Australian ‘common federal law’ to 
replace the previous efforts which, in his opinion, had allowed undesirable aliens to 
‘creep through the gaps in state frontiers’.60 
The switch from state to federal operations meant that the planned health clauses 
generated more debate than in the New Zealand Parliament. Barton acknowledged that 
some would argue that persons who are idiots or lunatics, diseased or prostitutes would 
be hard to detect. However, because he thought it ‘not difficult to detect such types on 
shore’, it should be possible to detect that at sea. Melbourne MP Sir Malcolm 
McEacharn disagreed wholeheartedly with his party leader, arguing that this detection 
would be ‘almost impossible’.61 McEacharn’s background as a shipping magnate led 
him to focus on the responsibilities required of the shipping companies.
62
 The Prime 
Minister had authorised customs officials to detain vessels from which prohibited 
immigrants had been landed if the shipping companies did not comply with their 
responsibilities.
63
 Deeming this too restrictive, McEacharn introduced an amendment to 
the Bill to protect the ship master or owner from being penalised. This provision 
enabled shipping companies to argue that they should not be held responsible for 
prohibited passengers if they had taken the ‘correct precautions’. This leeway 
McEacharn considered necessary, because it was ‘utterly impossible’ for the shipping 
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companies to know the reason for their passengers’ prohibited status, or whether they 
were likely to become public charges.
64
 
Any mention of the ‘idiots and insane’ clause was mainly made in reference to 
the other categories denoting undesirable health or behaviour. Queenland’s Richard 
Edwards agreed with the restriction of ‘criminals, the diseased and insane persons’.65 
Isaac Alfred Issacs wanted the provisions to be more far-reaching.
66
 While he condoned 
the exclusion of those he described as having ‘defects physical, mental or moral’ he 
wanted the government to be given emergency powers to prohibit  ‘any person, class or 
description of persons’ when required. This idea was, however, ultimately voted down 
by his colleagues who thought this power would be too despotic.
67
 
McEacharn was not the only politician to challenge the administration of the 
‘prohibited immigrant’ clause. Free Trader Paddy Glynn, who would go on to serve for 
two decades in the Commonwealth parliament, was equally concerned with its 
application.
68
 In querying how the ‘pauper clause’ would work, he argued that British 
subjects should have the opportunity to prove that they were unlikely to become a 
public charge. William Spence added to this debate by asking ‘who is to decide whether 
an immigrant is an idiot or insane person?’69 Although this was the most direct political 
question raised thus far as to how to classify ‘mentally ill’ immigrants, it did not result 
in an overhaul of operations. Instead the government ministers admitted that the 
identification of both ‘paupers’ and ‘insane’ would have to be left to the discretion of 
customs officials and ship’s doctors. Glynn continued to object to the power given to 
these officials, but only in relation to the label of ‘pauper’. He thought that a British 
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man, even if he arrived with little money, should be able to argue that he was not a 
pauper, but had ‘expectations, strength and energy’, and above was a ‘British subject’. 
Barton fudged the issue on whether someone was a ‘pauper’, ‘insane’ or 
‘diseased’ by conceding that such decisions had to be ‘matters of fact’. After Glynn 
pointed out that the wording of the Bill made the ‘Minister or an officer’ responsible for 
deciding whether someone was a public charge, Spence argued that similarly somebody 
must also have to decide whether someone was idiot, insane or diseased. After another 
colleague pointed out that the practice in America was for the customs officers to 
determine the matter, it took John Watson, who would briefly become the first Labor 
Prime Minister in 1904, to suggest that the ship’s doctor’s opinion should stand as 
sufficient.
70
 
Others had the foresight to be concerned about the long term reliance on this 
practice. Leader of the Opposition, George Reid informed the House that a manager of 
one of the big shipping companies had requested that migrants be medically inspected at 
the departure ports. Reid advocated this idea, which would re-emerge in part the 
following decade, for a number of reasons. He thought that not only would it alleviate 
the burdens on the government, shipping companies and intending emigrants, but would 
also provide great protection to Australia.  This was because, Reid explained, medical 
inspectors would identify ‘persons likely to become a charge upon the public, idiots and 
persons suffering from infectious diseases and so on’. Equally, this system would be 
easy to establish, he suggested, because the shipping companies would provide 
examination facilities. Furthermore, inspectors would only be needed at the few ports in 
the mother country and Europe, where the bulk of migration came from. If it were too 
late to alter the Bill now, Reid asked, might the government consider implementing a 
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system later?
71
Attorney-General Alfred Deakin concurred that the idea was practical 
because would prevent ‘persons certain to be rejected’ from travelling. It would also, he 
suggested, help absolve the ship-owners from accusations of ‘wantonly bringing 
undesirable immigrants to our shores’. Any such future appointments could be managed 
through the clause which enabled the Governor-General to ‘appoint officers under the 
Act’. Not wanting to concede on all points, Deakin stressed that government would not 
renounce its right to still reject those passengers when needed.
72
 
Such a provision was not formulated until the following decade. In 1901 the 
government left the identification of the ‘insane’ and other prohibited types to the 
border controllers. As such, despite the new legal framework, the operations were very 
much left to continue under the status quo. The exclusion of the ‘mentally ill’ as a basic 
tenet went unchallenged. Deakin’s introduction of the clause which sought to punish 
those ‘wilfully instrumental’ in bringing any ‘idiots or insane’ into the country, was also 
accepted easily. The debate about this clause focussed on which governmental 
department should collect the penalty payments, rather than the clause’s intent. 73An 
administrative clause which provoked no dissent was the plan to collate national 
statistics.  Section 17 legislated that yearly returns were required detailing the numbers 
of persons refused admission, under which prohibited clause, and where they came 
from.
74
  
Although the Bill did not define what constituted an idiot or insane immigrant, it 
created a theoretical national border control system. This protection included a number 
of levels of, as Paddy Glynn feared, discretion and exemption. The Governor-General 
could appoint the officers to carry out the Act who were responsible for deciding who 
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was likely to become a public charge.
75
 Some persons, if exempted by the Minister of 
External Affairs, could not be excused from the provisions entirely.
76
 By the time the 
Bill had reached the Senate on 6 December 1901 there had been no further discussion 
about how this new framework would be administered. On 11 December the Senate 
sanctioned the Bill.
77
 By 23 December the Governor-General confirmed that ‘An Act to 
place certain restrictions on Immigration and to provide for the removal from the 
Commonwealth of prohibited immigrants’ had passed both the Senate and House of 
Representatives.
78
 By the start of 1902, one year after the Federalisation of Australia, 
the Act had been granted royal assent.
79
 The Commonwealth of Australia, like New 
Zealand, had created a new legal system to regulate the entry of the ‘undesirable’. As 
will be made apparent, this framework was more theoretical than practical. The officials 
responsible for its operations were not given any clear instructions on how to do so, so 
continued with the existing, state, approaches. 
Transnational Comparisons: Policy Translated into Practice 
 
Policy 
 
 
Within eighteen months of each other, New Zealand and Australia implemented a new 
legal framework under which they could, in theory, reject the ‘mentally ill’ at their 
borders.  This was made operational by making ‘idiots and ‘insane’ prohibited, hence 
deportable. In the case of Australia, the practicalities of this were yet to be developed. 
This function followed the precedent of the Natal Act which, in turn, had been 
influenced by United States legislation. Both Australia and New Zealand also adopted a 
specific penalty clause directed at ‘any person’ assisting idiots or insane persons to land.  
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 This new era of immigration control remained heavily reliant on the shipping 
companies. As with the bonding system, the ship’s master, owner or charterer’ was 
made responsible for ‘removing’ their prohibited passengers. If the shipping companies 
did not comply with this they were liable for financial penalties, detainment or both. 
However, only New Zealand clearly defined the system of deportation. This section was 
entitled ‘Provisions with respect of removal of prohibited immigrants from New 
Zealand’. As detailed in full in Appendix C, this made the shipping company who had 
carried the passenger, financially and practically responsible for their return. The 
liability of these commercial operators was clearly defined. The ship’s command was 
required to keep the prohibited person on board, or cover their onshore maintenance, 
then return them to their port of departure, or country of birth. Furthermore, if their 
passenger appeared to be destitute at point of returning them, the shipping company had 
to provide them with one month’s maintenance. This provision had troubled William 
Herries in the parliamentary debates. He feared that it would induce people who knew 
they would be rejected to travel and subsequently claim this maintenance.
80
  
 While Herries’ concern was far-fetched, a level of benevolence was also evident 
in other loopholes. Both Acts permitted the entrance of wives or children, even if ‘idiot 
or insane’, to enter, as long as their husband or parent was not a prohibited immigrant.81 
Furthermore, New Zealand did not annul the Imbecile Passengers Act. Curiously, it 
remained used in parallel with the new Immigration Restriction Act. In 1908 both Acts 
were combined their Immigration Restriction Act to ‘consolidate certain enactments of 
the General Assembly related to Restrictions of Immigration into New Zealand’.82 The 
IPA’s provisions, including the bonding system, remained active. The 1908 Act was 
divided into four parts: I- Imbecile Passengers, II-Prohibited Immigrants, III-Chinese 
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and IV General Provisions. This combined legislative approach meant that New 
Zealand continued to either deport or request bonds for immigrants.
83
 Within the 1908 
consolidated Act, the ‘mentally ill’ remained labelled as ‘lunatic’ or ‘idiotic’ under Part 
I, concurrent with the ‘idiots or insane’ under Part II. 
 The Australian Act, as a federal law, represented a much clearer departure from 
previous state legislation.  Although its deportation provision was not so clearly defined 
as New Zealand’s, steps were soon taken to rectify this. The 1905 Amendment Act 
tightened much of the Australian provisions. The ‘contract labourer’ prohibited clause 
was removed and replaced with a separate Contract Immigrants Act. In addition to 
customs officers, the police were empowered to enforce the provisions of the IRA.
84
 
The loophole excusing wives or children from the prohibited clause was removed 
entirely.
85
 This meant that the families of non-prohibited men were no longer 
automatically protected, thus widening the legal net. Furthermore a new Section 13A 
was created to define the deportation process. As detailed in Appendix D, in line with 
New Zealand, this provision made the shipping company liable for the maintenance and 
deportation of their prohibited passengers. The wording of this clause shows how, 
unlike in the already unified New Zealand, the federal controls relied on the Australian 
State operations.  While shipping companies were to pay their financial liabilities to the 
Commonwealth, the purposed was described as reimbursing the States for the cost of 
keeping, and maintaining, the prohibited immigrant pending their deportation.
86
 
Accordingly both countries relied on local border operators to manage national 
legislation, without providing any clear instructions on how to identify the mentally ill. 
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Practice 
 
Compared to the ill-defined practices of the IPA, the New Zealand government 
attempted to create an administrative framework for their new Act, as represented in 
Process Chart 4. In 1900 they published ‘Regulations under the Immigration Restriction 
Act, 1899’. These guidelines confirmed that the port health officer was responsible for 
assessing the health of the immigrants (Step 3), although in theory this relied on a 
system of referral.  
 
This task remained reliant on the administrative skills of the ship’s master (Step 1) who 
was required to complete the ‘Form of Certificate’ (see Appendix E). This made him 
culpable for highlighting any passengers or crew, whom he considered fell under the 
Act. This form was collected by the customs officer who was responsible for boarding 
every vessel arriving ‘from places beyond New Zealand’ (Step 2). The port health 
officer had to inform the customs officer as to ‘any person on the vessel who comes 
within the restrictions of subsection (2) or (3) of section 3 of the Act’. This meant that 
the port health officer was responsible for deciding whether someone was ‘idiot or 
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insane’, or ‘suffering from a contagious disease which is loathsome or dangerous’.87 
The customs officer was responsible for administering the ‘education test’ and 
collecting the £100 allowing those who failed it to land, pending their exemption 
application (Steps 4 and 5).
88
 This system relied on the referrals made by the ship’s 
master who on the ‘Form of Certificate’ certified to the ‘best of their belief’ none of 
their passengers or crew was liable to the restrictions of the Act. 
The New Zealand Customs Inspector, W. Glasgow, circulated these regulations 
and the new ‘Application for Admission into New Zealand’ forms which constituted the 
‘education test’ (Appendix F). Glasgow advised his officers that immigrants were 
required to write out the whole of the form in their native language.
89
 Unlike the 
ambiguous Australian version of the test, based on any passage of fifty words in a 
European language chosen by the officer, the New Zealand one involved a uniform 
statement.
90
 Glasgow provided his officers with this form which had been translated 
into four European languages.
91
 By 1905, although it had been redesigned to ‘avoid it 
becoming too familiar’, it was created in a further eleven languages.92 
 The new health clauses were not so explicitly explained to those charged with 
operating them. The 1900 Public Health Act, however, included a specific part relating 
to quarantine which formalised the ‘Proceedings on Arrival of Ships’.93 These 
provisions continued to focus on infectious disease. They detailed how, once the district 
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health officer had  ordered a ship quarantined, the ship’s master had to provide an 
inventory of the ship’s voyage and answer all such questions ‘touching the health of the 
passengers during the voyage’. The New Zealand border officials responsible for asking 
these questions were widely defined as either the (harbour) pilot, a person boarding or 
conducting the ship, or any person appointed by the Minister or District Health Officer 
to board the ship.
94
 This same official was also able to ask the same questions of the 
‘surgeon, dispenser, or other medical officer of every ship’.95 None of these provisions 
were referenced in relation to either Immigration Act. There were however a deal of 
similarities. Whether in relation to quarantine or immigration controls, the border 
officials relied on the ship’s master to provide accurate referrals as to the health or their 
passengers and crew.  
Only in 1907 did Glasgow provide some information regarding the non-
infectious undesirables. He advised his staff that ‘chronic alcoholics’ should be bonded 
as ‘infirm’ under the IPA, although warned that the health officers should be cautious 
with this diagnosis, because the condition was not conclusively proven by delirium 
tremens.
96
 No diagnostic instructions were given in relation to the ‘lunatic’, ‘idiotic’ or 
‘insane’. In 1910 the Secretary of Customs again confirmed the role of the port health 
officer. The Secretary was clear on the demarcation between the health and customs 
officials. The former was, he explained, responsible only for advising the customs 
officer whether an immigrant was ‘infirm or otherwise’. It was the customs collector 
who decided whether a bond should be taken.
97
 These instructions again display how 
confirming ‘mental illness’ in immigrants remained the responsibility of the port health 
officers.  
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The new Australian operations appeared to place more responsibility on the 
customs officer to make this decision. Because they initially relied on the legacy of the 
state procedures, the port health or quarantine officers must have played a part in the 
process.  Similar to New Zealand, the Commonwealth government provided guidelines 
outlining the responsibilities of the port officials. The Federal department responsible 
for outlining constitutional practice, the Executive Council, provided the officers 
‘charged with the enforcement of the Act’, some instructions. Compared to their New 
Zealand counterparts, the Australian customs officers seemed to have greater 
responsibility in deciding whether an immigrant was prohibited under a health clause. If 
the custom officer had a ‘reason to believe’ that an ‘an idiot, or a person suffering from 
a contagious disease’ was on board, they could detain a vessel for twenty-four hours. 
The instructions described this detention as allowing for a medical examination to take 
place, although they did not state by whom.
98
 One newspaper reported how the 
‘authority to detain’ had been granted in relation to any immigrants suspected of what it 
termed ‘poverty, insanity or crime’.99 This referral system again relied on the ship’s 
master. Like in New Zealand, the customs officer used the captain’s inventory to 
question them further, and search the vessel, a task which was not to be ‘hindered or 
obstructed’.100 As such, it is likely the Australian system operated similar to New 
Zealand’, represented in Process Chart 4.  
In 1903, so eighteen months after the passing of the Act, steps were taken to 
define better border procedures relating to ‘mentally ill’ immigrants in Australia. This 
intervention by the ministerial department responsible for the Act’s administration, the 
Department of External Affairs, signified the start of a divergence between New 
Zealand and Australian practices. This focus would lead, over the next two decades, to 
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Australian attempts to define their border operations. These initial steps would however 
bring one aspect of the control of ‘mentally ill’ immigrants back in line with New 
Zealand, that of allowing entry under a bonding provision. 
 From 1902 the office of the Australian government responsible for 
administering the Act began to modernise their approach to the health of immigrants. 
Atlee Hunt, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, wrote to the State Customs 
Collectors.
101
 He advised these local officials that his department was considering the 
‘action to be taken in connection with the admission of lunatics who arrive in Australia 
from parts beyond The Commonwealth’.102 This admission is telling. First it suggests 
that the government had not properly considered the practicalities of exclusion and 
second, it indicates how, despite the legal clause referring to ‘idiots and insane’ the term 
‘lunatic’ remained in use outside the asylum setting. Initially Hunt relied on the current 
legal provisions and stressed the importance of Section 9, the clause which specified 
that shipping companies could be fined up to one hundred pounds for transporting 
prohibited immigrants. He informed the customs officers that the State solicitors should 
be instructed to ‘press magistrates to impose substantial fines’.103 
The reliance on the threat of penalties as a deterrent proved inadequate. The 
resulting response by the Australian government signified how, despite the introduction 
of the prohibited clause, some ‘mentally ill’ immigrants were not automatically rejected 
or arrival. In response to Hunt’s request, the immigration agent at Brisbane explained 
the previous operations there. The ‘insane’ immigrants had been allowed to land for 
treatment and, when suitably recovered, ‘were shipped back to their friends in the 
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United Kingdom’.104 The Port Adelaide officer alluded to a similar system. Under the 
South Australia Immigration Limitation Act, he explained to Hunt, immigrants were 
allowed in under bonds. Those confirmed as ‘lunatics’ by the magistrate were admitted 
to the asylum.
105
 
By March 1902, the Department of External Affairs reintroduced the bonding 
provision which had been so apparent in the nineteenth-century state operations.  Hunt 
informed the customs departments that insane immigrants could be landed for medical 
treatment, if a five hundred pound bond was provided. To formalise this concession a 
specific exemption certificate for the ‘insane’ was created (Appendix G). Form 29 
constituted the application to the Minister of External Affairs for a Certificate of 
Exemption. It was designed specifically for anyone supposed to be insane and likely to 
become a public charge. Exemption was based on financial assurances and granted only 
on the condition that the applicant ‘executes this obligation with one approved 
surety’.106 It was, in every way bar the name, the equivalent of a bond certificate.  
The importance of this, in modern parlance, ‘U-turn’ should not be overlooked. 
Despite Australia and New Zealand declaring ‘idiots and insane’ as prohibited, both 
allowed them to enter under the older bonding system. As such, although the fear of 
degeneration was widespread across the Australasian region, the ‘mentally ill’ were still 
allowed entry if the money was provided for them to do so, in addition to the exemption 
provisions.
107
 Both of these concessions suggest that in these ‘worlds without welfare’ 
the fear of immigrants becoming public charges mattered more than the type of 
condition that could render them destitute. Examining the statistics and the details of 
actual immigration exclusion cases validates this hypothesis. 
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Outcomes 
By 1902 Australia and New Zealand had enacted similar border controls in relation to 
the ‘mentally ill’. Both sought to deport the ‘idiot or insane’ or, if a bond was provided, 
allow them entry. The numbers involved can be ascertained from official reportage. 
Although New Zealand’s IRA did not specify, like Australia’s, that these statistics were 
a legal requirement, from 1904 the New Zealand Minister of Public Health’s  annual 
report began to reference levels of infectious disease in immigrants.
108
 It is therefore 
likely that the Wellington’s Evening Post 1906 synopsis of immigrants returned or 
bonded came from a similar official source. This collated information is represented in 
Table 7. The paper declared that ‘guardians of the health and general well-being of the 
colony’ were making New Zealand a ‘difficult country for the physically or mentally 
unfit to enter’.109 They provided yearly statistics of immigrant cases in order to justify 
this opinion. 
 
Table 7: Bonded and deported immigrant cases, New Zealand, 1901-1906 
  1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 TOTAL %  
Insane Returned  1 1 1 1 0 3 7 19 
Consumptives Returned  0 1 2 1 4 2 10 27 
Infirm Bonded  1 5 7 4 3 0 20 54 
TOTAL  2 7 10 6 7 5 37  
 
Source: ‘Keeping out Undesirables: Imbecile Passengers’, The Evening Post, 16 November 1906, p. 5. 
 
  These figures enable us to make a key observation. They show how the 
provisions of the IPA and IRA operated in tandem prior to their amalgamation in 1908. 
The ‘insane returned’ were done so presumably under the prohibited clause of the IRA, as 
were the ‘consumptives returned’. This latter group must have fallen under the 
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‘contagious disease which is loathsome or dangerous’ clause. From the overall total of 
thirty-seven, seven were deported for being ‘insane’, which accounts for nineteen per 
cent. This is a lower proportion than the figures in Table 2 which suggested that two-
thirds of the bonds enacted under the IPA between 1883 and 1899 related to the wide 
scope of ‘mental illness’. However, it is likely that the ‘infirm bonded’ in Table 7 
included some such cases under the catch-all phrase ‘lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, 
or infirm’. The ‘insane returned’ in Table 7 were done so under the provisions of the 
IRA. To try to untangle these complexities it is again possible to use actual immigration 
case studies. From them it is possible to show how the label ‘infirm’ could equally 
include the ‘mentally infirm’ or as, one health officer tried to suggest, a man who was 
‘not very bright’. Some of the immigration cases which exist as archival sources show 
how officials at the time struggled to work within the combined provisions, which the 
shipping companies used to their advantage. 
  Although the figures provided by The Post grouped the health conditions 
simplistically, the port officials continued to use an array of labels across both Acts.  In 
1900 a so-called ‘imbecile passenger’ was returned from Auckland to Newcastle, New 
South Wales.
110
 Whether defined as ‘idiots’, ‘imbeciles’, ‘lunatics’ or ‘insane’, some 
immigrants were still not being caught under either legislation. In 1902 for example, 
Customs Inspector William Glasgow was forced to concede, after consulting with the 
police, that a bond could not be requested for a ‘lunatic’ Joseph Goss.111 Whether this 
was an issue of timeliness is not clear, unlike with the case of a so-called ‘congenital 
idiot’ Alexander Manton, who was admitted to Auckland Mental Hospital. The 
superintendent there, Dr Hay, asked why the IPA had not been used to prevent Manton, 
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who had been a patient in the Kew Hospital Melbourne, from entering New Zealand. The 
time elapsed between Manton’s admission and Hay’s complaint suggests that any claim 
would have been outside the fourteen day period.
112
 In 1906 an official at the Avondale 
Lunatic Asylum acted more efficiently to execute a bond claim. Because George 
Grierson, admitted for being a ‘lunatic’ had arrived on the Zealandia, ten days 
previously, the asylum official made it clear to the customs collector that Grierson ‘must 
come under the Imbeciles Passenger Act’.113 
 While these cases suggest that the port officials favoured the IPA bonding 
provision, other evidence suggests that the shipping companies elected to use the 
deportation facility rather than paying the bond. This strategy was particularly apparent 
in the case of William Innes. Described by border officials as an ‘old man’ and an ex-
miner from Queensland, Innes attempted to land in Wellington with only three shillings 
and six pence. His physical and financial state singled him out to the border officials, as 
did Innes’ own admission that he felt ‘queer in the head’. Initially, port health officer Dr 
Pollen detained him on board but, after questioning Innes further described him as 
‘quite rational, and better in every way’. Pollen reported that could not therefore certify 
Innes as ‘insane’, or ‘imbecile’. Still believing that Innes would become a public charge, 
Pollen attempted to define him as ‘not very bright’. The Union Shipping Company 
refused to accept this ‘diagnosis’ so instead elected to return Innes to Sydney at their 
own expense.
114
 This type of collusion between border officials and shipping companies 
ended in tragedy for Daniel Lynch. After arriving in Auckland on the Ventura he 
jumped overboard, and subsequently told the police that he would return to Sydney by 
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train. Such behaviour led to Lynch being certified as a ‘lunatic’. To avoid paying the 
bond, the Oceanic Company elected to return him to Sydney. Upon arrival there Lynch 
again jumped overboard. This time he drowned and his tragic end received press 
attention on both sides of the Tasman.
115
  
 Although deportation had been legalised through the IRA, its actual use 
appeared dependent on the motivations of the port officials and the shipping companies. 
Securing entry into New Zealand still rested, therefore, on financial considerations. It 
would seem that the shipping companies became even more complicit in managing the 
migration of the ‘mentally ill’. The extent of this is difficult to ascertain. Innes and 
Lynch were both deported in 1905, yet the statistics for the ‘insane returned’ that year 
was nil (Table 7). It is possible to speculate that the shipping companies used their own 
‘informal’ system of return. These instances may not have therefore been noted as 
statistics under the ‘prohibited immigrant’ clause of the IRA. The seven ‘insane 
returned’ between 1901 and 1906 may have been rejected outright by the port health 
officers. The names of the immigrants for whom immigration officials attempted to 
enact bonds, where known, suggest that they were either of British or Australian origin. 
Despite the new legal framework, the reaction to, and management of ‘mentally-
ill’ immigrants remained messy and subjective. The 1908 case of Belgian Joseph Pinto 
enables us to speculate that nationality may have determined whether deportation was 
more likely. The facts of Pinto’s court case were reported on enthusiastically by New 
Zealand journalists, mainly because of his assertion that he had invented a valuable 
‘cypher code’. This had apparently led him to travel to the United States in order to sell 
his invention accompanied by his with his wife and brother-in-law. He had travelled to 
San Francisco, seeking passage to Peru but was reportedly drugged and robbed by his 
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family. Pinto recalled waking up on a steamer which, it turned out, was heading to 
Auckland.   
In this case port health officials did not struggle to diagnose Pinto’s state of 
mind. After being kept under observation en-route because he had shown ‘symptoms of 
insanity’, Dr Sharman declared Pinto to be in a ‘state of lunacy’ on arrival. He was 
handed over to the authorities, and after escaping, was found wandering in a ‘weak and 
pitiable condition’. In the ensuing court case he was represented by the Belgian Consul 
who pointed out that Pinto currently appeared quite rational and in possession of his 
senses. The judge thought otherwise and ordered Pinto remanded for observation, 
during which time the jail surgeon found him too debilitated to be imprisoned. After a 
further stint in hospital, Pinto’s case was heard in full. His ‘cypher system’, was 
presented in court as a piece of metal with a system of round holes punched into it. It 
does not appear that his ability to stay through the bonding system was ever an option. 
The judge ordered Pinto to be returned on the same ship in which he had arrived, the 
Tofua and strictly enforced the provisions of the IRA. He found the Union Shipping 
Company culpable for Pinto’s removal and all of his costs, including for arrest, stays in 
prison and hospital, and even for his cab trip to the wharf.
 116
 
The nationality of those bonded or rejected under the New Zealand provisions is 
not always obvious, unlike under the Australian Act. Providing the statistics of those 
prohibited was a legal requirement.  Table 8 provides the figures of prohibited 
immigrant between 1902 and 1912. This date range has been selected because in 1912 
the Australian prohibited clauses were overhauled. 
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Table 8: Prohibited immigrants under the Australian Immigration Restriction Act, 1902-1912 
Section 3 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 TOTAL % (app.) 
Education Test 618 136 115 104 NA 61 107 107 26 40 71 1385 86 
Public Charge 32 0 0 2 NA 0 0 0 2 4 11 51 3 
Idiot/Insane 2 16 2 0 NA 1 1 1 1 3 4 31 2 
Diseased 0 0 0 0 NA 0 0 0 2 20 36 58 4 
Criminal 1 0 0 0 NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Prostitute 0 0 0 0 NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Contract Lab.  0 0 0 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 0 
Stowaway NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 11 16 65 92 6 
 653 152 117 106 NA 62 108 108 42 83 187 1618  
Source: York, Immigration Restriction, 1901-1950. 
 
These official figures should still be treated with some scepticism. The original source 
states that no returns were available for 1906. Furthermore, the published values for 
1908 and 1909 are identical, which seems unlikely. Despite these caveats, a number of 
trends are apparent. As designed, the Australian IRA was used mainly in relation to the 
‘education test’. From 1908 it was also geared towards against stowaways, a provision 
enacted in response to, what one newspaper described as, the ‘regular traffic’ of 
stowaways between Hong Kong and Australian ports.
117
 These two classes combined 
made up over ninety per cent of those excluded. 
 The remaining approximate ten per cent represented those deemed undesirable 
for their health or likely to become public charges.  Out of the total of 1618 exclusions, 
only thirty-one were prohibited under clause 3(c) ‘idiots and insane’. This works out at 
around two per cent rate. It is possible to further define this thirty-one by nationality.  
Twelve were British, and of the remainder, seven were French, five German, two 
‘Hindoos’, two South Sea Islanders, two Italian, and one Malay. It could be speculated 
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that the British ‘insane’ were more likely allowed entry under certificates of exemption, 
although no evidence has been uncovered to justify this claim. 
 
Table 9: Prohibited immigrants under the Australian IRA under the ‘idiot/insane’ clause 1902-1912 
Section 3  1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 TOTAL 
TOTAL  653 152 117 106 NA 62 108 108 42 83 187 1618 
3c British   2 2 0 0 NA 0 1 1 1 2 3 12 
3c Non- British  0 14 2 0 NA 1 0 0 0 1 1 19 
Total Idiot/Insane  2 16 2 0 NA 1 1 1 1 3 4 31 
Source: York, Immigration Restriction, 1901-1950. 
 
If we consider the proportion of ‘idiots or insane’ excluded it appears low. However by 
comparing them to New Zealand’s reaction to the insane, diseased and infirm we get 
similar percentages. Of the 140 prohibited for either being a public charge, insane or 
diseased, those under 3(c) ‘idiots and insane’ represent twenty two per cent which is 
comparable to New Zealand’s nineteen per cent ‘insane returned’ in Table 7.  Those 
classed as prohibited in Australia were likewise ‘returned’. This is made evident in the 
case of one of the ‘idiot or insane’ cases noted within the figures for 1902. The Western 
Australia customs ledger includes the entry for a British male ‘lunatic’ who, after 
arriving on 23 October, was deported  four days later to Colombo.
118
  
 Other assumptions can be made about the Australian operations with caution. 
The increase in the prohibited total for the insane in 1903 should be attributed to the 
attention given to the clause by Atlee Hunt the previous year. In some cases it is 
possible to match these anonymous statistics to names, thus adding detail to the 
practices of the legislation. One of the non-British ‘insane’ deported in 1904 was 
French. This is likely to be the case of John Francis Vettner who was described by 
newspapers as a ‘returning colonist’, latterly of Western Australia.  He had attempted 
gold prospecting in the Indo-Malay Peninsula, where he had caught a fever which 
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triggered his so-called ‘mental aberration’. He arrived in Melbourne under the charge of 
a French gendarme. Vettner was found ‘insane’ by the chief immigration agent who 
served the captain with the necessary form, intimating that he would be held responsible 
under the Act if the passenger landed.
119
 
Some evidence points to Australian reticence in using the deportation function, 
or at least it being used humanely. In 1905 Hunt advised his officers not to return 
immigrants on the vessel they had arrived on, as this might undermine their recovery.
120
 
This was more benevolent than New Zealand’s process which favoured using the same 
ship. The following year the Australian Prime Minister himself, Alfred Deakin, sought 
to improve these operations. Like in New Zealand, this intervention was required due to 
shipping companies trying to avoid their financial liabilities. This was the case when the 
captain of the London Hill docked at Port Melbourne, refused to apply for a bond for 
one of his ‘insane’ crew. The sailor escaped but was returned to the ship where, 
according to newspaper reports, Deakin stepped in to try to induce the captain to ‘do his 
duty’ under the Act. Reports suggested that this case coincided with a similar complaint 
made to the Prime Minister about another ‘insane man’ who had been landed without 
any checks.
121
  
This high level intervention suggests how the federal authorities were still, five 
years after the implementation of the 1901 Act, developing their operations. 
Furthermore, these cases led journalists to reflect on how border controls were meant to 
operate. While the burden of maintenance fell on the state, they explained, the 
Commonwealth acted for them in providing border protection. This combination meant 
that ‘no insane people can land in Australia unless there is some guarantee given for 
their maintenance’. These newspapers reported that Deakin’s involvement was due to 
                                                 
119
 ‘An Insane Immigrant’, The Adelaide Advertiser, 26 March 1904, p. 8. 
120
 ‘Insane Immigrants’, The South Australian Advertiser, 6 April 1905, p. 4. 
121
 ‘Insane Immigrants: The Minister Intervenes’, The Adelaide Advertiser, 16 March 1906, p. 5. 
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his wish that the cases were resolved in such a way as to ‘administer as little suffering 
as possible to those concerned’.122  
The numbers of those prohibited under the health clauses remained minimal 
over the years up to 1912. In 1911 the Comptroller General of the Department of Trade 
and Customs created Confidential Notes for the Guidance of Officers. The main purpose 
of these instructions was to remind the officers of the deportation provision and those 
aimed at excluding ‘coloured immigrants.’ This document did include some information 
relating to the health provisions. All it did, however, was to highlight the role of the 
medical quarantine officers. As previously suggested, these officers do therefore appear 
to have been the equivalent of the New Zealand port health officers. It was the 
quarantine officers, the Comptroller General confirmed, who were responsible for 
informing the customs officers of anyone suspected of falling under the clauses 3 (b), 
(c), or (d).
123
 Accordingly, local border operations remained subjective because were 
managed by individuals acting according to their own experience and motivation. Like 
in New Zealand, the language employed by customs and immigration officials did not 
match the legislation. In the Western Australia customs ledger for example, by the end 
of 1912 a man was listed as deported for his ‘mental derangement’ rather than the 
specified ‘idiot or insane’.124 As such, neither Australian nor New Zealand border 
operators used uniform language, despite operating under a new framework which had, 
at least, defined their roles and responsibilities.  
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 ‘Insane Immigrants’, The Adelaide Advertiser, 13 March 1906, p. 5; ‘Insane Immigrants: The Minister 
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Guidance of Officers’, p. 8.  
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 NAA: PP4/4, Customs Ledger 23/12/1902 to 12/12/1907 Book 2, pp. 26-27.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has exposed the problems involved in the attempts of New Zealand and 
Australia to establish the ‘new phase’ of border controls. Both nations used the new 
framework within which the ‘insane’ were deemed prohibited. However the practice of 
deportation developed haphazardly. The legacy of nineteenth century border controls 
meant that the concept of excluding ‘idiots’ and ‘insane’ went unchallenged by 
politicians and other members of the establishment. These ‘mentally ill’ were not 
singled out as prohibited, but were designated as a separate category following the 
design of the Natal Act. In reality Australasian politicians and administrators rarely 
spoke of the ‘mentally ill’ as a separate category, but continued to include them, 
alongside the diseased, criminal and immoral, as undesirable.  
And yet, whereas the Natal Act was promoted as the legal benchmark, both New 
Zealand and Australia deviated from it. Their continued use of a bonding system needs 
to be highlighted as a key departure from the Natal blueprint. New Zealand employed 
their Imbeciles Passenger Act concurrent to the new Act.  Likewise Australia soon 
incorporated a change to their 1901 Act, which enabled the ‘insane’ to enter under 
bonds. These concessions suggest some sort of empathy for these types, as long as 
assurance was provided for their maintenance. It should be assumed that this function 
was aimed more at their British ‘brethren’. New Zealanders expressed this compassion 
more explicitly. They chose not to apply the education test to British or Irish migrants, 
and avoided the direct ‘pauper’ clause. Unlike the unilaterally accepted ‘idiots and 
insane’ clause, the more controversial sections had of course been debated at length 
earlier. There were clearly many parallels between the furore about New Zealand’s 
1894 Undesirable Immigrants Bill and Australian concerns about their 1901 Act. These 
concerns were framed in how the healthy, hardworking British and European 
immigrants would be affected.  
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Australasian politicians accepted that the so-called insane should not be allowed 
entry but, in terms of border management, neither Australia nor New Zealand 
implemented a secure border system. Although the roles of customs and health, or 
quarantine, officers were defined, these remained reliant on the involvement of the 
shipping companies. These commercial operators became savvier to the legislation, 
which they manipulated. The rhetoric about the undesirable remained inconsistent.  
Nowhere was this more apparent than when New Zealand’s Dr Pollen attempted to 
enact a bond for William Innes, purely on the basis that he was old, poor, confused, and 
‘not very bright.’ In Australia port officials continued to use archaic terms such as 
‘lunatic’. As the next chapter shows, the terminology used a local levels remained 
muddled well into the next decade. The Australians however would attempt to tighten, 
standardise and, most importantly, ‘medicalise’ the operations of their legislation. Such 
attempts in the new ‘eugenic century’ would finally incorporate modern terminology 
about the ‘mentally’ and ‘morally’ unfit into immigration control. 
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Chapter Six: Standardising Defence Lines, Eugenics & 
Border Control 1912—1920 
 
 
In 1912 The Commonwealth of Australia overhauled its Immigration Restriction Act in 
terms of its title, scope, and practicalities.  The new Immigration Act created the 
position of Commonwealth Medical Officer (CMO), to which Dr William Perrin Norris 
was appointed. Norris described the Act as the ‘first one which may be said to have a 
definite eugenic phase’.1 The Act sought to enforce pre-embarkation medical 
certification for all prospective migrants leaving Britain; and, through Norris, finally 
provided standardised guidelines for those managing these ‘dual governmental barriers 
of defence: the screening in London, and national Australian quarantine borders’.2   
Norris would also argue that the terminology of immigration legislation should 
be made uniform ‘if not throughout the world, then at least the British Empire’.3 Yet, 
despite the assertion from legislators that these changes would reduce hardships on 
intending migrants, the removal of the term ‘Restriction’ from the Act’s title belied its 
contents. The health clauses were widened substantially: paragraph 3(c) to ‘idiots, 
imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, or epileptics’; and additional sections were created to 
target those with transmissible disability, diseases or defects. These heredity clauses led 
contemporaries and current scholars to frame Australia’s 1912 Immigration Act in the 
context of eugenics. As acknowledged in the ‘Categorising Worthiness’ section in 
Chapter One, both Australia and New Zealand utilised eugenic principles in their 
nation-building projects of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These attempts 
included immigration control. Two scholarly viewpoints in particular have informed 
                                                 
1
 HCPP 1914-16 [Cd. 7710] Dominions Royal Commission. Royal Commission on the Natural 
Resources, Trade, and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty's Dominions. Minutes of evidence 
taken in London in June and July 1914, and papers laid before the commission, p. 3. 
2
 Bashford, Imperial Hygiene, p. 156.  
3
 HCPP 1914-16 [Cd. 7710] Dominions Royal Commission. Royal Commission on the Natural 
Resources, Trade, and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty's Dominions, p. 1. 
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this research. Stephen Garton has suggested that immigration restriction may have been 
the success story of eugenic public policy in Australasia.
4
 More recently Alison 
Bashford has stated that the ‘insanity clauses’ within the legislation linked ‘eugenics 
and immigration most squarely.
5
 
And yet, there is so much more to be learnt about this so-called eugenic phase, a 
period in which Australia attempted to standardise its controls in the metropole. As will 
be shown in this chapter, the applications of these eugenic clauses were by no means 
uniform either across, or within, Australia, and created friction between state and 
commonwealth ideologies and individuals. Additionally, whilst New Zealand’s border 
controllers used the same eugenic terminology as their Australian counterparts in their 
practices, the New Zealand 1908 Immigration Restriction Act endured unchanged. As 
such, it is the Australian experience which takes centre stage in this chapter, in a decade 
which saw the end of the alignment between New Zealand and Australian legislation.  
This chapter will be structured around three overarching sections. The first 
considers the career of the individual who would play a formative role in the creation of 
a new era of standardisation and centralisation, but who until now has been overlooked 
by scholars of public health and migration regulation. Dr William Perrin Norris, who 
began as a parochial doctor, would achieve federal positions in charge of first 
quarantine, and then, immigration control. Of less national standing, but likewise a 
purveyor of modernisation was Dr A. Wallace Weihen. Both men symbolised the new 
era of internationalisation, standardisation and eugenic thinking. They sought to 
influence the thinking of the political administrators charged with defending Australia’s 
borders from the various ‘problematic’ types. The second section considers how far 
these eugenic themes extended into the political arena and led to the overhaul of the 
Immigration Act in 1912. This approach helps explain why Australia became 
                                                 
4
 Garton, ‘Eugenics in Australia and New Zealand’, p. 249. 
5
 Bashford, ‘Insanity and Immigration Restriction’, p. 23.  
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particularly receptive to eugenicist thinking, and why it moved ahead of New Zealand 
by incorporating such thinking into their legislation. This involved a major change in 
the British-based operations. The Commonwealth Medical Officer sought to establish 
national control over the Australian State officials operating in London.  
Finally this chapter’s third section employs the usual policy-versus- practice 
method to consider how well the updated 1912 Act worked. It shows how Norris 
confronted the same kind of problems that had faced all those who had gone before him, 
including how to deal with those who ‘appeared sane’ before they left Britain. He 
uniquely tried to bring order to the messy job of patrolling Australia’s borders. While 
his aim was to roll out a new kind of coordinated and standardised system of policing 
across both a newly-federated Australia and the wider British world, what he found was 
that his vision was frustrated by wider forces; ministers were uncomfortable with such a 
far-reaching project; state agent-generals who were charged with peopling the empire 
were resistant; and finally World War One curtailed the full implementation of the 
scheme. Consideration of  the New Zealand’s practices shows how, despite the 
legislation not being overtly eugenic, ideas similar to those in Australia, were still 
apparent.  This shows that although in many ways the designs of Norris and other 
eugenicists were frustrated in the period before 1914, their ideals endured and would re-
emerge in the post-war era, a topic to which we will return in the final chapter. Up until 
now it is clear that Australia followed in New Zealand’s footsteps. This chapter shows 
that Australia became much more sophisticated in their methods of border control. 
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William Perrin Norris: Transnational Medical Reformer  
 
The simple description of Dr W.P. Norris as a ‘medical practitioner’ in his son’s- 
decorated war-hero Sir Frank Kingsley Norris (1893–1984) - entry in the Australian 
Dictionary of Biography does Norris Senior a great disservice.
6
 Indeed the life of 
William Perrin Norris (circa. 1867-1940) has been overlooked by historians, despite his 
own war efforts, and pivotal federal roles. As the first Director of Federal Quarantine, 
then first Commonwealth Medical Officer, Norris shaped the medical administration of 
immigration regulations due to his dedication to preventative medicine and public 
health.
7
 It is worthwhile reiterating here that border officials in both Britain and 
Australasia worked within ill-defined operational structures in all of the eras considered 
in this study. Yet even in more specialised, relevant research Norris is only given a 
passing mention. Warwick Anderson, for example, despite recognising many figures 
who counselled politicians and the public on how to cultivate a working white race, 
 
mentions Norris’ quarantine role only briefly.8 Bashford likewise references his 1912 
Quarantine Report in relation to her research on how a pure, white, island-nation was 
imagined yet does not delve further.
9
 Conversely, much historiographical space has 
been given to those who moved within Norris’ circle and similarly sought to improve 
Australian health and heredity.  Such figures include his successor as Quarantine 
Director, Dr J.H.L. Cumpston, and other notable Melbournian eugenicists, Prime 
Minister Alfred Deakin, and Dr R.J.A. Berry.
10
 To address this omission, previously un-
interrogated sources are used to position Norris at the heart of Australian attempts to 
create national uniform border controls. 
                                                 
6
 ADB online version, Andrew J. Ray, 'Norris, Sir Frank Kingsley (1893–1984), [accessed 19 May 2014].  
7
 F. Kingsley Norris, No Memory for Pain: An Autobiography (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1970), p. 9. 
8
 Anderson, The Cultivation of Whiteness, pp. 4, 91.  
9
 Bashford, Imperial Hygiene, pp. 126-127. 
10
 Garton, ‘Eugenics in Australia and New Zealand’, p. 244. See also Bryder, History of Medicine in 
Australia and New Zealand’, p. 313. 
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 In order to explain Norris’ incredible career trajectory it is worthwhile briefly 
considering his early life. If a merited biography were ever written about William Perrin 
Norris it would no doubt describe him as an assured scholar. We do not know his exact 
date of birth but do know that his parents arrived from England in the 1860s.
11
 It 
appears that they settled in Victoria because Norris was born in Fitzroy, Melbourne.
12
 
By the mid-1880s he was excelling in his medical studies at the University of 
Melbourne where, in his fourth year, he was awarded the gold medal for proficiency in 
a field which would shape his career, ‘Hygiene’.13 In 1889 he was awarded various 
scholarships and married.
14
After receiving his Bachelor of Medicine, Norris entered 
general medical practice in mainly rural locales.
15
 Clearly seeking to combine his early 
professional and married life with the continuation of academic pursuits, in 1892, he 
received his Doctorate of Medicine from The University of Melbourne.
16
 The same 
year, in a precursor to his later overseas research trips, Norris sailed to England to study 
for his Diploma in Public Health in London. On this journey he acted as ship’s surgeon, 
which again must have influenced his professional life. However, on returning to 
Australia he returned to general practice in Victoria.
17
 Norris’ scholasticism was 
                                                 
11
 Norris, No Memory for Pain, pp. 21-22. 
12
 ‘Director of Federal Quarantine’, The Barrier Miner (Broken Hill ), 25 May 1909, p. 2. 
13
 Second year: top of class and awarded Second Year Medical Exhibition. ‘The University of Melbourne: 
Honour Examination’, The (Melbourne) Argus, 31 December 1885, p. 7; Third Year: top of class and 
awarded Third Year Medical Exhibition, ‘The University of Melbourne: Honour Examination’, and 
‘Exhibitions’, The (Melbourne)Argus, 31 December 1886, p.6; Fourth year: first-class and gold medal for 
proficiency in therapeutics, dietetics and hygiene, ‘The University of Melbourne: Honour Examination’ 
The (Melbourne) Argus, 29 December 1887, p. 6. 
14
 Fifth year: achieved first class and awarded scholarships for forensic medicine and physiological 
medicine, and in surgery and obstetric medicine and diseases of women and children.
 ‘The University of 
Melbourne: Honour Examination’ The (Melbourne) Argus , 29 March 1889, p. 3. Norris married Mary 
Foulkes, ‘Marriages,’ The (Melbourne) Argus, 15 June 1889, p. 1. 
15
 Frank Kingsley describes his father as starting his practice at Coalville, in Gippsville, South-East 
Victoria, see No Memory for Pain, p. 9. In 1890 W. P. Norris acted as public vaccinator in the agricultural 
town of Beeac, south-west Australia. See ‘The Government Gazette’, The Colac Herald (Victoria), 30 
September 1890, p. 3. In 1891 Norris and Dr W.J. Craig announced that they had taken over the practice 
on Main-street, Lilydale, see ‘Advertising’, Evelyn Observer, and South and East Bourke Record 
(Victoria), 17 July 1891, p. 2. In November 1893 he was elected to the board of advice for the school 
district of the south-western and north-western ridings of the Shire of Lilydale. See ‘Untitled’, The 
(Melbourne) Argus, 21 November 1893, p. 6. His first son Jack was probably born in 1890.  
16
 ‘The University of Melbourne: Conferring of Degrees’, The (Melbourne) Argus, 15 November 1892,  
p. 3. 
17
 Norris, No Memory for Pain, p. 9. 
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recognised by his son Frank who described his father as an ‘inveterate reader’, recalling 
how he was knocked off his horse by an overhanging branch whilst riding and reading 
simultaneously.
18
 Yet, despite W.P. Norris’ clear predilection for intellectual pursuits, 
local newspaper accounts also suggest that he was a popular, community-focussed 
general practitioner. In May 1896 he was elected medical officer for the Bendigo United 
Friendly Societies’ Dispensary and Medical Institute, and a number of letters were 
written to the Bendigo Advertiser thanking him for his ‘skilful and attentive 
treatment’.19 From singing baritone at the local glee club’s concert; giving public talks 
at the Philosophical Society; overseeing the exams for the nursing class of the St John’s 
Ambulance Association;  to regularly donating to the Bendigo Hospital, Norris was 
clearly a popular man of some local standing.
20
 These dual foundations of professional 
capability and academic excellence would lead first to state, and then federal 
prominence in the sphere of public health, which, as will become apparent, was only 
one step removed from border control.  
 The first stage of this transition began in 1900 when Norris was appointed to 
Victoria’s Board of Health, so relocated his family to Melbourne, site of the state, and 
later, the federal government.
21
 By 1904 he had been promoted to the head of this 
Board, where during his time there he sought to improve the health of the domestic 
population. This involved projects as varied as finding suitable sites for consumptive 
sanatoria; promoting the use of individual cups when taking communion; and advising 
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 Ibid, p. 1. 
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See for example letter from Mr and Mrs Leech, ‘Notices’, Bendigo Advertiser (Victoria), 11 June 1897, p. 
3; E. Buckland, ‘Notices’, Bendigo Advertiser (Victoria), 5 November 1897, p. 3; Timothy O’Halloran 
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 ‘Director of Federal Quarantine’, The Barrier Miner (Broken Hill), 25 May 1909, p. 2.  
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sheep shearers on how to avoid contracting diseases.
22
 This role also allowed him to 
fashion State legislation and promote it as a blueprint for national standards.
23
 It is 
important to note the types of professional and personal circles in which he moved. Son 
Frank recalled sharing family picnics with Alfred Deakin and his family who lived at 
the ‘top end of their street’, in affluent South Yarra.24 Deakin was Australian Prime 
Minister on three occasions throughout the 1910s, so it is likely that Norris advised him 
about the control of immigration and public health. Norris was also active at the trans-
colonial events at which medical ideas were discussed and disseminated. He held key 
positions at the 1908 Australasian Medical Congresses in Melbourne. Norris sat on both 
the executive and public health and state medicine
 
committees.
25
 Amongst Norris’ 
contributions to the Congress was his recommendation for using uniform medical 
terminology in recording the statistics for births and deaths.
26
 
 By promoting the standardisation of state and commonwealth policy and 
practice Norris was active in the era in which the national government took control over 
quarantine and immigration. In 1904 the state leaders convened at the Quarantine 
Conference to discuss uniform national quarantine regulations.
27
 The first 
Commonwealth Quarantine Act came into existence in 1908.
28
 Overseen by the 
Minister for Trade and Customs, and administered by the Governor-General, this Act 
signified the start of federal control over state quarantine stations and officers.
29
 In 
1909, in order to oversee this centralisation, the post Director of Quarantine was 
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 ‘Bendigo’, The (Melbourne) Argus, 16  January 1903, p. 6; ‘Risk in the Communion Cup’, The 
(Melbourne) Argus, 11 April 1908, p. 21; ‘Shearing Wet Sheep: Report of Committee of Enquiry’, 
Border Watch (Mount Gambier, Southern Australia), 19 June 1909, p. 4.  
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 Transactions of the Eight Session of the Australasian Medical Congress, held in Melbourne, Victoria, 
October 1908, Volume I  (J.Kemp, Government Printer, Victoria, 1909), pp. iv,vii. 
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created.
 30
 Out of Norris and fourteen other applicants, the final choice was between 
him, and his Queensland state counterpart, Dr Ham.
31
 In May 1909, aged 42, Norris was 
appointed to this federal position.
32
 In a little under ten years he had progressed from 
parochial medical practice to formulating and implementing national health policies. 
As Director of Quarantine, Norris managed the transition between state and 
commonwealth control.  This involved creating instructions for the border officials and 
shipping companies as to their duties under the Act.  In addition to his day job, Norris 
continued to participate in the intellectual spheres in which hygiene and heredity were 
debated. At the start of 1911 he acted as president of the Sanitary Science and Hygiene 
committee for the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science Conference 
in Sydney. In his presidential address, entitled ‘Public Health Ideals’, Norris ruminated 
on the ideas of heredity and morality. Of particular interest to him was the spread of 
tuberculosis which he classed as a physical and mental disorder.
33
 In this address Norris 
displayed his knowledge of how the Australian Immigration Restriction Act operated. 
He explained how the medical officer inspected the passenger lists of arriving ships. If 
they found anyone ‘infectious’, ‘consumptive’ or ‘mentally or physically infirm’ they 
were reported to the customs officer. This officer then took, in Norris’ words, the ‘next 
step’ by investigating the case. The medical officer’s duty was, he explained, ‘one of 
detection’ only. Norris’s explanation reflects the one provided in the 1911 Confidential 
Notes for the Guidance of Officers. Importantly, Norris went on to quote the practices of 
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 ‘Director of Quarantine’, The Sydney Stock and Station Journal, 23 March 1909, p. 4.  For a full 
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Canada and the United States, whose legislation he described as so restrictive that it 
enabled the deportation of unfit people years after they had arrived.
34
 
Norris’ knowledge of North American immigration controls increased 
exponentially after he was sent on a worldwide reconnaissance mission to report on 
international quarantine developments. In 1911 Minister of Trade and Customs Frank 
Tudor sanctioned this trip, considering it financially viable because would it result in 
the better protection of public health.
35
 The importance of this trip should not be 
underestimated, nor should Norris’ destinations. On 28 August 1911 Norris left Sydney 
on the Makura journeying via New Zealand to America, Canada, Great Britain, Europe 
and Asia.
36
 Other reports place him at Honolulu, San Francisco, New York, Quebec, 
and Brisbane.
37
 It was on this research trip that he must have examined the North 
American immigration practices which came to influence his attempts to improve 
Australian procedures three years later. 
Norris’ position enabled him to influence governmental practices directly. He 
was not the only Australian or, as we have seen, New Zealander, to express admiration 
for North American legislation. Other influential medical figures were espousing similar 
calls to align with North American practices. The 1911 Australasian Medical Congress, 
which Norris missed due him being overseas, included the presentation of the first paper 
dedicated solely to the problems of immigrant medical inspection. Dr A. Wallace 
Weihen, like Norris, borrowed international themes for his paper ‘The Medical 
Inspection of Immigrants to Australia’.38 Whether Weihen and Norris ever crossed paths 
is unknown, but they shared a number of traits. Both engaged with eugenic theories, had 
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trained and/or practised in London and advocated using North American style 
operations. As a trained optometrist, Weihen was particularly concerned that Australia 
did not check immigrants for trachoma like the United States did.
39
 He much admired 
the writing of the United States’ Immigration Restriction League’s Prescott F. Hall, who 
had persistently petitioned for better immigration control in America.
40
 
 Weihen, like Norris, promoted the North American practices as the ideal. He 
advocated a similar system of medical inspection to remove the current onus on 
shipping companies and emigration agencies. The individual Australian states, like New 
Zealand, still recruited immigrants on an ad-hoc basis. Weihen described the medical 
certification used by the state schemes as ‘perfunctory and valueless’. He also thought 
that the pre-departure medical inspection of passengers in Britain was arbitrarily 
performed.  Instead he advocated the use of procedures similar to those of North 
America, whose practices were so thorough that ‘little more could be done to prevent 
the ingress of improper persons’.41 Weihen’s definition of ‘impropriety’ clearly had 
eugenic undertones. He wanted medical officers ‘experienced in inherited and 
transmissible disease’ to disallow the entry of those with ‘defects’ and ‘the progenitors 
of those likely to populate asylums and gaols’.42 Weihen also compared the immigrant 
deportation rates of Australia and Canada.  Compared to Canada’s level of 0.4% 
Weihen was perplexed by Australia’s mere 0.04% , a value which reflects the low 
numbers presented in Table 8 (Chapter 5). Weihen saw this low proportion as meaning 
that ‘either we are getting the healthiest people in the world, or we are not weeding out 
the undesirables’.43 It was these latter borderline cases, he warned, which were actually 
the most problematic.  Recycling one of Prescott Hall’s phrases, those of ‘poor 
physique’, he argued, were most likely to become a burden on the community and 
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reproduce their physical degeneracy.
44
 Weihen argued that Australia should also refuse 
entry to those seeking to make the country ‘the scene, either of their ineffectiveness, 
their follies, or their crimes’.45 To do this they should look at ‘the perfection of the 
arrangements for inspection at Ellis Island,’ which he described as based on the same 
rigorous lines of Canada.
46
  
 This fear-mongering guaranteed newspaper headlines, such as the Sydney 
Evening News’ paraphrasing that Australia could become a ‘dumping ground’ if the 
practices were not improved.
47
 Politicians also began to notice the extent of this medical 
petitioning. The Minister responsible for administering the Immigration Restriction Act, 
Egerton Batchelor, responded to these reports. He explained that Australian health 
administration was being made stricter. Unfortunately his sudden death a week later 
meant he would not see these improvements.
48
 Others involved in the practicalities of 
immigration control tried to temper Weihen’s concerns. Sydney’s immigration officer 
reported that, out of eight thousand people, only six had arrived in an unsatisfactory 
state of health.
49
  Like the Agent-Generals of New Zealand had done, New South 
Wales’ Agent-General, Timothy Coghlan defended his state’s processes. Their assisted 
emigrants were, he explained, examined by their home doctor, then on-board by the 
Board of Trade officers and the ship’s doctor.50 As with the previous eras considered 
therefore, intellectual concerns about degeneration did not correspond with the views of 
many migration administrators, who had practical experience. 
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 It took Norris to act as a conduit between these two professions. By the time he 
returned from his fact-finding mission in 1912, he too was convinced that ‘Australia 
was the worst protected civilised country in the world’.51 At the Australian 
parliamentary winter session politicians geared up to rectify this situation. They reacted 
to the concerns expressed by the eugenically minded physicians. Many of the aspects of 
the much admired North American legislation which attempted to exclude the 
borderline defectives were replicated.  Some Australian provisions would be even more 
eugenically driven. This would cause a rift between the idealists like Norris, and the 
State officials who were used to operating under their own, more practical regulations.  
Reinforcing Border Controls 
 
Whereas New Zealand had been managed as a political nation-state since 1876, 
Australians politicians were, twenty-five years later, attempting to do the same. In the 
decade following federation, their immigration and quarantine operations were still 
being transitioned to a national level of control.  It is important to recognise how the 
boundaries within the Commonwealth of Australia were still also being delineated. The 
Northern Territory separated from South Australia on 1
 
January 1911. Norris’ return 
from his all-important research trip coincided with the debates on how to best populate 
this ‘new’ area. As with the attempts to fill ‘empty’ Antipodean land dating back a 
hundred years, discussions about The Crowns Lands Ordinance - which facilitated the 
administrative creation of the Northern Territory - debated which types should be 
chosen to populate this area. The established States were also still actively recruiting the 
best of British as and when the labour markets required.
52
 
                                                 
51
 ‘Quarantine in Australia’, The Press (Canterbury), 27 April 1912, p. 11. 
52
 Michael Roe, Australia, Britain and Migration, 1915-1940: A Study of Desperate Hopes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 7. 
 230 
 
The Australasian migrant recruitment practices were receiving more imperial 
attention. Resulting from the 1911 Imperial Conference, a Dominions Royal 
Commission was created, one of its purposes being to bolster British emigration to the 
dominions.
53
 The 1910s are a decade in which, if it had not been for the outbreak of war 
in Europe, imperial and dominion migration could have been more jointly managed. 
Australian politicians also sought better control and administration of their border 
regulations. Throughout many political debates in 1912, a number of common themes 
emerged: namely better border protection, population control and distinguishing 
between state and commonwealth accountabilities. Norris would be directly drawn into 
these issues. Although Weihen’s views were not quoted directly in the parliamentary 
debates, it should be speculated that they were discussed in private political circles. 
What follows now is an examination the 1912 parliamentary debates to highlight how 
the eugenic thinking of medical reformers like Norris and Weihen was apparent in the 
subsequently updated system of border control. 
At the core of these ideas was a problem which had been raised persistently by 
Australasians- the lack of proper pre-departure medical inspection in Britain. Executive 
Council Vice-President, Gregor McGregor, hinted on a number of occasions that the 
government were planning to have all intending migrants health-checked before they 
departed from Britain.
54
 This suggests that Deakin’s condoning of such an idea in 1901 
had not been in vain.
55
 Between July and September 1912 much political attention was 
given to border control. On 18 July, Perth MP James Fowler requested leave be granted 
to introduce an amendment bill for the Immigration Restriction Act.
56
 Fowler couched 
this Bill as designed to give ‘extended power to the Minister for External Affairs to 
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deport criminals’.57 The fear over undesirables entering Australia was reflected in other 
debates about population standards. One member stressed that the Northern Territory 
should not be allowed to be a ‘dumping ground for derelicts’.58 Another raised concern 
over the ‘amount of weeds’ arriving in Queensland with pre-existing diseases, based on 
the example of a woman who had arrived with syphilis for which she was treated, and 
then allowed to remain.
59
 
These types of complaints led McGregor to explain the current operations and 
highlighted plans for improvement. In August he admitted that the government was 
preparing to subject every intending immigrant to a medical examination.
60
 In a later 
debate he explained how it was the Australian states that employed the examining 
officers in Britain. The Commonwealth government was responsible for investigating 
the condition of the immigrants on arrival, and preventing their landing under the 
Quarantine or Immigration Restriction Acts.
61
 This split of responsibilities was 
described by MP Sydney Sampson as a ‘flagrant neglect of duty’. He accused the 
government of not providing the states with enough assistance to facilitate migration, 
and failing to properly administering the Acts. It was the government’ duty, Sampson 
reiterated, to ‘see that those who are not fit to mix with our Australian people on the 
grounds of health’ are not admitted’.62 
The blueprint for this more effective border protection, Norris’ Report on 
Quarantine, had been circulated in August and was discussed by parliament on 23 
October.
63
 Although it dealt mainly with infectious disease, Norris’ desire for 
uniformity was evident in the control of all types of illness. He advised that ‘the 
machinery of the quarantine must be effective’ for the measures to be successful. Norris 
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also detailed the need to standardise procedures and establish properly staffed 
quarantine stations. His ideas were warmly received. Protectionist Littleton Groom 
described Norris’ recommendations as ‘masterly and striking’ and justified the cost of 
his research trip. Politicians went on to discuss whether Norris’ role as Quarantine 
Director should be granted ‘statutory officer’ status. This meant that he would be 
empowered to make decisions while the Minister remained responsible for the Act 
itself.
64
 Such a discussion shows how highly Norris was regarded in the highest of 
political circles. The new Immigration Bill, about to be speedily enacted as part of the 
political desire to tighten their border controls, would result in Norris becoming the 
Commonwealth government’s key immigration official in London. 
 
Immigration Bill 1912 
 
 
Although McGregor had implied that the new Bill would provide for the medical 
examination of migrants before they left Britain, this key change had not been well 
publicised. After the Bill was officially presented at the end of November The 
Melbourne Argus, for example, expressed surprise that no suggestion of it had been 
given in the Governor-General’s speech.65 The generally positive journalistic reception 
to the Bill helped perpetuate a misunderstanding that would endure; the idea that 
Australian officials would medically examine emigrants at their port of departure. The 
Argus reported that the states had long thought that the commonwealth should exercise 
stricter supervision at the place of embarkation. It also linked the plans to Norris’ 
department, stating how it had resulted from a study of recent arrivals undertaken by the 
quarantine authority.
66
 Other papers continued with the assumption that the medical 
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examination would occur at the departure points.
67
 Alongside the positive reaction from 
newspapers, Prime Minister Andrew Fisher was also confident that the Bill was one that 
the government would want to pass before the end of the session.
68
 The Colac Herald 
fully supported this ‘we are all saying ditto to Mr. Fisher and his colleagues in 
connection with the majority of details in the Immigration Restriction Bill’.69 
Politically however, not all of the Bill’s details would be so positively received. 
Some politicians were reticent to so-hastily accept the new mechanism and its clearly 
eugenic framework. It was not until the Bill’s second reading on 10 December that the 
full details of the plans for medical inspections were made clear by Minister for 
External Affairs, Josiah Thomas.
70
 Thomas confirmed that a medical bureau in London 
was to be created. This office would arrange the examination of all intending migrants, 
providing them with prima facie evidence before they made plans to travel. This type of 
pre-approval in advance of the journey, was necessary, he explained, not only because 
of the inadequacies of the existing system, but also to safeguard the health of the public 
and the immigrants. The medical officer in charge of the central bureau would nominate 
local doctors from whom persons would have to obtain their medical approval 
certificates. Not only would this lessen the risk of migrants having to spend many weeks 
in close contact with diseased persons, Thomas explained, but it would also help protect 
the existing population.  As such, this new system was aimed are preventing the 
introduction of those with communicable disease, those likely to become financial 
burdens, and, those ‘possessed of defects which they are liable to transmit to their 
offspring’.71 
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 This reference to ‘transmissible defects’ clearly drew on the fears of 
degeneration, as espoused by reformers such as Weihen. These eugenic themes did not 
sit comfortably with some. As he had done in the 1901 debates, Paddy Glynn queried 
the practical implementation of such ideals, especially, as he put it, ‘when the threshold 
of scientific discussion in regards to eugenics had barely been reached’. He recognised 
that the measures intended to exclude not just the diseased, but also, those ‘affected by 
unsoundness’. And, although he agreed that attempts should be made to protect the 
population from the lowering of ‘physical vitality’, Glynn described the provisions as 
too drastic.  He thought that the ‘draftsman has gone too far by including all sorts of 
defects which are common to the average person in the street’. He further complained 
that no-one would want their ‘mental capacity’ decided by the discretion of a customs or 
medical officer. As for the new clause prohibiting the ‘feebleminded’, he scorned that it 
was not possible to walk down the street without meeting ‘in the opinion of some, a 
feebleminded or defective within the meaning of the Bill’. How, he asked, could a 
defect be defined, when the grades of human intelligence range from 1 to 100 in every 
thousand people?  
 Thomas’ response to these valid points was to quote the provenance of the new 
clauses. They were, he explained, derived from the Canadian and United States 
regulations which were working along the same lines. This correlation is made clear in 
Table 10. The ‘mentally ill’ clause, 3 (c), had clearly been aligned with the North 
American provisions, because now referred to the so-called imbeciles, epileptics and 
feebleminded. The label insane was not disregarded entirely. It was incorporated into 
clause 3(g). The terms mental and physical defect were also copied from existing North 
American clauses, and yet, the Australian government took this eugenic approach 
further. They added clauses 3 (d) and 3 (g) to deal with ‘serious transmissible disease or 
defects’ and any other ‘prescribed disease, disability or disqualification’. 
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Table 10: Immigration Restriction: health and public charge terminology (abridged) 1901-1912 
 Australia(1901) United States (1907) Canada (1910) Australia (1912) 1912  Clause 
      
‘Public 
Charge’ 
Any person 
likely to become 
a charge upon 
the public or 
upon any public 
or charitable 
institution.  
 
Paupers; persons likely to 
become a public charge; 
professional beggars. 
Pauper, destitute, a 
professional 
beggar or vagrant. 
Any person suffering 
from any other disease or 
mental or physical 
defect, which from its 
nature is, in the opinion 
of an officer, liable to 
render the person 
concerned a charge upon 
the public or upon any 
public or charitable 
institution; 
 
3(f) 
‘Mentally Ill’ Any idiot or 
insane person. 
All idiots, imbeciles, 
feebleminded persons, 
epileptics, insane 
persons, and persons 
who have been insane 
within five years 
previous; persons who 
have had two or more 
attacks of insanity at 
any time previously 
 
Idiots, imbeciles, 
feeble-minded 
persons, 
epileptics, insane 
persons, and 
persons who have 
been insane 
within five years 
previous. 
 
Any idiot, imbecile, 
feeble-minded person, 
or epileptic; 
3(c) 
‘Diseased’ Any person 
suffering from 
an infectious or 
contagious 
disease of a 
loathsome or 
dangerous 
character. 
Persons afflicted with 
tuberculosis or with a 
loathsome or dangerous 
contagious disease. 
Persons afflicted 
with any 
loathsome disease, 
or with a disease 
which is 
contagious or 
infectious, or 
which may 
become dangerous 
to the public 
health 
Any person suffering 
from pulmonary 
tuberculosis, trachoma, 
or with any loathsome or 
dangerous 
communicable disease, 
either general or local. 
3(e) 
      
‘Defective’  Persons not 
comprehended within any 
of the foregoing excluded 
classes who are found to 
be and are certified by 
the examining surgeon as 
being mentally or 
physically defective, 
such mental or physical 
defect being of a nature 
which may affect the 
ability of such alien to 
earn a living 
Immigrants who 
are dumb, blind, or 
otherwise 
physically 
defective (unless 
can prove have 
sufficient money, 
trade, or family to 
satisfy the 
Minister will not 
become a public 
charge) 
 
Any person suffering 
from a serious 
transmissible disease or 
defect. 
 
Any person suffering 
from any other disease 
or mental or physical 
defect (see ‘public 
charge’ above) 
3(d) &3(f)  
Other     Any person not 
possessed of the 
prescribed certificate of 
health; 
 
3(b) 
    Any person suffering 
from any other disease, 
disability, or 
disqualification which 
is prescribed (including 
insanity, mental 
derangement and 
dementia) 
3(g) 
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 Glynn was not the only one alarmed by the extent of the language referring to 
defects. Dr William Maloney advised caution because, he explained, if these provisions 
were taken literally, only five per cent of the current population would be eligible as 
emigrants.
72
 He also wanted to know whether those suffering from temporary illnesses 
could be admitted for treatment in order to recover. Others thought these provisions 
were inhumane. Admirer of Norris’ report Lyttleton Groom, although agreeing that 
those permanently diseased should be excluded, queried the definitions of ‘mental or 
physical defect’. Could they not, he asked, ‘tone down such absolute prohibitions as 
may cause inhumane treatment’?73 Both Groom and Maloney drew on the so called 
‘humane provision’ within the Canadian Act. As detailed in Table 10, this clause 
allowed the ‘physically defective’ to enter if they could prove that they would not 
become public charges, a privilege the Canadians had also given to the ‘feebleminded, 
‘idiot’, ‘insane’ and ‘epileptic’ in 1906 but removed four years later.74 
 It was the language rather than the intent of these new provisions which seemed 
to cause the most political reticence to the Bill. When Josiah Thomas was questioned 
about whether the blind, or dumb, or consumptive health tourists seeking recovery, 
would be excluded, Thomas had to remind the House that these measures already 
existed. The 1901 Act already prohibited the ‘paupers’, the ‘diseased’ and the ‘idiots 
and insane’. As Minister for External Affairs he was, however, able to concede that the 
operations of the Bill may need reconsidering. After being pressed further as to whether 
a ‘humane provision’ could be incorporated, Thomas agreed that this could provide 
discretion to immigrants who were ‘imbecile’ or ‘diseased’, if part of a family. He was 
more circumspect about a similar plea for any possible leeway given to those who, 
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despite being of good character, had committed crimes under duress.
75
 When questioned 
about the specific reference to tuberculosis he agreed to pass this information to their 
medical advisor, and ‘if necessary, amend the clause’.76 Just before the lengthy session 
adjourned, Paddy Glynn again tried to query the amount of discretion given to the 
officers charged with excluding the immigrants. To this Thomas was less receptive and 
retorted that ‘the government would have to be consulted in any case’.77  
 At the next reading of the Bill, three days later, Thomas attempted to waylay the 
political fears about the extent of the new clauses. He explained that they were to ‘stand 
as they were’, but ‘no injustice need be feared’. This was because, Thomas explained, 
the existing functionality of the exemption certificates acted as the equivalent of the 
Canadian ‘humane provision’. This Ministerial discretion allowed for the entry of 
families where individual children were unwell, or for those deemed curable if they 
became ill on the journey. Such an explanation smoothed the way for the final reading 
of the Bill.
78
 The following week it was considered in the Upper House.
79
 By 21 
December the amended Immigration Act had been passed as part of the final week of 
pre-Christmas legislative activity. This haste was described by one newspaper as a 
‘great rush of bills towards the finish’.80  
 Unlike the extensive 1901 debate, which led to the first Immigration Restriction 
Act, the passing of the 1912 Immigration Act was relatively swift. However, this 
comparatively speedy enactment does not reflect the magnitude of the changes it 
                                                 
75
 As per clauses (ga) and (gb) regarding conviction. Richmond (NSW) MP Mr Massy-Green called for 
provisions be made for those who had ‘embezzled under great temptation’. 
76
 Dr Charles Carty Salmon queried why it was specifically pulmonary tuberculosis, when in his opinion 
there were other portions of the respiratory tract, not just the lungs, which may be affected with 
tuberculosis, causing just a great a risk of infection and communicability ADB online version, I. R. 
Hancock, 'Salmon, Charles Carty (1860–1917)', [accessed 18 March 2015].  
77
 CAPD, ‘Immigration Restriction Bill – Second Reading’, 10  December 1912. 
78
 CAPD, ‘Immigration Restriction Bill – Third Reading’, 13  December 1912. 
79
 CAPD, Historical Votes and Proceedings No. 105, 20
  
December 1912. 
80
 ‘The Australian Parliament’, The Worker (Brisbane) 26 December 1912. Other Bills passed included 
those relating to Bounties, Manufacture Experiments, Wood, Pulp, Rock and Phosphates. See ‘Federal 
Parliament’ The Tamworth Daily Observer (New South Wales), 14  December 1912, p. 2; ‘The Federal 
Session’, The Kalgoorlie Miner (Western Australia), 23 December 1912, p. 5. 
 238 
 
represented. By the end of 1912 Australia had redefined its border controls by 
significantly extending the prohibited immigrant clause. Furthermore it sought to make 
Britain a location at which this legal decision could be made. This new provision, which 
represented a clear departure from the previous reliance on Australian border control 
systems, was not however debated. Not only did new Sections 3A to 3J enable medical 
bureaux to be created outside Australia, the new Act again placed more onus on the 
ship’s doctor. The ship’s medical officer now had to provide certification that he had 
individually examined each migrant at least once during the voyage. Because of the 
importance of these new provisions they are included in full in Appendix H. Taken as a 
whole, they were designed to make entry into Australia dependent on having an official 
‘certificate of health’, both before and during the voyage. This dual approach, as 
Bashford has pointed out, merged the health and personal identity of migrants.
81
 In 
theory it should have allowed for the instances of those who had appeared sane before 
they left, by finding them unfit on the journey itself. However, in relation to the periodic 
forms of mental illness this was never going to prove effective. 
 In broadening the scope of illnesses, and the location at which they could be 
identified, this Act represents the most important changes in Australasian immigration 
control encountered thus far in this study. It attempted to align the prohibited immigrant 
clauses with pre-departure and en-route assessment of immigrants’ health. And yet, 
most of the new provisions were overlooked at the time. Paddy Glynn’s criticism of the 
extended prohibited clauses formed the main focus in the journalistic review of the 
debates.
82
 The Act’s passing went largely ignored in the press, due, no doubt to the 
festive season. At the start of the New Year, one Senator did complain that, as one of 
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the ‘important measures’, the Act should have received proper consideration, rather than 
being hurried through in the last week of the session.
83
  
In this Australian equivalent of a political ‘silly season’, the Act was parodied in 
some circles. A journalistic skit portrayed a fictional well-to-do couple in a wealthy 
Melbourne suburb as reacting in dismay to the plans of the ‘dreadful Socialist 
government’. They are imagined as saying, ‘Fancy nice people like us’ having to be 
examined by a ‘gruff Commonwealth doctor in a hurry’ with the other crowds of 
immigrants. This was contrasted with two workers being outraged about having to share 
a ship with ‘a hundred toffs in the saloon and a big bunch of them was (sic) just rotten 
with sickness’.84 This is a useful parody of how these immigration controls were seen as 
adversely affecting both the wealthy, and the deserving labouring types. Other parties 
expressed practical concerns. The Australian Chamber of Commerce, for example, 
forwarded protests to the Colonial Office in London regarding various clauses of the 
Act.
85
 The practical implementation of these provisions was yet to be fully understood. 
The resulting tensions between the state agent-generals and the Commonwealth officials 
would prove a much more newsworthy story across Britain, New Zealand and Australia. 
It fell to William Perrin Norris to try to implement this new ‘eugenic phase’ of 
Australian border control. 
 
Establishing Control in the Metropole 
 
At the beginning of 1913 the Commonwealth government forged ahead with 
implementing their rapidly amended Act. Once the new political session opened steps 
were taken to appoint the Commonwealth Medical Officer (CMO) responsible for 
overseeing the new Commonwealth Medical Bureau (CMB) in London. The role was 
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advertised personally by Minister of External Affairs Josiah Thomas.
86
 The job 
specification detailed the main responsibilities as follows. The CMO was to arrange for 
the examination of intending immigrants for Australia, select the medical examiners to 
perform this, and to liaise with British Board of Trade officers.
87
 How many applied for 
the position is not known but, when Norris was appointed in March, newspapers were 
keen to note how this ‘transfer entirely of his own making’ meant a loss of £200 in 
salary for him.
88
   
From what we have learnt about Norris this move is not surprising. It would 
place him at the core of European debates regarding public health and eugenics. This 
was an era in which similarly minded Australians were active on an international stage. 
Before Norris and his wife left for England he attended the Fourteenth Australasian 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) conference in Melbourne. He sat 
on the Anthropometric Research Committee alongside R.J.A. Berry and Dr Mary Booth 
which sought to assess schoolchildren’s intelligence levels.89 Booth and Norris 
subsequently represented Australia at a London conference about infant welfare.
90
  
This London-based role gave Norris an international platform in what was 
clearly meant to be a long term move. The family home in South Yarra was sold and 
sons Frank and Jack, by then both studying medicine at Melbourne University, moved 
into its residential Trinity College.
91
 In May 1913 Norris and his wife attended the 
naming of Canberra as the new capital of Australia, before travelling to London.
92
 
Norris was soon promoting the use of uniform legislation ‘throughout the English 
speaking world’, a phrase he used regarding medicine at a select committee held in 
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June.
93
 Norris’ passion for uniformity would translate into his extensive regulations for 
migration control which he would complete over the following year. 
Unlike New Zealand, Australia placed a medical administrator in London. This 
should be seen as a key divergence from the usual parallels between these two 
countries’ migration control. In some areas there was a continuation of nineteenth- 
century controls. Each country or, in terms of Australia, state, had London-based 
officials overseeing assisted migration schemes. These Agent-Generals, or for New 
Zealand, the High Commissioner, continued to represent Australasian concerns in 
London. The New Zealand High Commissioner had replaced that of Agent-General in 
1905, and despite their history, Richard Seddon had appointed William Pember Reeves 
to this role.
94
 Reeves was succeeded by William-Hall-Jones (1908-1912) and Sir 
Thomas Mackenzie (1912-1920).
95
 No evidence suggests that New Zealand politicians 
sought to establish their own medical bureau in London at this stage. The New Zealand 
press did, however, express admiration for the Australian plans and called for similar 
controls.  The New Zealander Observer, for example, called for a ‘system as close-
meshed and thorough as America conducts on Ellis Island’. This report was eugenic in 
nature.  It complained that there were enough ‘locally-bred diseased’ to make it 
necessary to bar those who ‘propagate their kind’ so ‘transmit their deficiencies’. The 
Observer went on to describe how the ‘cursory chest-thumping and tongue inspection’ 
of immigrants arriving into New Zealand was inadequate.
96
 
New Zealand and British commentators reported Norris’ arrival in London with 
some misunderstanding of his role. The New Zealand Herald, for example described the 
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1912 Act as providing for the examination of emigrants just prior to departure.
97
 
Although many reports understood that this involved a medical bureau the London 
Times had not appreciated how this would be created in London and not at the British 
ports.
98
 Even the usually vocal Journal of Comparative Legislation reported the 
practicalities of the Act dispassionately. It quoted directly from the wording of the Act’s 
provision regarding the establishment of ‘medical bureaux at places outside of the 
Commonwealth’.99 The Dominions Department of the British Colonial Office did 
however recognise how the 1912 Act amended the original one ‘in important respects’. 
It accordingly included the full legislation as an appendix to their yearly report.
100
   
In Australia there was still confusion as to how the Act would operate. In an 
address, ironically presented at Norris’ sons’ college, Dr Fowler spoke on the 
‘Australian Immigration Problem’. He explained how multiple medical bureaux were 
being organised in Europe which, in his opinion would still not be enough to exclude 
the ‘feebleminded’ immigrant.101 By November 1913 the realities had been made 
clearer across Australasian. The Canterbury Press, in reporting on the high numbers of 
consumptives landing in Australia, expressed hope that the establishment of the bureau 
in London would prevent further instances of this.
102
 By the start of 1914 the Australian 
plans were coming to fruition. 
Commonwealth Versus States 
 
It can be speculated that, between his arrival in the British summer of 1913 and the end 
of the year, Norris had formulated the new operations. This is because by the start of 
1914 the Australian Agent-Generals were reportedly alarmed by some of the 
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‘inquisitorial character of the questions’ in the new system.103 It is likely that they were 
responding to a version of Norris’ Notes and Instructions for the Guidance of Medical 
Referees, a source which now exists as an appendix to an operational review a decade 
later.
104
 These tensions place Norris as intermediary between commonwealth and state 
ideals.  In addition they involved a figure who had persistently questioned the 
translation of policy into practice, Paddy Glynn, who as Minister for External Affairs 
between June 1913 and September 1914, who vouched for Norris’ intentions to override 
the states’ operations. 
 Glynn’s previous concerns about the ‘extent of defects’ included in the Act led 
him to make some changes to the regulations.
105
 The Agent-Generals for South 
Australia, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia highlighted a number of 
concerns, mainly about how these ‘excessively stringent regulations’ would prove 
costly and deter prospective emigrants.
106
 In response, Glynn explained that he had 
amended the new clause 3(g) which allowed for a ‘list of prescribed diseases, 
disabilities and disqualifications’. He had done this, Glynn explained, in order to make 
the restrictions less ‘a matter of eugenics’ and direct the medical referees as to ‘what 
diseases they shall particularly direct their attention’. He had removed the following 
conditions: 
senile decay, tuberculosis of digestive track or of genito-urinary system, or of 
the bones or joints, heart disease with signs of heart failure, chronic bronchitis 
with complications, and other serious nervous affections,  
 
Table 11 reflects the ‘before and after’ extent of these changes. By tabling them 
in this format it is clear that the focus of this clause remained on the wide definition of 
mental and moral illnesses. Furthermore the other clauses relating to ‘mental disease’ 
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3(c), and defects 3 (a) and (d), remained. As such, despite Glynn’s protestations, the 
overall provisions were still very much eugenic in intent. They were designed to 
exclude the illnesses feared for their likelihood of being passed down through future 
generations, such as mental derangement, insanity and alcoholism.   
 
Table 11: Comparison of changes within clause 3g of Australia’s 1912 Immigration Act 
 Prescribed diseases, disabilities and disqualifications  
As Enacted  Serious deformities or physical defects, insanity, an attack of insanity within 
five years of proposed emigration, or a history of two or more attacks of 
insanity or mental derangement at any time, or dementia, chronic alcoholism, 
senile decay, tuberculosis of digestive track or of genito-urinary system, or of 
the bones or joints, heart disease with signs of heart failure, chronic bronchitis 
with complications, paralysis or other serious nervous affections, cancer or 
other malignant growths, chronic rheumatism, rheumatoid arthritis, or 
rheumatic gout, severe hernia (rupture). 
 
 
 
As Amended Insanity, an attack of insanity within five years of proposed emigration, or a 
history of two or more attacks of insanity or mental derangement at any time, 
or dementia, chronic alcoholism, paralysis, cancer or other malignant growths,  
 
   
Source: ‘The Questions Asked’, The Examiner (Tasmania), 21 February 1914, p. 7. 
 
Glynn’s concern about the practicalities of identifying such defects had however 
led him to the redesign of the ‘specimen question list’ used in the medical, of which he 
wanted to be similar to those required for life insurance. As detailed in Appendix I, 
these questions were generic, and covered the basics such as age, work absences, family 
history and sanatorium admissions.
107
 Glynn saw both of his concessions as adequate so 
informed the Agent-Generals that the Act now had to be administered as it now stood. 
He advised these state representatives to act in accordance with Norris. Glynn asserted 
that as Minister, he had devoted much time to reducing the inquisitorial nature of the 
questions. He had done this to ensure that the system would attract migrants ‘sound in 
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mind and body’, while ensuring that immigration had no direct relation to the question 
of eugenics.
108
 
Conversely, Norris would design the medical regulations according to his own 
eugenic leanings. This involved negotiating with the agent-generals, with whom he 
shared diplomatic circles.
109
 These Australian representatives were not averse to the 
idea of eugenics entirely. At the 1912 First International Eugenics Conference in 
London, the Agent-General for New South Wales attended the conference dinner 
alongside such luminaries as Arnold White and H.G. Wells.
110
 The reticence displayed 
by the state officials serves to remind us that, despite federalisation, local concerns 
remained. The widespread animosity towards the changes focused on how they would 
hamper emigration, and not suit the requirements of all states. On behalf of Victoria, 
Premier William Watt and Agent-General McBride requested that the regulations were 
not made operational until fully understood by all parties.
111
 Their New South Wales 
counterparts, despite previously sanctioning the system because it would protect their 
regions from consumptives, now backpedalled. Perhaps not realising how many types of 
immigrants would be affected by the changes, they suggested it should be tested for a 
year on third class passengers.
112
 Western Australia’s Agent-General, Sir Newton 
Moore, asserted his regions requirements and ignored the Victorian concerns, While he 
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thought that an amalgamated system may suit New South Wales and Victoria, the 
current safeguards for his State, he boasted, were sufficient.
113
 
Between March and April 1914 Norris sought to waylay the fears of the Agent-
Generals most of whom wanted the existing operations to continue. Tasmania’s Agent-
General, Thomas Robinson, and Moore’s deputy, Ware, argued that the current system 
of medical certification was sufficient.
114
 Other emigration officials feared that unless 
the forms were seriously modified they would hamper departmental operations. 
Sounding remarkably like the New Zealand proponents of emigration from the 1870s 
and 1880, an official admitted that while ‘unsatisfactory cases had been occasionally 
admitted under the current system’ the traffic should not be stemmed.115 By the end of 
March Glynn was forced to intervene again and vouched for Norris. Glynn explaining 
that because Norris had not initially known the nature of the States’ concerns, his CMO 
had been at a disadvantage.
116
   
These Australian tensions proved more newsworthy than the passing of the 1912 
Act.  Newspapers in London and New Zealand followed the developments closely in 
stories which, in turn, raised the profile of the plans for an Australian medical bureau in 
London.
117
 Some reports however continued to misinterpret the extent and ease of the 
implemented the planned changes. One account reported how Norris had already 
appointed two thousand general practitioners experienced in industrial insurance, so 
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‘did not expect any difficulty in enforcing the Act’.118 In some instances Norris himself 
was forced to clarify his position. In an interview with The Times he explained that the 
medical inspections were not to occur at the port of embarkation as many thought. 
Instead they were to be performed locally and overseen by the medical bureau on 
Victoria Street, Westminster.
119
 He also sought to promote the levels of dispensation 
allowed for under the Act. As well as the exemption facility he explained that those on 
return tickets, and those not disembarking at Australian ports, were immune to the 
regulations. Furthermore, he highlighted that if intending emigrants failed the medical 
examination in Britain they would not be charged for it.
120
 
By mid-April 1914 Norris’ negotiations had paid off. The state representatives 
were reportedly satisfied with his amendments and his new regulations had been 
submitted to Paddy Glynn for confirmation. It was expected that they would become 
operative in June.
121
 As such, eighteen months after the 1912 Immigration Act had been 
ratified, and, a year after Norris had arrived in England, the new clauses were ready to 
be put into operation. This translation of policy into practice had not been 
straightforward. The Minister for External Affairs, Paddy Glynn, had used his political 
authority to reduce the list of prescribed diseases at a policy level. Norris, as the officer 
in charge of implementing the operations, had made further concessions to the state 
Agent-Generals. In theory Australia had, for the first time, a centralised system of 
migrant medical assessment in Britain, seemingly sanctioned by imperial authorities. 
However, the expectation that this scheme would become operative in the northern 
hemisphere summer of 1914 would prove premature. 
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Identifying the ‘Mentally inept, the feckless, and those with mental inertia’ 
 
 
Through facilitating Australia’s new system of migration control, Norris created the 
first and most comprehensive instructions identified over the course of this study. In his 
Notes and Instructions for the Guidance of Medical Referees, circa 1913-1914, he dealt 
with the problems which had so far been raised by immigration officials, doctor and 
politicians in relation to the control of ‘mentally ill’ immigrants. Norris crucially sought 
to make provisions for those who appeared ‘normal’ but for whom the very act of 
migration triggered episodic ‘insanity’. He was therefore the first border administrator 
to attempt to create operational practices to match the legislation. It is within his 
extensive regulations that, despite Glynn’s aim to reduce the eugenic aspect of the Act, 
Norris sought to prioritise identifying ‘mental or physical defect’. To do this he drew 
heavily on the North American procedural guidelines which similarly focussed on 
assessing whether immigrants displayed ‘marked stigmata of degeneration’. 
 Norris’ instructions indicate how he had responded to the concerns of the Agent-
Generals. He created two sets of procedures, one for self-paying passengers and one for 
assisted immigrants, each involving a different set of paperwork and application 
process. The process diagrams show how each set of practices were designed to operate. 
As detailed in Process Chart 5, those seeking to make their own way to Australia would 
now also have to obtain the same medical approval as assisted emigrants before 
purchasing their tickets (Steps 2, 3 and 4). The resulting certificate of health would be a 
pre-requisite of booking travel (Step 5). As such, its design and any corresponding 
instructions, or borderline cases were the responsibility of the Commonwealth Medical 
Officer.  
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In terms of assisted passengers, although the system of medical examination matched 
that for self-paying passengers, Norris had acquiesced to the State officials’ petitioning.   
As represented in Process Chart 6, the State Offices kept their right to approve assisted 
passages (Step 7) based on the medical report which the intending migrant had to 
provide as part of their application (Step 5). The medical referees followed the same set 
of regulations designed by Norris (Steps 2, 3, 4 and 6), albeit using different paperwork.  
In effect then these systems worked in parallel, resulting from the 1912 legislative 
requirement for all emigrants to have pre-departure medical approval. Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth Medical Bureau (CMB) was meant to oversee the method of the 
medical assessment for all types of emigrants. However, like the prevailing system of 
 250 
 
migrant recruitment, these medical checks relied on the action of local doctors, and did 
not occur, as many commentators thought, just prior to embarkation. 
 
 
          However, whether dealing with assisted or self-funding emigrants, these British 
doctors were meant to operate according to Australian requirements. Norris designed 
this new system to, in his words, prevent the ‘danger of migrants being found ‘fit’ be 
one examiner, only to be found ‘unfit’ by another’.122 This statement is indicative of his 
desire for uniformity, for which he designed his clear and extensive instructions. He 
informed his medical referees that they were responsible for identifying any ‘disease’ or 
‘mental or physical defect’ in all both types of intending emigrants.123 The format of the 
examination was the same for both classes of intended migrants, and for the healthy, 
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resulted in a certificate of health. Those applying for assisted passages were responsible 
for providing this certificate, or the paperwork detailing their rejection, to the relevant 
state immigration office.
124
 The self-paying then used the certificate to purchase their 
ticket. 
The CMB officers had greater say in the eligibility of these self-funding 
emigrants (see Process Chart 5: Steps 6, 7 and 8). This is because the CMO monitored 
the incoming paperwork and was authorised to either approve it, or request further 
medical assessment in any doubtful cases.
125
 Furthermore the CMO could raise a case 
for exemption as per the so-called ‘humane provision’ so often quoted by politicians 
who sought to play down the severity of the regulations. With the Australian High 
Commissioner located in the same London office, this referral was easily done. This 
exemption was not so easily granted. It was awarded only if the health of other family 
members was satisfactory. Furthermore it was very much dependent on the family’s 
finances. They had to prove that they had a ‘home to go to in Australia’ and were not 
likely to become public charges.
126
 
 Whereas Glynn had wanted the medical examination to be similar to those 
performed for life insurance, Norris’ instructions went way further. He wanted a clear 
paper trail from which he could check that the physical and mental condition of the 
migrants was uniformly assessed. Furthermore, he encouraged his medical referees to 
provide any other ‘special facts’.127 In providing advice as to how to consider each 
subsection of clause 3 of the 1912 Act relating to prohibited health clauses, Norris 
clearly framed these ‘special facts’ in relation to the so-called ‘transmissible defects’ 
about which Glynn had been so scathing. 
                                                 
124
 Ibid, pp. 28-29.  
125
 Ibid, p. 27.  
126
 Ibid, p. 28.  
127
 Ibid.  
 252 
 
 Norris was entirely open as to how he had been influenced by international 
degeneration theories and methods of migration control. He issued his thanks to the 
medical services involved with immigration restriction in the United States and the 
Dominion of Canada who, he explained, had ‘published similar notes for the guidance 
of medical officer at ports of landing’.128 It can be assumed that he had obtained copies 
of such guidance in his 1911 research trip.
129
 This influence is further apparent in 
Norris’ use of the phrase ‘marked stigmata of degeneration,’ which was used in United 
States Public Health Service’s guidelines. In 1905, Ellis Island physician Thomas 
Salmon had described the signs, such as abnormal conduct and expression, as 
highlighting that a person’s mental state required further investigation.130 Norris 
likewise wanted the referees to look out for such ‘stigmata’ in their ‘general survey’ of 
an intending migrant. While he listed ‘physical abnormalities’ such as lameness and 
curved spines, he also thought that ‘defective speech’, blindness, or other ‘marked 
sensory defects’ and, the more ‘marked stigmata of degeneracy’ should be obvious.131 
 Such instructions were part of Norris’ aim to prevent those with transmissible 
defects from emigrating. He went as far as prioritising the identification of those with 
so-called ‘mental or physical defects’. The reference to ‘defect’ existed in two of the 
new health sub-clauses: 3(d) ‘any person suffering from a serious transmissible disease 
or defect’ and 3(f) ‘any person suffering from any other disease or mental or physical 
defect, which from its nature is, in the opinion of an officer, liable to render the person 
concerned a charge upon the public or upon any public or charitable institution’. 
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  Norris’ interpretation of these ‘defects’ indicates how he considered them related 
to degeneration. He explained that the terms ‘mental or physical defect’ were applicable 
to:   
the condition of persons of weak or feeble constitution, those whose physique, 
mentality or both are such that the individual can be definitely recognised as one 
who would be very liable to go to the wall, to become one of the unemployable 
owing to his or her natural weakness or defect.
132
 
 
  
As such, he instructed that the ‘mentally inept, the feckless, and those with mental 
inertia, whose inherent defects bring them to the low level of the dregs of society’ were 
not to be awarded the certificate of health.  Norris did allow a level of dispensation. He 
explained that he could approve such types, if proven to have succumbed to this state 
due to lack of food, overwork, or other ‘adverse condition’. This caveat was based on 
whether the intending immigrant presented a ‘courageous spirit and goodwill’, sounding 
remarkable like the Victorian concept of ‘good character’.133  
 Unlike the outmoded concept of character, Norris wanted to modernise the 
terminology relating to ‘diseases and defects of the nervous system’. In this regard he 
thought it ‘convenient to depart somewhat’ from the wording in the Act.134 Although, he 
explained, the Act had taken into account the varieties of ‘mental weaknesses’, it had 
not made the extent of ‘defects’ completely obvious. The Commonwealth, Norris 
stressed, was very much aware that, although ‘a defect or feeblemindedness’ may not 
exclude someone from some ‘amenities of life’, they may prove objectionable in 
succeeding generations. He therefore warned that it should not be presumed that the 
‘less marked the defect, the less objectionable is the affected person as an immigrant’.135 
Accordingly, if an applicant presented a ‘definite mental disorder’ they were likely to be 
part of a family wanting to emigrate who had ‘some inherent weaknesses’. The medical 
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report, Norris advised, should therefore include a statement as to whether the case of 
‘idiocy, imbecility, feeblemindedness or insanity’ was an isolated phenomenon. 
Furthermore the medical referees should consider whether the presented ‘disorder’ was 
explainable by family history, or indicated another ‘downward step in a family showing 
other signs of degeneration’.136 
 Norris was the first also the first Australasian migration administrator to 
properly define ‘mental disease’ and ‘mental disability’. Section 3(c) had, in 1912, been 
expanded from ‘idiot and ‘insane’ to ‘idiot, imbecile, feeble-minded, or epileptic’. 
Norris’ regulations for his medical referees provided definitions for these conditions 
taken from the British 1913 Mental Deficiency Act. He also provided advice on how 
they could be identified. 
Table 12: W.P. Norris’ instructions on how to identify the ‘mentally defective’ 1914 
 Definition from Mental Deficiency Act 1913  Norris’ advice as to identifying these conditions  
Idiots   Persons so deeply defective in mind from birth or 
from an early age as to be unable to guard 
themselves against common physical dangers. 
 
 
 
Idiots and imbeciles will be readily detected by vices of 
bodily confirmation, stigmata of degeneration, sensory 
defects, perversion of the instincts and intellectual and 
moral defects. 
Imbeciles Persons in whose case there exists from birth or an 
early age mental defectiveness not amounting to 
idiocy, yet so pronounced that they are incapable of 
managing themselves or their affairs, or, in the case 
of children, of being taught to do so.   
 
Moral Imbeciles  Persons who from an early age display some 
permanent mental defect coupled with strong 
vicious or criminal propensities, on which 
punishment as little or no deterrent effect. 
 
In certain cases of moral imbecility, the mental 
defect, though present, may not in the course of an 
ordinary medical examination, be very noticeable, 
and unless this is borne in mind, such cases may be 
overlooked. 
 
 
Feebleminded Those in whom there exists from birth or from an 
early age mental defectiveness not amounting to 
imbecility, yet so pronounced that they require 
care, supervision, and control for their own 
protection, or for the protection of others, or, in the 
case of children, that they, by reason of such 
defectiveness, appear to be permanently incapable 
of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in 
an ordinary school . 
 
Feeblemindedness or congenital mental defect, in 
degrees short of idiocy or imbecility may be 
manifested in the form of insufficiency of mental 
capacity, or as perverted mentality, though the 
latter may not be very evident in the course of a 
single examination. Any special feature in the case 
should be mentioned, so that the Minister may be 
informed if the question of an exemption is under 
consideration. 
 
    
Source: Norris, ‘Notes and Instructions’, in Howse, pp. 29-30.  
 
As apparent from Table 12, Norris considered ‘idiots and imbeciles’ interchangeably 
and identifiable by their so-called ‘vices of bodily confirmation, stigmata of 
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degeneration, sensory defects, perversion of the instincts and intellectual and moral 
defects’.137 He did not specify how these ‘vices’, ‘stigmata’ ‘defects’ or ‘perversions’ 
would manifest themselves. Norris also referred to ‘moral imbecility’, as a condition 
which was a less obvious ‘mental defect’, despite it not being included in any of the 
immigration regulations.
138
   
It was about the ‘feebleminded’, a ‘condition calling for special caution’ that 
Norris expressed special concern. He informed his referees they should be wary of  
so-called ‘insufficient mental capacity’ or ‘perverted mentality’, and refer any uncertain 
cases for a second opinion. This caution was necessary, Norris explained, because those 
with a ‘less marked degree of feeblemindedness’ may ‘beget offspring’ and be 
‘responsible for further mental defectives and degenerates in the next generation’. 
Accordingly, because he thought it was difficult to distinguish between the ‘normal’ and 
the ‘defective or pervert’ the ‘administration, either the CMO or state offices, should 
make the final decision. Norris did offer some caveats to this vagueness. Mental inertia 
could, he explained, follow a prolonged illness or be due to other temporary and 
remediable disturbances of general nutrition.
139
   
 The condition of ‘insanity’ was also considered at length by Norris. No longer a 
specified condition under section 3(c), it now came within the list of ‘prescribed 
diseases, disabilities or disqualifications’, 3(g).  As such, the label ‘insanity’ did not 
directly appear in the wording of the 1912 Immigration Act but was included in Paddy 
Glynn’s updated prescribed diseases list of:  
insanity, an attack of insanity within five years of proposed emigration, a history 
of two or more attacks of insanity or mental derangement at any time, or 
dementia; chronic alcoholism; paralysis; cancer, or other malignant growths; 
chronic rheumatism.
140
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As such, the attempts to legislate for a periodic insanity matched the North American 
provisions. This list ensured that the history of a migrant’s ‘mental health’ was 
considered more extensively.  Intending emigrants could not have had ‘insane attacks’ 
within five years of application, or more than one ‘attack’ ever. Norris conceded that 
this would be difficult to prove and that determining the occurrence of ‘previous 
attacks’ would only be ascertained by careful enquiry. He also considered that these 
cases would be rare and only likely if families wanted to take a ‘mentally deranged’ 
relative with them, which in itself would require special arrangements. However, 
insanity in its pronounced form would be ‘readily recognisable’.141 
 Norris astutely made reference to the possibility that the act of migration itself 
could, in his words, temporarily upset an immigrant’s ‘mental balance’. This had been 
noted in wider Australian medical circles. In 1913 Australian Inspector of the Insane, Dr 
W. E. Jones, commented that even if immigrants started out as desirable, the change of 
environment and new conditions of life must affect their minds.
142
 Such a view is 
reminiscent of the complaints in New Zealand that migrants appeared sane before 
departure. Norris directly sought to avoid such instances occurring. He thought that this 
condition of unbalance’ was more likely to occur in those ‘less informed’ and normally 
engaged in ‘monotonous drudgery’. The medical referees therefore had to decide 
whether a ‘return to normal’ could be foreseen, but in all cases should enquire into their 
previous history. This was, Norris explained, because ‘the excitement may be but the 
determinant, revealing inherent mental instability’.143 How his referees were meant to 
assess this is not clear, unless he thought that the medical examination itself caused the 
so-called imbalance. This ‘disordered’ state was, as this study has shown, more likely to 
occur on the journey, or upon arrival. As yet no primary evidence has proved that 
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Norris’ instructions were designed for, or reached, the health officers at Australian 
ports. 
 Norris provided his British medical referees with other, albeit similarly vague 
information on how to deal with other mental and physical conditions, including some 
such as tuberculosis and senile decay, which Glynn had removed from the prescribed 
list.
144
 Of the valid and current conditions, Norris admitted that the identification of 
‘chronic alcoholism’ was difficult because the ‘confirmed alcoholic’ did not bear the 
‘marks of his or her habits’. Instead, he suggested, a history of delirium tremens may 
suggest this conditions, or the truth may be elicited by asking which and when alcoholic 
beverages are preferred.
145
 Dementia ‘in its more ordinary more marked form’ should 
be ‘obvious’, Norris explained, although less so when apparent in adolescents as 
dementia praecox. This may be indicated by ‘stigmata of degeneration’, or ‘indifference 
to their surroundings, discomfort or personal desires’.146 Epilepsy, now included within 
clause 3(c), he admitted, was equally hard to recognise, usually only by cautious 
questioning, although ‘the scarred or bitten tongue may in some cases furnish a lead’.147 
 Although much of Norris’ advice was vague, it should be taken in its context. 
His regulations were ground breaking in the way in which he attempted to create 
uniformity in the assessment of migrants’ health. In theory, the creation of the CMB 
provided a centralised system of quality assurance and in, unclear cases, second 
opinions as to a migrant’s suitability. While the states remained ultimately responsible 
for sanctioning assisted passages they were meant to do so, in effect, using Norris’ 
medical guidelines. In line with the new Australian Act, this system refocused the 
medical approval of migrants in the metropole. It meant that intending migrants had to 
gain approval prior to booking their journey. And, although this seems reminiscent of 
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Featherston’s and Vogel’s medical certification system, Australia’s 1912 Act made this 
pre-departure approval necessary for non-assisted and assisted passengers.  
 Norris’ experience and motivations are apparent in the way he designed these 
regulations. Although he made sure to publicise how exemptions were in place in order 
to avoid hardship, he also sought to expand the scope of the ‘prohibited clauses’. 
Despite how Paddy Glynn had tempered the eugenic aspects of some of the provisions, 
Norris designed his regulations to deal with the ‘inherently weak’. This approach was 
not meant to be clandestine. By June 1914 Norris was advocating that the Australian 
regulations and his instructions be used by the other dominions, including New Zealand. 
 
Promoting British World Uniformity 
 
 
The increasing imperial attempts to reintegrate with their dominions had, in 1913, led to 
a visit by representatives of the Dominions Royal Commission (DRC) to Australia and 
New Zealand. This research trip had been arranged in order, amongst other types of 
fact-finding, to consider the establishment of a joint migration scheme.
148
 The resulting 
1914 report did not, however, reference Australia’s 1912 Immigration Act, and instead 
focussed on the operations and perceived success of the assisted migration schemes.
149
 
Norris wrote to the DRC in June 1914 to point out, what he thought were key omissions 
in the report. He explained Australia’s plan to medically examine all types of intending 
immigrants in a letter which set out how far his system had progressed. Not only had he 
already appointed nearly 1,500 referees, Norris explained, but they were about to be 
‘instructed as to what is required of them’. He took this opportunity to suggest that the 
same type of medical examination should be used ‘on the grounds of common 
humanity’ for all overseas dominions.  Because their legislation been improved in order 
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to prevent the introduction of the ‘diseased and defective persons’, Norris thought that 
the terminology for the ‘diseases, defects and physical and mental disabilities’ be made 
uniform , at least within the British Empire.
150
 
 Norris reiterated these bold claims when invited to speak at a DRC hearing on 1 
July.  He was questioned about the practicalities of the system by representatives from 
the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and 
Newfoundland.
151
 Unlike Australian Minister of External Affairs, Paddy Glynn, Norris 
expressed pride in what he called the ‘definite eugenic phase’ of the 1912 Act.152 As he 
had done in his letter to the DRC, Norris confirmed that the system would soon be fully 
operational. Furthermore, he explained that many of the medical men he had recruited 
had already done similar work for the Australian states. Like the Australian agent-
generals, the DRC panel was intrigued as to how the commonwealth’s responsibilities 
differed from those of the states.  
 Norris’ responses suggest that he had become a little grandiose. The Acts were, 
he mused, ‘instruments, or weapons’ and the ‘man behind the gun’ was the minister 
who dealt with special cases. The state agent-generals could not sanction these 
exemptions, or enable the entry for those deemed prohibited. They could only ‘smooth 
the way’ by granting assisted passages. The Commonwealth government held the power 
of exclusion or admission, Norris explained, but, while his own proposals needed 
ministerial approval, they did not have to go before parliament. This autonomy shocked 
the United Kingdom’s William Lorimer. He queried its extent, asking whether Norris’ 
plans would be sanctioned by his administration, without any further legislation, just to  
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‘give you a better class of immigrant?’ Yes, Norris responded, ‘to prevent hardship, to 
get a fuller medical history and assist us in getting immigrants in sound health’. When 
asked whether he represented the interests of ‘all of Australia’ Norris answered that he 
did. This was because, he explained, he was also in charge of the medical officers at 
Australian ports, who examined immigrants on arrival there.
153
 This bold claim has not 
been substantiated by any sources viewed to date. As Director of Quarantine this would 
have been the case, but Norris’ previous role does not appear to be combined with that 
of Commonwealth Medical Officer. 
 In accordance with his eugenicist leanings, Norris expressed pride in how the 
1912 Act was the first to reference serious transmissible diseases or defects. This led 
Australia’s representative, Donald Campbell, to query how this differed from other 
legislation.
154
 Norris explained that while United States, Canada and New Zealand took 
account of diseases, they did not take account of the transmissibility of these 
conditions.
155
 He promoted implementing a uniform system for the dominions and 
Britain, which would not only help safeguard their borders, but would improve 
efficiency. About this claim Sir Rider Haggard was circumspect. He suggested that a 
joint system would mean that the dominions would take the healthy population and 
leave the sick in England. Norris had an answer for this, explaining that under the 
existing British law, diseased emigrants were prevented from boarding emigrant 
ships.
156
 After final questioning from Donald Campbell about whether the legislation 
would restrict emigration, Norris returned to promoting the system as a way of avoiding 
hardship. He explained that the provisions would benefit the intending emigrants, by 
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saving them time and money and provide them with the assurance that they were less 
likely to be rejected on arrival in Australia.
157
  
 New Zealand’s John Robert Sinclair remained quiet throughout this 
interrogation, only asking whether Norris had thought the previous Australian system 
defective. Norris reacted defensively. The current system, he retorted, was not 
‘fundamentally defective’ but was seen as inhumane.158 Other evidence does point to 
how the New Zealand government was planning to update its immigration legislation 
along eugenic lines. On 4 July 1914, an editorial piece in the New Zealand Herald 
congratulated Mr Fisher for introducing the Immigration Restriction Amendment 
Bill.
159
 This amendment, the paper explained, was designed to add to the existing 
prohibited class with the clause ‘any person or class of persons deemed by the Minister 
on economic standard or on account of standard or habits of life to be unsuited to the 
requirements of New Zealand’. This provision, was according to the Herald, designed 
to give the national administrators the power to protect against undesirable immigrants 
of any ‘kind and degree’, but, in particular, would exclude the ‘degenerate hordes from 
Central and Southern Europe’ and the ‘Asiatic contingents who are tapping at the door 
of every English-speaking state in the Pacific’.160 
 The Herald’s proclamation that there did not appear to be ‘the slightest 
possibility that the Bill will not become law’ was premature.161 The Australasian 
attempts to exclude transmissible defects or ‘degenerate hordes’ were stymied by events 
in Europe. While Norris promoted the standardisation of medical inspection across the 
dominions, and Fisher introduced his ‘unsuitability’ clause to the New Zealand 
government, the ‘July Crisis’ in Europe augured the start of the First World War. On 4 
August Britain declared war on Germany, and the very nations whom Norris had 
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wanted to agree on standardised practices - Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South 
Africa - rallied to the imperial cause.  
 Norris and his sons joined the Australian war effort. Son Frank postponed his 
medical studies to enlist on 18
 
August.
162
 W.P. Norris joined the Australian Army 
Medical Corps Reserve.
163
Although he remained Commonwealth Medical Officer his 
attention switched to the welfare of Australian soldiers, as did that of the state agent-
generals.  Reports place Norris in London and France throughout the war.
164
 By 
February 1916, due to the ‘heavy strain of his war work’, he was granted three months 
sick leave, during which time he travelled to America.
165
 Despite reports suggesting that 
he might not return to the position of CMO, Norris did, and remained in the post until 
1921.
166
 After the war he focussed more on international public health. In 1919 he 
became an Associate Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, and sat on a committee 
concerned with hookworm, yellow fever and malaria.
167
 1920 saw him travelling to 
both Melbourne and Paris before deciding to ‘take up residence’ in England.168 It fell to 
his successor to enact uniform health procedures under the emerging post-war empire 
settlement ideology. Norris’ pre-war efforts remained, on the whole, unacknowledged.  
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However as this research has shown, his career needs to be understood as much more 
than simply being a ‘medical practictioner’.169  
Eugenic Border Controls, New Zealand and Australia 1913—1920 
 
The ability to judge whether the so-called ‘new eugenic phase’ of immigration 
restriction worked in practice, is distorted by the effects of the First World War. Prior to 
migration being disrupted by the hostilities, the respective immigration legislation of 
Australia and New Zealand had diverged. Australia had enacted eugenic clauses in their 
Immigration Act, and W. P. Norris had created the practical provisions enabling 
intending emigrants to be pre-assessed in Britain. New Zealand did not have this ability 
but had introduced a Bill to amend their Act to enable them to exclude those ‘unsuitable 
by standards or habits of life’. While the language employed in Australia’s legislation 
was overtly eugenic, this does not mean that New Zealanders did not share, or openly 
express similar concerns about degeneration. 
 It should be speculated that New Zealand did not have a figure like Norris. This 
claim requires caution, because, as Linda Bryder has pointed out, the link between 
public health and national identity in New Zealand has not been explored to the same 
extent as it has been for Australia.
170
 It took a man like Norris to create the practical 
links between Australian policy and practice. There does not appear to have been an 
equivalent New Zealand position or personality, able to connect the realms of public 
health, immigration and quarantine control like Norris did. 
As already ascertained, New Zealand medical professionals did seek to petition 
the New Zealand government to improve migration control. Although the Immigration 
Restriction Act was not aligned to Australia’s, the New Zealand border operators also 
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sought to exclude the ‘borderline’ types. By examining the immigration exclusion 
statistics and immigration cases for both countries, it is possible to suggest the port 
officials were similarly motivated. While Norris had wanted Australian officials to 
exclude the ‘mentally inept’, ‘defective’ and ‘feckless’, New Zealanders similarly 
sought to restrict the entry of the ‘infirm’. This section examines how these border 
controls operated in practice between 1913 and 1920, when Australia’s Act was again 
amended. 
The official Australian statistics show a clear increase in the number of 
prohibitions under ‘mental health’ clauses after 1912. This suggests that the Australian 
border controllers embraced the new labels under which they could exclude an 
immigrant upon arrival. Under the 1902 to 1912 provisions, only two per cent of the 
total prohibited had been for being ‘idiot or insane’ (Table 18). From 1912 the expanded 
prohibited immigrant clauses had widened the net. The ‘mentally ill’ were no longer 
just labelled as ‘idiots and insane’ but instead were ‘idiot, imbecile, feebleminded, or 
epileptic’, under clause 3(c).  The ‘chronic alcoholic’, the ‘insane’ or ‘demented’ now 
fell within the list of prescribed diseases or defects in 3(g). The physically or mentally 
defective, if considered to be public charges, could be caught under 3(f), and, if Norris’ 
instructions worked, also under 3(d) ‘serious transmissible disease or defect’. Table 13 
represents York’s collation of the immigration statistics for the period in question, 1913 
–1920, from which it is possible to compare, to a certain extent, how the 1912 changes 
affected the numbers and types of immigrant rejected at the Australian borders. 
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Table 13: Prohibited immigrants under Australia’s Immigration Act, 1913-1920 
Section 3   Clause   1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 TOTAL %    
Education Test  a  38 8 25 217 10 4 3 2 307 57    
No certificate of health  b  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
Idiot/Imbecile/Feebleminded/Epileptic  c  9 10 2 2 0 0 0 0 23 4.3    
Transmissible disease or defect  d  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 <1    
Communicable disease  e  23 15 3 8 1 0 0 2 52 9.7    
Other disease or defect  f  9 8 2 1 0 0 0 1 21 3.9    
Other prescribed  disease/disability   g  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 <1    
Conviction (1)
 171
  ga  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 <1    
Conviction (2)
 172
  gb  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
Prostitute 
173
  gc  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
Stowaway  NA  30 13 23 3 1 12 24 19 125 23.4    
TOTAL    109 54 56 223 13 16 27 26 534     
Source: York, Immigration Restriction, 1901-1950. 
 
If considering clause 3(c) in isolation, the percentage rate for this period doubled to 
around four per cent compared to this same proportion of two per cent between 1902 to 
1912 (Table 8). Furthermore, in 1914, this group represented nearly one-fifth of the 
overall exclusions. It is also possible that the figures for 3(f) and 3(g) included those 
found to be ‘mentally defective’, ‘insane’ or suffering from ‘dementia’. Taking the 
health clauses separately, a total of one hundred exclusions occurred for the clauses 3 
(c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) between 1913 and 1920. Within this, the twenty-three cases 
under 3 (c) represents twenty-three per cent, so roughly the same proportion as the 
period 1902 –1912. This suggests that despite the extended clauses the Australian port 
officials were identifying a similar proportion of those they considered to be ‘mentally 
ill’. 
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 This sense of status quo is also reflected in the results under the clause 
pertaining to ‘transmissible defects’, 3(d). Only one person across this seven year 
sample was prohibited for under this, indicative of the clause’s vagueness. The results 
under 3(g) for prescribed disease or defect were equally low. In reality some of those 
excluded were perceived as ‘defective’ anyway.  A Victorian newspaper reported how 
in 1914 three persons of ‘unsound mind’ had been returned to England. Although this is 
a term reminiscent of migration control in the previous century, the rest of the report 
uses language which related to degeneration. Their ‘unsoundness’ may have something 
to do with homesickness, the paper conceded, but they were also likely to have been 
‘weaklings and wasters’, like the specimens seen hanging about the streets of 
Melbourne.
174
 Whether they were returned under 3(c) or 3 (f) is unknown. Regardless, it 
would appear that the new eugenic clauses went on the whole underused at the 
Australian borders. 
 Rhetoric around ‘mental weaknesses’ were also evident in New Zealand 
practices. Although the statutory reporting of the exclusion numbers was not a 
requirement under the Immigration Acts, the figures were made available in a different 
official source. From 1912 the yearly report provided by the Inspector-General of 
Hospitals and Charitable Institutions included a section entitled ‘Immigration 
Restriction Acts’. The broader legal immigration framework remained predominately 
unchanged.  In 1913, the loophole which had allowed family members of the un-
prohibited husband or father to enter was closed.
175
 Consequently these families had to 
rely on applying to the Minister of Internal Affairs for exemption.
176
 As per the 1908 
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Consolidated Act, those classed as ‘lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind or infirm’, and 
‘idiot, insane or suffering from contagious disease’ remained prohibited.   
This confused system was reflected in the way in which the results of the 
Immigration Restrictions Acts were reported. The port health officers’ statements were 
reproduced in the Inspector-General’s reports. These localised accounts show how 
officials continued to operate using inconsistent terminology. Not only was this evident 
in the way in which health conditions were described, but also as to the action taken by 
the port officials .The data from the reports for the years 1911 through to 1914 have 
been collated into Table 14. For the subsequent years, 1915 through to 1920, no data 
exists because the Inspector-General’s reports did not include the corresponding 
‘Immigration Restriction Acts’ section.177 Again we are faced with incomplete sets of 
data. Within the published reports, whole data samples are missing, for Auckland 1914; 
Christchurch 1912; Dunedin, 1912 and 1913; and Wellington, 1912.  
Despite these irregularities a number of conclusions can be made. Across the 
whole set of data there is a clear deviation from the description ‘lunatic, idiotic, deaf, 
dumb, blind or infirm’, or ‘idiot, insane or suffering from contagious disease’ referred 
to in the combined Acts. Furthermore, the description of the action taken against the 
immigrants varied widely. Examples include ‘allowed to land’, ‘dealt with’, ‘forbidden 
to land’, ‘admitted under bond’, ‘landed under guarantee’, or, simply not detailed at all. 
Where the condition or outcome has not been defined in the source, they have been 
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transcribed in the table as unspecified.  In this master table, any condition suggesting 
‘mental illness or disability’ has been emboldened.  
 
Table 14: Cases reported under the New Zealand Immigration Restriction Acts 1911 to 1914 
Port/District  1911 1912 1913 1914  TOTAL  
Auckland  Total 5: 
 
Dr Makgill: 
 
3 phthisical: 1detained in 
hospital until returned 
home by shipping 
company. 1 reported as 
such by southern ports, 
(outcome unspecified), 1 
removed to hospital where 
died. 
1 venereal: allowed to 
land, reports for 6 months 
as out-patient at hospital 
1 epileptic ‘dealt with as 
an undesirable 
immigrant’ 
 
Total 20: 
 
‘District Health Officer’ 
 
1 tuberculosis: arrived under 
assumed name 
1 unspecified: admitted to 
hospital under bond 
1 unspecified: admitted under 
bond 
1 proven consumptive, not 
examined by PHO, allowed to 
remain 
1 detained at Auckland, freed at 
Wellington 
1 blind: forbidden to land 
1 infirm: forbidden to land 
2 ships hands: forbidden to land 
1 mentally afflicted action not 
specified 
1 stowaway action unspecified: 
1 syphilitic, not allowed to land 
2 ships hands syphilitic, not 
allowed to land 
1 consumptive/asthmatic: 
returned to Vancouver 
1 ships hand: allowed to remain 
1 fibroid lung, belonged to 
Dominion, allowed to land 
1 ship’s cook, unspecified, 
transferred to ship, going to 
Sydney 
 
 
Total 25: 
 
‘District Health 
Officer’ 
 
1phthsis: landed 
under conditional 
permit 
1 unspecified 
landed under 
conditional permit 
1 heart disease: 
landed under proof 
that was New 
Zealander 
1 ‘mental case’: 
landed under 
skipper’s 
guarantee 
1 phthsis: 
prohibited from 
landing 
10 measles of 
which one allowed 
to land for hospital 
treatment, one en 
route to Sydney – 
other 8 outcome 
unspecified 
2 more phthsis: 
landed under 
conditional permit 
2 ‘contagious 
diseases’ 
prohibited from 
landing 
1phthsis: landed 
under guarantee 
1 epileptic: 
landed under 
guarantee 
1phthsis: allowed 
to land for hospital 
treatment but 
subsequently 
deported 
3 unspecified, 
prohibited with 
‘usual proviso’. 
 
None 
reported 
 50 
       
Canterbury/ 
Christchurch  
Total 10 
 
Dr Finch 
 
5 unspecified : allowed to 
land under bond 
5 seamen unspecified: 
prevented from landing. 
 
None reported Total 5 
 
‘District Health 
Officer’ 
 
4 syphilitic: 
refused admission 
1 tuberculosis: 
refused admission 
 
Total 9 
 
‘District 
Health 
Officer’ 
 
All action 
unspecified: 
6 syphilitic: 
3 
tuberculosis 
 24 
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Port/District  1911 1912 1913 1914  TOTAL  
Dunedin/ 
Otago   
Total 2 
 
Dr Champtaloup 
 
2 unspecified : neither 
allowed to land under 
bond. 
 
None reported None reported Total 2 
 
‘District 
Health 
Officer’ 
 
1 syphilis: 
removed to 
hospital 
under 
skippers 
guarantee 
1 dementia: 
New 
Zealander 
so allowed 
to land. 
 
 4 
Wellington  Total: 8 
 
Dr Chesson 
 
4 mentally afflicted: 3 
prevented from landing, 1 
sent to hospital 
1 phthisical: prevented 
from landing 
1 spinal trouble: prevented 
from landing 
1 infirm: prevented from 
landing 
1 heart disease: prevented 
from landing 
 
None reported Total 15 
 
‘District Health 
Officer’ 
 
1 consumptive: 
deported to Sydney 
1 embolism: sent 
back to London 
1 mentally 
deficient: sent 
back to London 
1 chest-disease: 
returned to Sydney 
1 consumptive:  
returned to London 
1 consumptive:  
New Zealander, 
allowed to land.  
1 infirm: New 
Zealander, allowed 
to land. 
1 syphilitic: New 
Zealander, allowed 
to land. 
1 infirm: sent back 
to Sydney 
1 syphilitic: sent 
back to London 
1 infirm: sent back 
to London 
1 consumptive: 
died  
1 consumptive: 
deported to 
London 
1 deaf-mute: 
deported to Sydney 
1 syphilitic: 
deported to 
Newcastle (NSW) 
Total 11 
 
‘District 
Health 
Officer’ 
 
1 epileptic: 
bond 
executed 
1 
consumptive: 
action 
unspecified  
1 
melancholia
: returned to 
London 
1 infirm: 
bond 
executed 
1 chest 
trouble: 
returned to 
London 
1 
consumptive 
dying child: 
allowed to 
land 
3 insane: 
returned to 
London 
1 infirm: 
bond 
executed 
1 heart 
disease and 
infirm: bond 
executed 
 34 
TOTAL  25 20 45 22  112 
 
Source: AJHR, H-31, ‘Public Health Reports and Charitable Aid’: 1912 (p. 97); 1913 (p. 70); 1914, (p. 
69); 1915 (p. 36). 
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The cases from Table 14 which alluded to the various forms of ‘mental illness’ have 
been condensed in Table 15 below. They are identified in brackets next to the overall 
total per year, per port. From this it is possible to suggest an approximate proportion of 
those who were dealt with for ‘mental illness’. From an overall total of 112, fifteen were 
labelled as follows: epilepsy (three), mental case (one), mentally afflicted (five), 
mentally deficient (one), melancholic (one), insane (three), and dementia (one).   
 
Table 15: Mental illness cases reported under the New Zealand Immigration Acts 1911 to 1914 
   1911  1912 1913 1914  TOTAL  
Auckland 5(1) 20(1) 25(2) 0  50 (4)  
 epileptic mentally 
afflicted 
1 mental case, 1 
epileptic 
    
        
Wellington  8(4) 0 15(1) 11(5)  34(10)  
 4 mentally 
afflicted 
 1 mentally deficient 3 insane, 1 epileptic, 1 
melancholic 
   
 
Christchurch   
 
 
10 
 
 
0 
 
 
5 
 
 
9 
  
24 
 
Dunedin 2 0 0 2(1) 
 dementia 
 4(1)  
        
TOTAL 25(5) 20(1) 45(3) 22(6)  112(15)  
Source: AJHR, H-31, ‘Public Health Reports and Charitable Aid’: 1912 (p. 97); 1913 (p. 70); 1914, (p. 
69); 1915 (p. 36). 
 
The rate of fifteen out of a total of 112 represents a lower proportion - thirteen per cent - 
than the nineteen per cent suggested for the figures available for the period 1901 to 
1906 (Table 7). However it is possible that from the twenty-six labelled as infirm or not 
specified at all, within Table 14, included further borderline undesirable types.  
 This inconsistency was also evident in how the action taken against immigrants 
was reported. As such it is not clear whether the IRA or IPA was used. Of the Auckland 
cases, one ‘epileptic’ was ‘dealt with as an undesirable immigrant’; the outcome for the 
‘mentally afflicted’ was not noted, and the ‘mental case’ was ‘landed under the 
skipper’s guarantee’. Of the Wellington cases, Dr Cheeson was, at least, consistent in 
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his labelling. All four cases were described as ‘mentally afflicted’, of which three were 
‘prevented from landing’ and one was ‘sent to hospital. The anonymous Wellington 
District Health Officer who provided the information for 1913 and 1914 also seem to 
favour the deportation system. In 1913 one ‘mentally deficient was ‘sent back to 
London’, and the following year one ‘melancholic’ and three ‘insane’ suffered the same 
fate. In 1914 he executed a bond for an ‘epileptic’, while his counterpart in Dunedin 
allowed someone with dementia to land on the basis they were a New Zealander. 
 Such differing outcomes reflect the messiness of the joint approach which used 
the bonding and deportation provisions concurrently.  Of the descriptions used, only 
‘insane’ appeared within the legislation. Of the others, dementia, epilepsy and mentally 
deficient were apparent within Australian law or regulations. This suggests that the New 
Zealand border controllers were influenced by Australian practices, or if not, used wider 
medical terminology. Again by considering the details of actual immigration cases it is 
possible to identify a number of key themes. First, we see a continuation of muddled 
practices, the very antithesis of Norris’ calls for uniformity. Second, within this fragile 
framework, we find patterns of local, national and international collusion. Third, it is 
clear that all parties were engaging with rhetoric about transmissible degeneration. This 
confirms that, despite the absence of overtly eugenic language in New Zealand 
legislation, fears of degeneration informed those operating their borders. 
 One case in particular shows how the labelling relating to physical, mental and 
moral ‘defects’ were tied to fears of degeneration. The 1912 entry for Auckland in 
Table 14 referred to as ‘tuberculosis: landed under an assumed name’ is likely James 
Robinson. One time resident of Waihi, Coromandel, Robinson had left his family 
dependent on the local aid board, and had gone to Australia. On hearing about his 
imminent return, the local officials forewarned the customs collector in Auckland. They 
did this in order, they hoped, to prevent Robinson leaving Australia, and to avoid the 
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costs of his ‘certain repatriation’. Robinson’s conditions were many. As well as being a 
‘chronic consumptive,’ his diseased leg was ‘stiff and stinking’ and because a ‘sexual 
maniac’ he had spent time in two Victorian asylums.178   
 His physical conditions meant that Robinson’s first attempt to leave Australia 
had been stymied by the health checks of the shipping company. He subsequently 
however managed to make the journey under an assumed name. Furthermore, he passed 
the port checks at Auckland and was able to return to his family in Waihi, where his leg 
was amputated. The local authorities sought compensation for the cost of this procedure 
through the Immigration Restriction Act. In investigating how Robinson had been able 
to return, the customs department uncovered a number of processes which had failed. 
Because he had used a pseudonym the ship’s stewards had failed to notice him on his 
second attempt to travel. Although the condition of his leg had been noticed, Robinson 
apparently had persuaded the ship’s doctor that he was ‘simply a little lame’. Instead the 
customs department tried to use Robinson’s tuberculosis as a reason to petition the 
shipping company to deport him.
179
  
 Other parties argued that this removal would be unfair on him and his family. 
The Waihi district health officer described this action as ‘extreme’. Not only was 
Robinson with his family but, allowing his post-operation recovery time, the three 
months’ time limit for deportation would have lapsed. The Huddart Parker Shipping 
Company likewise attempted to argue that he should remain with his family in order to 
avoid them having to cover his deportation costs. The customs collector ultimately 
conceded that Robinson should remain, due to his residency and his likely rejection at 
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 NZNA: BBAO A133 5544 Box 145a Record Number 1913/742, George Craig,  Secretary of Customs, 
Wellington – James Robinson prohibited immigrant. 
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 As per Part II, section 19 of the Immigration Restriction Act, 1908. 
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Australian ports. Robinson was duly granted approval to remain, which according to the 
minister was the only ‘reasonable course’.180  
 Robinson’s story indicates how officials in Australia and New Zealand, and the 
shipping companies who managed the routes between them, were complicit in 
attempting to control the movement of the ‘unwanted’. Other cases indicate how these 
networks went beyond these Australasian neighbours. In 1911 the United States’ police 
authorities warned their counterparts in Sydney that the ‘mentally deranged’ Alexander 
Keay had left Washington State and was likely en-route. The Australian police in turn 
forewarned the New Zealand police and Department of Trade and Customs.
181
  
 While local authorities and shipping companies sought to avoid the financial 
costs of health care or repatriation, some people became informants for their own 
unwanted relatives. In September 1912, Belgian artist Marechal de Vidts, an Auckland 
resident, wrote to the customs department asking them to look out for his brother and 
nephew.
182
 De Vidts insisted that he could not afford to maintain his relatives and 
described their undesirability at length. He described both as having drink problems. 
This had rendered his nephew unemployable and his brother to be admitted to a Belgian 
asylum because of his ‘lunacy’. His brother, de Vidts explained, had been removed 
from the asylum in order to send him to New Zealand, so he feared that both were likely 
to become ‘mentally deranged’ if permitted to land. Despite these warnings they arrived 
in Auckland without problem, leading de Vidts to complain to the customs department 
more explicitly. Although he conceded that they were currently behaving well, they had 
no means of support. As such, he feared that they would ‘break out at the first 
opportunity’, and his brother would probably ‘become insane’. Unlike for those deemed 
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‘insane’ on arrival, without means of support, the customs department was unable to 
act. The Customs Secretary conceded that nothing could be done at this stage, but the 
case would be noted, in the event of the conditions affecting undesirable immigrants 
being considered for revision in the future.
183
 
 The port health officials clearly continued to struggle with the labelling of such 
types. Despite this, neither the terminology nor any other provisions were revised. 
Whereas, under the Australian system, the de Vidts may have fallen under the clauses 
for ‘mentally defective’, ‘feebleminded’ or ‘chronically alcoholic’, the New Zealand 
officials did not have the same legal footing. This did not mean that attempts were not 
made to exclude borderline types. While the cases detailed in Table 14 referred to 
‘mentally afflicted’ and a ‘mental case’, other evidence shows how some officials 
attempted to use even vaguer terms. 
 On a number of occasions Auckland health officer Dr Sharman was frustrated 
by this confines of this terminology. After British relatives of a ‘drunkard of the 
confirmed type’ warned that he was en-route, Sharman took action. The man in 
question, T. Day, a ships steward, was reportedly running away from his debts and, as 
well as being a drunk, suffered from fits and consumption. Despite these traits, neither 
the ship’s surgeon nor Sharman could diagnose any adverse health condition in Day, so 
he was allowed to land without restriction.
184
 On the same ship, the condition of a 
steerage passenger Duncan Arthur Davidson was equally borderline. However after 
confessing that he could not go so far as to say Davidson was ‘lunatic or insane upon 
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 NZNA: BBAO A133 5544 Box 232a  Record Number 1912/2266, WB Montgomery, Secretary of 
Customs, Wellington – Adheniar de Vidts, aged 50 and Raoul aged 25 – arrived per ‘Maheno’ 22 
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arrival’ Sharman bonded him as ‘mentally infirm’.185 This vagueness was noted by the 
Secretary of Customs who, when confirming receipt of the bond wrote, ‘I presume that 
Davidson is not insane’.186  
 Sharman is likely to be the health officer behind the 1913 instance described in 
the source as ‘mental case: landed under skipper’s guarantee’.  This involved a Scottish 
farmer, John Stark, who was reported by the ship’s captain as ‘acting strangely’ on the 
journey. His behaviour had highlighted him to the other passengers, and as a result of 
their attention, Stark had become violent and ‘mentally afflicted’. Upon his arrival in 
Auckland Sharman reported that he was unable to find evidence of this condition. The 
customs official informed Sharman that unless certified as a ‘lunatic’, Stark could not 
be detained. Accordingly, the ship’s captain signed the bond to enable him to land for 
being ‘infirm’.187 Stark’s case provides proof of how those borderline cases were 
bonded for being ‘infirm’ under the ‘Imbeciles Passengers’ section of the 1908 
consolidated Act.   
 Seamen in particular were bonded under vague and, unlegislated for conditions, 
such as sexually transmitted diseases. As already acknowledged, the use of immigration 
restrictions towards ships’ crew, provides another research opportunity for historians. 
For example, the three noted as ‘prohibited, with the usual proviso’ within the 1913 
Auckland cases (Table 14) were most probably sailors from the Makura. The 
immigration case notes describe that one had gonorrhoea, one ‘burns’ and one, Walter 
Gould, was ‘insane’. Sharman was only able to certify this after Gould landed and was 
arrested for being a ‘lunatic at large’. Prior to this Sharman suspected him merely 
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 NZNA: BBAO A133 5544 Box 154 Record Number 1914/278, George Craig,  Secretary of Customs, 
Wellington – DA Davidson – infirm immigrant ex Ayrshire acknowledging receipt of bond. 
187
 NZNA: BBAO A133 5544 Box 144a Record Number 1913/375, WB Montgomery, Secretary of 
Customs, Wellington – John Stark, aged 30, Farmer, immigrant –forwarding bond. 
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‘mentally defective’.188 This label would have made Gould deportable under the 
Australian provisions. 
 Despite emigration from Britain being disrupted during wartime, sailors and 
some migrants traversed between Australia and New Zealand. Of the 1908 Act, Part  
Part II, Section 17 enabled those who could prove that they were ‘formerly domiciled in 
New Zealand’ to argue that they should not be prohibited. In 1915 the Union Shipping 
Company sought to invoke this provision to avoid the costs for Violet Jane Alexander 
who, after threatening to jump overboard at Auckland, was certified as ‘mentally 
afflicted’. Alexander had been working in Sydney as a governess for two years, but was 
sent home to New Zealand after apparently ‘labouring under certain delusions’. The 
customs collector agreed with the shipping company’s assertion, that as in similar cases 
of New Zealanders returning from Australia, bonds had not been requested.
189
 Overall it 
appears that New Zealand officials continued to act on a case by case basis, and were 
influenced by the shipping companies as to their desired outcome.  
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has exposed the extent of loopholes, exemptions and inconsistencies in the 
early twentieth century immigration restrictions of Australia and New Zealand. As such, 
despite the strongly worded legal frameworks, their migration control should be 
understood as less vigorous than it was designed to be. However while the fears of 
transmissible defects were explicit in the Australian Act, they were also evident in the 
New Zealand practices. If Dr Sharman and his colleagues had been working within the 
Australian framework, they would have been able to label the borderline ‘mentally 
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inept’ cases with confidence. It is clear that New Zealand’s catch-all ‘infirm’ 
classification was used very much in the same way as Australia’s new clauses. The aims 
of the two countries were the same; those undesirable for their physical, mental or moral 
weakness were not welcome. This commonality enabled the creation of networks acting 
as early warning systems across the Anglo-sphere.  
Whereas, in previous eras, New Zealand had actively influenced or engaged 
with immigration control techniques, the Commonwealth of Australia now forged 
ahead.  This divergence is likely a result of personalities and timing. In this era of 
Australian nation-building, Dr William Perrin Norris’ skills were perfectly placed. By 
the 1910s New Zealand had been a united political entity for over thirty years, 
compared to Australia’s ten. It appears that New Zealand sat back and let the enduring 
techniques continue, including the ineffective terminology around mental illness used 
by border controllers. The Commonwealth of Australia engaged more urgently with the 
clauses apparent in North American legislation. Eugenic thinking however was also 
apparent in the practices of New Zealand’s immigration legislation, if not in its 
wording.  As indicated by Fisher’s amendment Bill shows, steps to tighten its clauses 
were planned. It should be speculated too that New Zealand may have felt somewhat 
protected by her larger neighbour over the Tasman, not just as the first port of call from 
Asia, but also from Europe. There was clearly an early warning system in place between 
Australia, New Zealand and beyond.  
Unsurprisingly the impact of the First World War distorts our understanding of 
this period. Thinking counter-factually, New Zealand might have gone on to incorporate 
a eugenic phase in their legislation. Norris might have implemented his overarching 
uniform system through which all the dominions had their immigrants medically 
assessed. A new type of unwanted immigrant emerged due to the aftermath of the war, 
those deemed dangerous because of their political or national affiliations. Both 
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Australia and New Zealand enacted legislation to limit or exclude those of German or 
Austro-German descent, or seen as ‘dangerous to the peace’.190  
 As in the other time periods examined, it is important to reflect on the 
differences between policy and practice. Both New Zealand and Australia enabled the 
entry of immigrants, even if they had been deemed ‘insane’. Caveats and clauses existed 
to ensure that financial exemptions were made. The eugenic nature of the regulations 
was tempered, in part, by the amount of so-called humane provisions. However, people 
were still slipping past border controls, due to the transient nature of ‘mental disease’. 
The recognition that the act of migration triggered ‘mental disturbances’ was reflected 
in Norris’ regulations.  
 The certificates of health, or exemption applications signified a way of seeking 
pre-approval for entry. This was in effect to provide proof that immigrants were not 
likely to become public charges. And yet, the bonding system continued which meant 
that people could still buy their way in. Whereas immigrants previously had to provide 
financial securities on entry, the certificate of health requirement signified a more active 
approach, for Australian border control, at least. Implementing this type of system in the 
metropole would require the backing of the Imperial government. It was in the post-war 
period, when imperial and dominion ties were stronger than ever before, that the joint 
approach to migration was realised. 
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Chapter 7: Insufficient Mental Equipment 
 
 
 In 1926 a key Australian immigration official assured New Zealanders that they were 
getting a ‘magnificent class’ of immigrants.1 This claim came from the man who had 
been Australia’s Director of Migration in London since March 1921, Percy Hunter.2 
Despite Norris’ attempt to petition for a dominion-wide medical examination over ten 
years earlier, this had not occurred under his tenure as CMO. Hunter credited this 
apparent success to the common system of migrant selection used by Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand which, he explained, had been formulated by himself and 
Commonwealth Medical Officer (CMO), Dr E.W. Morris. Under the presidency of New 
Zealand High Commissioner Sir James Allen, and in conjunction with the British 
Medical Association, a roster of between 1,500 and 2,000 district medical referees had 
been appointed. These men, Hunter explained, performed all the work of examining 
migrants for the dominions.
3
 
 Unlike Norris’ unrealised vision from over a decade earlier, Hunter boasted how 
this system was operational and working as ‘effective as it could be’. Furthermore he 
explained how this system had been investigated two years earlier by Sir Neville 
Howse, whom Hunter described as ‘one of the greatest organising brains in the medical 
service’. Not only had the process been improved according to Howse’s 
recommendations, but it now it had the backing of New Zealand’s immigration officer 
in London, Mr F.T. Sandford, and the British government.
4
 This final chapter examines 
the validity of Hunter’s claims. Taking his assertions at face value could provide a neat 
conclusion to this thesis. And yet, as has been established through each period covered, 
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4
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the attempts to manage the entry of those perceived to be ‘mentally ill’ was beset was 
problems. 
Hunter spoke as if Australia and New Zealand used the same system of 
migration control based on medical pre-selection in Britain. Furthermore, although he 
conceded like some migration administrators before him that ‘perfection could not be 
expected’, his overall opinion was a positive one.5 This chapter, by continuing the 
policy versus practice approach, exposes how this so-called perfection was not, despite 
the best attempts of figures like Howse, fully achievable. This final analysis considers 
Norris’ legacy and highlights how Sir Neville Howse similarly wanted the Australian 
medical inspection in Britain to ‘eliminate’ all persons suffering from ‘mental 
deficiency’.6  
 This chapter is organised into three sections. First it considers Percy Hunter’s 
role in establishing the medical selection system for the Empire settlement schemes. 
Although the intervention of the British government in dominion migration following 
the end of the First World War has been widely studied, only Michael Roe has given 
attention to the provisions for medical inspection.
7
 He did not, however, fully 
interrogate Howse’s involvement in this. Accordingly, the second part of this chapter 
does just that. Crucially this shows how Howse was committed to Norris’ vision. 
However, the final section of this chapter exposes how, yet again, attempts to modernise 
medical practices failed to achieve the total exclusion of ‘mentally ill’ immigrants.  
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By the end of the 1920s those described as having ‘mental disabilities’, ‘unsuitable 
temperaments’, or simply ‘undesirable’ constituted the majority of returned migrants. 
Accordingly, this final chapter shows how the problem experienced by border 
administrations, over the previous one hundred years, were still not fully resolved, and 
were unlikely to ever be. 
Systematic Emigration to Empire Settlement: Plus ça Change 
 
 
Not only were many problems not resolved, but many ideas about migration control 
were simply recycled. All that had really changed was the language used to describe the 
borderline undesirable types, and the amount of administrators involved in their 
assessment. The imperial attempts to induce emigration in the 1920s were reminiscent 
of the emigration schemes of the first part of the nineteenth century. The ideal labouring 
migrants were required to be healthy, hearty and hard-working. The establishment of the 
Oversea Settlement Committee (OSC) in 1919 has been widely acknowledged as the 
forerunner to the 1922 Empire Settlement Act.
8
 These provisions signified imperial 
attempts to help populate Australia, Canada and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand. Some 
familiar names were involved within the lengthy negotiations that this joint approach 
necessitated. The Dominions Royal Commission’s Sir Rider Haggard, for example, who 
had heard Norris’ calls for a uniform system of medical inspection in 1914, helped 
negotiations between the Australian state premiers and the British government.
9
   
 Norris’ calls for uniformity were not acknowledged by those who established the 
subsequent joint medical inspection system. In 1921 Dr E.W. Morris replaced him as 
CMO, reportedly because Norris wanted to be ‘relieved of his duties’.10 This change 
coincided with the creation of the London based role of Australian Director of 
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Migration and Settlement. In 1920, after deciding that he wanted greater federal control 
over assisted migration, Australian Prime Minister Hughes consolidated the state offices 
into the Commonwealth Department at Australia House.
11
 Percy Hunter, who had 
overseen the immigration offices of Victoria and New South Wales, was appointed to 
manage the newly combined department.
12
 
 It was Hunter, as Director of Migration, who represented the interests of the 
Commonwealth of Australia at OSC meetings. At one such meeting in 1921, British 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alfred Milner, was careful to stress that overseas 
settlement meant distributing the white population of the Empire in the way ‘most 
conducive to the development, stability and strength of the whole’. Reminiscent of 
nineteenth century colonial complaints about Britain ‘shovelling out paupers’, Milner 
was careful to couch the plans as designed not to relieve unemployment, but to prevent 
it by stimulating the production of raw materials.
13
 He also expressed concern about the 
practicalities of emigration. Milner was keen for emigrants not to be left to fend for 
themselves. His explanation of this reflected nineteenth-century schemes where the 
unemployed were ‘absorbed into the town population or fell into distress’.14  
 Also reminiscent of previous attempts at migration control was the idea of 
migrant suitability. The committee discussed the current dominion practice of granting 
passages to people only if in ‘good health and physically fitted for life overseas’. Like 
Julius Vogel’s concerns from fifty years previously, the OSC noted how medical 
certification was provided by local doctors who were often ‘keen to facilitate matters’. 
This led to a discussion which suggests that Norris’ plans were only then about to come 
to fruition. The committee noted how the Australian department had appointed 1,500 
referees, who would receive ‘full instructions as to the nature of the information which 
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they are required to furnish’. Furthermore, it was understood that similar systems were 
to be ‘adopted by all the dominions at an early date’.15 Accordingly, one of the 
committee’s recommendations was that ‘improved methods of selection’ were essential 
for enabling a ‘strong policy of state-aided empire settlement’.16 
 By June 1922, ten years after it had first been legislated for, the Australian 
medical assessment system had only been established, at least in part. Hunter suggested 
to the OSC that, because it was ‘working well’, the Australian practices could easily be 
extended to incorporate the empire settlement schemes. All that would need to happen, 
he explained, was for the existing forms to be updated to include information as 
required by the Oversea Settlement Office. Hunter’s explanation of the Australian 
system displays how it involved a combination of paper and personal approval. While 
external passenger agents collated the references, medical certificates and passage 
money, the intending emigrants were interviewed personally by officers at Australia 
House, employment exchanges or voluntary organisations. The OSC agreed that, on 
face value, this system ‘appeared to meet the situation’. After Hunter submitted his 
proposals in writing, he was given the authority to decide whether applicants were 
suitable ‘morally, financially, medically and in all other respects’ for settlement in 
Australia.
17
   
 While Australian administrators took the lead in the practicalities of the Empire 
settlement schemes, New Zealand remained more circumspect.
18
 New Zealand 
politicians responded to the schemes later, and with less enthusiasm, than the 
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Australians.
19
 In 1923, New Zealand’s Minister of Immigration, W. Nosworthy 
responded to the Bill with some reticence. He expressed hope that the scheme would 
stimulate the flow of immigrants, but was concerned about the idea that the country was 
able to assimilate ‘thousands and thousands’ of immigrants. Perhaps wary of the 
problems cause by earlier immigration systems, Nosworthy wanted provisions made for 
the ‘proper reception’ and employment of the new arrivals. Despite these caveats he 
was, however, ‘fully alive to the economic advantage’ of migration and settlement to 
the Empire as a whole.
20
 In July the New Zealand Governor-General informed the 
British Secretary of State that the New Zealand government had agreed to the loan 
provisions of the Empire Settlement Act therefore had instructed its High Commissioner 
to ‘act accordingly’.21  
 This High Commissioner was Sir James Allen, who in 1926 Percy Hunter would 
describe as being instrumental to the success of the joint inspection scheme.
22
 In 
October, Allen and New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey attended the Imperial 
Economic Conference in London.
23
 Allen responded to the Parliamentary-Secretary of 
the Department of Overseas Trade, Albert Buckley’s, critique that the scheme at that 
point was not ‘really fruitful’.24 Allen listed a number of New Zealand’s limitations, 
namely the lack of available land and the prevalence of seasonal labour requirements.
25
 
Like Nosworthy, Allen did however, repeat New Zealand’s willingness to absorb new 
settlers and acknowledged the ‘defects’ in the current systems.26 Although no specifics 
of migrant selection or approval were discussed at this meeting, Buckley acknowledged 
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that operational practices were being investigated. At that time the British Oversea 
Delegation were in New Zealand, under the direction of Sir William Windham. Buckley 
described Windham as an experienced migration official, with ‘special knowledge of 
migration problems’.27 
 Unlike the reports which had overlooked immigration restriction legislation and 
incurred the wrath of Norris, Windham’s review included this information in 
appendices. New Zealand’s convoluted immigration acts were neatly summarised 
within a section entitled ‘Immigration Regulations: Prohibited Immigrants’. This 
included the list of those prohibited, including ‘idiots and insane persons’. Furthermore, 
after listing the types of people for whom a bond was required to cover maintenance for 
five years, the following statement was made, ‘the bond may be given by the friends of 
the person concerned if satisfactory to the Collector of Customs’.28 This shows that 
although the original legislation had made the shipping companies culpable for their 
passengers, in reality New Zealanders could pay for the friends and family to enter the 
country, a fact borne out by archival sources.
29
 
 This report also highlighted how these familial links were more important in 
terms of the New Zealand involvement with the Empire Settlement Act. New Zealand 
residents could nominate people for assisted passages as long as they did not fall under 
the prohibited classes, and were likewise warned that assistance would not be granted to 
‘unhealthy persons’. Like in the nineteenth-century schemes, if cases of lung, chest or 
‘other like complaints’ were discovered by the medical officer at British ports the whole 
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family would be prevented from embarking.
30
 Applications were initially managed by 
the Immigration Department in Wellington, which forwarded approved cases to the 
High Commissioner in London. The High Commissioner then facilitated the remainder 
of the process. Medical examinations were arranged at the expense of the applicant, and 
character reports were obtained from their referees. If everything was satisfactory 
passages were arranged.
31 
This description makes Allen responsible for deciding, based 
on their health and character, whether migrants were suitable for assistance. As such, he 
acted very much in the same vein as the agent-generals did. However, unlike the 
previous split between provisions for assisted and non-assisted immigrants, the 
‘prohibited immigrant’ clause now applied to both.  
 While Allen, on leaving the position in 1926, would bemoan that New Zealand 
had not fully taken up the opportunities provided by the ESA, this was not the case for 
Australia.
32
 In engaging fully with the opportunity to increase their population, 
Australian administrators again sought to improve the methods of medical selection. In 
1923 Australian Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce instructed Sir Neville Howse to 
investigate and suggest improvements to the Commonwealth’s British based practices. 
The resulting document provides the largest amount of operational information 
pertaining to any era or region considered in this thesis. Although Howse’s report has 
been acknowledged to be an ‘outstanding consolidated source’ its contents have not 
been analysed.
33
 Not only did it contain Norris’ 1914 regulations but it also detailed the 
methods and results of the system as it stood in 1923. Amongst this was Howse’s 
recognition that the label ‘mentally deficient’ was both arbitrary and unhelpful. Instead 
he recommended that other less offensive descriptions he used. He was however 
committed to keeping out these borderline types. 
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Sir Neville Howse:‘One of the greatest organising brains in the medical 
service’ 
 
Like Frank Kinsley Norris, son of W.P Norris, Sir Neville Howse is revered as an 
Australian war hero. In 1901 he was awarded a Victoria Cross for his bravery in the 
Boer War.
34
 His military and medical career has been documented by a number of 
biographers.
35
 In 1921 Howse was appointed Director-General of the Australian Army 
Medical Service, a role which made him responsible for making recommendations to 
public health provision.
36
 In 1923 Howse represented Australia at the League of Nations 
in Geneva, and, while in Europe, was asked by Prime Minister Stanley Bruce to report 
on the Commonwealth’s practices at Australia House.37 His subsequent 
recommendations, as to how to improve the medical inspection of migrants, were 
approved by Bruce and put into effect the same year.
38
 In comparison to his other 
achievements, in a lengthy and assured career, Howse’s time at Australia House has 
been overlooked. One of his biographers has, however, described him as eugenically 
minded and a fierce proponent of the White Australia policy.
39
 These traits are apparent 
in his 1923 report which represents the most thorough consideration of migration 
operations by a contemporary examined thus far. 
Prior to Howse’s review, Australia’s Immigration Act had been amended once 
more. From 1920 some of the ‘prescribed diseases and disabilities’ previously listed 
under clause 3(g), namely ‘insanity’ and ‘dementia’, were included more visibly within 
clause 3(c). This ‘mental illness’ clause which had begun in 1901 as ‘idiots and insane’, 
now read as 
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any idiot, imbecile, feeble-minded person, epileptic, person suffering from 
dementia, insane person, person who has been insane within five years 
previously, or person who has had two or more attacks of insanity.
40
  
 
The same year also saw the inclusion of Section 8A which enabled the minister 
to request the deportation of those ‘who had become an inmate of an insane asylum or 
public charitable institution within three years of their arrival’.41 It would appear on 
paper that even if the ‘mentally ill’ were able to reach Australia, they had to remain 
well, or face being returned. 
Despite these changes, the practices of Australian immigration control in Britain 
were still being fine-tuned. In December 1922 the Assistant Director of the Melbourne 
Immigration Office wrote to the Secretary of the Commonwealth Home and Territories 
Department to complain about the limitations of the London-based officers. Neither the 
Director of the Migration and Settlement Office (DMS), the CMO, nor any of their 
officers, the Melbourne official complained, had the authority to prevent unsuitable 
migrants from sailing for Australia. The Assistant Director suggested that the DMS and 
the CMO be given greater powers in order to try to prevent such types from embarking 
at British ports.
42
 
 The resulting memorandum from the Minister for Home and Territories, George 
Pearce, endorsing these recommendations, shows how the original complaint had been 
made in relation to a ‘mentally deficient’ girl. The details of the case display how, 
despite the best efforts of the CMB, the ‘mentally ill’ were still migrating, in this 
instance through collusion with the shipping company. The CMO had reportedly 
warned the Superintendent of the P & O Line that a girl ‘suffering from mental 
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deficiency’ and her father, were embarking at London, but that they would not be 
allowed to land in Australia. Despite this warning, the father and the shipping 
company’s superintendent had decided to ‘take the risk’. Although the CMO  
cabled the Australian authorities in advance, the customs collector at Adelaide admitted 
the girl under an exemption certificate. This involved her father providing the 
‘maintenance undertaking’ and the shipping company promising to return her to 
England if called upon to do so.  
Pearce agreed with this recommendation because he wanted to ‘support the 
authorities in London as much as possible’. He did however concede that they could not 
legislate to prevent people from setting out for Australia. Instead, Pearce thought that 
granting the British based officials greater authority would deter the shipping companies 
from flouting the rules. By showing them that the Australian authorities would back up 
their counterparts in London, Pearce hoped they would ‘not be so ready to take the risk 
of carrying an afflicted passenger whose admission to Australia had not been definitely 
authorised’.  In terms of practicalities he envisaged an early warning system. If the 
CMO or DMS uncovered any further instances of migrants seeking to travel without 
approval, they were to inform the shipping companies, and the Home and Territories 
Department. As such, these powers only translated so far. Furthermore, Pearce stressed 
that persons could still be allowed to enter Australia if they were not likely to be a 
‘menace to the community’ and adequate maintenance guarantees were provided. 
Despite these limitations, the suggestion was duly approved by the Governor-General of 
the Executive Council who noted that the change should be ‘helpful in restricting people 
from bringing weaklings to the Commonwealth’.43   
 The timing of this meant that, when Howse investigated the systems in place at 
Australia House in 1923, Percy Hunter as DMS and E.W. Morris as CMO were officers 
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under the current Immigration Act. Howse would however conclude that the CMOs 
presence at the embarkation of emigrants was not necessary. Through observing and 
working with Hunter and his deputy J. T. Barnes, Morris and the Australian High 
Commissioner Sir Joseph Cook, Howse performed a thorough review of policy and 
practice. In addition he interviewed the pertinent third parties, the selecting officers, 
shipping agents and the medical referees. Furthermore, he observed the embarkation 
process and questioned the migrants themselves as to their experiences.
44
 By formatting 
Howse’s findings into a process chart it is clear that, by 1923, Australia’s migration 
control relied on a number of levels of administrative approval. 
As can be seen in Process Diagram 7, this system was designed towards the 
provision of assisted passages under the Empire Settlement Act. As such, it did not 
reference the ‘prescribed certificates of health’ legislated for in the 1912 Immigration 
Act. It also suggests that the CMO’s role was more limited than Norris’ vision for it. 
Specific officers were responsible for granting different types of necessary approval 
prior to the involvement of medical referees. The eligibility of those seeking assistance 
to migrate was checked first by the official from whom they first sought advice (Step 1). 
This first gatekeeper was not necessarily situated at Australia House. Applications could 
also be submitted through British social organisations and employment offices. All 
these clerks were expected to evaluate the intending applicants in person. Before 
handing over the forms to them, these officials had to consider a number of factors 
indicating suitability. Applicants should be ‘free from any physical disability likely to 
impair his usefulness as a settler, of good moral character, of abstemious habits and in 
every respect … [be] a desirable person’.45   
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The application form itself was designed on more practical grounds. It asked for the 
applicant’s vital statistics, marital status, farming capabilities, finances and whether they 
had links to Australia. In terms of health suitability the applicant was asked whether 
they or their family had any physical disabilities. At this stage applicants were advised 
that medical and character references would be required.
46
 However, before this medical 
approval stage was triggered, the applicant’s character and financial suitability were 
checked. As per Steps 2, 3 and 4, the Director of Migration requested character referees. 
If these proved inconclusive he could ask the Ministry of Labour or YMCA to make 
further enquires. This was because of the perception that these local representatives 
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were ‘often of the greatest value in estimating the true character of the prospective 
migrant’. If good character was proven, their case would be passed to another senior 
officer to assess their financial suitability, the criteria of which Howse did not detail.
47
 
 What Howse did uncover was how these approval steps led to a large proportion 
of rejects prior to the medical assessment stage. He found that out of a sample of nearly 
two hundred cases submitted by the regional selection officers, 126 were rejected by the 
staff at Australia House.
48
 This represents over sixty per cent and yet, when the Deputy 
Director reviewed another set of approved cases he found that a further seven per cent 
should not have passed.
49
 This means that a large proportion of applicants were rejected. 
Of the ones referred to the next step in the process only those deemed financially 
suitable were forwarded to the medical stage. Applicants were only then provided with 
the official medical examination form and advised which medical referee to contact. 
These select few were informed that ‘under no circumstances will any other medical 
certificate be accepted, unless duly certified by the above-named medical referee’.50 
 Because he thought the proper completion of the medical certificate as essential,  
Howse described this process at length. These medical referees alone, he acknowledged, 
had the opportunity of making a detailed examination of the prospective migrant.  
Howse confirmed that as CMO, Morris had arranged for all dominions to use the same 
referees, and that those with war service were preferred because they were more likely 
to spot those ‘unlikely to make good under hard conditions’. In addition Morris had 
designed a specific instruction card which advised the medical referees to properly 
consider the ‘nervous system and mental condition’.51  
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Morris’ advice read as follows: 
Particular attention is asked as to mental condition and capacity in all cases, 
but especially in the case of children and the feebleminded. Inquiries should 
be made as to previous treatment for, or any family history of, mental 
disease or epilepsy in any form.
52
 
 
The CMO had, prior to Howse’s review, reminded the medical referees to complete the 
certification fully, and to regard in particular the section regarding mental diseases and 
epilepsy. This was because, he asserted, the ‘Directors of Migration of the Empire’ 
considered them particularly important.
53
 This echoed Norris’ sentiments from a decade 
earlier. 
 And yet, these two pieces of evidence appear to be the only written procedural 
contributions Morris made. Curiously, Howse included Norris’ Notes and Instructions 
for the Guidance of Medical Referees in full, as an appendix, yet did not mention them 
in his analysis. Instead Howse noted how the CMO’s second opinion had been sought in 
an average of 43 per cent of the medical forms returned to the department.
54
 As 
represented in Step 7 of Process Map 7, these were assessed initially by medical clerks. 
These officers had been trained to follow the medical standards and to refer any cases in 
whom ‘some variation from the normal occurs’ to the CMO (Step 8). Morris, or his 
equivalent, could then make the decision whether to reject the application or defer it, 
although if for longer than six months, a new medical would be required.
55
 Otherwise 
the cases passed by the medical clerks were forwarded to a senior officer to grant final 
approval, as were those sanctioned by the CMO. Subsequently the paperwork was 
forwarded to officials in Australia before the person emigrated, which usually occurred 
within four months of them being given the final consent to do so.
56
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 Despite the amount of pre-approval checks and supporting paperwork, a 
person’s entry to Australia was not automatically guaranteed. The emigrants were 
checked prior to departure by the CMO, a medical officer from the Board of Trade, and 
the ship’s doctor. Howse described this check as cursory and only likely to detect a 
migrant ‘afflicted with some gross complaint’. As per the 1912 Act, the ship’s doctor 
was legally obliged to report on the state of each immigrant’s health to the Australian 
quarantine officers who assessed them on arrival. Taken together, Howse concluded that 
‘extensive and elaborate machinery’ existed to safeguard against the entry of prohibited 
migrants into Australia’.57 
Aside from responding positively to the legal and administrative provisions, 
Howse was troubled by the amount of cases being returned by Australia. He had 
discovered that between 1 March 1921 and 31August 1923 sixty-five approved people 
had been rejected at the Australian border. This represented a mere 0.125 per cent of the 
overall 51,863 persons who had emigrated successfully. As such, Howse conceded that 
this meant that the present method of examination must be ‘fairly satisfactory’. He 
suggested that some of the unsuitable cases may not have been detected due to their 
own deceit. Intrigued as to the reasons for their return, Howse had made enquiries as to 
the conditions which had led to people being returned. As detailed in Table 16, nearly 
half had been so according to the labels ‘brain and nervous diseases’, ‘mental 
deficiency’ and epilepsy.  
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Table 16:  Emigrants returned from Australia under medical grounds: 1921 to 1923.  
Label  TOTAL  
Mental Deficiency   21 
Epilepsy  8 
Venereal Disease  6 
General Debility  5 
Tuberculosis  5 
Heart Disease  5 
Physical Deformities   5 
Not Definitely Specified   5 
Locomotor Ataxia  1 
Arthritis  1 
Night Blindness  1 
Otitis Media  1 
Hernia  1 
TOTAL  65 
Source: ‘Howse, ‘Migrants: Medical Examination in England,’ p. 9 
 
 
Although the term ‘mental deficiency’ had not been included as a prohibited clause 
within the Act, it was clearly the favoured term for the borderline cases of ‘mental 
illness’. While these conditions quoted in the table may have been listed as ‘prescribed 
disease or disability’ the inclusion of ‘not definitely specified’ shows how inexact 
terminology endured. Rather than querying the mismatch between immigration policy 
and practice, Howse expressed concern about the amount of migrants returned for being 
‘mentally deficient’. In one such case he had examined a man, and although had found 
him to have a ‘poor memory’ and a ‘neurotic, excitable temperament’, did not think he 
should have been described as ‘mentally deficient’. Furthermore, the man’s deformities 
in his hands and feet, Howse discovered, which may have warranted the man’s return, 
had not been used as justification for it.
58
  Despite viewing these physical conditions 
pejoratively, Howse also queried the use of the label ‘physical deformity’. He had found 
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that in one such case a man suffered from ‘bunions, hammer toes and corns’ but in 
reality his return had been arranged because of complaints by his employer that he was 
an ‘absolute failure, lazy, untrustworthy and cruel to animals’. 
 These types of labelling led Howse to make a radical suggestion which was 
reminiscent of Norris’ concern about those whose natural weaknesses meant they were 
likely to ‘go to the wall’. Howse described these same types in more conciliatory 
language. These were people who had ‘sufficient mental equipment to carry them 
successfully in the quiet life of an English village’ but whose abilities deteriorated 
because of the conditions of the voyage and the ‘new start’. Howse thought that, despite 
their inadequacies, these types should not be labelled as ‘mentally deficient’. This he 
had found only caused more trouble to them and their families. Instead Howse 
suggested what he thought a fairer description, ‘not likely to become a successful 
migrant under the arduous conditions of life in Australia’. Recognising that this was 
wordy he suggested that it could be represented by a ‘code word’ in cable 
correspondence.
59
 
 As Norris had done, Howse created a set of instructions to assist the medical 
referees to identity those he thought ‘unlikely to be successful’. Howse wanted the 
doctors to ascertain whether the migrant would be able to ‘stand a totally new 
environment, and to react normally to his new conditions’. His advice on how they 
could do this reflected the use of intelligence testing to determine mental standards. 
Howse recommended that the referees use ordinary ‘clinical standards’ and simple tests 
regarding mental arithmetic, current affairs and local geographical knowledge. While 
this advice represented a departure from Norris’, Howse remained concerned about the 
migrants’ hereditary traits.  
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He reiterated the importance of questioning the applicant on the presence of 
neurasthenia - commonly held to be a psychopathological condition akin to nervous 
exhaustion - or insanity in their family.  Howse’s  reasoning for this reflected ideas 
about nervous disease. Because, he explained, it was common for people to emigrate to 
improve their health, including for ‘mental instability, epilepsy and nervous breakdown, 
Howse wanted more questions be asked about their own history. If they admitted to 
theirs or family members having been in a lunatic asylum, the CMO should then write 
to their previous doctors.
60
  
 Howse made another key observation: that the Australian officials, both in 
Australia and in Britain, were not working to a common standard.
61
 He was greatly 
surprised that the CMO in Britain and the Commonwealth Director of Quarantine based 
in Australia had not conferred as to the exact physical and mental requirements in 
migrants.
62
 Furthermore, he concluded that the medical referees, although operating for 
all of the dominions, were doing so using different standards.
63
 This information refutes 
not only Norris’ assertion to the DRC in 1914, that, as CMO, he was responsible for the 
quarantine controls in Australia, but also Morris’ belief that he implemented a uniform, 
Dominion-wide, medical selection system in Britain.  
 Howse sought to rectify both of these inconsistencies in Australian and wider 
dominion border control. He made a number of practical recommendations to assist in 
debarring those with ‘any disability or variation from the normal’.64 He redesigned the 
medical certificate by separating the statements made by the applicant and the doctor, so 
that the latter’s could remain confidential.65 Howse recommended that the ship’s doctor 
should see each migrant properly at least once on the journey. This was necessary, he 
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explained, for the doctor to confidently complete the statement as to the migrant’s 
mental and physical condition.
66
 He also queried the Commonwealth Minister of Home 
and Territories’ reliance on the exemption system. Although in some cases Howse 
accepted it was necessary, such as in the case of a seven year old ‘cretin’ who entered 
Australia with his father, he thought that better consideration should be given the 
financial status of those who guaranteed immigrants’ future maintenance.67 
 Perhaps suspicious of Morris’ over-confidence in his own abilities, Howse 
sought to redesign the role of CMO somewhat. Because he had found Morris’ presence 
at the pre-departure examination not to be cost effective, Howse wanted the CMO to act 
more in an advisory role.
68
 This idea aligns Howse’s vision of the role to that of Norris’. 
Howse thought that the CMO should do more to instruct the medical referees personally 
in order to make their working practices uniform. Ideally, Howse wanted to centralise 
the whole system by having the medical inspections performed at Australia House or 
regional examination centres. He did, however, concede that these ideas were too 
expensive.
69
 Instead he advocated that a senior officer perform a final personal check of 
each applicant before confirming and booking their passage.
70
 If his recommendations 
had not resulted in improvements within a year, Howse suggested a long term plan. 
Either more staff should be employed at Australia House, or as a last resort, special 
observation hospitals in Australia could monitor any ‘doubtful cases’.71   
This latter extreme step was not necessary according to Percy Hunter’s glowing 
report of how Howse’ recommendations had been implemented.72 Other more impartial 
evidence exists to show that Howse’s review did lead to improvements. Roe has 
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identified that two extra medical officers were employed to travel around Britain to see 
applicants in person.
73
 It is likely also that Howse’s report led to a further amendment in 
the Australian Immigration Act. In 1926 the term ‘mental or physical defect’ was 
removed from clause 3(f). As already discussed, Howse did not like the term ‘mental 
deficiency ‘and wanted to make the clause sound less severe, while also ensuring that 
those without ‘sufficient mental equipment’ were excluded. This idea was reflected in 
the new wording of clause 3(f) which now read as: 
any person, who in the opinion of an officer, is likely if he enters the 
Commonwealth to become a charge upon the public by reason of infirmity of 
mind or body, insufficiency of means to support himself, or by any other 
means.
74
 
 
The purpose behind this wording is clear. It focussed on those who were thought 
not likely to be self-supporting, whether institutionalised or not. Furthermore, the phrase 
‘infirmity of mind’ sought to expand the scope of those deemed mentally unsuitable or 
dysfunctional. These changes were another indication of how, in the long history of 
mental illness and migration control, political administrations continued to incorporate 
more and more terminology, officers and administration. In relation to the borderline 
and transient conditions, ideas about ‘temperament’ and other vague ‘peculiarities’ 
became used as reasons for rejection, or deportation. This was a return to the ‘bad 
character’ idea from a hundred years previously. 
From ‘Half-Scamps, Half-Lunatics’ to the ‘Temperamentally 
Unsuitable’ 
 
No British world or Anglo-sphere legislature was able to completely exclude the 
borderline types who were deemed ‘mentally’ or ‘morally’ unsuitable. Daniel Pollen’s 
1873 description of the ‘half-scamps, half-lunatic’, which denoted sub-standard mental 
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or moral capacity, evolved into other terms which appeared in immigration debates. In 
1904 British legislators attempted to have immigrants of ‘notoriously bad character’ 
excluded through their Aliens Bill.
75
 The United States got the closest to legislating 
against such borderline types with their inclusion, from 1917, of ‘constitutional 
psychopathic inferiority’ as a prohibited immigrant clause. While this term was meant 
to denote ‘unstable individuals on the border line between sanity and insanity’, some 
American eugenicists wanted the even vaguer ‘general shiftlessness’ incorporated into 
their restrictions.
76
  
Although Norris and Howse had attempted to advise the medical referees on 
how to identify levels of mental ‘defect’ or ‘deficiency’ in intending migrants, no 
Australasian administration matched the United States Public Health Service’s 1918 
Manual of the Mental Examination of Aliens. This set of guidelines included 
photographic examples of ‘mental defectives’ to assist immigration officers in 
recognising them by their visual ‘signs of degeneracy’.77 By 1924, however, the United 
States replaced their prohibited clauses entirely with the new Johnson-Reed 
Immigration Act which used a quota system based on assumptions about national 
traits.
78
 
While Howse did not openly acknowledge the influence of North American 
practices in his revamped guidelines, he did condone the use of intelligence testing for 
immigrants. By the early twentieth century IQ testing was accepted as an apparently 
scientific and efficient way to identify and grade ‘mental defectives’.79 Australian 
medical reformers engaged with this system enthusiastically. R.J.A. Berry, who had sat 
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on the Anthropometric Research Committee at the 1914 AAAS Conference with Norris, 
was particularly active in this field.
80
 In 1920 he had co-authored ‘Intelligence and 
Social Valuation’ with S. D. Porteus, Director of the Vineland Training School for 
Idiots, New Jersey.
81
  
One Australian psychologist, in particular, advocated using the same techniques 
as undertaken in United States immigration control. At the 1925 Australian Association 
of Psychology and Philosophy General Meeting, Dr Alfred Horatio Martin presented a 
paper entitled ‘The Psychological Examination of Immigrants’.82 He did this in order to 
highlight how, despite the many attempts to segregate the unfit within Australia, not 
enough was being done to reject them coming in.
83
 While Howse had recommended the 
use of ‘simple education’ tests’, Martin advocated a full replication of the entire United 
States version of immigration control. In noting how the United States had ‘dammed the 
tide of migration to her shores’, Martin wanted Australia to use quota systems and 
intelligence testing.
84
 This he found necessary on two grounds. First the new United 
States quota system meant that their ‘outflow would end up in Australia’.85 Second, 
without a better selection of migrants, Martin feared how Australia would be ‘inundated 
by social evils’, evident in those who lacked a certain degree of intelligence. These 
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types, Martin asserted, had a high degree of suggestibility so could not maintain 
themselves and were susceptible to criminal temptations.
86
  
This description sounds remarkably like the ‘moral imbeciles’ Norris had tried 
to warn his medical referees about over a decade earlier. Martin provided some practical 
recommendations about how to select migrants he described as ‘efficient individuals’ 
who displayed ‘emotional stability’. This again involved using new checks and more 
layers of officialdom. Martin wanted the current medical assessment to be bolstered by 
extra staff that was ‘skilled in psychological analysis’. These officials, Martin suggested 
could administer ‘simple intelligence tests’ to immigrants in order to exclude those who 
did not reach an ‘adequate mental standard’. Furthermore, he thought some migrants 
should be tested for so-called ‘emotional stability’. Martin also wanted the current time 
frame within which existing immigrants could be deported extended from three to five 
years.
87
 There is some evidence that Australia did incorporate levels of intelligence 
testing into their practices, although the exact date of which remains unclear. Roe has 
suggested that the Binet-Simon scale used in United States immigration control, began 
to be used in Australian controls around 1927.
88
 Boucher dates it to starting ‘after 1925’ 
in relation to the physical and intelligence testing of child emigrants.
89
 Both of these 
suggested dates point to the influence of Howse and, or Martin. 
Morris’ penchant for self-publicity does not shed any light on whether IQ testing 
was implemented under his tenure. In 1926 he decided to return to Australia for good, 
retiring from the position of CMO. In contrast to Martin’s warnings, Morris continued 
to proclaim the British-based practices a success. He proudly informed The Adelaide 
Mail that out of nearly 80,000 aplications he had processed, only 0.24% had been 
returned on medical grounds. Because fewer migrants were failing in their host 
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countries Morris concluded that he was now satisfied with how the dominion medical 
departments in London had adopted the medical referee system.
90
 There is a lack of 
archival evidence to help validate Morris’ claim, although it has been noted that the 
Australian officials operating in London were percieved to be hypercritical.
91
 It is 
possible that the paperwork for those rejected now exists in Australian state archives. 
Roe for example has identified two such cases in the Queensland repository. He found 
that one man was rejected for being an ‘irregular worker, unimpressive and of an 
unlikely temperament’, and another because he was apparently on the ‘small side’ and 
had no money’.92 
It is also debateable as to whether a uniform dominion-wide system was in 
place. At the 1926 Imperial Conference the efficiency of the system was discussed 
again. Like state officials had done with Norris over a decade earlier, Australian state 
administrators continued to complain that their particular requirements were not being 
taken into account. In addition to making provsions for fluctuating labour requirements, 
the standards of assisted immigrants was discussed. Conference delegates agreed that 
because the physiques of some migrants had been ‘subject to some comment’, 
clarification was required as to the reasons of rejection. These reasons did not appear to 
have been either understood or uniform. The border controllers were not, according to 
the topics discussed at the conference, able to disclose why individuals had been 
rejected.
93
  
 Sources do however exist to enable historians to consider these reasons for 
rejection. First we can turn again to York’s collation of the yearly returns for prohibited 
immigrants. This represents those rejected at Australian borders. Second, CMO between 
1929 and 1932 Frank McCallum, provided a valuable overview of those returned for 
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their unsuitability. While these two sources help us consider the outcomes of Australian 
border control in the 1920s, data relating to New Zealand is lacking. From 1922 to 1925 
the Annual Report of the Director-General of Health included information regarding the 
inspection of overseas vessels for the previous year. This report referenced the number 
of cases of infectious disease, contagious disease, infirm immigrants and prohibited 
immigrants reported per port. This data did not, however, detail the health clauses 
involved, but just gave the figures, as collated into Table 17. It appears that the infirm or 
prohibited immigrants were reported in addition to the diseased cases. 
 
Table 17:  New Zealand Port Health Inspections of Overseas Vessels, 1921-1924 
Type   1921 1922 1923 1924 
Infectious Disease  42 17 45 51 
Contagious Disease  14 3 8 12 
Infirm Immigrants  79 31 40 0 
Prohibited Immigrants  55 80 159 158 
TOTAL  190 131 252 221 
Source: AJHRs, Section H-31: 1922 (p. 14), 1923 (p. 16), 1924 (p. 17) 1925 (p. 21).  
 
From 1926 this report made the results more specific and differentiated between 
prohibited immigrants, infectious diseases, venereal disease and ‘mental defective 
cases’ as detailed in Table 18.  
 
Table 18:  New Zealand Port Health Inspections of Overseas Vessels, 1925-1930  
Type   1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 TOTAL 
Prohibited Immigrants  114 169 108 127 142 140 800 
Infectious Disease  41 50 22 8 8 7 136 
VD cases  14 4 9 17 19 27 90 
Mental Defective Cases  4 1 1 20 1 0 27 
TOTAL  173 224 140 172 170 174 1053 
Source: AJHRs, Section H-31: 1926 (p. 18), 1927 (p. 15), 1928 (p. 20), 1929 (p. 19), 1930 (p. 19), 1931 
(p. 13). 
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Again this data does not specify the reasons why immigrants were prohibited, or 
the outcome for those deemed ‘mentally defective’, which spiked in 1928. If these cases 
existed in addition to the other groups, meaning that they did not fall within the 
prohibited immigrant figures, then the ‘mentally defective’ represented 2.5% of the total 
of 1053.  This suggests a drop from the proportion suggested in Table 15 for the years 
between 1911 and 1914.  If this represents all immigrants defined by their ‘mental 
health’ then it does show, like for Australia, that fewer ‘mentally ill’ migrants were 
being assisted under the empire settlement schemes. If not, then the labelling itself 
provides an interesting finding. It shows how the New Zealand description of ‘mentally 
ill’ immigrants, in operational terms, if not legislatively, had aligned to that of 
Australia.
94
  
Table 19 represents the results of Australia’s Immigration Act between 1921 and 
1930, when empire settlement assistance for migration to Australia ended.
95
 As apparent 
here, Australian control included a wide ranging set of prohibited clauses, within which 
the majority of cases again fell under the literacy and stowaway causes.  
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Table 19: Prohibited immigrants under the Australian Immigration Act, 1921-1930 
Section 3   Clause   1921 1922 1923 1924 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 TOTAL  % 
Education Test  a  16 9 10 9 14 7 0 23 134 222  42 
No certificate of health  b  0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  <1 
Idiot/Imbecile/Feebleminded/Epileptic  c  1 4 7 3 7 5 1 1 2 31  6 
Transmissible disease or defect  d  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  <1 
Communicable disease  e  0 3 5 1 1 5 5 1 0 21  4 
Other disease or defect  f  1 0 0 2 4 7 15 13 4 46  9 
Other prescribed  disease/disability   g   1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  <1 
Conviction (1)
 96
  ga   1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  <1 
Conviction (2)
 97
  gb  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Prostitute 
98
  gc  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Advocated overthrow of Govt  gd  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
German parentage  ge  0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 7  1.3 
Fails to prove passport  gf  1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 6  1.1 
Deported under any act  gg  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Any person declared undesirable  gh  NA NA NA NA 3 0 0 0 0 3  <1 
Stowaway  NA  7 1 25 23 28 63 11 15 4 177  34 
Deserters   NA  0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2  <1 
War precautions repeal act  NA  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  <1 
TOTAL    29 18 49 50 58 88 32 53 145 522   
Source: York, Immigration Restriction, 1901-1950. 
 
In terms of the medical clauses it is necessary to use these values to check 
whether the assertions of Morris and Hunter were correct. Table 20 shows the 
percentage proportions derived from Table 19, in comparison to the equivalent data for 
1913-1920 (Table 13).  
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Table 20: Comparison of Australian results under the prohibited health clause pre and post 1921 
Section 3    Clause   1913-
1920 % 
1921- 
1930 % 
 
No certificate of health  b  0 <1  
Idiot/Imbecile/Feebleminded/Epileptic  c  4.3 6  
Transmissible disease or defect  d  <1 <1  
Communicable disease  e  9.7 4  
Other disease or defect/infirmity   f  3.9 9  
Other prescribed  disease/disability   g  <1 <1  
       
Source: York, Immigration Restriction, 1901-1950. 
 
Although Hunter and Morris were convinced that their so-called uniform system 
represented a vast improvement in medical assessment, only the rate of communicable 
disease reduced. The rate of the ‘mentally ill’ clause 3 (c) increased, although this could 
suggest that the processes at the Australian borders had been made more stringent. From 
the overall total of 31 cases (Table 19) only one was British, which too could suggest 
that migrants processed by the Australian officials in London were of a better standard.   
It can be more confidently asserted that the increase in 3(f) resulted from the 1926 
amendment which widened the remit of the clause to ‘infirmity of mind or body’. As 
such this widening of scope was more likely to be used to restrict the entry of the 
borderline undesirable. This claim is validated by the opinion of the CMO who was 
party to the statistics of cases returned between 1929 and 1931.  
Frank McCallum was CMO at the end of the 1920s, a decade which had seen a 
number of changes to Australia’s Immigration Act, and the establishment of the migrant 
selection process in Britain.
99
 Despite these major changes, McCallum’s review of his 
time in office shows how Australian immigration control remained reliant on having to 
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make ad-hoc judgements. Furthermore, it highlights how many of the prohibited 
immigrant clauses in Table 19 were redundant. McCallum’s evidence is dated 1935, the 
year in which Australian politicians sought to repeal key provisions of the 1912 Act for  
which Norris had so meticulously planned. The discussions about whether a legal clause 
regarding creating medical bureaux was still required led McCallum to observe that 
prohibited clause 3 (b) had never been implemented.
100
 This was the ‘no certificate of 
health’ clause, and yet, as indicated in Table 19 two immigrants had been prohibited in 
1923 for not having this paperwork.  This not only suggests that much of Norris’ work 
was done in vain, but that these two 1923 rejections were either incorrectly labelled or 
not in fact legally excluded. 
McCallum also provided his opinion as to the other health clauses. He had found 
clauses 3(c) to (g) to have worked ‘generally satisfactory’ and had followed the 
‘traditional practice and phraseology’ of the United States, Canada, South Africa and 
New Zealand. It was his opinion as to clause 3(f) which in particular made the 
transnational link between Australian and North American practices. McCallum 
explained how he and his officers had interpreted it as being the same as Section 2 of 
the United States’ 1906 legislation which provided for those ‘mentally and physically 
defective, being of a nature that may affect their ability to earn a living’.101    
 McCallum also confirmed that the equivalent clause within the Australian Act 
was used to deal with those he described as the difficult ‘shiftless, inadaptable’ types. 
They were the people, he explained, for whom it was difficult to label as having mental 
or physical defects, but who were ‘obviously temperamentally unsuited under the 
conditions of migration’. This description echoed Howse’s concern about those  
                                                 
100
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‘not likely to become a successful migrant under the arduous conditions of life in 
Australia’. Although Howse had wanted these types to be prevented from migrating 
outright, McCallum suggested that they were more often a case for deportation than for 
‘restriction of admission’. Because ‘infirmity of mind’ was only likely to be detected by 
an experienced medical officer he admitted that it was used in practice especially if the  
 ‘insufficiency of means’ provision did not apply.102 This suggests that it was used 
arbitrarily for those who appeared undesirable, even if they had financial means. This 
wide scope was confirmed by McCallum’s use of two examples. He explained that the 
infirmity clause was often used in the cases of ‘deaf mutism’ or in those who appeared 
to have a ‘frankly unsatisfactory family history in regard to mental conditions’.103  As 
such, he recognised how it was used in relation to the transmissible defects of which 
Norris was so keen to identify. Determining whether such defects were of a ‘pre-
embarkation origin’ was, McCallum explained, covered by the ‘existing sub-section and 
Departmental arrangements’ which enabled someone to be found prohibited after entry 
if found to have obtained entrance to the Commonwealth by ‘false representations’.104  
 Like Howse, McCallum had analysed some cases of returned migrants to 
determine the reasons for their deportation. His labelling deviated from the official 
wording within the Immigration Act, and shows the wide variety of terms used to 
describe people rejected for their so-called undesirability. As Table 21 indicates, only 
the term epilepsy correlates with any of the ‘mental health’ prohibited immigrant 
clauses while the labels used for physical conditions were equally vague.
105
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Table 21: Cases of deportees 1928-1931 reviewed by the CMO at Australia House  
Label  TOTAL  
Mental Disabilities   104 
Epilepsy  14 
Temperamentally Unsuitable   35 
Undesirable (police cases etc.)  71 
Pulmonary Tuberculosis  51 
Heart Lesions  8 
Venereal Diseases   13 
Surgical Conditions   53 
Miscellaneous medical cases  72 
TOTAL  421 
Source: NAA: A1928, 520/20/1 Amendment of the Immigration Act, p. 2 
 
 
Despite these irregularities, if we take ‘mental disabilities’, ‘epilepsy’, ‘temperamentally 
unsuitable’ and ‘undesirable-police cases etc.’ to cover the wide scope of mental and 
moral infirmities, they represent over half of the people deported.  McCallum found that 
the average time spent in Australia before being deported was two years and seven 
months. Because this was just under the current three year time limit he recommended, 
like Martin had done, that the relevant section of the Act be extended to five years. This 
increase was required, he explained, because in his experience he had found migrants 
likely to ‘suffer from recrudescence of mental, pulmonary and other infirmities’.106  
Taken together McCallum’s explanations suggest that by the end of the 1920s steps 
were in place to deal with the type of immigrants which had troubled administrators for 
the previous one hundred years. Those temperamentally unsuitable were akin to those 
previously described as bad characters, and those who suffered from ‘recrudescence’ - 
recurrence -of mental infirmities, were those previously described as perfectly sane 
before they left England.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has shown that, despite the creation of a Commonwealth Medical Bureau, 
and increased attempts to improve medical practices, many challenges of border control 
remained unresolved. Both Sir Neville Howse and Dr Frank McCallum concluded that 
the borderline ‘mentally ill’ types were the most problematic. We get a sense that the 
disconnect between policy and practice for these types would continue ad infinitum, 
regardless of the legal deportation framework established by Australia.  By the time of 
McCallum’s tenure as CMO, border administrators were open as to how they 
interpreted the legislation. The use of the term ‘mental infirmities’ provided a ‘catch-all’ 
term for those who appeared mentally or temperamentally unsuitable. For those who 
managed to gain entry, their residency was by no means assured.  
The situation in New Zealand is less clear, despite Percy Hunter’s assurances 
that they were receiving a ‘magnificent class’. The proportion of those rejected for 
being mentally deficient does appear to have reduced, although the problems with the 
available data have been raised as a caveat. Perhaps then, the entry of those perceived to 
be mentally ill was not deemed problematic enough. Unlike Australia, New Zealand did 
not alter their Immigration Act in terms of the health clauses over the same period. 
This does not mean that New Zealand ended its attempts to exclude the 
‘mentally ill’. Both countries continued to do so under different guises. Australia’s 
Immigration Act remained in force until replaced in 1958 by the Migration Act in which 
‘serious mental deficiency, dementia, insanity, epilepsy, addiction, and alcoholism’ 
remained listed as ‘prescribed diseases’.107 In 1964 New Zealand consolidated its 
immigration legislation but kept any ‘mentally defective person’ as prohibited.108 The 
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terminology was changed again in 1976 to ‘any mentally disordered person’.109 This 
clause remained until 1987 when all previous acts were repealed.
110
 This continuity has 
been recognised by Bashford. While race and ethnicity were dropped as exclusion 
criteria from the mid twentieth century, the mental health provisions endured, often as 
part of visa requirements.
111
 
The 1920s version of British world migration control was tied to visions of 
Empire settlement. Much time and effort was spent on the facilities for migrant 
assessment in Britain. The evidence provided by Howse, Morris and McCallum 
suggests that most of the undesirable were being screened out. Of those who were not, 
the deportation function facilitated their return. The real story of the 1920s  is the 
consideration of who, and for what reasons, were rejected in Britain for their so-called 
mental infirmities? Either way border controllers in Britain, Australia and New Zealand 
now viewed the variances within ‘mentally defective’, ‘mentally infirm’ or 
‘temperamentally unsuitable’ similarly. Because they were unlikely to succeed as 
immigrants, they were not given the assistance to migrate, rejected at the borders, or if 
their symptoms re-merged, deported. This part of the British world had sought to cover 
all eventualities and yet the same problem remained - how to identify those with 
borderline mental states.  It was these types, who were difficult to distinguish from the 
‘normal’ and who, regardless of the attempts to ascertain their likelihood of ‘relapse’ or 
productivity, endured as undesirables.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored the discrepancies between the policy and practice of British 
world immigration control. It has shown that at every stage, and in each region 
considered, no method was completely successful in excluding the so-called ‘mentally 
ill’. By focussing on those charged with managing the borders, this research has 
revealed that, whether the practices were located in Britain, New Zealand, the 
Commonwealth of Australia, or, on the voyage itself, there were too many aspects 
which were unpredictable. Whether it be due to the motivations of those involved - the 
migrant recruiters, border controllers, ship’s doctors - or the lack of proper legal 
framework for them to operate under, the fact remained; those who appeared ‘insane’ at 
some point in the migration process could not always be detected. 
By examining the evolution of British world border controls between the 1830s 
and 1920s, this study has shown that regardless of the attempts to transform methods 
and terminology, the same problems remained. Despite the enduring attempts to 
improve medical inspections in Britain or at the Australasian borders, some forms of 
‘mental illnesses’ remained uncontrollable. This was particularly true of the transient 
and periodic states of ‘insanity’ or ‘lunacy’, and of the less visually obvious conditions. 
It was the so-called mental ‘peculiarities’ or ‘infirmities’ which most troubled the 
policy-makers. As such, we have seen how the terms evolved in order to widen the net 
of these borderline types, whether labelled as half-scamp, half-lunatic, weak-minded, 
mentally infirm or temperamentally unsuitable.  
This study is the first one of its kind to examine the mechanics of Australasian 
migration control in this level of operational detail. It has responded to the calls to do 
this which began over twenty years ago when Barry York compiled Australia’s 
prohibited immigrants’ statistical data. It has made some sense of the vast array of 
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immigration regulations described by Robin Haines as ‘analytical complexities’. In 
doing so, this study has answered the need, highlighted as necessary by Alison Bashford 
and Angela McCarthy, to understand the practicalities of the immigration control of the 
‘mentally ill’. 
In providing the finer detail of the practices involved this research provides a 
wider reaching and more in-depth level of analysis to the current scholarship. So far 
historians have concentrated on specific parts of this story such as immigration 
restriction ideologies, border controls and asylum practices. This thesis has combined 
these approaches. In doing so it contributes to our understanding of how officials in the 
broader British world interacted within the framework of national and local border 
controls. This study has shown how local conditions and motivations complicated our 
idea that a British world was tied together by open and participative networks. 
By examining these tensions, this thesis has revealed a number of aspects which 
enhances current historiographical understanding. It has shown how the ship’s surgeon 
also needs to be considered as another actor in the muddled system of British world 
migration control. Furthermore it is clear that that the contemporary engagement with 
mental illness as a so-called malady of migration needs to go far beyond that of asylum 
studies. As such, this study contributes to the research by established medical historians 
like Catherine Cox, Angela McCarthy and Hilary Marland. It has shown how non-
institutional doctors, migrant recruiters and politicians also recognised how the act of 
migration could trigger inherent or periodic ‘mental instability’. While some officials 
sought to seek confirmation that hereditary insanity was not present in intending 
migrants, many admitted a lack of control over this.  
 This thesis has also crucially challenged the existing understanding in relation to 
return migration. In terms of Australia, the current scholarship has focussed on the 
deportation provisions in place from the 1920s. Regarding New Zealand, Angela 
 315 
 
McCarthy has speculated that official repatriation of the ‘mentally ill’ did not occur. 
This study has shown that across both regions, politicians and administrators petitioned 
for, and facilitated deportation in an earlier period than currently believed. And yet, it 
has also been shown that this function was used arbitrarily. 
 This inconsistency existed at each stage of migration control. In particular, the 
policy versus practice approach employed has challenged the current view of the early 
twentieth- century immigration control as a eugenicist success story. As such, this study 
challenges the perception of this so-called eugenic phase. While Bashford is correct in 
her opinion that the insanity clauses linked eugenics and immigration, this research has 
shown how this relationship was not so straightforward. Although the policy itself was 
driven by fears of degeneration, its eugenic application needs to be countered by the 
levels of discretion involved. This is most apparent in the continuation of the bonding 
facility which enabled the entry of immigrants even if ‘insane’ to enter though financial 
guarantee. 
 The comparison of immigration policies between New Zealand and the 
Commonwealth of Australia has revealed important points of comparison. The study’s 
importance also lies in how it has revealed differences and commonalities. There was a 
certain level of uniformity between these countries in how both implemented the 
prohibited immigrant clause. However in considering the layers of border 
administration which sat under this legislative framework, it has been shown how the 
border officials, whether based in Britain or Australasia, often operated according to 
their own motivations. By exposing these complexities, this study has shown that the 
legislation was based more on rhetoric than practical methods of exclusion, despite the 
best attempts of Australian medical reformers like W.P. Norris.  
Overall, these British world border controls have been shown to have been 
disordered, inconsistent and open to legal challenges. As such, this study has exposed 
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how local conditions complicated the idea of uniformity in British world networks.  
Despite the attempts to implement standardised practices in the twentieth century, 
ironically, the most tightly run network existed in provincial New Zealand in the 1860s. 
The recruitment agents for Otago reacted quickly to colonial complaints about the so-
called imported lunatics by seeking to improve their medical regulations. They updated 
their medical certification requirements to attempt to identify predisposition to insanity. 
Sixty years later, emboldened with ideas about eugenics, stigmata of degeneration and 
intelligence testing, administrators had still not developed a sure-fire way of doing this. 
These enduring attempts involved persistently changing the setting and extent of 
the medical assessment. The terminology used to describe the increasingly wide 
spectrum of mental disease and disability was incorporated, if not into immigration 
policy, the practices of port health officers. The nineteenth-century concept of ‘sound 
mind’ in systematic emigration schemes was framed as the antithesis to insanity. As 
such, the interchangeable lunacy, alongside idiot and imbecile, were the first labels to be 
incorporated into immigration restrictions. However it has been shown that the main 
purpose of the restrictions was to exclude what we have been calling the ‘borderline’ 
types. Nowhere is this more obvious than the use of descriptions like half-scamp, half-
lunatics and temperamentally unsuitable. These terms were recycled from the idea of 
bad character so decried in the nineteenth century. 
Within the evolving and increasingly messy system a number of themes 
remained consistent. The Australasian port health officers were responsible for 
identifying the incoming ‘mentally ill’. This was problematic for many reasons. Not 
only did they have a short time frame in which to make this decision, but also they were 
not experts in this field. Their roles had been created under the early nineteenth-century 
British world quarantine systems primarily to deal with infectious disease. At no point 
were they given specific instructions to help them identify those who according to the 
 317 
 
nineteenth-century legislation should have been labelled as of unsound mind, lunatic, 
idiot or insane. Even when Neville Howse came to review what was meant to be a more 
efficient Australian system in 1923, he found that the Australian port officials operated 
differently from their British-based counterparts. 
In contrast, the role of local medical referees and ships’ doctors achieved much 
greater attention from the policy makers. From the start of systematic emigration, 
through to the Empire settlement schemes, the culpability and honesty of the British 
doctors who sanctioned the medical state of intending emigrants was called into 
question. More than any other actor involved in the process, the responsibilities of 
medical referees went through a series of administrative changes, mainly in relation to 
their methods of certification. The ships’ doctors were also expected to play key roles in 
highlighting those they thought were undesirable, whether in terms of health or 
behaviour. By the twentieth century, colonial governments had fully integrated the 
ships’ medical officers in their own border control. The Australian Immigration Act in 
particular made the ship’s doctor responsible for providing a full inventory of their 
passengers’ health.  
By fully examining the system of British world border control this study has 
highlighted how the shipping companies had more influence than previously 
recognised. In many cases they openly flouted the regulations.  Not only did politicians 
petition for the protection of these commercial concerns, but the shipping companies 
were able to exploit the inconsistency of the operations. Throughout each political 
debate examined, the idea of excluding the ‘mentally ill’ was never challenged. Political 
concern instead rested on the methods of doing so, and whether the shipping and tourist 
trades would be disrupted.  
 By uncovering the extent of these financial concerns and the extent of loopholes 
within the legislation, this thesis has shown that, in regard to British immigrants, border 
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control remained financially driven. While historians have rightly pointed out the extent 
of how psychiatrists and asylum officials petitioned for greater controls based on their 
fear of race degeneration, this study has shown that political concern remained focussed 
on those likely to become public charges. From the start of systematic emigration in the 
1830s, immigrants were meant to be self-supporting. This led to the bonding systems, 
albeit erratically used, of the mid-to-late nineteenth century. While some politicians and 
asylum administrators advocated the rejection and return of the ‘insane’ amongst others 
deemed incapable, the implementation of the legal deportation system around the turn 
of the twentieth century, was not used to reject the ‘insane’ outright in all cases. Instead, 
both New Zealand and Australia continued to operate an exemption system based on 
financial bonds to secure entry. 
 This thesis has considered how, by whom, and where, the decision was made as 
to whether an intending migrant was mentally unsuitable. It has identified how a 
number of ‘gatekeepers’ existed at various stages of the process. In Britain, or more 
specifically London, the Agent-General or Commonwealth Medical Officer oversaw the 
medical and character references for assisted migrants provided by local professionals. 
At the British ports the ship’s doctor and British port officials performed a cursory 
medical assessment. On the voyage itself the ship’s doctor was responsible for 
monitoring the health and conduct of the passengers and reporting on such to the 
colonial authorities. Based on this information the colonial health or quarantine officers 
decided whether an immigrant was fit to land. Depending on whether operating under 
the bonding or deportation system, the customs official or immigration officer, 
determined the action required for those presenting as ‘insane’.  
 Futhermore, this study has shown that the United States’ influence on migration 
control went beyond that of on the immigration legislation itself. In addition to the 
prohibited immigrants clause, other North American terminology and practices were 
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replicated. Australian medical reformers like Norris and Weihen recommended the 
practical consideration of mental defects and stigmata and degneration in border 
operations. Australasian border control was, on all levels, a conglomerate of British and 
North American legislation and maritime controls. The New Zealand border controllers, 
although operating under a less obvious eugenic framework, used similar language. It 
does not appear that an equivalent to Norris existed or was required. This is possibly 
due to geography. Because they were sheltered by their larger neighbour, eugenically-
minded New Zealanders focussed on the state of their existing population, and favourite 
the use of a nomination system. 
It is impossible to avoid noting how many of the themes raised in this study are 
evident today. Concerns about immigration levels stem, in part, from the alleged 
pressure on public services. This is a recycling of the old fears about newcomers 
becoming public charges. Politicians continue to talk of the need for ‘bonds’ or 
financial securities to protect health services, and prevent those who are undesirable 
from entering. While archaic language relating to mental disease, disability and 
dysfunction is no longer used, the same ideas pertaining to the ideal immigrant remain. 
They should be healthy, well-behaved and overall, self-supporting. The immigration 
points system in place in Australia and New Zealand, the latter of which this author has 
been through, are frequently held up as the ideal way of both attracting the suitable 
migrants, and excluding the undesirable. This thesis has shown that the nineteenth- 
century ideals of the white Australasian settlement colonies being populated by those of 
sound mind and body in many ways remain today. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Immigration legislation excluding the ‘mentally and morally 
undesirable’ 
 
JSCL: Journal of Comparative Legislation 
JCLIL: Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 
 
  
Year Region Terminology Source 
1895 Trinidad and Tobago ‘criminal and vicious’  JSCL 1896-7, p. 130. 
1896  British Guiana & Grenada ‘pauper and criminal’ JSCL 1897, p. x.  
1905 British Central Africa ‘lunatics’ JSCL 1906, p. 502.  
1906 Straits Settlements ‘idiots and lunatics’ JSCL 1907, p. 294. 
1907  Mauritius ‘mental infirmity’ JSCL 1908, p.397. 
1913 Uganda ‘lunatics’ JSCL 1915, p. 98 
1923 Zanzibar Protectorate ‘insane’ JCLIL 1925, p.174. 
1925 Palestine  ‘lunatics’ JCLIL 1926, p. 206. 
1947  Zanzibar ‘mental defectives’ JCLIL 1949, p. 170 
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Appendix B: Comparison of prohibited clauses in the Immigration Restriction 
Acts of Natal, New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia 
 
 Natal  (1897) New Zealand (1899) Australia (1901)  
‘Education 
Test’ 
Any person who when 
asked to do so by an 
officer appointed under 
this Act, shall fail to 
himself write out and sign 
in the characters of the any 
language of Europe, an 
application to the Colonial 
Secretary in the form set 
out in Schedule B of this 
Act. 
Any person other than of British 
(including Irish) birth and parentage 
who, when asked so to do by an officer 
appointed under this Act by the 
Governor, fails to himself write out 
and sign, in the presence of such 
officer, in any European language, an 
application in the form numbered two 
in the Schedule hereto, or in such other 
form as the Colonial Secretary from 
time to time directs. Provided that any 
person dissatisfied with the decision of 
such officer shall have the right to 
appeal to the nearest Stipendiary 
Magistrate, who shall make such 
inquiries as he shall think fit, and his 
decision thereon shall be final 
Any person who when asked to do so 
by an officer fails to write out at 
dictation and sign in the presence of 
the officer a passage of fifty words in 
length in an European language 
directed by the officer. 
 
     
‘Public 
Charge’ 
Any person being a 
pauper, or likely to be a 
public charge 
 
 any person likely in the opinion of the 
Minister or of an officer to become a 
charge upon the public or upon any 
public or charitable institution 
 
 
 
‘Mentally 
Ill’ 
Any idiot or insane person Any idiot or insane person Any idiot or insane person  
‘Diseased’ Any person suffering from 
a loathsome or dangerous 
contagious disease 
 
Any person suffering from a 
contagious disease which is loathsome 
or dangerous 
Any person suffering from an 
infectious or contagious disease of a 
loathsome or dangerous character 
 
‘Criminal’ Any person who, not 
having received a free 
pardon, has within two 
years been convicted of a 
felony or other infamous 
crime or misdemeanour  
involving moral turpitude, 
and not being a mere 
political offence 
 
Any person who, not having received a 
free pardon, has within two years next 
preceding the date on which he lands 
has been convicted in any country of 
any offence involving moral turpitude, 
which if committed in New Zealand, 
would be punishable by imprisonment 
for two years or upwards, not being a 
mere political offence. 
Any person who has within three years 
been convicted of an offence, not 
being a mere political offence, and has 
been sentenced to imprisonment for 
one year or longer therefor, and has 
not received a pardon 
 
‘Prostitution’ any prostitute or person 
living on the prostitution 
of others 
 any prostitute or person living on the 
prostitution of others 
 
 
 
‘Other’ 
  any persons under a contract or 
agreement to perform manual labour 
within the Commonwealth: Provided 
that this paragraph shall not apply to 
workmen exempted by the Minister for 
special skill required in Australia or to 
persons under contract or agreement to 
serve as part of the crew of a vessel 
engaged in the coasting trade in 
Australian waters if the rates of wages 
specified therein are not lower than the 
rates ruling in the Commonwealth. 
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Appendix C: New Zealand Immigration Restriction Act 1899, Section 13 
 
For the purposes of removal from New Zealand of prohibited immigrants, the following 
provisions shall apply: 
 
1. The Colonial Secretary, or any person authorised by him, may make contact 
with the master, owner, or agent of any vessel for the passage of any such 
immigrant to the port or place in or near to his country of birth. 
2. Upon the contract being made, any immigrant may, with his personal effects, be 
placed on board such vessel by any officer under this Act, or by any officer of 
police, and the master shall keep such immigrant on board, and (if necessary) 
under custody, until the vessel has sailed. 
3. If the immigrant appears to be destitute, the officer placing him on board may 
supply him with such sum of money as the Colonial Secretary or any person 
authorised by him certifies to be reasonably required, in order to enable him to 
maintain himself for one month after disembarking from the vessel at the end of 
the voyage. 
4. All moneys expended under this section shall be included in computing the 
expenses incurred in respect of the immigrant’s removal from New Zealand.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix D: An Act to amend the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, No. 17 of 
1905, Section 13A 
 
The master, owners, agents, or charterers of a vessel in which a prohibited 
immigrant, or person who under section three or five of this Act becomes a 
prohibited immigrant, comes to the Commonwealth, shall, on being required in 
writing to any Collector of Customs shall do so, without charge to the 
Commonwealth, provide a passage for the prohibited immigrant to the place 
whence he came, and also be liable to pay the Commonwealth for the State a fair 
sum to recoup the State for the cost of keeping and maintaining the prohibited 
immigrant while awaiting his deportation from Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 323 
 
Appendix E: Form of Certificate: New Zealand’s Immigration Restriction Act 
1899
1073
 
 
FORM OF CERTIFICATE 
 
I,   master of the “  ,” from  , do hereby certify that , to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, there is no passenger or member of the crew on board my ship liable to the 
restrictions of “The Immigration Restriction Act, 1899,” of New Zealand, with the exemption of the 
following:- 
Name Nationality Nature of Liability 
   
 
Dated  , 19      , Master 
 
 
Appendix F: Form 2 Application for Admission into New Zealand Immigration 
Restriction Act 1899 
 
SCHEDULE 
Form 2 – APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION INTO NEW ZEALAND 
 
Under the provisions of the “ The Immigration Restriction Act, 1899”, I [Full name, occupation, 
and address] hereby make application for admission into New Zealand, and declare that I am not 
a prohibited immigrant within the meaning of that Act. 
 
And I further declare as follows- 
I was born at {space}, in the year 
My place of abode during the last twelve months has been 
Dated at {space}, this{space} day of 
                                                                                                         [Signature of 
Applicant] 
 
Appendix G: Form 29 Australia Immigration Restriction Act 1901 
 
 
Whereas {name} has applied to the Minister of External Affairs for Certificate of Exemption for 
a period of {number} months under the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 in favour of {name} 
who supposed to be insane and who may in the opinion of the Minister became a charge upon 
the public and WHEREAS the Minister has agreed to grant the Certificate of Exemption applied 
for on condition that the said {name}  executes this obligation with one approved surety. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1073
 ‘Regulations Under The Immigration Restriction Act, 1899’, (Wellington: John Mackay, 1900). 
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Appendix H: Commonwealth of Australia Immigration Act 1912 Section 4 
 
After section 3 of the Principal Act the following sections are inserted: 
 
3A  (1) The Governor-General may establish Commonwealth Medical 
Bureaux at such places outside the Commonwealth as he thinks fit. 
(2) The Minister may appoint a Chief Medical Officer to be in charge of 
a Commonwealth Medical Bureau and such other officers in connexion with the 
Bureau as he thinks necessary. 
(3) The salaries of such officers shall be paid out of moneys to be 
provided by the Parliament. 
(4) Officers so appointed shall not be subject to the Commonwealth 
Public Service Act 1902-1911 or any Act amending or substituted for the same.  
 
3B (1) The Minister may appoint duly qualified medical practitioners to be 
medical referees for the purposes of this Act as such places outside or within the 
Commonwealth as he thinks fit. 
(2) Medical referees shall be paid such fees as are prescribed. 
 
3C The Minister may authorize a list of questions to be put to and answered 
by an intending immigrant on his examination by a medical referee. 
 
3D  (1) An intending immigrant shall be examined as to his physical and 
mental fitness by a medical referee, and shall answer the authorized list of 
questions put to him by the medical referee, who shall, if he is satisfied that the 
intending immigrant is of sound health, issue to him, on payment of the 
prescribed fee, a certificate of health in the prescribed form. 
(2) Where an intending immigrant embarks at a port where there is no 
medical referee, he shall prior to his departure be examined as to his physical 
and mental fitness by the ship’s medical officer, and shall answer the authorized 
list of questions put to him by the ship’s medical officer, who shall, if he is 
satisfied that the intending immigrant is of sound health, issue to him, on 
payment of the prescribed fee, a certificate of health in the prescribed form. 
(3) If the ship’s medical officer is not satisfied that the intending 
immigrant is of sound health, he shall send a report on the health of the 
intending immigrant, together with the answers of the intending immigrant to 
the authorized list of questions to the Chief Medical Officer, who may, if he 
thinks fit, on payment of the prescribed fee, a certificate of health in the 
prescribed form to the intending immigrant: 
Provided that the Chief Medical Officer shall not issue a certificate of 
health to any person believed by him to be suffering from or affected with any 
disease or disability either specifically mentioned or of a class mentioned in this 
Act or the regulations. 
(4) The Chief Medical Officer may require an intending immigrant to be 
examined as to his physical and mental fitness by him or by a duly qualified 
medical practitioner appointed by him. 
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Appendix H: Commonwealth of Australia Immigration Act 1912 Section 4, cont. 
 
 
3E (1) A Collector or Sub-collector of Customs may, if he thinks fit, permit 
an intending immigrant who on arrival in the Commonwealth does not possess a 
certificate of health in the prescribed form to be  examined as to his physical and 
mental fitness by a medical referee upon payment of the prescribed fee 
 
(2) The medical referee shall, if he is satisfied that the intending 
immigrant is of sound health, issue to him a certificate of health in the 
prescribed form. 
 
3F The master of a ship carrying passengers to Australia shall on the ship’s 
arrival at her first port of entry to the Commonwealth report to an officer all 
cases in which a certificate of health has been issued to the intending immigrant 
by the ship’s medical officer. 
 Penalty: Fifty pounds 
 
3G (1) The master of a ship carrying passengers to Australia shall furnish to 
the officer in charge at the port of entry a certificate by the ship’s medical officer 
that he has individually examined each intending immigrant at least once during 
the voyage to Australia. 
 
(2) The medical officer of a vessel carrying passengers to Australia shall 
report to the officer in charge at the port of entry all cases of intending 
immigrants who on the voyage have shown indications of suffering from or 
being affected with any disease or disability, either specifically mentioned or of 
a class mentioned in the Act or the regulations.  
Penalty: Fifty pounds 
 
3F All certificates of health issued to intending immigrants shall be attached 
to the passenger list and handed to an officer at the port of entry. 
 
3I An officer may, if he thinks fit, detain an intending immigrant at his 
arrival at port of entry in Australia for a further examination as to his physical 
and mental fitness by a medical referee. 
 
 Provided that the detention of the immigrant shall not affect the liability 
of the master, owners, agents, or charterers of the vessel, in which the immigrant 
came into the Commonwealth, under section thirteen A of this Act. 
 
3J The Minister may, if he thinks fit, prevent an intending immigrant from 
entering the Commonwealth, notwithstanding that a certificate of health has 
been issued to the intending immigrant. 
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Appendix I: Personal Statement Australia Immigration Act 1912
1074
 
 
1. Please state: 
a. Your age 
b. Your occupation for the past five years 
c. Whether or not you are married 
d. How many children have you? 
2. Is the general state of your health good? 
3. When were you last off work or laid up through sickness or injury? 
i. What was the cause? 
ii. How long were you laid up? 
iii. Have you ever been in a sanatorium? 
4. Have you ever been rejected for life assurance at any time? 
i. If so when and for what reason. 
5. Are there any other circumstances relating to your health which are not referred to in the 
previous questions? 
6. Family History 
a. Age of   
i. Father 
ii. Mother 
b. Age of  at death, and cause of 
i. Father 
ii. Mother 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
1074
 ‘Federal Affairs’, The Adelaide Advertiser, 25 March 1914, p. 15.  
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